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  • Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1972 read with the Revenue Recovery Act, 1980,
  • sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 17. If Sections 11, 17 and 21 of the 1986 Act
  • Section 15 of the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1972,
  • CENTRAL EXCISE ACT 1944
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1972 read with the Revenue Recovery Act, 1980,
  • sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 17. If Sections 11, 17 and 21 of the 1986 Act
  • Section 15 of the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1972,
  • CENTRAL EXCISE ACT 1944
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

These writ petitions challenge orders made by the competent authority under the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1972 read with the Revenue Recovery Act, 1980, under which the District Collector-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Sirmour at Nahan, Himachal Pradesh, was directed to effect recovery as land revenue. The matters were consolidated for a common judgment because they raised similar questions. The central procedural question identified by the Court was whether these writ petitions were maintainable.

The Court referred to a prior decision of this Court in a batch of writ petitions (lead case CWP No. 4779/2014, M/s Indian Technomac Company Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others) decided on 4th August, 2014, in which the writ petitions were held to be not maintainable because an alternative remedy of appeal was available. That judgment was challenged by Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 22626-22641/2014 before the Supreme Court, which dismissed the SLP by order dated 22nd August, 2014, thereby upholding the High Court's judgment.

The Court reproduced Section 15 of the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1972, which provides an appellate remedy to the appellate authority within thirty days (subject to payment and related provisos), and observed that the petitioners therefore have a statutory right of appeal and an alternative remedy.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the writ petitions challenging the recovery orders under the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1972 read with the Revenue Recovery Act, 1980 are maintainable.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
M/s Indian Technomac Company Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others (CWP No. 4779/2014) This Court's prior holding that the writ petitions were not maintainable because an alternative remedy by way of appeal was available. Relied upon as a directly relevant precedent; the current petitions are disposed of in light of the principle applied in that lead case.
Union of India and another v. Guwahati Carbon Limited, (2012) 11 SCC 651 Reiterates that where a revenue statute provides a particular remedy in a particular forum, that remedy must be pursued and other forums are excluded. Used to support the proposition that statutory appeal remedies must be availed of before resorting to writ jurisdiction.
Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta (referenced) When a revenue statute prescribes a particular remedy, it must be sought in that forum; other forums are excluded. Quoted and relied upon as foundational authority for restraining writ jurisdiction where statutory remedies exist.
Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 Where a statute provides a complete machinery to challenge assessments, the prescribed mode must be followed and not a petition under Article 226. Applied to emphasize that rights/ liabilities created by statute with special remedies must be enforced by the statutory route, not by writ.
Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana (1950 SCR 566) Existence of an adequate alternate remedy is a factor to be considered by the writ court before exercising writ jurisdiction. Noted as authority for the proposition that adequacy of alternative remedy is relevant to maintainability of writs.
Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1 Under Article 226, High Court has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain writ petitions; normally will not exercise jurisdiction if effective remedy exists; exceptions enumerated (fundamental rights, denial of natural justice, lack of jurisdiction or vires challenge). Relied upon to explain the High Court's self-imposed restriction and the limited exceptions to declining writ jurisdiction when statutory remedies exist.
Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Assn. of India and others, (2011) 14 SCC 337 High Court erred in entertaining writ petition without notice of statutory remedy of appeal; statutory hierarchy of appeals must be exhausted before writ petition sought. Used to illustrate the principle that statutory remedies must be exhausted and that omission to refer to relevant statutory provisions is an error.
Commissioner of Income Tax and others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603 Discusses the law on the subject extensively and reiterates restraint in writ jurisdiction where statutory remedies exist. Referred to for a comprehensive summary of the principles governing alternative remedies and writ jurisdiction.
Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419 Rule of self-imposed restraint: writ petition will not be entertained if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person. Invoked as authority for refusing writ jurisdiction where statutory remedies exist.
Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford, 141 ER 486 Where a liability is created by statute which gives a special remedy, the remedy provided must be followed. Quoted (through Titaghur) to state the general rule that statutory remedies must be adhered to.
Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd., 1919 AC 368 House of Lords approval of the rule that statutory remedies must be followed where provided. Referenced as supporting authority in the chain of decisions upholding the rule of following statutory remedies.
Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. Ltd., 1935 AC 532 (PC) Privy Council authority affirming the rule that statutory remedy must be followed. Referenced as part of common-law authorities endorsing the statutory-remedy rule.
Secy. of State v. Mask and Co., AIR 1940 PC 105 Privy Council authority consistent with the principle that statutory remedies govern enforcement of statutory rights. Used as supporting precedent in the doctrinal chain.
K.S. Rashid and Sons v. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207 (and related authorities cited) Constitution Benches: Article 226 confers wide powers but is discretionary; courts will refuse writs when adequate remedy exists; limited circumstances where writs may be entertained. Relied upon to explain that Article 226 jurisdiction is discretionary and must take legislative intent into account.
Sangram Singh v. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425; Union Of India v. T.R Varma, AIR 1957 SC 882; State Of U.P v. Mohammad Nooh, AIR 1958 SC 86; K.S. Venkataraman v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1089 Earlier authorities forming part of the judicial approach that writ jurisdiction is discretionary and contingent upon availability of effective remedies. Referenced collectively to show historical continuity of the principle limiting writ relief when statutory remedies exist.
N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422; Municipal Council, Khurai v. Kamal Kumar (1965) 2 SCR 653; Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das, (1984) 2 SCC 436 Cases cited as part of the jurisprudence on the scope and restraint of writ jurisdiction. Used to demonstrate consistent application of the rule over time.
S.T. Muthusami v. K. Natarajan, (1988) 1 SCC 572; Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC 75; Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293 Further Supreme Court decisions cited for the principles governing Article 226 discretion and statutory remedies. Relied upon to reinforce the principal rule restricting writ jurisdiction where statutory remedies are available.
A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695; L.L. Sudhakar Reddy v. State of A.P., (2001) 6 SCC 634; Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami ... (2001) 8 SCC 509; Pratap Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 484; GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO, (2003) 1 SCC 72 Additional authorities illustrating the circumstances in which writ jurisdiction may be declined in favour of statutory remedies. Collected as supporting precedent for the Court's reliance on the alternative remedy principle.
Thansingh Nathmal (reiterated) Rule that writs are not entertained where effective statutory remedy exists. Applied to the present facts to support refusal of writ jurisdiction.
Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536 While Article 226/32 cannot be barred by statute, courts take legislative intent into account and exercise writ jurisdiction consistent with statutory scheme. Used to show that while writ jurisdiction remains, courts will respect statutory remedies and legislative intent when deciding whether to entertain writs.
G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192; CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1 SCC 260; Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura, (1999) 1 SCC 472; Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 3 SCC 5 Additional supporting authorities illustrating the Court's approach to Article 226 and statutory remedies. Referenced to demonstrate consistency of the legal principles applied by the Court.
C.A. Abraham v. ITO, (1961) 2 SCR 765; Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1998) 8 SCC 272; Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh, (1999) 1 SCC 209; Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan, (2001) 6 SCC 569 Further authorities cited in the Court's discussion of when writ relief should be declined in favour of statutory remedies. Used as part of the body of authority supporting decline of writ jurisdiction where statutory appeals are available.
Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana / Ram and Shyam Co. reference (1985) 3 SCC 267 Noted that where appeal is to an internal authority ("Caesar to Caesar's wife"), the remedy may be illusory and thus inadequate. Cited to indicate that alternative remedies must be effective and not a mere formality; however, no finding in the present opinion that the statutory remedy was ineffective.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court's analysis proceeded in the following sequence, based strictly on the materials reproduced in the opinion:

  1. The Court identified the central question as the maintainability of the writ petitions challenging tax/recovery orders made under the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1972 read with the Revenue Recovery Act, 1980.
  2. The Court reproduced Section 15 of the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1972, which provides a statutory right of appeal to an appellate authority within thirty days, subject to payment conditions and certain discretionary relaxation where the owner is unable to pay. From Section 15 the Court concluded that the petitioners have a right of appeal and thus an available alternative remedy.
  3. The Court relied extensively on binding Supreme Court authority (as well as its prior decision in the lead CWP) that consistently holds that where a statute furnishes a special and efficacious remedy, the writ jurisdiction under Article 226 will not normally be exercised to bypass that remedy. The Court quoted and referred to multiple Supreme Court decisions outlining the rule and its limited exceptions (fundamental rights, breach of natural justice, want of jurisdiction or vires challenges).
  4. Applying these principles to the present facts, the Court concluded that because the Act provides a complete machinery for assessment and appeals, the petitioners should have availed statutory appeals (to the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner / Additional Excise and Taxation Commissioner / Excise Commissioner, and subsequently Tribunal and High Court in revision/appeal as available) rather than file writ petitions.
  5. Additionally, the Court observed that the petitioners had not actually challenged the main order determining tax liability—the principal order under which liability was fixed—so the writ petitions were defective on that ground as well.
  6. In light of the foregoing, the Court held that the writ petitions were not maintainable and should be dismissed, while preserving the petitioners' liberty to pursue appropriate statutory remedies within a limited time and protecting interim orders and limitation periods as described in the judgment.

Holding and Implications

Holding: All the writ petitions are DISMISSED, along with pending applications.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The petitioners are granted liberty to seek the appropriate statutory remedy within three weeks.
  • The interim order dated 28.05.2014 is to continue until the petitioners pursue the statutory remedy in the time permitted.
  • The period spent by the petitioners in prosecuting these writ petitions is to be excluded by the Appellate Authority while computing the period of limitation for any appeal the petitioners may now initiate.
  • The Court additionally dismissed the petitions on the separate ground that the petitioners did not impugn the main order fixing tax liability.

No broader new precedent or novel legal doctrine was announced in this opinion; the decision applies established Supreme Court principles regarding the restraint on writ jurisdiction where effective statutory remedies are available.

A copy of the judgment is to be placed on each file, as directed by the Court.

    Jitender Singh Others v. State Of H.P. Others

    1. In all these writ petitions, the petitioners have called in question the orders made by the competent authority, in terms of the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1972 read with the Revenue Recovery Act, 1980, whereby the District Collector-cum-Deputy Commissioner, Sirmour at Nahan, Himachal Pradesh, was asked to effect the recovery as land revenue.

    2. We deem it proper to dispose of all these writ petitions by this common judgment for the reason that similar questions are involved.

    3. The moot question is-whether these writ petitions are maintainable?

    4. We had an occasion to hear and decide a batch of writ petitions, the lead case of which was CWP No. 4779/2014, titled as M/s Indian Technomac Company Ltd. v. State of Himachal Pradesh and others, decided on 4th August, 2014, whereby it was held that the writ petitions were not maintainable and came to be dismissed by providing that the writ petitioners are at liberty to seek appropriate remedy for the reason that the writ petitioners had an alternative remedy available, i.e. the remedy of appeal.

    5. Feeling aggrieved by the aforesaid judgment, the petitioners filed the Special Leave to Appeal (C) No. 22626-22641/2014, before the Apex Court, was dismissed vide judgment and order, dated 22nd August, 2014 and the judgment, supra, passed by this Court came to be upheld.

    6. It is apt to reproduce Section 15 of the Himachal Pradesh Motor Vehicles Taxation Act, 1972, herein:

    "(1) An appeal shall lie to the appellate authority appointed by the State Government in this behalf, against any original order passed under this Act, within thirty days of the passing of such order or within such period as the appellate authority may, for sufficient cause allow:

    Provided that no appeal shall be entertained by such authority unless he is satisfied that the amount of tax assessed and penalty imposed has been paid;

    Provided further that such authority, if satisfied that an owner is unable to make such payment, may, for reasons to be recorded in writing entertain an appeal without such payment having been made"

    7. While going through the aforesaid Section, one comes to an inescapable conclusion that the petitioners have right of appeal, thus are having alternative remedy available.

    8. We have taken note of the Apex Court judgments in the judgment passed in CWP No. 4779/2014, supra. It is apt to reproduce paras 12 to 16 of the said judgment herein:-

    12. The Apex Court in Union of India and another v. Guwahati Carbon Limited, (2012) 11 SCC 651, while dealing with the similar question, has observed in paragraphs 8, 9, 10, 11, 14 and 15 as under:

    "8. Before we discuss the correctness of the impugned order, we intend to remind ourselves the observations made by this Court in Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta, AIR 1979 SC 1250. In the said decision, this Court was pleased to observe that: (SCC p.88, para 23)

    "23. . when a revenue statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner and all the -other forums and modes of seeking remedy are excluded."

    9. A Bench of three learned Judges of as Court, in Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433, held: (SCC p.440, para 11)

    "11......The Act provides for a complete-machinery to challenge an order of assessment, and the impugned orders of assessment can only be challenged by the mode prescribed by the Act and not by a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. It is now well recognised that where right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for 1 enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute must be availed...."

    10. In other words, existence of an adequate alternate remedy is a factor to be considered by the writ court before exercising its writ jurisdiction (See Rashid Ahmed v. Municipal Board, Kairana., Kairana, 1950 SCR 566).

    11. In Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1, this Court held:

    "15. Under Article 226 of the Constitution, the High Court, having regard to the facts of the case, has a discretion to entertain or not to entertain a writ petition. But the High Court has imposed upon itself certain restrictions one of which is that if an effective and efficacious remedy is available, the High Court would not normally exercise its jurisdiction. But the alternative remedy has been consistently held by this Court not to operate as a bar in at least three contingencies, namely, where the writ petition has been filed for the enforcement of the Fundamental Rights or where there has been a violation of the principle of natural justices or where the order or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction or the vires of an Act is challenged......"

    xxxx xxxxx xxxx

    14. Having said so, we have gone through the orders passed by the Tribunal. The only determination made by the Tribunal is with regard to the assessable value of the commodity in question by excluding the freight/ transportation charges and the insurance charges from the assessable value of the commodity in question. Since what was done by the Tribunal is the determination of the assessable value of the commodity in question for the purpose of the levy of duty under the Act, in our opinion, the assessee ought to have carried the matter by way of an appeal before this Court under Section 35L of the Central Excise Act, 1944.

    15. In our opinion, the assessee ought not to have filed a writ petition before the High Court questioning the correctness or otherwise of the orders passed by the Tribunal. The Excise Law is a complete code in order to seek redress in excise matters and hence may not be appropriate for the writ court to entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution. Therefore, the learned Single Judge was justified in observing that since the assessee has a remedy in the form of a right of appeal under the statute, that remedy must be exhausted first. The order passed by the learned Single Judge, in our opinion, ought not to have been interfered with by the Division Bench of the High Court in the appeal filed by the respondent/assessee."

    13. The Apex Court in Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators/Association of India and others, (2011) 14 SCC 337, after discussing its various earlier decisions, held that the High Court had committed error in entertaining the writ petition without noticing and referring to the relevant provisions of law applicable in that case, which contained statutory remedy of appeal and accordingly set aside the order of the High Court in terms of which the writ petition was entertained. It is apt to reproduce paragraphs 24 and 25 hereunder:

    "24. Section 19 provides for remedy of appeal against an order made by the State Commission in exercise of its powers under sub-clause (i) of Clause (a) of Section 17. If Sections 11, 17 and 21 of the 1986 Act which relate to the jurisdiction of the District Forum, the State Commission and the National Commission, there does not appear any plausible reason to interpret the same in a manner which would frustrate the object of legislation.

    25. What has surprised us is that the High Court has not even referred to sections 17 and 19 of the 1986 act and the law laid down in various judgments of this Court and yet it has declared that the directions given by the State Commission are without jurisdiction and that too by overlooking the availability of statutory remedy of appeal to the respondents."

    14. The Apex Court in a recent decision in Commissioner of Income Tax and others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, (2014) 1 SCC 603, has discussed the law, on the subject, right from the year 1859 till the date of judgment i.e. 8th August, 2013. We deem it proper to reproduce paragraphs 12, 13, 15, 16 and 17 hereunder:

    "12. The Constitution Benches of this Court in K.S. Rashid and Sons v. Income Tax Investigation Commission, AIR 1954 SC 207; Sangram Singh v. 1. Election Tribunal, Kotah, AIR 1955 SC 425; Union Of India v. T.R Varma ., AIR 1957 SC 882; State Of U.P v. Mohammad Nooh ., AIR 1958 SC 86 and K.S. Venkataraman and Co. (P) Ltd. v. State of Madras, AIR 1966 SC 1089, have held that though Article 226 confers very wide powers in the matter of issuing writs on the High Court, the remedy of writ is absolutely discretionary in character. If the High Court is satisfied that the aggrieved party can have an adequate or suitable relief elsewhere, it can refuse to exercise its jurisdiction. The Court, in extraordinary circumstances, may exercise the power if it comes to the conclusion that there has been a breach of the principles of natural justice or the procedure required for decision has not been adopted. (See: N.T. Veluswami Thevar v. G. Raja Nainar, AIR 1959 SC 422; Municipal Council, Khurai v. Kamal Kumar, (1965) 2 SCR 653; Siliguri Municipality v. Amalendu Das, (1984) 2 SCC 436; S.T. Muthusami v. K. Natarajan, (1988) 1 SCC 572; Rajasthan SRTC v. Krishna Kant, (1995) 5 SCC 75; Kerala SEB v. Kurien E. Kalathil, (2000) 6 SCC 293; A. Venkatasubbiah Naidu v. S. Chellappan, (2000) 7 SCC 695; L.L. Sudhakar Reddy v. State of A.P., (2001) 6 SCC 634; Shri Sant Sadguru Janardan Swami (Moingiri Maharaj); Sahakari Dugdha Utpadak Sanstha v. State of Maharashtra, (2001) 8 SCC 509; Pratap Singh v. State of Haryana, (2002) 7 SCC 484 and GKN Driveshafts (India) Ltd. v. ITO, (2003) 1 SCC 72).

    13. In Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Assn. of India, (2011) 14 SCC 337, this Court has held that where hierarchy of appeals is provided by the statute, the party must exhaust the statutory remedies before resorting to writ jurisdiction for relief and observed as follows: (SCC pp.343-45 paras 12-14)

    "12. In Thansingh Nathmal v. Supdt. of Taxes, AIR 1964 SC 1419 this Court adverted to the rule of self-imposed restraint that the writ petition will not be entertained if an effective remedy is available to the aggrieved person and observed: (AIR p. 1423, para 7).

    '7. The High Court does not therefore act as a court of appeal against the decision of a court or tribunal, to correct errors of fact, and does not by assuming jurisdiction under Article 226 trench upon an alternative remedy provided by statute for obtaining relief. Where it is open to the aggrieved petitioner to move another tribunal, or even itself in another jurisdiction for obtaining redress in the manner provided by a statute, the High Court normally will not permit by entertaining a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution the machinery created under the statute to be bypassed, and will leave the party applying to it to seek resort to the machinery so set up.'

    13. In Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433 this Court observed: (SCC pp. 440- 41, para 11)

    '11. It is now well recognised that where a right or liability is created by a statute which gives a special remedy for enforcing it, the remedy provided by that statute only must be availed of. This rule was stated with great clarity by Willes, J. in Wolverhampton New Waterworks Co. v. Hawkesford, 141 ER 486 in the following passage: (ER p. 495)

    " There are three classes of cases in which a liability may be established founded upon a statute. But there is a third class viz. where a liability not existing at common law is created by a statute which at the same time gives a special and particular remedy for enforcing it.

    The remedy provided by the statute must be followed, and it is not competent to the party to pursue the course applicable to cases of the second class. The form given by the statute must be adopted and adhered to."

    The rule laid down in this passage was approved by the House of Lords in Neville v. London Express Newspapers Ltd., 1919 AC 368 and has been reaffirmed by the Privy Council in Attorney General of Trinidad and Tobago v. Gordon Grant and Co. Ltd., 1935 AC 532 (PC) and Secy. of State v. Mask and Co., AIR 1940 PC 105. It has also been held to be equally applicable to enforcement of rights, and has been followed by this Court throughout. The High Court was therefore justified in dismissing the writ petitions in limine.'

    14. In Mafatlal Industries Ltd. v. Union of India, (1997) 5 SCC 536 B.P. Jeevan Reddy, J. (speaking for the majority of the larger Bench) observed: (SCC p. 607, para 77)

    '77. So far as the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226-or for that matter, the jurisdiction of this Court under Article 32-is concerned, it is obvious that the provisions of the Act cannot bar and curtail these remedies. It is, however, equally obvious that while exercising the power under Article 226/Article 32, the Court would certainly take note of the legislative intent manifested in the provisions of the Act and would exercise their jurisdiction consistent with the provisions of the enactment.'" (See: G. Veerappa Pillai v. Raman & Raman Ltd., AIR 1952 SC 192; CCE v. Dunlop India Ltd., (1985) 1 SCC 260; Ramendra Kishore Biswas v. State of Tripura, (1999) 1 SCC 472; Shivgonda Anna Patil v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 3 SCC 5; C.A. Abraham v. ITO, (1961) 2 SCR 765; Titaghur Paper Mills Co. Ltd. v. State of Orissa, (1983) 2 SCC 433; H.B. Gandhi v. Gopi Nath and Sons, 1992 Supp (2) SCC 312; Whirlpool Corpn. v. Registrar of Trade Marks, (1998) 8 SCC 1; Tin Plate Co. of India Ltd. v. State of Bihar, (1998) 8 SCC 272; Sheela Devi v. Jaspal Singh., (1999) 1 SCC 209 and Punjab National Bank v. O.C. Krishnan, (2001) 6 SCC 569)

    14. In Union of India v. Guwahati Carbon Ltd., (2012) 11 SCC 651, this Court has reiterated the aforesaid principle and observed: (SCC p.653, para 8)

    "8. Before we discuss the correctness of the impugned order, we intend to remind ourselves the observations made by this Court in Munshi Ram v. Municipal Committee, Chheharta, (1979) 3 SCC 83. In the said decision, this Court was pleased to observe that: (SCC p. 88, para 23).

    '23. when a revenue statute provides for a person aggrieved by an assessment thereunder, a particular remedy to be sought in a particular forum, in a particular way, it must be sought in that forum and in that manner, and all the other forums and modes of seeking [remedy] are excluded.'"

    xxxxx xxxxx xxxx

    15. Thus, while it can be said that this Court has recognised some exceptions to the rule of alternative remedy, i.e., where the statutory authority has not acted in accordance with the provisions of the enactment in question, or in defiance of the fundamental principles of judicial procedure, or has resorted to invoke the provisions which are repealed, or when an order has been passed in total violation of the principles of natural justice, the proposition laid down in Thansingh Nathmal case AIR 1964 SC 1419, Titagarh Paper Mills case 1983 SCC (Tax) 131 and other similar judgments that the High Court will not entertain a petition under Article 226 of the Constitution if an effective alternative remedy is available to the aggrieved person or the statute under which the action complained of has been taken itself contains a mechanism for redressal of grievance still holds the field. Therefore, when a statutory forum is created by law for redressal of grievances, a writ petition should not be entertained ignoring the statutory dispensation.

    16. In the instant case, the Act provides complete machinery for the assessment/re-assessment of tax, imposition of penalty and for obtaining relief in respect of any improper orders passed by the Revenue Authorities, and the assessee could not be permitted to abandon that machinery and to invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court under Article 226 of the Constitution when he had adequate remedy open to him by an appeal to the Commissioner of Income Tax (Appeals). The remedy under the statute, however, must be effective and not a mere formality with no substantial relief. In Ram and Shyam Co. v. State of Haryana, (1985) 3 SCC 267 this Court has noticed that if an appeal is from "Caesar to Caesar's wife" the existence of alternative remedy would be a mirage and an exercise in futility.

    17. In the instant case, neither has the writ petitioner assessee described the available alternate remedy under the Act as ineffectual and non-efficacious while invoking the writ jurisdiction of the High Court nor has the High Court ascribed cogent and satisfactory reasons to have exercised its jurisdiction in the facts of instant case. In light of the same, we are of the considered opinion that the Writ Court ought not to have entertained the Writ Petition filed by the assessee, wherein he has only questioned the correctness or otherwise of the notices issued under Section 148 of the Act, the re-assessment orders passed and the consequential-demand notices issued thereon."

    15. The decisions referred to by the learned counsel for the petitioners have been discussed by the Apex Court in the decisions of Union of India and another v. Guwahati Carbon Limited, Nivedita Sharma v. Cellular Operators Association of India and others and Commissioner of Income Tax and others v. Chhabil Dass Agarwal, referred to hereinabove.

    16. The sum and substance of the above discussion is that the writ petitioners-Company have remedies of appeal(s), before approaching the High Court by way of the writ petitions, for the redressal of their grievances. The petitioners ought to have exhausted the remedy of appeal before the Deputy Excise and Taxation Commissioner or Additional Excise and Taxation Commissioner or the Excise Commissioner, as the case may be, and if the petitioners were not successful in those appeal proceedings, another remedy available to them was to challenge the said order(s) by the medium of appeal before the Tribunal, and again, if they were unsuccessful, they could have availed the remedy of revision before the High Court in terms of section 48 of the hp vat act, 2005. Keeping in view the above discussion, read with the fact that the dispute raised in these writ petitions relates to revenue/tax matters, it can safely be concluded that the petitioners have sufficient efficacious remedy(ies) available."

    9. In view of the ratio laid down by the Apex Court in the aforesaid judgments, the writ petitions are not maintainable.

    10. These writ petitions are also to be dismissed on the ground that the petitioners have not questioned the main order, whereby the tax liability stands determined and the writ petitioners were held liable to pay tax.

    11. With these observations, all these writ petitions are dismissed, alongwith pending applications. However, the petitioners are at liberty to seek appropriate remedy within three weeks. Till then, the interim order dated 28.05.2014 to continue.

    12. It is also provided that the period spent by the petitioners for prosecuting these writ petitions shall be excluded by the Appellate Authority while computing the period of limitation.

    13. A copy of this judgment be placed on each file.

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    Jitender Singh Others v. State Of H.P. Others
    (Oct 29, 2014)