1. This reference under Section 395 (2), Code of criminal Procedure, 1973 (for short the Code) by an Additional Sessions Judge, raises the following question for opinion of this Court: What is the ambit of powers of a Magistrate on an application for restoration of the complaint moved by a complainant, after his complaint had been already dismissed for his Don-appearance vis-a-vis: (a) a compoundable or non-cognizable case; (b) a cognizable or non-compoundable case.
2. The facts leading to the reference in brief are that Ram Babu-respondent No. 1 instituted a complaint against Mata Din and others in the court of a Metropolitan Magistrate under Sections 452, 324, 323 read with Section 34, Indian Penal Code (for short IPC). The accused were summoned by Shri Gurdeep Kumar, Metropolitan Magistrate vide order dated 13th March 1981 to stand trial for offences under Sections 452/324 and 322/34 I. P. C. Later, on 9th November 1982 the successor court presided over by Shri K. C. Lohia, Metropolitan Magistrate, dismissed the said complaint. It passed the following order: None for the parties. It is 3. 45 p. m. The case is called several times. So the case is dismissed in default. The file be consigned to the Record Room.
3. After about a month i. e. on 9th December, 1982, the complainant-Ram Babu moved an application for restoration of the complaint contending that he had mistaken the date of hearing to be 9th December 1982 instead of 9th November 1982. Shri R. C. Yaduvanshi, who had by then succeeded Shri K. C. Lohia, allowed the said application and restored the complaint to its original position. Feeling aggrieved by the said order the accused persons filed revision petition being Criminal Revision No. 81/83 in the Court of Session. It was heard by an Additional Sessions Judge, who vide order dated 8th August 1984 has made this reference for opinion of this Court on the aforesaid question of law. The learned Additional Sessions Judge noticed that there was a conflict of judicial opinion on the point in issue, in that some of the Judges of this Court took the view that a subordinate criminal court is competent to restore a complaint dismissed in default whereas some other Judges took the contrary view holding that in a situation like this the Magistrate dismissing the complaint becomes functus officio and in the absence of any specific provision enabling him to restore the complaint to its original position the prohibition contained in section 362 of the code would operate and preclude the Magistrate from reviving the complaint. He noticed that the conflict of opinion had become all the more irreconcilable subsequent to the decision of the Supreme Court in Bindeshwari Prasad v. Kali Singh section 362 of the code which corresponds to Section 369 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, 1898 (hereinafter referred to as the old Code) reads as under: Save as otherwise provided by this Code or by any other law for the time being in force, no Court, when it has signed its judgment or final, order disposing of a case, shall alter or review the same except to correct a clerical or arithmetical error.
4. It may be noticed here that the words or final order have been introduced in this Section to make clear that the Section is applicable to judgments as well as fin at orders These words did not exist in the Old Code. Evidently this Section embodies a universal, principle of law that, when a matter has been finally disposed of by a criminal court, the Court is, in the absence of a direct statutory provision, functus officio and cannot entertain a fresh prayer for the same relief unless and until the previous order of final disposal has been set aside. In other words, it cannot alter or recall its order which finally disposes of a case. The vital question for determination, therefore, would be whether an order of discharge like the present which purports to have been made under Section 249 of the Code, although not stated specifically, can be termed as judgment or final order or not. In other words, where the order in question is neither a judgment (within the meaning of Section 362) nor a final order, there is nothing in law preventing the court which passed it from reconsidering it or from entertaining a fresh application for the same reliof as was asked for in the proceeding in which the order was passed. This, would be the position notwithstanding the fact that there is no specific provision in the Code empowering a criminal court to alter, modify or recall its earlier order. Thus, the crucial question for determination is whether the impugned order falls within the ambit of prohibition enshrined in Section 362. There is a long catena of decisions of various High Courts that an order of discharge under section 259 of the old code made without consideration of the allegations on merit is not a judgment or a final order. (See Dwarka Nath Mondu/ v. Beni Mahub Banerji, Mir Ahmed Hossein v. Mahomed Askari, Mt. Harbari v. Raya Premji and another, Emperor v. Maheswara Kondaya and another, (a Bench decision of Madras High Court) and B. D. Sethi and others v. V. P. Dewan. The gist of all these authorities is that the word judgment indicates some final determination of the case which would end it once for all, such as an order. of conviction or acquittal. Hence, an order dismissing a complaint under Section 203 or discharging an accused under Section 259 is not a judgment. In B. D. Sethi (supra) the complaint had been instituted under section 500 I. P. C. It was dismissed in dofault of the appearance of the complainant. It was noticed that the offence there under was compoundable as well as non-cognizable. So, the complaint was dismissed under, section 259 of the old code. The Division Bench after adverting to several decisions of various High Courts including Dwarka Nath Mondul, Maheswara Kondaya and Mr. Harbai (supra) came to the conclusion that the order of discharge of an accused under section 259 of the old code did not amount to a judgment under that Code. Hence, the Magistrate would be competent to revive the complaint and re-summon the accused after setting aside the order, of discharge. V. D. Misra, J. who spoke for the Court, specifically adverted to the following observation of the Federal Court in Kuppuswamy Rao v. The Kind. In our opinion, the term judgment itself indicates a judicial decision given on the merits of the dispute brought before the Court. In a criminal case it cannot cover a preliminary or interlocutory order.
5. Pertinently this observation of the Federal Court was considered recently in Madhu Limaye v. State Of Maharashtra., in the context of the bar contained in Section 397 (2) of the Code with regard to the exercise of revisional power in relation to an interlocutory order Said Untwalia, J. who spoke for the court: Before we conclude we may point out an obvious, almost insurmountable, difficulty in the way of applying literally the test laid down in Kuppuswami Raots case (supra) and in holding that an order of the kind under consideration being not a final order must necessarily be an interlocutory one. If a complaint is dismissed under Section 203 or under Section 204 (4) or the Court holds the proceeding to be void or discharges the accused, a revision to the High Court at the instance of the complainant or the prosecutor would be competent, otherwise it will make Section 398 of the new Code otiose.
6. All the same the Supreme Court did not go to the extent of saying that in order of discharge like the present would be tantamount to a final order and all that it held was that an order rejecting the plea of the accused on a point which when accepted will conclude the particular proceeding, will surely be not an interlocutory order within the meaning of Section 397. Indeed, it classified such an order as something of intermediary nature falling in between the two i. e. an interlocutory order and a final order. Reliance in this context was placed by the Supreme Court on its earlier decision in Amar Nath and others v. State of Haryana and others, in which case too the question had arisen whether an order of the Magistrate summoning the accused was an interlocutory one or not.
7. Still later his very question cropped up before the Supreme Court in Municipal - Corporation of Delhi v. Girdhari Lal and others, but the Supreme Court loft this question open saying that: The question whether a discharge order is interlocutory or otherwise need not detain us because it is, settled by a decision of this Court that the discharge order terminates the proceeding and, therefore, it is revisable under Section 397 (1), Cr. P. C.
8. Evidently the Supreme Court has not dwelt upon this aspect of the matter.
9. Another reason why an order of discharge under Section 249 cannot be termed as a final order is that it must necessarily be made before the charge had been framed. In a warrant case Instituted otherwise on a police report discharge and acquittal of accused are distinct concepts applicable to different stages of the proceeding in court. The legal effect and incidents of discharge and acquittal are also different. An order of discharge in a warrant case instituted on a complaint can be made only after the process has been issued and before the charge is framed. Thus, the trial in a warrant case starts with the framing of charge prior to it the proceeding is only an inquiry. Hence, once a charge is framed the Magistrate has no power under any provision of the Code to cancel the charge and reverse the proceeding to the stage of Section 245 corresponding to Section 253 of the Old Code.
10. Yet another reason why an order of discharge under Section 249 cannot amount to a final order is that such an order does not operate as a bar to a second complaint on the same facts by the same complainant. Reference may be made with advantage to Raghuvans Prasad and another v. State, Sri Han Ghosh v. Sushil Chakravarty, Kala Singh v. Gurdev Kaur and Sudershan Prasad Jam and others v. Nem Chandra Jam and anr. In all these cases it has been held that dismissal of a complaint under Section 249 in a warrant case does not bar a fresh complaint on the same ground as it does not amount to acquittal. Thus, looked at from any angle the conclusion is irresistible that an order of discharge under Section 249 of the Code cannot be termed judgment or final order as envisaged in section 362 of the code. The same view has been expressed by Prithvi Raj, J. , in R. R. Verma v. T. M. Lalani and others. Following the decision in B. D. Sethi (supra) the learned Judge, held that an order dismissing the complaint for default of appearance of the complainant is not a: judgment nor, a final order disposing of the case finally and, therefore, does not fall within the mischief of section 362. The learned Judge further observed that a distinction would be drawn between cases in which the order of discharge has been passed on appreciation of evidence with a view to determine the guilt or innocence of the accused and those in which the proceedings are terminated because of the absence of the complainant. It is only in those cases where the Magistrate has applied his mind to the facts of the case and discharged the accused on forming of opinion that the evidence adduced does not prima facie establish the guilt of the accused, the order would be said to be a judgment or a final order. When, however, an accused is discharged for default of appearance of the complainant, it is not a decision given on merits. In such a case the Magistrate is competent to set aside his earlier order and revive the old complaint. For the reasons already stated, I am in respectful agreement with this view.
11. Mr. C. L. Prem, learned counsel for the accused, has, however, canvassed with considerable favour that the view expressed by the Division Bench of this Court in B. D. Sethi (supra) and followed by Prithivi Raj, J. , in R. R. Verma (supra) no longer holds the fields on account of the authoritative pronouncement made by the Supreme Court in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh (supra) to the effect that there is no provision in the Code empowering a Magistrate to review or recall a judicial order passed by him. The inherent powers under section 561a of the old code (section 482 of the code) are only given to the High Court and unlike Section 151, Code of Civil Procedure, subordinate criminal courts have on inherent powers. However, on bestowing my caroful thought and consideration, I am of the view that the said decision is of no avail to Shri Prem inasmuch as the facts of the case were entirely different.
12. A perusal of the judgment in Bindeswari Prasad Singh shows that the complaint therein was concerned with a trivial matter but the complaint even though filed as far back as 21st February 1966 dragged on for over two years. The Sub-Divisional Magistrate, who could well dispose of the. matter himself had he cared to persue the complaint but instead he ordered a detailed inquiry under section 202 of the code. It appeared that the complaint was tossed about from one Magistrate to another for inquiry and report without any conclusive result, starting from 21st February 1966 to 23rd November 1968 i. e. , for a period of more than two years. Ultimately on 23rd November 1968 the complaint was dismissed under Section 203 of the Code on the ground that the complainant was absent and did not show any interest in the inquiry ordered by the court. A few days thereafter the complainant appeared before the Magistrate and filed an application for recalling the aforesaid order. The Magistrate passed no order on that application and he sent the same for inquiry to another Magistrate. Mill latter the matter was sent to yet another Magistrate. Eventually the learned Magistrate passed an order on 3rd May 1972 taking cognizance of the case and summoning the accused. It was against the said order that the accused filed a revision petition. It was observed by their Lordships of the Supreme Court that order dated 23rd November 1968 dismissing the complaint under Section 203 was a judicial order by which the Magistrate had given full reasons for dismissing the complaint. Their Lordships further observed that even if the Magistrate had any jurisdiction to recall his order it could have been done by another judicial order after giving reasons that he was satisfied that a case was made out for recalling the order. However, it appeared that theft was no express order recalling the order dismissing the complaint and the recall could be inferred from the issue of the process vide order dated 3rd May 1975. Their Lordships, proceeded to say further that: We, however, need not dilate on this point because there is absolutely no provision in the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1898 (which applies to this case) empowering a Magistrate to review or recall an order passed by him. Code of Criminal Procedure does contain a provision for inherent powers, namely, Section 561-A which, however, confers these powers on the High Court and the High Court alone. Unlike Section 151 of Civil Procedure Code, the subordinate criminal courts have no inherent powers. In these circumstances, therefore, the learned Magistrate had absolutely no jurisdiction to recall the order dismissing the complaint. In fact after having passed the order dated 23. 11. 1968, the Sub-Divisional Magistrate became functus officio and had no power to review or recall that order on any ground whatsoever. In these circumstances, therefore, the order even if there be one, recalling order dismissing the complaint, was entirely without jurisdiction.
13. Evidently order dated 23rd November 1968 of the Sub-Divisional Magistrate was held by the Supreme Court to be a final order as it had been passed after giving reasons. Once it is borne in mind that the complaint which was for a petty offence had been tossed about for about two and a half years the observation of the Magistrate that the complainant was not showing any interest in the inquiry ordered by the court was perfectly justified. Even otherwise the inquiry initiated by the Sub-Divisional Magistrate under Chapter XV of the Code terminated with the dismissal of the complaint under Section 203. It was in this context that the Supreme Court repelled the alternative submission made by counsel for the complainant in that case that the application given by him for recalling the order of dismissal of the complaint would amount to a fresh complaint. Said their Lordships: We are, however, unable to agree with this contention because there was no fresh complaint and it is now well settled that a second complaint can lie only on fresh facts or even on the previous facts only if a special case is made out. This has been held by this Court in A. I. R. 1962 5. C. 876.
14. Hence, by no stretch of reasoning the decision of the Supreme Court can be construed as an authority for the proposition that an order of discharge under Section 249 of the Code would be tantamount to a judgment or a final order within the contemplation of section 362 of the code. Needless to say that an order under Section 203 deals with an entirely different situation from that under Section 249. The Supreme Court was not called upon to decide and did not decide that an order of discharge under Section 249 amounts to a final order. In the off-quoted words of Lord Halsbury in Quinn v. Leathen Every judgment must be read as applicable to the particular facts proved, or assumed to be proved, since the generality of the expressions which may be found there are not intended to be expositions of the whole law, but governed and qualified by the particular facts of the case in which such expressions are to be found. The other is that a case is only an authority for what it actually decides. I entirely deny that it can be quoted for a proposition that may seem to follow logically from it. Such a mode of reasoning assumes that the law is necessarily a logical code, whereas every lawyer must acknowledge that the law is not always logical at all.
15. Almost to the same effect is the following observation of the Supreme Court in H. H. Maharaja dhiraja Madhav Rao Jivoji Rao Sacindia Bahadur and others v. Union of India: It is difficult to regard a word, a clause or a sentence occurring in a judgment of this Court, divorced from its context, as containing a full exposition of the law on a question when the question did not even fall to be answered in that judgment.
16. Hence, I am not persuaded to hold that the decision in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh in any manner impinges upon or stultifies the ratio of the decision of the Division. Bench in B. D. Sethi. In other words, the said judgment still holds the field.
17. On a parity of reasoning it cannot be held by any stretch of reasoning that the judgment dated 4th January 1983 of M. L. Jam, J. , in Mst. Shakkat Bano and others v. Parveen Sun and others, Cr. M. (M) 228/82, strikes a discordant note from that in B. D. Sethi. Its perusal would show that the complainant filed a complaint against the accused therein on 14th January 1981. He and two of his witnesses were also examined. The case was listed for arguments on 7th November 1981. On that date no-one appeared for the complainant and the learned Magistrate dismissed the complaint in default. Subsequently it was restored on 10th November 1981 and on 19th December 1981 the learned Magistrate directed process to be issued against the accused. It was the last mentioned order which was challenged by the accused in the aforesaid revision and the learned Judge observed that for better or worse, the learned Magistrate had recorded the reason why he dismissed the complaint. His reason was that the complainant did not appear and, therefore, the impugned order was also a judicial order. Hence, applying the ratio decidendi in Bindeshwari Prasad Singh he held that the order of dismissal was a final order disposing of the case and as such it could not be recalled. Surely, this decision too is of no avail to Mr. Prem in the instant case.
18. The other two cases, viz. , Prem Pal Singh Rawat v. Ram Babu, and Balal Ahmed v. R. S. Arora and others, on which reliance has been placed by Mr. Prem too are of no help to him. Both these cases were of dismissal of complaint under section 256 of the code. In Prem Pal Singh Rawat (supra) the complaint had been instituted in respect of offences punishable under sections 503, 500 and 506 Indian Penal Code on the ground that the accused had issued some circulars defaming the complainant. Vide order dated 10th September, 1979 the Magistrate found that offences punishable under sections 503 and 506 were not made out. However, he held that there were good grounds for proceeding against the accused for an offence under section 500 Indian Penal Code. Subsequently on December 2, 1976, the learned Magistrate dismissed the complaint in dofault. He, inter alia, observed that the accused had been summoned for the commission of an offence punishable under section 500 Indian Penal Code which was legally compoundable. Later on he restored the complaint to its original position vide order dated 4th December, 1976. The said order was challenged by the accused in revision. Luthra, J. before whom the matter came up for hearing noticed that the said case was not a warrant case because the maximum punishment provided for an offence under section 500 Indian Penal Code is simple imprisonment for two years and as such the same being a summons case within the meaning of section 2, clauses (w) and (x) of the Code was to be dealt with in accordance with the procedure provided in Chapter XX of the Code. So, section 56 was attracted to the facts of the case. The said conclusion obligates a Magistrate to acquit the accused in the event of absence of the complainant unless for some reasons he thinks it proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day. Hence, his Lordship observed that the Magistrate was acting within his jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint and it having resulted in acquittal there was no provision in the Code under which a complaint dismissed under section 256 could be restored. Pertinently attention of his Lordship was invited to the Division Bench judgment in B. D. Sethi which was also complaint case under section 500 Indian Penal Code. However, his Lordship distinguished the said case on the short ground that an offence under section 500 was a warrant case under the Old Code because the definition of the warrant case then was any case relating to an offence punishable with death, imprisonment for life or imprisonment for a term exceeding one year. Hence, procedure for trial of warrant cases was applicable to B. D. Sethits case. His Lordship also adverted to the following observations appearing in para 8 of the judgment in B. D. Sethi: The petitioner cannot derive any help from this decision. In this case the com plaint was in respect of an offence for which the procedure laid down under Chapter XX of the Code for the trial of summons-cases had to be followed. section 247 of the code, which forms part of this Chapter, lays down that if the complainant does not appear the Magistrate shall acquit the accused unless for some reason he thinks proper to adjourn the hearing of the case to some other day. Under these circumstances the dismissal of the complaint though expressed to be under section 259 of the code was in fact under section 247 and the result was that the accused stood acquitted.
19. So his Lordship concluded that the Division Bench judgment in B. D. Singh was not applicable to the dismissal of the complaint under section 256 of the code. Obviously any order which results in acquittal of the accused cannot but be a final order and as such section 362 of the code would be at once attracted and operate as a bar to its recall or alteration in any manner. Evidently sections 249 and 256 of the Code are designed to deal with different situations. Section 249 relates to warrant cases where the offence is compoundable or is non-cognizable and the Magistrate is empowered thereunder to discharge the accused, when the complainant is absent whereas section 250 comes into play after the process is issued, against the accused in a summons case and the accused is present in court but the complainant is not present. Obviously, therefore, the consequences and incidents following from the order of dismissal of the complaint under these two sections are bound to be different and there is no parity between them. It may also pertinent to notice here that the only remedy of a complainant, who is aggrieved by an order of acquittal whether on merits or as a sequel to dismissal of the complaint under section 256, is clearly by way of appeal under section 3n, sub-section (4) of the Code. It is, of course, subject to has obtaining special leave from the High Court. The High Court can decided the sufficiency of cause of non- appearance of the complainant and on satisfaction it can set aside the acquittal but the Magistrate cannot recall his own order of dismissal and set aside the acquittal was a necessary consequence thereof. Reference in this context be made with advantage to M/s. Guest Keen Williams Ltd. v. Murarilal. Hence, by no stretch of reasoning can the judgment of Luthra, J. be said to be in conflict with that in B. D. Sethi, rather it is perfectly in conformity with the same. The so-called divergence between the two is just a myth and a moon shine. For the same reason the judgment of Goswamy, J. in Balal Ahmed cannot be said to be in any way in conflict with the view expressed by the Division Bench in B. D. Sethi. Indeed, the following observation of his Lordship, is very pertinent to note: Since there is a difference of judicial opinion I would have normally referred the matter to a larger Bench. However, considering the facts that the Division Bench has drawn a distinction between the summons case and the warrant case, I do not feel it necessary to refer this case to a larger Bench. Following the Division Bench, with respect, I hold that the order dated 25. 6. 1981 was a final order and the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to review or revise the said order TI
20. The upshot of the whole discussion, therefore, is that no conflict or divergence in the ratio decidendi of the various cases, adverted to above, is discernible at all. In other words, the legal position enunciated in B. D. Sethi still holds the field and neither Bindeshwari Prasad Singh nor other judgments, adverted to above, of various learned Single Judges of this Court impinge upon or are in conflict with the same. Unfortunately, the learned Additional Sessions Judge without carefully scrutinising and analysing the ratio decidendi of these judgments hastened to the conclusion that there is divergence of judicial opinion in the various decisions of this Court. Hence, I do not feel persuaded to make a reference of the question posed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge to a larger Bench. He shall decide the revision petition in the light of the Divison Bench judgment which applies to a warrant case like the present one.
21. There is yet another aspect of the matter which has been totally lost sight of by the learned Additional Sessions Judge. A bare reading of Section 249 would show that the power to dismiss a complaint in a warrant case can be exercised by a Magistrate when the complainant is absent only if the offence may be lawfully compounded or is not a cognizable offence. In other words, if either of the two conditions, namely, the offence may be lawfully compounded or it is not: a cognizable offence, exists the section will apply. To put it otherwise, where the offence is neither compoundable nor non-cognizable the Section does not apply. Roforence in this context be made to Shankar Dass v. Mahu Ram and others, and Satyananda Naik v. Bhaskar Naik and others. In the words of D. P. Mohapatra, J. , in the latter decision: A bare reading of the section shows that the power to discharge under this section can be exercised in all non-cognizable offences, whether compoundable or not, and in all compoundable offence whether cognizable or not. In other words, the offences of which the accused persons are charged must be either compoundable or non-cognizable in order to attract the provisions of the section.
22. That being the legal position it was the bounden duty of the learned Magistrate to apply his judicial mind on this aspect of the matter before he could think of dismissing the complaint in default. It is elementary that the trial court must satisfy itself that all the essential ingredients of a provision of law are satisfied before the power conferred on the court thereunder is exercised. This is, of course, subject to the further rider that where a provision of law confers discretion on the court the discretion must be exercised judiciously with a view to advance the interest of justice rather than defeat it. Hence, where any of the ingredients contained in Section 249 is missing the court cannot discharge the accused on the failure of the complainant and the only course open to the Magistrate in a warrant case which is neither non-cognizable nor compoundable would be to proceed with the trial after framing the charge against the accused and to conclude the same, notwithstanding the fact that the complainant has absented himself. I am fortified in this view of t he matter by a Division Bench judgment of Punjab and Haryana High Court in Ajit Singh v. Ved Raj. Gopal Singh, J. , who spoke for the Bench, has very rightly pointed out the. The Section makes a significant departure from what is provided for a similar situation arising in a summons case which is dealt with by section 247 of the code providing that the Magistrate must in that event dismiss the complaint unless he thinks proper to adjourn it to some other date or dispenses with the personal attendance of the complainant. The Code thus gives much greater importance to the trial of warrant cases, especially when they cover cognizable and non-compoundable cases, and this for good reasons. Offences covered by warrant cases are of a far more serious type than those which may be tried in summons cases and society as such, is considered to be vitally interested in the trial of the former, while the latter are regarded as disputes being, more or less, of a personal nature.
23. Applying this criterion to the case in hand it is clear that even though offences under Sections 323 and 324 are compoundable as provided for in section 320 of the code, offence under Section 452 is not only cognizable but also non-compoundable. This Section deals with house trespass having made preparation for causing hurt, assault etc. , and is punishable with imprisonment for seven years and fine. Hence, the Magistrate had no jurisdiction to dismiss the complaint at least with respect to this offence. Where several offences are alleged against the accused in a warrant case, it is necessary that all of them should be compound able or non-cognizable for that the Section to apply. Hence, it was not open to the learned Magistrate to invoke Section 249 in the instant case and the correct course for him was to enforce the presence of the complainant and his witnesses. Reference in this context may be made with advantage to Beni Lal Saha and others v. Pranab Kumar Sen, Inspector, Central Excise Preveltive, Belonia25, and Satyananda Naik v. Bhaskar Naik and others (supra). I am in respectful agreement with the view expressed in all these authorities as it would follow as a necessary corollary from the language of this Section.
24. If that be so, the order of discharge in the instant case must be held to be illegal being without jurisdiction. In other words, it is void ab initio and a nullity. As a necessary corollary it would follow that the Magistrate was bound to ignore it as a being nonest. This view finds ample support from the decisions in T Somu Naidu, Ramesh Pada Mandal v. Kadambini Dasi, Beni Lal Saha (supra) and a Full Bench decision of Jammu and Kashmir High Court in Prem Singh v. State and another. The view expressed in all these decisions is that where the conditions laid down by law as precedent and requisite to the hearing of the case are not observed, that court acts without jurisdiction and its order being void ab initio, from the case can be re-heard and that such rehearing would not be barred by Section 369 (of the Old Code). In this view of the matter too, therefore, the learned Magistrate was competent to restore the complaint to its original position as the order of dismissal in default was no order in the eye of law.
25. As a result, this reference is returned to the learned Additional Sessions Judge with the observation that there is no divergence of judicial opinion on the points raised by him in the various pronouncements of this Court as noticed by him in the order of reference. Further the law as laid down by the Division Bench of this Court in B. D. Sethi (supra) still holds the field. The learned Additional Sessions Judge shall, therefore, decide the revision petition in the light of the said judgment and the observations made by me in the foregoing paragraph. This reference stands disposed of accordingly. The parties are now directed to appear before the learned Additional Sessions Judge (or his successor court) on 30th July 1985. Reference returned.