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citation codes
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  • SECTION 141 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 647 (of the 1882 Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 141 upon Order 43 Rule 1 sub-rule (c).27.
  • Article 226 of the Constitution.B) Section 104.
  • sections of the Code of Civil Procedure.19.
  • section 141 and Order 43 Rule 1 sub-rule (c),
  • Order of dismissalD) Order 43 Rule
  • Order 43 Rule 1 sub-rule (c)
  • Rules 4, 9 or 13 of Order 9
  • section 141. If section 104
  • section 141 and Order 9
  • Order 9 Rule 9.16.
  • Rule 9 of Order 9
  • Order 9 Rule 9.15.
  • Order 9, Rule 9. 1)
  • Order 9 Rule 9,
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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  • SECTION 141 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 647 (of the 1882 Code of Civil Procedure
  • section 141 upon Order 43 Rule 1 sub-rule (c).27.
  • Article 226 of the Constitution.B) Section 104.
  • sections of the Code of Civil Procedure.19.
  • section 141 and Order 43 Rule 1 sub-rule (c),
  • Order of dismissalD) Order 43 Rule
  • Order 43 Rule 1 sub-rule (c)
  • Rules 4, 9 or 13 of Order 9
  • section 141. If section 104
  • section 141 and Order 9
  • Order 9 Rule 9.16.
  • Rule 9 of Order 9
  • Order 9 Rule 9.15.
  • Order 9, Rule 9. 1)
  • Order 9 Rule 9,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiffs/applicants' suit was dismissed for default. An application for restoration was made (originally under section 151), which the Court treated as an application under Order 9 Rule 9; that restoration application was dismissed for default. A revisional application (under section 115) was filed against the second dismissal. A Single Judge had earlier held that the revisional application was maintainable and that the Order was not appealable. The opposite parties contested that view. The referring point between the judges concerns whether the dismissal of a restoration application is an appealable order under the Code of Civil Procedure.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a revisional application under section 115 is maintainable in the circumstances described.
  2. Whether the dismissal of a restoration application (an application under Order 9 Rule 9) is an appealable order within the Code of Civil Procedure.

Arguments of the Parties

The opinion does not contain a detailed account of the parties' legal arguments.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Dulal Chandra Ojha, report (sic) at AIR 1989 Cal. 91 Earlier reported short judgment on the point in issue (noting a difference of opinion). The Court noted this earlier short judgment and observed that it did not state reasons for its conclusion; it formed part of the comparative authorities but was distinguished for lack of reasoning.
(1895) I.L.R 17. All 106 (Thakur Prasad's case) (Privy Council) Section 647 of the 1882 Code (corresponding to section 141 of the present Code): proceedings include original matters in the nature of suits such as probate and guardianship. Used to support the proposition that section 141 brings within its scope proceedings which are "suit-like", thereby justifying reading "suit" to include certain proceedings and to import procedural and appeal provisions into those proceedings.
AIR 1928 Lahore 627 (Singh v. Singh) The right of appeal is not mere procedure but a vested right inhering from the commencement of action and not to be taken away except by express provision or necessary implication. Invoked to support the view that appealability is a substantive right and should not be denied by a restricted reading of the word "suit" unless clearly intended; therefore "suit" in the appeal rule should not be narrowly construed to defeat a vested right of appeal.
AIR 1988 Cal. 358 (Mat. Nurnahar Bewa) Special Bench holding that an application for restoration of a Misc. case arising out of an application under Rules 4, 9 or 13 of Order 9 is maintainable under Order 9 read with section 141. Relied on by the Court to show that a combined reading of section 141 and Order 9 yields an effective reading of "suit" as "suit/proceeding", supporting the appealability and maintainability analysis advanced in this opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began with the plain language of the relevant Code provisions and concluded that those provisions support a construction in which the word "suit" in certain rules must be read, where applicable, to mean "suit/proceeding" by reason of section 141. The key steps of the analysis are:

  1. The Code provisions considered include section 141 (procedure in regard to suits to be followed in proceedings), section 104 (orders from which appeal lies), Order 9 Rule 9 (setting aside dismissal of suit), and Order 43 Rule 1(c) (appeal from an order under Rule 9 of Order 9 rejecting an application to set aside a dismissal).
  2. Section 141 expressly includes proceedings under Order 9, and the Court rejected a narrow construction that would limit "procedure" to mere technical procedure and exclude substantive rights (such as the right of appeal). The phrase "procedure provided in this Code" was read as encompassing the Code in its entirety, including substantive provisions that confer rights.
  3. Given that appealability is a substantive right, the Court observed that section 141 can (and does) bring appealability into the scope of suit-like proceedings; the Court illustrated this by noting that probate (a suit-like proceeding) is appealable.
  4. Applying this interpretive approach, a restoration application (a proceeding under section 141 and Order 9 Rule 9) is itself capable of being restored if dismissed for default by another Order 9 Rule 9 application.
  5. Reading Order 43 Rule 1(c) in conjunction with section 141, the Court held that the word "suit" in that Rule should be read as "suit/proceeding". Consequently, an order rejecting a second application to restore (i.e., rejection of a restoration of a restoration application) is appealable.
  6. The parenthetical phrase "(in a case open to appeal)" in Order 43 Rule 1(c) was interpreted to mean that the case sought to be restored must itself be one which, if decided on merits, would give rise to an appealable decree; the same logic extends to successive restoration applications.
  7. The Court relied on the cited authorities (Thakur Prasad's case; Singh v. Singh; Mat. Nurnahar Bewa) to buttress the proposition that section 141 brings suit-like proceedings within the ambit of appealability and that appeal rights are vested and should not be curtailed by narrow readings of statutory words.
  8. On this combined reading of the Code provisions and authorities, the Court concluded that an order rejecting restoration of a restoration application is appealable under the Code.
  9. As a corollary, because an appeal lies against the dismissal of the restoration application, a revisional application (under section 115) challenging that dismissal is not maintainable in law.

Holding and Implications

Revisional application not maintainable

Direct effects (as expressed in the opinion):

  • The Court held that dismissal of a restoration application (including a second restoration application) is an appealable order when read in conjunction with section 141 and Order 43 Rule 1(c).
  • Because an appeal lies against such dismissal, the revisional application under section 115 is not maintainable in law.
  • The revisional application is to be listed before the Hon'ble Single Judge having jurisdiction for its disposal (the Court stated it did not have jurisdiction to pass the dismissal in the revisional application itself).

The opinion does not expressly state any broader precedent beyond the interpretative conclusions reached and confines its operative directions to the matters above.

Compiled strictly from the provided opinion. No information beyond that text has been added.

    Sushil Kumar De & Anr. v. Chhaya De & Ors.

    1. The Court: In the referring judgment of the Hon'ble Single Judge dated 8th August, 2003, His Lordship has noted the point of difference arising out of the short but reported earlier judgment of Dulal Chandra Ojha, report (sic) at AIR 1989 Cal. 91.

    2. The point of reference is about the maintainability of a revisional application under section 115.

    3. The plaintiffs'/applicants' suit was dismissed for default. After some proceedings in the High Court, the application for restoration (originally made under section 151) was treated as an application made under Order 9 Rule 9; the said restoration application was also dismissed for default. A revisional application was filed from the said second dismissal. His Lordship has held that a revisional application is maintainable and that the Order is not appealable.

    4. This has been contested by the opposite parties.

    5. The short point, therefore, is whether the dismissal of a restoration application is an appealable order within the Code.

    6. The reported judgment mentioned above does not mention any reasons for holding it to be so.

    7. In the later judgment His Lordship has held that the express words of Order 43 Rule 1 sub-rule (c) mention a suit and a dismissal of an application for restoration of a suit. Thus, restoration application or its dismissal is not covered by the express words.

    8. Both the parties have had to rely upon the identical portions of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    These are as follows:—

    A) “Section 141. Miscellaneous proceedings.— The procedure provided in this Code in regard to suits shall be followed, as far as it can be made applicable, in all proceedings in any Court of civil jurisdiction.

    Explanation.—In this section, the expression ‘proceedings’ includes proceedings under Order 9, but does not include any proceeding under Article 226 of the Constitution.

    B) Section 104. Orders from which appeal lies.— (1) An appeal shall lie from the following Orders, and save as otherwise expressly provided in the body of the Code or by any law for the time being in force, from no other Orders:—

    (i) any Order made under rules from which an appeal is expressly allowed by rules.

    C) Order 9, Rule 9.— 1) Where a suit is ……………………………………………….dismissed………….the plaintiff …………..if he satisfies the Court that there was sufficient cause for his non-appearance …………..the Court shall make an order setting aside the Order of dismissal…………

    D) Order 43 Rule 1. Appeal from orders.—An appeal shall lie from the following Orders under the provisions of section 104, namely …………(c) an Order under Rule 9 of Order 9 rejecting an application (in a case open to appeal) for an Order to set aside the dismissal of a suit;”.

    9. The plain meaning of these portion of the Code is quite clear. The authorities also support such plain construction.

    10. Under section 141, if there is a proceeding within the meaning of that section which is not a suit, the procedure for suits shall be followed. As such, whenever possible, in the sections or in the Orders, the word suit is to be read as suit/proceeding within the meaning of section 141.

    11. The section 141 states that the procedure provided in the Code is to be followed in those other proceedings.

    12. It is incorrect, in our opinion, to construe this phrase in a limited way and give the word procedure, occurring there; a limited meaning. It is incorrect to construe that word only to mean the so-called procedural part of the Code of Civil Procedure, and hold that only that part is made applicable to the other proceedings, but not the substantive part of the Code. The Code itself is a Code of Civil Procedure. It contains matters of substantive right which are not matters of mere procedure, as ordinarily understood. But the “procedure provided in this Code” is a phrase which refers to the entirety to the Code and not merely to a part of it.

    13. If it were the case, that section 141 makes only the ‘mere’ procedure of the Code applicable to proceedings other than suits, and the right to appeal being a substantive right, section 141 cannot, by its language, confer such a right, then the grant of Probate would also not be appealable. But clearly it is appealable. Thus, section 141 also ropes in the provisions of appealability.

    14. On this interpretation a restoration application, being a proceeding under section 141 is to be itself restored, if dismissed for default, by another application under Order 9 Rule 9.

    15. Similarly under Order 43 Rule 1 sub-rule (c) the second application under Order 9 Rule 9, on dismissal, will become appealable; the word suit is then to be read, by reason of section 141, as meaning the first application made under Order 9 Rule 9.

    16. The bracketed phrase “(in a case open to an appeal)” occurring in this sub-section means that, the case which is attempted to be restored, would itself give rise to an appealable order or decree if it were head and decided.

    17. When the appealability of an order made on an Order 9 Rule 9 application for restoring a suit, is under consideration, it means that the suit, if decreed, would have produced an appealable decree; if a restoration application of a restoration application is dismissed and appealed from, then it means that the first restoration application itself relating to the suit, if dismissed, would have given rise to an Order which is open to appeal.

    18. On this construction an Order rejecting restoration of a restoration application is appealable on a combined reading of the aforesaid sections of the Code of Civil Procedure.

    19. As regard the authorities, it is helpful to note Thakur Prasad's case, reported at (1895) I.L.R 17. All 106 (Privy Council) where it was stated as follows:

    “………the proceedings spoken in section 647 (of the 1882 Code of Civil Procedure which corresponds to section 141 of the present Code), include original matters in the nature of suits, such as proceedings in probates, guardianships and so forth, ………….”.

    20. By reason of the expression added by the 1976 amendment a restoration application has been given the same status as that of an original suit-like proceeding; that is whey (sic) the appealability arises out of the express provision of the Code.

    21. In another decision of the Judicial Committees given in the case of Singh v. Singh, reported at AIR 1928 Lahore 627, it was stated as follows:

    “………it is settled law that right of appeal is not a mere matter of procedure but a vested right which inheres in a party from the commencement of the action in the Court of first instance and such right could not be taken away except by an express provision or by necessary implication”.

    22. Thus, it would not be right to interpret the word suit in a restricted way in Order 43 Rule 1 sub-rule (c) and thus negate the right of appeal to the second restoration applicant, since he has that right even when he makes the second application in the first place.

    23. A Special Bench decision of our High Court, given in the case of Mat. Nurnahar Bewa, reported at AIR 1988 Cal. 358 states as follows - in the concluding sentence of paragraph 10:—

    “In our view, therefore, the application for restoration of a Misc. case arising out of an application under Rules 4, 9 or 13 of Order 9 for restoration of the Misc. case if such Misc. case itself is dismissed for default, is maintainable under Order 9 read with section 141 of the Civil Procedure Code and the first question referred to the Special Bench is therefore answered in the affirmative.”

    24. Thus, by a combined reading of section 141 and Order 9 the Special Bench has read, for the word suit in Order 9, effectively the word suit/proceeding.

    25. In a similar way, we read, by a combined application of section 141 and Order 43 Rule 1 sub-rule (c), for the word suit, the effective phrase suit/proceeding.

    26. Under section 104, sub-clause (i) mentions that only the orders provided as appealable in the Rules shall be appealable. It was argued that the Rule itself i.e Order 43 Rule 1 sub-rule (c) mentions but a suit; accordingly the dismissal of the restoration application is not appealable. But the beginning of section 104 mentions about the other provisions in the body of the Code which include section 141. If section 104 is read from the beginning upto clause (i), there is no way to exclude the effect of section 141 upon Order 43 Rule 1 sub-rule (c).

    27. As such, we are of the clear but respectful opinion that the revisional application is not maintainable in law as an appeal lies.

    28. Whatever might be the words of reference to us, we can only decide the differing point of law between the two Hon'ble Judges. We have given that decision above.

    29. The revisional application itself would now have to be listed before the Hon'ble Single Judge having the jurisdiction for its disposal.

    30. It might be said that there remains nothing but an order of dismissal to be passed in the revisional application; that may be so, but we do not have the jurisdiction to pass it.

    Ajoy Nath Roy & Joytosh Banerjee, JJ.

    Revisional application not maintainable.
    S.K.P

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    Sushil Kumar De & Anr. v. Chhaya De & Ors.
    (Nov 17, 2003)