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  • Madras Act XIV of 1952 applied. Madras Act XIV of 1956
  • Madras Act XXV of 1955 as amended by Act XIV of 1956
  • Protection Act. Then came Madras Act XIV of 1956
  • Protection Act, 1952 (Madras Act XIV of 1952)
  • Protection Act 1954 (Madras Act VI of 1954)
  • provisions of the Madras Act XXV of 1955.
  • Protection Act, Madras Act XIV of 1952.
  • Protection (Amendment) Act of 1956
  • S. 6 A of Madras Act XXV of 1955
  • Protection (Amendment) Act, 1956,
  • S. 4 of Madras Act XXV of 1955
  • S. 4 (5) of Act XXV of 1955.
  • S. 115 of Act V of 1908
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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  • Madras Act XIV of 1952 applied. Madras Act XIV of 1956
  • Madras Act XXV of 1955 as amended by Act XIV of 1956
  • Protection Act. Then came Madras Act XIV of 1956
  • Protection Act, 1952 (Madras Act XIV of 1952)
  • Protection Act 1954 (Madras Act VI of 1954)
  • provisions of the Madras Act XXV of 1955.
  • Protection Act, Madras Act XIV of 1952.
  • Protection (Amendment) Act of 1956
  • S. 6 A of Madras Act XXV of 1955
  • Protection (Amendment) Act, 1956,
  • S. 4 of Madras Act XXV of 1955
  • S. 4 (5) of Act XXV of 1955.
  • S. 115 of Act V of 1908
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Jagadisan, J.) — Civil Revision arising from O.S. No. 135 of 1956

Factual and Procedural Background

O. S. No. 135 of 1956 (District Munsif's Court, Tiruvarur) was a suit by a plaintiff for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with the plaintiff's possession and enjoyment of 3 acres 66 cents of suit lands in Mudikondan village, Nannilam Taluk, Tanjore District. For the fasli year 1955–1956 the plaintiff let the lands to the defendant on a "waram" basis. After the 1956 harvest the plaintiff says he took possession in February 1956, intending to cultivate personally thereafter; the plaintiff alleged that the defendant interfered after having voluntarily surrendered the lands and sued for injunction.

The plaintiff obtained an interlocutory injunction from the District Munsif on 5 July 1956 (I.A. No. 569/1956). The defendant filed I.A. No. 1162/1956 invoking S. 6-A of Madras Act XXV of 1955, seeking transfer of the suit to the Revenue Divisional Officer, Nagapattinam, claiming he was a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of the Act. The District Munsif ordered the transfer; the plaintiff filed this civil revision under S. 115, Act V of 1908 challenging that transfer order. The matter was directed to a Division Bench for hearing because it involved an important question of law affecting many landlords and ryots in Tanjore District.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned District Munsif properly applied the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection Acts (Madras Act XXV of 1955 as amended by Madras Act XIV of 1956) in deciding that the defendant was a cultivating tenant entitled to transfer under S. 6-A.
  2. Whether, for the purposes of S. 6-A and restoration provisions (S. 4 and its explanations), the defendant's status must be determined as of the date when Madras Act XXV of 1955 came into force in Tanjore District (29 September 1956) rather than earlier dates.
  3. Whether a civil court may, on a prima facie finding that a defendant is a cultivating tenant, transfer a suit under S. 6-A to the Revenue Divisional Officer where the plaintiff's remedy in the civil court (e.g., an injunction) is the relief sought.
  4. Whether a voluntary surrender of possession by the defendant (if established) precludes a claim of "eviction" under S. 4(5) and thus entitlement to restoration of possession under the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff resisted the application to transfer the suit under S. 6-A and asserted that the defendant had voluntarily surrendered possession of the lands in February 1956, before the amending Act came into force in Tanjore District.
  • The plaintiff relied on the interlocutory injunction granted on 5 July 1956 and argued that that factual posture affected the question of possession when the amending Act came into force.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The defendant claimed to be a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of Madras Act XXV of 1955 and therefore invoked S. 6-A to have the suit transferred to the Revenue Divisional Officer.
  • The defendant implicitly relied on the operation of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1956 (Act XIV of 1956), which brought Tanjore within the scope of Madras Act XXV of 1955 as of 29 September 1956.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kamalambal v. Krishnaswami Vandayar (1959) 1 M.L.J. 105 = 71 L.W. 686 Interpretation of Explanation II: the 'date aforesaid' refers to the date when Act XIV of 1956 came into force; tenant cannot claim benefits if dispossessed before that date. The court agreed with the reasoning in Kamalambal that a tenant dispossessed before the coming into force of the amending Act (29 Sep 1956) cannot claim S.4(5) benefits; used to support the timing conclusion.
Kuppammal v. Vallingiri Gounden (1957) 1 M.L.J. 293 = 70 L.W. 11 Definition and scope of "eviction" under the Acts: voluntary surrender by tenant is not an eviction. The court relied on this to explain that if the defendant voluntarily surrendered possession, he could not claim eviction-based restoration under S.4(5).
Veluchami Naicker v. Mouna Gurusami Naicker (1957) 2 M.L.J. 628 = 70 L.W. 933 Application of S.6-A to suits pending when the provision was enacted; if court decides the defendants are cultivating tenants entitled to benefits, the civil court should transfer the suit to the Revenue Divisional Officer. The court acknowledged this decision but examined its scope and contrasted it with other authorities; discussed its statement that a civil court that finds defendants are cultivating tenants should transfer the suit.
Ratnaswami Mudali v. Pannammal (1958) 1 M.L.J. 427 = 71 L.W. 470 Followed Veluchami Naicker on S.6-A's operation prompting transfer where civil court finds cultivating tenants. Cited as a follow-up authority; used in the court's review of the jurisprudence on S.6-A.
Kuppuswami v. Subramaniasami Devastanam (1958) 1 M.L.J. 208 = 71 L.W. 303 Before transfer under S.6-A a civil court must be satisfied that the tenant is a cultivating tenant and is entitled to some benefit under the Act. The court cited this case to support the proposition that both cultivating-tenant status and entitlement to benefits must be satisfied before transfer.
Syed Sahib v. Angamuthu Moopan (1958) 1 M.L.J. 232 = 71 L.W. 225 Prima facie finding by civil court that defendant is a cultivating tenant is sufficient to transfer; the transferred suit becomes a petition for restoration by legal fiction. The present court expressly disagreed with the view in this case, rejecting automatic conversion on a mere prima facie finding and criticizing the effects of such an approach.
Subbaratna Iyer v. Pattavarthi Moopan (1958) 2 M.L.J. 184 Reinforced that a civil court's role under S.6-A is to make a prima facie satisfaction that the defendant may be a cultivating tenant; final decision is for the Revenue Court. The present court noted this authority but declined to follow the approach that a prima facie finding should automatically oust the civil court's jurisdiction.
Mohamed Karimuddin Sahib v. Mohambara Naicker (C.C.C.A. No.149 of 1955 and C.R.P. No.464 of 1959) Considered scope of S.6-A in suits seeking relief beyond mere possession—whether civil court should make only a prima facie finding. The court cited this case for the proposition that some judges have taken a different view and that the civil court must consider competency to grant the relief sought before transferring.
Subbiah Mudaliar v. Pakkiri Pandaram (1958) 2 M.L.J. 510 = 71 L.W. 698 Period of limitation for restoration under the Act creates vested rights in favor of the landlord if tenant fails to apply within statutory time; consequences of lapsing statutory period. The court relied on this to caution against automatic conversion of civil suits to restoration petitions that may nullify landlords' vested rights arising from limitation lapses.
Ramaswami Rajah v. Ellappa Gounder (1960) 2 M.L.J. 26 = 73 L.W. 747 = I.L.R. 1960 Mad. 1173 Revenue Divisional Officer has no jurisdiction to grant injunctions; injunctions are civil remedies under CPC and cannot be assumed by revenue authorities. The court used this authority to show that transferring an injunction suit to the Revenue Court may deprive the plaintiff of a remedy (injunction) that the Revenue Court cannot grant.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in discrete legal steps, applying statutory text and precedent precisely to the facts before it:

  1. Timing of application of Madras Act XXV of 1955 to Tanjore District:

    The court relied on Explanation (2) to S.3 which states that for areas where the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyals Protection Act (Madras Act XIV of 1952) had been in force, the phrase "commencement of this Act" in Act XXV of 1955 is to be construed as referring to the date when the amending Act XIV of 1956 came into force. The amending Act came into force on 29 September 1956; therefore Madras Act XXV of 1955 did not operate in Tanjore until that date.

  2. Error in the District Munsif's approach:

    The District Munsif was said to have improperly treated the defendant's status as a cultivating tenant by applying facts and circumstances that existed prior to 29 September 1956 (i.e., before the Act applied in Tanjore). The court held that the relevant question is whether the defendant was a cultivating tenant entitled to benefits on 29 September 1956, not at earlier dates. The District Munsif also did not sufficiently consider the plaintiff's contention of a voluntary surrender of possession in February 1956.

  3. Voluntary surrender vs. eviction:

    The court emphasized that S.4(5) entitles a cultivating tenant to restoration only if he proves eviction. If the tenant voluntarily surrendered possession (as the plaintiff alleged here), he cannot claim eviction-based restoration; the court cited Kuppammal v. Vallingiri Gounden for the proposition that voluntary surrender is not eviction.

  4. Applicability of S.4(2) (extent/eligibility):

    The District Munsif had found the defendant held more than 11 acres in total (as owner and lessee). S.4(2) and its Explanation disqualify a cultivating tenant in possession, as owner or tenant, of land exceeding 6-2/3 acres from restoration. The court observed that on the unchallenged finding of the District Munsif about the defendant's total holdings, the defendant would not be a cultivating tenant entitled to restoration under S.4.

  5. Scope and correct operation of S.6-A:

    The court analyzed S.6-A, which permits transfer of suits for possession or injunction if it is proved that the defendant is a cultivating tenant entitled to the Act's benefits. Reviewing authorities, the court distilled three essential preconditions before a civil court should transfer a suit under S.6-A: (1) the defendant must be a cultivating tenant as defined in the Act; (2) he must be entitled to benefits under the Act; and (3) on transfer he must be in a position to obtain one of the statutory reliefs provided by the Act. Without concurrence of all three, transfer is inappropriate.

    The court rejected the view (adopted in some earlier decisions) that a mere prima facie finding of cultivating-tenant status automatically ousts the civil court's jurisdiction and requires transfer. The court explained the practical and legal anomalies of that approach: the Revenue Divisional Officer cannot grant injunctions; there is no mechanism to retransfer proceedings if the Revenue Court disagrees; and the statutory limitation for restoration (which can create vested rights for landlords) would be undermined by automatic conversions of civil suits into restoration petitions.

  6. Application to the present case:

    Applying these principles to the record, the court concluded that the District Munsif erred in finding the defendant to be a cultivating tenant entitled to benefits on 29 September 1956 because the Munsif:

    • failed to determine status as of 29 September 1956;
    • failed to consider the plaintiff's plea of voluntary surrender (a matter crucial to whether there was eviction); and
    • ignored the disqualification under S.4(2) once the defendant's total holding (more than 11 acres) was taken into account.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The civil revision petition is allowed; the judgment/order of the learned District Munsif ordering transfer is set aside; and O. S. No. 135 of 1956 is restored to the file of the District Munsif, Tiruvarur, for retrial on all issues. There will be no order as to costs.

Direct Consequences for the Parties

  • The transfer order to the Revenue Divisional Officer is invalidated and the suit returns to the civil court for full trial on all issues.
  • Both parties are at liberty to adduce further and additional evidence in the retrial.
  • There is no order as to costs.

Broader Legal Implications (as stated in the opinion)

  • The court clarified that S.6-A cannot be applied to effect an automatic transfer on a mere prima facie finding; instead, the civil court must be satisfied that the defendant is a cultivating tenant, entitled to benefits, and in a position on transfer to obtain the statutory reliefs under the Act.
  • The court emphasized that the Revenue Divisional Officer has no jurisdiction to grant injunctions; transferring an injunction suit to revenue jurisdiction may deprive the plaintiff of reliefs available in civil courts.
  • The decision reiterates that statutory limitation periods for restoration under the Act create vested rights and cannot be nullified by an automatic conversion of civil suits into restoration petitions at the revenue forum.

No section of this summary contains information that was not present in the provided opinion. Where the opinion did not supply extended detail (for example, the opinion did not state whether the defendant had in fact filed any application to the Revenue Divisional Officer prior to this revision), this summary does not purport to add or infer facts beyond those expressly recorded in the judgment.

    M.S Ramachandra Sastrigal v. Kuppuswami Vanniar.

    (Petition (disposed of on 15-11-1960) under S. 115 of Act V of 1908 praying the High Court to revise the order of the Dt. Munsif Court, Tiruvarur dated 7-12-56 in I. A. No. 1162/56 in O. S. No. 135/56.)

    JAGADISAN, J.

    O. S. No. 135 of 1956 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Tiruvarur is a suit in which the plaintiff prays for a permanent injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the suit lands, of an extent of 3 acres 66 cents, in the village of Mudikondan, Nannilam Taluk, Tanjore Dt. In the fasli year 1955-1956 the plaintiff let the lands to the defendant for cultivation on “waram” basis for that year. After the harvest of the lands in 1956 according to the plaintiff he took possession of the lands in February 1956 intending to cultivate the lands himself personally in future. Alleging that the defendant interfered with his possession and enjoyment of the suit lands, after having voluntarily surrendered the lands, the plaintiff instituted the suit referred to above for a permanent injunction. The plaintiff filed I. A. No. 569 of 1956 for a temporary injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession of the suit lands during the pendency of the suit. The defendant contested the application but the learned District Munsif of Tiruvarur by his order dated 5th July 1956 granted the temporary injunction as prayed for by the plaintiff. At the time when the suit was instituted and the order for temporary injunction was passed the relation of landlord and tenant in respect of agricultural lands in the district of Tanjore was governed by the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyals Protection Act, Madras Act XIV of 1952. That Act was not a State-wide legislation but was confined in operation only to the district of Tanjore though the State had the power to extend it to other territories as well. The Madras Cultivating Tenants protection act xxv of 1955, received the assent of the President on 24th September 1955 and was published in the Fort St. George Gazette on 27th September 1955. But it applied to areas not covered by the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyals Protection Act. Then came Madras Act XIV of 1956 which amended the Madras Act XXV of 1955 extending the operation of the Madras Act XXV of 1955 to the territories previously covered by madras act xiv of 1952. This amending Act received the assent of the President on 29th September 1956 and was published in the Fort St. George Gazette on 1st October 1956.

    The defendant in O. S. No. 135 of 1956 on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Tiruvarur, filed I. A. No. 1162 of 1956 invoking the aid of S. 6 A of Madras Act XXV of 1955 and prayed for transfer of the suit to the file of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Nagapattinam. He claimed that he was a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of Madras Act XXV of 1955 and that therefore the transfer of the suit to the file of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Nagapattinam should be ordered.

    The plaintiff resisted this application but the learned District Munsif ordered the transfer and hence this civil revision petition has been preferred by the plaintiff challenging the correctness of the said order.

    The civil revision petition was heard in the first instance by Panchapakesa Ayyar J. who directed the matter to be posted before a Division Bench observing that “an important question of law affecting thousands of landlords and ryots in Tanjore District was involved.”

    The learned District Munsif of Tiruvarur was of the opinion that though Madras Act XXV of 1955 came into operation in the Tanjore district where the suit lands are situated only on 29th September 1956 by reason of the amending act xiv of 1956 the status of the defendant, whether he is a cultivating tenant or not, had to be determined as if the Act XXV of 1955 governed the relationship of the parties even prior to the coming into force of the amending Act. The defendant having been restrained by an order of temporary injunction passed on 5th July 1956 from interfering with the possession and enjoyment of the suit lands by the plaintiff was certainly out of possession at least from that date. On 29th September 1956, when the amending Act came into force by reason of the operation of the injunction order the defendant must be deemed to be not in possession of the suit lands. Whether the defendant was in possession of the suit lands on the date of the institution of the suit will have to be determined only in the, suit on the order for temporary injunction granted in favour of the plaintiff cannot certainly conclude the matter. The learned District Munsif is wrong in holding that the defendant is a cultivating tenant because he was in possession of the suit lands as a waramdar for the fasli year 1955-1956 overlooking the plea of the plaintiff that there was an actual surrender of possession of the lands in favour of the defendant sometime in February 1956. We are not assuming that the plaintiff's case of alleged surrender of possession by the defendant is true. We are clearly of opinion that the finding of the learned District Munsif that the defendant was a cultivating tenant is vitiated because he wrongly assumed that the status of the defendant as a cultivating tenant can be determined on the facts and circumstances which existed prior to the coming into force of the amending act xiv of 1956 and which ceased to exist on the date when the amending Act came into force and because he failed to consider the plea of the plaintiff that there was a voluntary surrender of possession of lands in his favour as early as February 1956. S. 3 Cl. (2) Explanation (2) is as follows:

    “In relation to areas where the Tanjore Tenants and Pannaiyals Protection Act, 1952 (Madras Act XIV of 1952) and to areas where the South Kanara Cultivating Tenants Protection Act 1954 (Madras Act VI of 1954) were in force immediately before the date of coming into force of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1956, the expression ‘commencement of this Act’ whenever it occurs in this Act shall be construed as referring to the date aforesaid.”

    This provision makes it clear that in respect of the Revenue District of Tanjore, Madras Act XXV of 1955 came into operation only on 29th September 1956 the date when the amending Act of 1956 came into force. There is no warrant for giving retrospective operation to Madras Act XXV of 1955 to the area in Revenue District of Tanjore as it cannot be that both madras act xiv of 1952 and madras act xxv of 1955 were in concurrent operation in regard to that territory.

    In Kamalambal v. Krishnaswami Vandayar (1959) 1 M.L.J. 105 = 71 L.W. 686., Ramachandra Iyer, J., has taken the same view as expressed by us. At page 106 the learned Judge observed thus:

    “By reason of this Explanation the tenant would be entitled to claim restoration of possession if on the date of coming into force of the madras act xiv of 1956 or thereafter he was dispossessed but as stated already he was dispossessed on 6th September 1956, that is sometime before coming into operation of the Madras Act XXV of 1955 as amended by Act XIV of 1956 in regard to areas to which Madras Act XIV of 1952 applied. Madras Act XIV of 1956 received the assent of the President on 29th September 1956. It is therefore clear that the tenant-respondent cannot claim the benefit of S. 4 (5) of Act XXV of 1955. Mr. Venkataraman on behalf of the respondent argued that the words in the explanation, namely, ‘the expression commencement of this Act shall be construed as referred to the date aforesaid’ would only refer to the date of coming into force of the Madras Act XXV of 1955 in its original form. I think this contention is not well founded. A reading of Explanation II clearly shows that the ‘date aforesaid’ refers only to the date when the Act XIV of 1956 came into force.”

    With respect, we agree with this observation.

    The question which the learned District Munsif had to determine was whether the defendant was a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of Madras Act XXV of 1955 on 29th September 1956 the date on which he, the tenant in Tanjore District, obtained the benefit of Madras Act XXV of 1955 by reason of the amending act xiv of 1956. The learned District Munsif failed to determine this question, and his finding that the defendant was a cultivating tenant cannot therefore be upheld.

    The plaintiff claims that there was a voluntary surrender of possession of the suit lands in his favour, the defendant having given up possession in response to his request to have the lands under his personal pannai cultivation. S. 4 of Madras Act XXV of 1955 enables a dispossessed tenant in certain circumstances to obtain restoration of possession. S. 4 (1) provides that every cultivating tenant who was in possession of any land on 1st December 1953 and who was not in possession thereof at the commencement of this Act shall on application to the Revenue Divisional Officer be entitled to be restored to such possession. S. 4 (5) provides that any cultivating tenant who after the commencement of this Act has been evicted except under the provisions of Sub-S. 4 of S. 3 shall be entitled to apply to the Revenue Divisional Officer within two months from the date of such eviction or within two months from the date of coming into force of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act, 1956, for restoration to him of the possession of the lands from which he was evicted. On the facts of the case placed before us the present case does not appear to be governed by S. 4(1) of the Act. If the defendant were to claim the benefit of restoration under S. 4 (5) of the Act, then he must prove eviction. If in fact the defendant had surrendered possession to the plaintiff he cannot claim to have been evicted.

    In Kuppammal v. Vallingiri Gounden (1957) 1 M.L.J. 293 = 70 L.W. 11., Rajagopala Alyangar J. as he then was, observed thus at p. 298:

    “We consider that ‘eviction’ as used in S. 3 (1) and S. 4 (2) is an eviction of this character and that in cases where the tenant surrenders possession voluntarily without being compelled to do so by any act or conduct on the part of the land of the landlord there is no eviction. It is not our purpose to define exhaustively the acts or conduct on the part of a landlord which constitute eviction. It is sufficient for our purpose to say that there would be no eviction when a tenant voluntarily and willingly surrenders possession of the land to the landlord. So far as the present case is concerned, the admitted facts and the finding of the Revenue Divisional Officer are that the surrender was for consideration and was a tesult of a bargain freely and voluntarily entered into between the parties. In the circumstances there was no eviction of the first respondent from the holding which he formerly held.”

    The learned District Munsif has also failed to determine the question whether there was in fact a voluntary surrender of possession of the suit lands by the defendant in favour of the plaintiff. The determination of this question has a great bearing on the issue whether the defendant was a cultivating tenant or not when the amending act xiv of 1956 came into force. The failure of the learned District Munsif to advert to this vitaluestion has also vitiated his finding that the defendant is a cultivating tenant.

    The learned District Munsif has found as a fact that the defendant is cultivating nanja lands of 5 acres 78 cents as owner and more than 5 acres 78 cents as lessee under one Swaminatha Iyer and Krishnamurthi Iyer. On this finding which has not been challenged before us by the learned Counsel appearing for the respondent, it is obvious that the defendant is not a cultivating tenant entitled to restoration of possession of the suit lands in view of the explanation to S. 4 of the Act. S. 4 (2) is as follows:

    “Nothing in Sub-S. (1) shall be deemed to entitle any such cultivating tenant to restoration of possession (1) if, on the day this Act comes into force, he in possession, either as owner or as tenant or as both, of land exceeding the extent specified in the Explanation below or if he has been assessed to any sales tax, profession tax or income tax under the respective laws relating to the levy of such taxes during 1953-1954 or 1954-1945 or………”

    The explanation is: “The extent referred to in Cls. (i) to (iii) above is 6-2/3 acres of wet land.”

    The total holding of the defendant both as owner and as lessee as found by the learned District Munsif comes to more than 11 acres. Despite this finding the learned District Munsif was of the opinion that the defendant was entitled to the benefits of the Act as a cultivating tenant and observed thus:

    “Therefore the objection of the respondent that the petitioner cultivates more than 6 and 2/3 acres of nanja and hence not entitled to recovery of possession will not hold good as there is no question of recovery of possession by the defendants in this suit and the only question between the plaintiff and the defendant in this suit is who is in possession.”

    We are wholly unable to appreciate the logic or soundness of this reasoning.

    The defendant in the suit has called in aid S. 6-A of the Act which is as fellows:

    “If in any suit before any Court for possession of, or injunction in relation to, any land it is proved by affidavit or otherwise that the defendant is a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of this Act, the Court shall not proceed with the trial of the suit but shall transfer it to the Revenue Divisional Officer, who shall thereupon deal with and dispose of it as though it were an application under this Act and all the provisions of this Act shall apply to such an application and the applicant.”

    This section has been considered by this Court on several occasions. In Veluchami Naicker v. Mouna Gurusami Naicker (1957) 2 M.L.J. 628 = 70 L.W. 933., it was held by a Division Bench consisting of the learned Chief Justice and Panchapakesa Aiyar J. that S. 6-A of the Act governed suits pending in a civil Court at the time that provision was enacted. The learned Chief Justice at p. 629 observed as follows:

    “If the Court decided that the defendants are cultivating tenants entitled to the benefits of the Act, then it shall not proceed with the further trial of the suit but shall transfer it to the Revenue Divisional Officer. If, however, the Court comes to the conclusion that the defendants are not cultivating tenants, then it can proceed with the trial and pass such decree as it may deem fit.”

    The suit out of which the appeal before the Division Bench arose was one for recovery of possession in which the defendants claimed to be cultivating tenants not liable to be evicted except by the Revenue Divisional Officer in due conformity with the provisions of the Madras Act XXV of 1955. The jurisdiction to evict a cultivating tenant is vested only in the Revenue Divisional Officer to the exclusion of the civil Court. The observation of the Division Bench that the suit should be transferred to the Revenue Divisional Officer if it were to be found that the defendants in that case were cultivating tenants was made because of the lack of the jurisdiction in civil Court to evict a cultivating tenant. The decision in Ratnaswami Mudali v. Pannammal (1958) 1 M.L.J. 427 = 71 L.W. 470. followed the above decision.

    In Kuppuswami v. Subramaniasami Devastanam (1958) 1 M.L.J. 208 = 71 L.W. 303. it was held by Balakrishna Aiyar, J. that having regard to the scheme of the Act and the language of S. 6-A of the Act, before a civil Court can transfer a proceeding under that section it must be satisfied that the tenant is not only a cultivating tenant as defined by the Act but he should also be entitled to some benefit or other under the Act. At page 209 the learned Judge observed thus:

    “Therefore before the civil Court can transfer a proceeding under S. 6-A to the Revenue Court it must be satisfied that the tenant is not merely a cultivating tenant as defined in the Act, but also entitled to some benefit or other under the Act.”

    The learned Judge expressed the view that if both these contentions are not satisfied no question of any transfer under S. 6-A of the Act will arise.

    In Syed Sahib v. Angamuthu Moopan (1958) 1 M.L.J. 232 = 71 L.W. 225. Panchapakesa Ayyar, J. had to deal with the scope and ambit of S. 6-A of the Act. In that case the suit was filed by one Syed Sahib on the file of the District Munsif's Court, Tiruchirapalli, for an injunction restraining the defendant from interfering with his possession and enjoyment of the suit lands on the ground that the defendant was a mere trespasser attempting to take the law into his own hands. An application was filed by the defendant under S. 6-A of the Act, praying for transfer of the suit to the file of the Revenue Divisional Officer, Tiruchirapalli. The civil Court held that prima facie the defendant was a cultivating tenant and directed the transfer of the suit to the Revenue Court. The Revenue Court also held that the defendant in the suit was a cultivating tenant after the matter was transferred to its file. It is this order of the Revenue Court which formed the subject matter of the civil revision petition heard by Panchapakesa Ayyar, J, The learned Judge observed that the finding of the civil Court under S. 6-A of the Act that the defendant was a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefit of the Act was only a prima facie finding and can never be a final finding binding on Revenue Court. As stated already the suit out of which the proceedings culminated in the civil revision petition was one purely for in junction. It was contended before the learned Judge that there was no petition by the alleged tenant for restoration of possession of the holding to him and that therefore there was no scope for the Revenue Court to decide the question whether the tenant was entitled to restoration of possession on the assumption that there was some such petition before the Revenue Court. This contention was repelled by the learned Judge in the following words:

    “Section 6-A says that on the transfer of the suit by the civil Court to the Revenue Court, the Divisional Officer shall deal with the matter and dispose of it, as though it were an application under Act XIV of 1956. No doubt, as Mr. Ramachandra Iyer pointed out, this is a legal fiction, but legal fictions, are well known to law, and are, in fact, a kind of hidden soul in the law making for progress. Many Acts contain such legal fictions. There is no question of their validity, or as the sovereign legislature, or any other legislature to the extent of its competence, can legislate with such fictions added on provided there is no discrimination under Art. 14 of the Constitution, or any other invalidating factor none of which exist here. So, the moment the District Munsif, Tiruchirapalli, transferred the suit for injunction, under S. 6-A to the Revenue Divisional Officer, the suit automatically became a petition for restoration of possession by the tenant though in fact the tenant had not filed any such petition.”

    This decision was followed by the same learned Judge in a subsequent decision of his, Subbaratnatn Iyer v. Pattavarthi Moopan (1958) 2 M.L.J. 184.Therein the learned Judge observed as follows:

    “The lower Court never held the respondent to be a cultivating tenant. It merely presumed from the evidence on record, that the respondent might turn out to be a cultivating tenant, and that to all that S. 6-A requires for entitling or requiring a civil Court to transfer a suit to the Revenue Court where the question whether the person claiming to be a cultivating tenant was really a cultivating tenant would be gone into in full and finally decided, and a binding finding given thereon.” I have held in a similar case that a civil Court, when transferring a suit like this is only required to satisfy itself prima facie that the defendant is a cultivating tenant and that it need not give a finding that he is really a cultivating tenant, it has no jurisdiction to give such a final finding, as only a Revenue Court can give it…. It cannot adopt the prima facie conclusion of a civil Court when transferring the suit under S. 6-A. though it may agree with the prima facie conclusion for the reason given by it in its own finding that the defendant is a cultivating tenant.”

    In Mohamed Karimuddin Sahib v. Mohambara Naicker C.C.C.A. No. 149 1955 and C.R.P. No. 464 of 1959., Ramachandra Iyer J. had occasion to consider the question of applicability of S. 6-A of the Act in a suit for relief not merely for recovery of possession but also for recovery of arrears of rent or damages for use and occupation. The two decisions of Panchapakesa Ayyar J. referred to above were cited before him. Ramachandra Iyer J. observed thus:

    “The learned Judge held in the two cases that the civil Court should come only to a prima facie conclusion on the question whether the defendant was a cultivating tenant or not and that the final decision on that issue rested with the revenue Court. With great respect to the learned Judge I cannot agree.”

    Ramachandra Iyer J. further observed thus:

    “Therefore before an order for transfer is made the Court should find that it is incompetent to give the reliefs sought by reason of the Act.”

    Earlier the learned Judge observed thus:

    “But what S. 6-A contemplates is the transfer of the suit and not the reference of any issue, that is, that relating to possession.”

    We are of opinion that the view taken by Panchapakesa Ayyar J. in Syed Sahib v. Angamuthu Moopan (1955) 1 M.L.J. 232 = 71 L.W. 225., and Subbaratna Iyer v. Pattavarthi Moopan (1958) 2 M.L.J. 184., is not correct. With great respect to the learned Judges, we are unable to subscribe to the view that a prima facie finding of the civil Court holding that a party to the suit is a cultivating tenant can deprive the civil Court of its jurisdiction to try the suit making it incumbent on that Court to transfer the suit to the Revenue Court.

    If the view of the learned Judge as expressed by him in those decisions were to prevail it would lead to anomalouts. What is to happen if the Revenue Court were to hold contrary to the prima facie finding of the civil Court that the tenant is not a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefit of the Act? There is no machinery under the Act for the Revenue Divisional Officer to retransfer the proceeding to the file of the civil Court. Further civil Court cannot lose its jurisdiction to try a suit competently laid before it on tentative conclusions or prima facie findings. Before the civil Court decides not to try a suit it must reach definite concussion and must record a comprehensive finding that it has no jurisdiction to deal with the matter, There cannot of course be a summary enquiry by a civil Court on such a vital issue as that of jurisdiction to try the suit.

    With great respect to Panchapakesa Ayyar J. we do not also agree with the view expressed by him that a simple suit for injunction laid before the civil Court can become automatically converted into a petition for restoration for possession by the tenant, once the suit is transferred to the file of the Revenue Divisional Officer on a tentative finding that the defendant is a cultivating tenant.

    Under S. 4 (3) of the Act every application to a Revenue Divisional Officer under Sub-S. (1) for restoration of possession has to be made within 30 days from the commencement of the Act. S. 4. (5) of the Act prescribes that a cultivating tenant who has been evicted after the commencement of the Act should apply to the Revenue Divisional Officer within two months from the date of eviction or within two months from the date of coming into force of the Madras Cultivating Tenants Protection (Amendment) Act of 1956 for restoration to him of the possession of the lands. The Act thus prescribes the period of limitation for application for restoration of possession. In Subbiah Mudaliar v. Pakkiri Pandaram (1958) 2 M.L.J. 510 = 71 L.W. 698., the learned Chief Justice has observed that the lapse of the period of limitation prescribed for restoration of possession under the Act creates a vested right in favour of the landlord against any claim for restoration of possession. There cannot therefore be an automatic conversion of a suit for injunction in the civil Court into an application for restoration of possession before the Revenue Court which may have the effect of nullifying the vested rights accrued in favour of the landlord by reason of the cultivating tenant having failed to take the proper steps for restoration as prescribed by the statute.

    It is of course open to the legislature to introduce a legal fiction. But neither the civil Court nor the Revenue Divisional Officer can import a legal fiction so as to grant a relief to a party who is not asking for such a relief.

    The plain words of S. 6-A of the Act clearly indicate the scope of that provision. The suit which is sought to be transferred must be one for possession or injunction in relation to any land. The defendant in such a suit can, if he is a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of the Act, have the trial of the suit before the civil Court interrupted and have the suit transferred to the Revenue Divisional Officer. On a transfer being ordered in terms of that section the Revenue Divisional Officer shall deal with and dispose of the suit as though it were an application under the Act. Before the section can operate three conditions must be fulfilled. The first is that the defendant must be a cultivating tenant; the second is that he must be entitled to the benefits of the Act; the third is that he must on a transfer of the proceeding to the Revenue Divisional Officer be in a position to obtain one or other of the statutory reliefs provided for in his favour under the Act. Without the concurrence of these three conditions no transfer should be ordered by the civil Court under the provisions of S. 6-A of the Act.

    In a simple suit for an injunction laid in a civil Court, for restraining the defendant in the suit from interfering with the plaintiff's possession and enjoyment of the land, the defendant even if he were to be a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of the Act cannot gain anything by merely having the forum of adjudication being shifted from the civil Court to the Revenue Court. It is obvious that a Revenue Court cannot grant any injunction. The Revenue Court has no jurisdiction to consider the question whether an injunction can or cannot be granted. In Ramaswami Rajah v. Ellappa Gounder (1960) 2 M.L.J. 26. (Short Notes) C.R.P. No. 936 of 1960, same case since reported in 73 L.W. 747 = I.L.R. 1960 Mad. 1173. decided by Ramachandra Iyer, J. the extract as per the report of the Short Notes is as follows:

    “An injunction which is a preventive remedy, is granted by Courts under the specific provisions of the Civil Procedure Code. There is no inherent power in any Tribunal to grant an injunction unless the jurisdiction to grant it is expressly conferred by statute and such a power cannot be assumed by implication. Hence a Revenue Divisional Officer would have no jurisdiction to grant an injunction restraining a landlord from entering his property. The tenant has always got his remedy in such cases to approach the civil Courts for relief by way of injunction.”

    In the present case we are not informed that the defendant in the suit has preferred any application before the Revenue Divisional Officer for restoration of possession. Whether it will be open to him to prefer any such application in future if he has not already preferred one is a matter on which we need not express any opinion. In any view of the matter we do not see the necessity for a transfer of the suit from the file of the civil Court to that of the Revenue Court. There are only three possibilities arising on the pleadings of the parties in the case. Firstly the plaintiff in the suit might have been in possession of the suit lands on the date of the suit and the defendant may not be a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of the Act. If this is the real position it is obvious that an injunction must issue in favour of the plaintiff. In fact even the terms of S. 6-A cannot operate and the suit cannot be transferred. Secondly the plaintiff might have been in possession of the suit lands on the date of the suit but the defendant might be a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of the Act. In this case also the civil Court will have to grant an injunction but this decree for injunction will however be subject to such order as the Revenue Divisional Officer may pass by way of restoration of possession or otherwise at the instance of the tenant and as a result of appropriate proceedings which he might take under the Act. The third possibility is that the plaintiff might not have been in possession of the suit lands on the date of the suit. In such a case whether the defendant is a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of the Act or not the suit must fail. We are therefore of opinion that taking any view of the matter S. 6-A of the Act cannot properly govern the case. We have held already that the finding of the learned District Munsif even on the question whether the defendant is a cultivating tenant entitled to the benefits of the Act or not is erroneous in law and unsustainable.

    The civil revision petition is allowed; the judgment of the learned District Munsif is set aside; and O. S. No. 135 of 1956 is restored to the file of the District Munsif, Tiruvarur, for being retried on all the issues arising in the case, the parties being at liberty to adduce such further and additional evidence as they think fit. There will however be no order as to costs.

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    M.S Ramachandra Sastrigal v. Kuppuswami Vanniar.
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