This batch of petitions arises out of four petitions filed by the landlady under S. 14 (1) (b) of the Madras Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, Madras Act XVIII of 1960 (hereinafter referred to as the Act) alleging that the building is bona fide required by her for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolition was to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished. All the four petitions were heard together and disposed of and allowed by the Rent Controller by a common order. There were four separate appeals which were disposed of by four separate orders of the appellate authority. In three cases, out of which C.R.P. No. 1337, 1338 and 1342 of 1964 arise, the petitions of the landlady were dismissed and the order of the Rent Controller reversed, while in one appeal the order of the Rent Controller was confirmed C.R.P. No. 1255 of 1964 has been preferred by the tenant, while the other three revision petitions have been preferred by the landlady.

The building in question is a non-residential one situated in Triplicane High Road, a very busy business centre. The four tenants were each occupying a shop in front and carrying on business there; all the four shops constituting one block essentially forming part of one single building, though let out as separate units. In the petitions the landlady alleged that these shops are more than a century old, and old fashioned being tiled ones, and that she wanted the possession of the building with a view to immediately demolish these old shops and put up a pucca new terraced building as one block for which purpose she had applied to the Corporation of Madras and had also obtained sanction of the plan in B. A. 2829 of 1962 on 12th November 1962. Her further case was that as the premises in question is in a commercial and business locality of the City, it would be more advantageous to have a new construction with a double storey for constructing which she has ample resources.

The four tenants filed separate objection statements in none of which was any suggestion made that the petition for eviction was filed with any ulterior motive or as a lever to obtain enhanced rent. The main objection by the four tenants was of the same pattern i.e., that the building was not so bad and in such a dilapidated condition as to require immediate demolition. The statement of the landlady about her resources and means to put up a new building was not questioned by any of the tenants.

Before the Rent Controller, the agent of the landlady, was examined on her side, while on the side of the tenants, two tsnants, one Mahboob Bahsha tenant in H.R.C. No. 5927 of 1962 and Jaffer Baig, tenant in H.R.C No. 6133 of 1962 were examined as R.Ws.1 and 2.

The Rent Controller came to the conclusion that the evidence of P.W.1, the agent of the landlady, was substantially true, that there was no rebutting evidence, that the buildings were 60 or 70 years old, and that the landlady bona fide required the building for the purpose of demolishing and for putting up a new construction. This view was reversed by the appellate authority by a process of reasoning which I consider singularly perverse. A reading of the appellate orders in three cases show that the appellate authority has misread the evidence and overlooked the fact that in two cases there has been no rebutting evidence and in one case the tenant who examined himself admitted that the condition of the building was 50 or 60 years old and required demolition and reconstruction. Again in the other case in which the tenant Jaffer Baig has been examined as R.W.2, has not said a word about the condition of the building, with the result that the evidence on the side of the landlady with regard to the condition of the building; remained unrebutted. But yet the appellate authority has rejected the same on the ground that his testimony is interested. It has overlooked the fact that there has not been any effective cross-examination of P.W.1 by any of the tenants with regard to the building and its condition.

The appellate authority has evolved a new theory as though there is or was any distinction between the condition or age of the buildings between one and the other. It has lost sight of the fact that the four shops constituted one block, that a single common petition was filed, that the allegations were all common, that there was no separate pleading with regard to each building, and that the tenants themselves never made any difference between one building, or another and that the main defence in all was a common one i.e., that the building was not in such immediate danger of requiring demolition and reconstruction. Even in the evidence stage no distinction was made between one building and another and even before the Rent Controller the same attitude was adopted by all the tenants. The appellate authority dissects the evidence of P.W.1, R.W.1 and R.W.2, as referable to certain shops as though it is capable of such analysis and comes to the conclusion that the evidence which was adduced by R.W.1, was not in relation to the premises in question. Even the brief evidence, has not been carefully analysed by the appellate authority, and its order is vitiated by mistakes and errors as to what the witnesses have deposed.

The appellate authority took an extreme view that a landlord can ask for possession under S. 14 (1) (b) only if the buildings are old and dilapidated requiring immediate demolition, that the old age and dilapidated condition of the building constituted the condition for eviction and that alone should be taken into account, that no other consideration would be germane such as the genuine bona fide desire of the landlord or his need to put up a new building with a view to make the property yield a better income and return. He also took the curious view, which I have no hesitation in characterising as perverse, in holding that unless a notice was received from the Corporation demanding immediate demolition, the building cannot be said to be old and that when a shop had been leased out about seven months ago, that itself was sufficient to conclusively establish that the building was not old but new and therefore could not be required for demolition. I have stated enough to indicate that the order of the appellate authority cannot be obviously supported, justifying this Court's interference under S. 25 of the Act.

On behalf of the tenants it was urged that under S. 14 (1) (b) a tenant can be evicted only if the building is old and dilapidated requiring immediate demolition, and that the words “the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing “ relate solely and exclusively to the condition of the building and has nothing to do with the intention or object of the landlady (landlord) though prompted by the best of motives, namely, to make a better investment with a view to get a good return by putting up a new building, even for purposes of letting out. On behalf of the landlady, it was argued that under S. 14 (1) (b), the crucial factor is the bona fides of the landlord in requiring the building for immediate demolition, and that so long as the application is not prompted by any ulterior motive with a view to merely evict the tenant simply relying upon immediate demolition as the ground for eviction, the landlord is entitled to possession of the property. He urged that the old age or the dilapidated condition of the building is not a necessary condition to sustain an application under S. 14 (1) (b), but that it is only one of tha circumstances to be taken into account in coming to the conclusion about the bona fide requirement of the landlady for the purpose of demolition. In substance his argument was that if the building was very old and dilapidated a case for demolition would be easily made out, but that that is not the same thing as saying that in other cases, there cannot be any eviction even though the landlady genuinely intended to immediately demolish and reconstruct and had made all the arrangements to carry out her scheme and backed up by enough financial resources. On an interpretation of the relevant provisions of the Act and on a consideration of the case law, I am of opinion that the contention raised on behalf of the landlady should be accepted as well founded.

The relevant provision in S. 14 may now be extracted :

“Sec. 14: Recovery of possession by landlord for repairs or for reconstruction:—

(1) Notwithstanding anything contained in this Act, but subject to the provisions of S. 12 and 13, on an application made by a landlord, the Controller shall, if he is satisfied—(b) that the building is bona fide required by the landlord for the immediate purpose of demolishing it and such demolishing is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building on the site of the building sought to be demolished, pass an order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building to the landlord before a specified date.

(2) No order directing the tenant to deliver possession of the building under this section shall be passed :

(b) on the ground specified in Cl. (b) of Sub-S. (1), unless the landlord gives an undertaking that the work of demolishing any material portion of the building shall be substantially commenced by him not later than one month and shall be completed before the expiry of 3 months from the date he recovers possession of the entire building or before the expiry of such further period as the Controller may, for reasons to be recorded in writing, allow”

S. 16 provides that if the landlord had no commenced the work of demolition within the period of one month as per his Undertaking under Cl. (b) of S. 14(2), the tenant will be entitled to restoration of possession of the property originally occupied by him after giving the requisite notice to the landlord. It has to be noticed at the outset that these provisions, Ss. 14 to 16 are new provisions enacted in the Madras Act of 1960 for the first time. The Rent Control legislation of some of the other States contain like provision though employing different language and imposing different condition.

Taking the language of the Section I see nothing in it to warrant the interpretation that the words “bona fide required by the landlord” be referable only to the conditions of the building ruling out every other consideration. It must not be forgotten that this legislation is in essence ex proprietary in character involving serious curtailment of the rights of the owners of properties end therefore Courts should not give any undue or wide interpretation to the provision beyond what the express language of the provision warrants, in consonance with the avowed object of the legislation, namely, unreasonable eviction of tenants. I see nothing in the object of the enactment or in the language of the provision which compels or necessarily warrants the view that once a building is let out, the landlord can never obtain possession of the property either for better investment or for improvement in the sense that the tenant acquires a permanent right, as it were, subject only to the dilapidated condition of the building. The very fact that S. 14 (1) (b) provides that demolition is to be made for the purpose of erecting a new building in the place of the one sought to be demolished shows that more and better accommodation is intended to be secured. In my opinion, the provision in S. 14 (2) (b) requiring demolition to be commenced within one month and completed within three months emphasises that the old age or the dilapidated condition of the building is not the decisive factor under S. 14 (1) (b). The condition of the building is obviously an objective test to be established by evidence and capable of verification by personal local inspection. If the crux of the question centers round the physical state or condition of the building, there will be very little scope for the notion of a bona fide requirement. There is warrant for reading “bona fide required by the landlord” as equivalent to “building bona fide requiring demolition.” Either the building requires demolition or not. But it is not possible to have conception of a building bona fide requiring demolition. A decrepit building no doubt may call for immediate demolition and without anything more without any further provision the landlord could be said to have satisfied the requirement or condition of his bona fide requiring the building for immediate demolition. But the terms of the section are clearly wide enough to cover cases where the landlord bona fide requires a building for the expansion of his own business or for legitimate purposes. A concrete and immediate proposal or scheme to demolish an existing building and reconstruct it into a bigger more productive and higher income yielding one cannot by any means be said to be mala fide . In my opinion the proper view to take of this provision is that whenever the condition of the building is not such as to require immediate demolition the case of the landlord should be scrutinised to find out whether he bona fide intends to immediately demolish the building or whether the provision is invoked merely with a view to evict the tenant. In that context the plans or schemes of the landlord, his resources etc., would have a bearing as tending to establish the bona fide requirement of the landlord. In my opinion, S. 14 (1) (b) is not rendered inapplicable merely because the building is not old or dilapidated but is in a good condition.

When this provision was introduced for the first time in 1960 it can be legitimately presumed that the Madras legislature adopted the scheme of the corresponding analogous provision in the other States and how the Courts in those States have dealt with the question. In Bhulan Singh v. Gnanendra Kumar A.I.R. 1950 Cal. 74., a Bench of the Calcutta High Court had to consider the scope of S. 11 of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Provisions) Act of 1948. S. 11 of that Act provided that a tenant cannot be evicted so long as he pays to the full extent the rent allowable under the Act, and performs the conditions of the tenancy and the following proviso exempted the application of this provision “Nothing in this sub section shall apply where the premises are bona fide required by the landlord either for purposes of building or rebuilding, or for his own occupation or for the occupation of any person for whose benefit the premises are held”. Suits were filed against a batch of tenants on the ground that the premises in question were between 100 to 150 years old and were in a dilapidated condition. The Bench took the view that the words “bona fide required by the landlord” cannot be read as “premises bona fide requiring rebuilding”. Harries, C.J., delivering the judgment of the Bench put the matter thus :

“It was suggested that this provision giving the landlord a right to possession, if he established that he required the premises bona fide for rebuilding could have no application whatsoever unless the state of the premises was such that they required to be rebuilt. It is to be observed that proviso (f) to S. 11 (1) of the Act does not mention premises requiring rebuilding. What it states is that Sub-S. (1) shall have no application if the landlord requires the premises bona fide for rebuilding. The state of the premises therefore is not an essential factor in the case. However, it cannot be overlooked that in this case the learned judge has accepted the evidence of a witness which showed that these premises were very old, dilapidated, dangerous and likely to fall if extensive repairs were not done to them quickly.

It appears to me that the premises are bona fide required by the landlord for the purpose of rebuilding if the landlord honestly requires them for that purpose. The equivalent of the phrase ‘ bona fide ’ is ‘honestly’. It refers to the state of the landlord's mind. The landlord therefore will be entitled to possession as against the tenant if he established that he honestly requires the premises for rebuilding”.

The Bench did not accept the argument that the landlord could not bona fide require the premises for rebuilding unless rebuilding was absolutely necessary, and that the disturbance of the tenants was absolutely necessary. The ratio decidendi of this decision is that if the landlord establishes bona fide requirement for rebuilding and the Court is satisfied on the facts placed before it that the landlord honestly desires to rebuild and has the means to rebuild and will certainly rebuild if possession is given to him then the landlord would be entitled to evict the tenant. In the case of old dilapidated building the Court does not generally require proof of other circumstances but if the condition of the building is good the Court would require proof by other circumstances such as means, sanctioned plans, etc.

In S.E.E Works v. R. Sadha Devi A.I.R. 1957 Cal. 227. a Bench of the Calcutta High Court had to deal with S. 12 (h) of the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Powers) Act of 1950. That provision provided that if the premises were required reasonably by the landlord for the purpose of rebuilding the landlord can obtain an order for eviction. The significance of the use of the adverb “reasonably” came up for decision. The matter was explained thus at page 229 :

“The test of reasonableness must be whether the purpose for which the rebuilding is proposed is reasonable. Three things are necessary. First, the occupation of the premises by the landlord must be ‘required’ secondly, that requirement must be for the purpose of rebuilding i and thirdly, that the requirement is reasonable. If the purpose of rebuilding is merely to make the house more beautiful, that would not be considered a reasonable requirement. If, on the other hand, the purpose of rebuilding, as in this case, is to ensure the safety of the tenants and the preservation of property, the requirement must be ordinarily considered to be reasonable”.

In Mukherjee v. Abhoypada Banerjee A.I.R. 1958 Cal. 229., again another case under the same provision of the West Bengal Act of 1950, the Calcutta High Court held that the fact that the new building could not accommodate more than one family, and that the proposed new alterations would endure more to the benefit of the landlord than of the public, and that the advantage of the public would be very small are not circumstances as to make the requirement of the landlord not reasonable. In the West Bengal Premises Rent Control (Temporary Powers) Act of 1950, t here was a new provision, which was not in the 1948 Act, to the effect that the Court in determining the reasonableness of the requirement of the landlord “should have regard to a comparative public benefit or disadvantage by extending or diminishing accommodation”. There is no such provision in the madras act and the madras act is more on the pattern of the earlier Bengal Act to 1948, which came up for discussion in Bulan Singh v. Gnanendra Kumar A.I.R. 1659 Cal. 74.

In the Punjab Motor Co. Shaik Juman A.I.R. 1823 Rangoon 12., the Bench of the Rangoon High Court had to deal with S. 10 of the Rangoon Rent Act of 1920. In that case, the landlord wanted the premises for demolishing the old one and erecting a new four storeyed building. It was held that if the landlord had the means to carry out the purpose and had the bona fide intention to do so he was entitled to a decree in ejectment in the view that the Rent Act was not intended to interfere with the legal user of private property.

In Mohamed Azizuddin v. Aviz Hassan (1960) 2 And. W.R. 203., the Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court had to consider the scope of S. 15 (3) (a) (iv) of the Hyderabad Houses (Rent, Eviction and Lease) Control Act, 1954, the material portion of which runs as follows :

“A landlord may subject to the provisions of Cl. (d) apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the house—(iv) if the landlord desires to carry out essential repairs or alterations to the house which cannot be made without the tenant vacating the house, bona fide requires the house for the purpose of building or rebuilding or for making substantial additions which cannot be made without the tenant vacating the house;”

In that case, the landlords filed an application on the ground that they had no house of their own and that they wanted to demolish the building with a view to rebuild a three-storeyed building for their residence in the first two floors and for letting out the third floor. The question was whether the landlords had satisfied that they bona fide required the house for the purpose of building or rebuilding. The matter was put thus at page 205 :

“In so far as Cl. (iv) is concerned, the landlord would be entitled to an order for eviction if he bona fide requires the house for building or rebuilding for making substantial repairs, etc. Here again the question of bona fides would be a question of fact, that is, the Rent Controller would be entitled to take into consideration the fact that the landlord has the means and that he intends in fact to construct. The question whether he intends to construct a big or a small building, and whether it is reasonable or necessary to construct it or not, is not a matter which could be taken into consideration because that would depend upon the means and the intention of the landlord to make the best use of his property, a matter in which his view will not be substituted by the view of the Rent Controller. If the landlord had the means to build and intends to build, a three storeyed building as in this case, that does not go counter to the policy of the Rent Control Act. In fact, it may effectuate the policy because the policy of the Rent Control Act is to protect the tenants, having regard to the scarcity of accommodation. If a landlord can afford to build premises with greater accommodation, certainly that would in some way relieve the scarcity”.

It may be mentioned that the Bench of the Andhra Pradesh High Court followed the principle of the decision of the Calcutta High Court in Bhutan Singh v. Gnantndra Kumar A.I.R. 1659 Cal. 74., and the decision of the Rangoon High Court referred to earlier.

From the above decisions it will be seen that the test of the landlord bona fide requiring the building does not necessarily depend upon the bad condition or the old age or dilapidated condition of the building.

In Ramchander v. Kedarnaih A.I.R. 1954 Punj. 135., the Court had to interpret S. 13 (3) (a) (iii) of the Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, which was in these terms :

“A landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession in the case of any building, if he requires it for the re-erection of that building, or for its replacement by another building, or for the erection of other buildings”.

The Court held that the landlord will be en titled to eviction and that it was rot a necessary condition that the building should be in a dilapidated stage requiring demolition on the ground that it was not the state, of the building which was the test of rebuilding but it was the desire of the landlord to rebuild. The decision of the Calcutta High Court first cited was followed.

In Bundass v. Pearelal A.I.R. 1959 Punj. 23., Khosla, J., dissented from the eaulier decision of the Punjab High Court referred to and held that it was not the desire of the landlord to rebuild but his bona fide need for reconstruction that was the determining factor.

An examination of the recant decisions of this Court shows that the old age or the bad or dilapidated condition of the building is not regarded as an essential sine qua non for an order for eviction. In Ahmed and Sons and others v. N. Sivathanu C.R.P. 1763 to 1766 of 1963., Ramachandra Iyer, C.J., expressed the opinion that the right of the landlord is not confined to cases of old buildings which require demolition for that reason. The learned Judge pointed out that it is not the duty of judicial authority to have preconceived ideas in the matter of construction of expropriatory legislation or exhibit any zeal to see that a tenant is protected as far as possible. Emphasising that the object of the Act is only to prevent arbitrary eviction of the tenants the learned Chief Justice put the matter thus :

“There is yet another reason. In the present case the building was in a sound condition. The landlord wanted is no doubt for being pulled down so that he can put up a boarding house whereby to enable him to earn more out of it a legitimate ambition by itself. But till he was able to make the tenants vacate it there was nothing wrong in his requiring a fair rent to be paid, and, steps taken in that behalf cannot be considered as otherwise than bona fide ”.

In Ramachandra v. Kazim Khaleeli 77 L.W. 632., Kailasam, J., while construing S. 14 (1) (b) observed that it was not necessary that the building should be very old and decrepit to enable the landlord to claim that his immediate purpose was for demolition of the building. The Learned Judge did not accept the argument that the condition of the building should be regarded as the decisive factor. In Madavan Vaidyar v. M.K. Natarajan and mother C.R.P. 68 of 1964. Kailasam, J., has reiterated the same view and rejected the argument that the landlord himself must make out as a condition of eviction that the building was in such a state of bad condition that it required immediate demolition.

My attention was also drawn to the judgment of Vankatadri, J., in a batch of revision cases Chandrsekhara Chetti v. Sri Kakumani Adikesavalu Chetti Charities C.R.P. 2114 of 1963 etc. 78 L.W. (J.) S.N. 9. dated 6th November 1964. The learned Judge has reviewed the entire case-law and following the decisions of this Court referred to earlier held that S. 14 (1) (b) is not confined to a bad and dilapidated building. The learned Judge has summed up the position as follows:

“In order to prove bona fides in such applications as the present one, where the landlord requires the building for the immediate purpose of demolition, he should satisfy the deciding authority that his requirement is a reasonable and bona fide one, that he has prepared the plans and the necessary estimates for the new building, that he has obtained the necessary sanction from the Corporation or the Municipal Authorities for the purpose of such erection and that he has got the necessary funds with him to carry out such reconstruction”.

With respect I think this is the correct legal position.

Learned Counsel for the tenants relied upon a judgment of Anantanarayanan J. in Mehsin Bhai v. Hale and Co. (1964) 2 M.L.J. 147 = 77 L.W. 194. as laying down that under S. 14(1) (b) a landlord can make out a bona fide requirement for demolition only if the condition of the building is old and dilapidated. This decision has already been considered and referred to by Kailasam J. and Venkatadri J. The facts of the case are not fully set out in the judgment and after carefully perusing the same, I am unable to agree with the contention of the learned Counsel for the tenants regarding the purport of this judgment. The learned Judge has observed that the criteria to be applied by the Court are several and the Court should have to come to a decision upon the totality of the facts. There is no reference in that decision to the immediate preparedness of the landlord for demolition and for putting up immediately a new building, whether the landlord had obtained the sanction of the Municipal authorities and whether the landlord had the necessary resources and such relevant considerations. With great respect I am unable to read this judgment as containing any pronouncement or statement of the law about the scope of S. 14 (1) (b). I see force in the contention of the learned Counsel for the landlady that this case was dismissed in the admission stage and the attention of the learned Judge had not been drawn to several decisions touching the aspect.

It is necessary, at this stage, to refer to the judgment of the Supreme Court in Motaram v. Jiwanlal A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 479. which has been referred to by Kailasam J. and Venkatadri J. Learned Counsel for the tenants contended that the learned Judges of this Court have not correctly appreciated the ratio decidendi of the decision of the Supreme Court, and that according to that decision the determining or the decisive factor is the bad or dilapidated condition of the building, and that if that condition is not satisfied a landlord is not entitled to obtain eviction despite his establishing the other considerations like genuine desire, means, and immediate preparedness to demolish and put up a new building. After carefully examining that decision I am unable to take the view that it supports the extreme contention put forward on behalf of the tenants. In the first place, it must be observed that the observations therein, should be understood in the essential background of the established facts of that case. In that case the Rent Control authorities found that there was no proof that the building was in a dilapidated condition or the financial status of the landlord was such as to say that he had a genuine desire to demolish and reconstruct the building. It was also ground that the shops were in good condition and that the landlord was not in good faith wanting to replace the building when he had no means to build it. In revision the High Court reversed the decision of the Rent control authorities and ordered eviction on the short ground that the actual condition of the premises was a wholly irrelevant consideration. S. 13 of the Patiala and East Punjab State Union Urban Rent Restriction Ordinance provided that) the landlord may apply for eviction “in the case of any building if he (the landlord) requires it for re-erection of the building or for its replacement by another building or for the erection of other buildings”.

It also provided that the Controller shall, if he is satisfied that the claim of the landlord is bona fide , make an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession of the building. The Supreme Court took the view that the High Court had exceeded its powers of revision in interfering with a decision on a question of fact when it has not been made out that the decision of the Rent Control authorities was erroneous or improper. On the question of the construction of the Act the Supreme Court observed that according to the provisions it should be established that the claim of the landlord, that he required the building for reconstruction and re-erection must be bona fide that is to say “honest in the circumstances”. It was also pointed out that such a requirement should be considered in relation to the surrounding circumstances of the case. The matter was put thus at page 502 :—

“The very purpose of the Rent Restriction Acts would be defeated if the landlords were to come forward and to get tenants turned out, on the bare plea that they want to reconstruct the houses, without first establishing that the plea is bona fide with regard to all the circumstances, vis , that the houses need reconstruction or that they had the means to reconstruct them etc. The two Tribunals below had gone into the matter thoroughly, and had agreed that the landlord had neither the means to reconstruct the building nor had he made any attempt to face cross-examination as a party. They were also of the opinion that the building was in a good state and did not need to be pulled down or reconstructed”.

It must at once be noticed that the Supreme Court has used the disjunctive “or” wheat referring to the condition of the building and the means of the landlord to reconstruct them. I have no doubt that quite a different language would have been used to express the idea if the Supreme Court meant to hold that the decisive factor was the bad dilapidated condition of the building and nothing else. The very fact that reference was made to the absence of resources or the means of the landlord indicates that i n the view of the Supreme Court the means of the landlord and his immediate preparedness to demolish and reconstruct are equally germane and relevant considerations.

In this connection I may refer to the decision of the Supreme Court in Motiram v. Suraj Bhan A.I.R. 1960 S.C. 655. which had to consider S. 13 (3) (a) (iii) of the unamended East Punjab Urban Rent Restriction Act, III of 1949. In that case the application for eviction was filed both on the ground of wilful default in the payment of rent and also on the ground that the landlord required the shop for his personal use and with a view to reconstruct the shop for which the necessary plan has bean prepared and sanction obtained from the municipal committee. S. 13 (3) (a) (iii) of the East Punjab Act provided that the landlord may apply to the Controller for an order directing the tenant to put the landlord in possession in the case of any building if ha requires it for rebuilding or for its replacement by another building or for than erection of other buildings. The High Court held that the requirement of the landlord was bona fide and there was no evidence to show that the requirement of the landlord was otherwise. While affirming the decision of the High Court, Gajendragadkar, J. as he then was, delivering the judgment of the Supreme Court, observed as follows:

“All the relevant evidence available on the record on this point clearly sustains the view taken by the High Court that tha case made by the landlord under S. 13 (3) (a) (iii) was bona fide . Soon after he purchased the house he decided to reconstruct the building, moved the Municipality with his plan and obtained its sanction. It is difficult to understand how on these facts it would be permissible to hold that the landlord is acting mala fide ”.

From these observations it will be clear that the arrangements made by the landlord, his resources and getting sanction of the plan from the Municipality are all undoubtedly relevant and germane considerations bearing upon the question of the bona fide requirement of the landlord.

In any opinion, in arriving at the proper interpretation S. 14 (1) (b) it must be borne in mind that this provision was introduced for the first time in 1960 with a plethora of State legislations of various States, dealing with the topic of demolition and reconstruction. The legislature does not use the expression “reasonably requires” as in some other States which connote some element of objectivity. The Madrae provision has reproduced than Bengal Act of 1948 and not even that of 1950. In the 1950 Bengal Act on the topic of demolition and reconstruction the Bengal Act has added a rider as it were, that the relative public advantage on the question of increase or decrease in accommodation would be a relevant consideration. In the Madras Act, there is no such provision. Further the question of the relative hardship to the tenant outweighing the advantage of the landlord as bearing upon the question of eviction has been provided in the Madras Act in the proviso to S. 10 (3) (c), dealing with the requirement of additional accommodation by the landlord. To prevent arbitrary or unreasonable eviction which would frustrate and defeat the object of the Act, S. 14 has imposed the conditions that the purpose must be not only immediate demolition simpliciter but also the purpose of immediate reconstruction. In other words, both the conditions immediate demolition and immediate reconstruction must be satisfied concurrently. A time limit has also been specified for the commencement of the demolition work and its completion. There is also provision for the tenant to obtain possession back if the landlord failed to carry out the work of demolition. When so many conditions have been specifically provided, I do not see any justification for importing by implication a further condition regarding the age or the dilapidated nature of the building as a necessary condition for eviction. If the crux of the question is the condition of the building, I fail to see how any question of bona fide requirement can come into play at all. I am therefore clearly of the opinion that the bona fide requirements of the landlord can be proved either by proof of the bad condition of the building or by other circumstances such as the means of the landlord etc.

It only remains to refer to the English law and the relevant decisions which have been rendered under the Landlord and tenant Act of 1954 (2 and 3 Eliz. 2, c. 56). Several statutes have been enacted in England from time to time for regulating the rights and obligations between landlord and tenant, like Fixation of Fair Rent Act, Eviction of Tenants etc. S. 26 in the Act of 1954 provides that at the termination of a prior tenancy the tenant is entitled to apply for a statutory renewal of the tenancy. If the Court orders the grant of a new tenancy it shall be for such a period as may be agreed to between the parties or as determined by the Court to be reasonable in all circumstances not exceeding 14 years. S. 30 (1) (a) to (g) contain the grounds on which a landlord can oppose the tenant's application for renewal of tenancy. A comparison of those provisions with than provisions of Ss. 10 to 14 of Madras Act XVIII of 1960 shows that the grounds mentioned in S. 30 of the English Act are the grounds on which a landlord can seek eviction, like default in the payment of rent, unauthorised sub-letting, acts of waste, requirement of alternative or other accommodation etc. One of the grounds is that contained in S. 30 (f) which runs as follows :

“that on the termination of the current tenancy the landlord intends to demolish or reconstruct the premises comprised in the holding or a substantial part of those premises or to carry out substantial work of construction on the building or part thereof and that he could not reasonably do so without obtaining possession of the holding”

In Fisher v. Taylors Furnishing Stores Ltd., (1956) 2 A.E.R. 78., the tenant's application for the grant of a new lease of the shop was opposed by the Landlord under S. 30(1) (f) on the ground that the landlord intended to demolish and reconstruct the premises. The County Court Judge took the view that if the tenant was evicted that would enable the landlords to occupy the premises for the purpose of their own business under S. 30 (1) (g) for which they would otherwise be barred by reason of the statutory provision in the English Act that a purchaser within 5 years of his purchase would not be entitled to obtain possession of the premises. In other words, the County Court took the view that the genuine intention of the landlord to demolish the premises was offset by the circumstance that the landlord would thus be able to circumvent the provision which would preclude a purchaser-front obtaining possession within five years of his purchase. The Court of appeal did not agree with this view and held that the tenant was not entitled to the renewal and that the landlord was entitled to obtain possession of the building for demolition. Denning L.J.' observed as follows at page 79 :

“So he puts forward a case for reconstruction under S. 30 (1) (f), hoping to get possession on that ground. In such circumstances, the Court must be careful to sea that S. 30 (1) (f) is fully satisfied before it allows him to get possession. For this purpose, the Court must be satisfied that the intention to reconstruct is genuine and not colourable; that it is a firm and settled intention, not likely to be changed; that the reconstruction is of a substantial part of the premises, indeed so substantial that it cannot be thought to be a device to gat possession; that the work is so extensive that it is necessary to get possession of the holding in order to do it; and that it is intended to do the work at once and not after a time. Unless the Court were to insist strictly on those requirements, tenants might be deprived of the protection which parliament intended them to have. It must be remembered that, if the landlord, having got possession, honestly changes his mind and does not do any work of reconstruction, the tenant has no remedy. Hence the necessity for a firm and settled intention.

Morris L J. put the matter thus at page 81:

“S. 31(1) provides : If the landlord opposes an application under S. 24 (1) of this Act on grounds on which he is entitled to oppose it in accordance with the last foregoing section and establishes any of those grounds to the satisfaction of the Court, the Court shall not make an order for the grant of a new tenancy. Words to be noted are “and establishes any of those grounds to the satisfaction of the Court”. In the present case the first two findings of the learned County Court Judge were as follows : (1) That on the determination Of the tenancy at Christmas 1955, the respondent landlords do intend to demolish the whole of No. 72. (2) That they cannot reasonably do so without obtaining possession of the holding. Why then should the landlords not succeed in opposing their tenant's application? Counsel for the tenant submits two reasons. In the first place he submits that a landlord can only succeed in his opposition under S. 20 (1) (f) if the proposed works owe their planning and inception to the dictates of sound estate management, or, stated otherwise, if viewed in detachment and unrelated to any intention to occupy, the landlord has the objective aim of protecting the asset of which he is owner. But I do not find in the section any wording which warrants these submissions. The landlord must show that ha has an intention as laid down. If ho shows that he has that intention and that he could not reasonably carry it out without obtaining possession of the holding, then he succeeds in his opposition.”

Rejecting a similar argument based upon the condition of the building or the prudence of the landlord's requirement, Parket L. J., observed as follows at page 85:—

“Counsel for the tenant, however, urged that, in order to rely on para (f), the landlord must show that his intention to do the work is based on principles of good business management or of sound, economics. Again I can see no warrant for introducing any such implied limitation on the express words of the paragraph. No doubt if a landlord alleged an intention to pull down perfectly sound and useful buildings, that intention would be suspect and makes it harder for him to establish the genuineness of his alleged intention, but it is another thing to gay that, however genuine his Intention, ha cannot succeed unless he can show that the proposed work is consistent with good business management”.

From this decision it follows that if the requirement of the landlord is proved to be genuine and not spurious or specious he will be entitled to obtain an order for eviction.

The same view was taken in a later decision of the Court of Appeal in Craddock v. Hampshire C.C., (1958) 1 A.E.R. 449., and the earlier decision of the Court of Appeal, referred to earlier was applied. In that case the tenant contended that the landlord's objection under S. 30 (1) (f) was not based upon a genuine intention to demolish but the landlords were only pretending to say so. Lord Evershed M. R. rejected the argument in the following words:—

“It would still be open to the tenant to say that the intention to demolish was not really a genuine intention at all—that the Council were not concerned to demolish; they were only pretending to say so, because they wanted to throw this property into an agricultural holding, and knew that unless they said that they were going to demolish they would not succeed in establishing the objection under the section. The short answer to any suggestion of that kind (and Counsel for the tenant did not contend to the contrary) is that the learned Judge held that there was here proved a genuine intention, a firm and settled intention, on the County Council's part to demolish”.

It is unnecessary to burden this judgment with a citation of other English decisions. It is sufficient to state that the principle that emerges from the English decisions is that a landlord is entitled to obtain eviction if he establishes a genuine bona fide intention to demolish even though ultimately a landlord after obtaining possession may be using the building for his own business purposes which latter purpose if relied upon would not have entitled the landlord to obtain eviction. In other words, a bona fide genuine intention and reasonable requirement cannot be off set by collateral consequences.

For all these reasons, I am of opinion that the landlady is entitled to an order for eviction in all the four cases. C.R.P. 1337, 1338 and 1342 of 1964 are allowed and C.R.P. 1255 of 1964 is dismissed and all the four petitions filed by the landlady are ordered. Parties shall bear their own costs throughout. Time for vacating till 31st May 1965 for all the four tenants.