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  • Section 7 Cl. 5(b) of the Court fees Act
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  • Section 7 Cl. 5(b) of the Court fees Act
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Opinion Summary — Civil Revision Petition (District Munsif, Erode; O.S. No. 152 of 1954)

Factual and Procedural Background

This is a Civil Revision Petition filed against an order of the learned District Munsif, Erode, in O.S. No. 152 of 1954. The original suit was instituted by Arunachala Goundan seeking a declaration of his sole title to items 1–3, 5–9, 11 and 12 of the plaint properties, a half share in items 4 and 10, and for possession and mesne profits.

The plaint alleges that S.A. Krishnaswami Goundan and the second defendant are the sons of the plaintiff and that they formed a joint Hindu family of which the plaintiff was manager. One Subbaraya Goundan was declared insolvent in I.P. 146 of 1929, and the insolvent's properties were sold at auction by the Official Receiver, Coimbatore, on 16-8-1953. The second defendant, for his father, was the highest bidder and a sale certificate was issued in his name. The plaintiff alleges he has enjoyed the properties since the sale by leasing and collecting rents. The second defendant allegedly executed a fictitious sale deed in favour of the first defendant; defendants 3–5 are lessees; defendants 6–9 are impleaded on account of asserted interests in certain survey numbers.

A preliminary issue was framed as to whether the suit had been properly valued for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction. The specific controversy was whether the lands in dispute are "lands paying only revenue to the Government" within the meaning of Section 7 Cl. 5(b) of the Court Fees Act (so that court-fee was to be based on ten times the annual revenue) or whether the suit should be treated as one for setting aside a sale deed dated 12-3-1945 (in which case the defendants argued court-fee should be on the market value of Rs. 15,000).

The learned District Munsif held that the court-fee paid on the plaint was correct. The defeated defendants filed the present Civil Revision Petition challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit has been properly valued for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction—specifically, whether the lands fall under Section 7 Cl. 5(b) of the Court Fees Act (lands paying only revenue) so that court-fee is calculated on ten times the annual revenue, or whether the suit must be construed as one for setting aside a sale deed and charged on an ad valorem basis (market value).
  2. Whether, on the plaint allegations, the plaintiff must pray for cancellation of the sale deed (and thereby attract ad valorem court-fee), or whether a third party plaintiff need not seek cancellation to obtain appropriate relief and correctly pay the court-fee based on the plaint as framed.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Allegations / Position

  • The plaintiff alleged ownership/entitlement to specified items of the plaint properties and asserted possession and receipt of rents since the auction sale. The plaintiff paid court-fee on the basis that the lands are "lands paying only revenue to the Government" under Section 7 Cl. 5(b) of the Court Fees Act (court-fee on ten times the annual revenue).
  • The plaint characterizes the sale deed (executed by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant) as a sham transaction; the plaintiff did not allege that he was a party to that sale deed or expressly seek cancellation of it.

Defendants' Contentions

  • The contesting defendants contended that the suit should be construed as one for setting aside the sale deed dated 12-3-1945 executed by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant, and that the plaintiff should therefore pay court-fee computed on the market value of the suit lands covered by that sale deed (ad valorem basis), which the defendants stated were worth Rs. 15,000.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kuttiammu v. Kalliani Amma, AIR 1943 Mad 474 (A) Authority for proposition that court cannot go beyond the plaint allegations; the allegation in the plaint determines court-fee and class of suit. Relied upon to support the view that the court-fee must be determined from the plaint allegations and that defendants' contentions cannot change the class of suit for court-fee purposes.
Secy. of State v. Lakhanna, AIR 1933 Mad 430 (B) Same proposition: court cannot go beyond the plaint; plaint determines court-fee class. Applied to reinforce that the defendant's allegations are immaterial for determining court-fee and jurisdiction under the Court Fees Act.
T.R. Manikkam Pillai v. T.S. Murugesam Pillai, AIR 1933 Mad 431 (C) Same proposition as above regarding reliance on plaint allegations for court-fee classification. Used to support the settled principle that the plaint allegations determine the court-fee characterisation.
Kayathan Roche v. Ohinnayya Roche, AIR 1939 Mad 435 (D) Principle that the substance of the relief as disclosed in the plaint determines the class under the Act; form of prayer is not decisive. Relied upon to state that substance over form governs classification for court-fee; court should look at plaint as a whole.
C. Athimoola Mudaliar v. Fathimathul Kubra Begam Saheba, AIR 1936 Mad 383 (E) Supports the proposition that substance of relief controls classification, not the form of the prayer. Applied to support the approach that the plaint's substance determines the class for court-fee assessment.
Alagar Iyengar v. Srinivasa Alyangar, AIR 1925 Mad 1248 (P) Authority cited among cases supporting substance-over-form in determining court-fee class. Referenced to buttress the rule that court-fee classification looks to the substance of the relief sought.
Ramaswami Ayyangar v. Rangachariar, AIR 1940 Mad 113 (G) Another authority cited for the substance-over-form principle in court-fee classification. Relied upon in the same cluster to support the view on determining the class of suit from the plaint as a whole.
Venkata Ramani v. Narayanaswami, AIR 1925 Mad 713 (H) Principle that court-fee is to be charged on plaints as framed and not as they ought to be framed. Applied in support of the proposition that the plaint should be charged based on its present averments; the court will not treat it as if it included a different prayer.
In re. Kallugudi Raehappa, AIR 1938 Mad 645 (I) Authority tied to the rule that court-fee is to be charged on the plaint as framed. Used to reinforce the principle that the court cannot treat a suit as including a prayer not actually in the plaint for fee purposes.
Devaki Antarjanam v. Mariyakutti Umma, AIR 1947 Mad 130 (J) Authority for the proposition that third parties not bound by a document need not sue for cancellation and can seek relief on the footing of ignoring the document. Applied to support the conclusion that the plaintiff, not being party to the sale deed, need not pray for cancellation to obtain appropriate relief and to justify the court-fee paid.
Ramanujam Pillai v. Ramaswami Pillai, AIR 1946 Mad 181 (K) Supports the proposition that third parties may ignore an impugned document and sue for relief without seeking cancellation. Relied upon to show that cancellation is not necessary where plaintiff is not a party to the challenged document.
Rangaswami Ayyangar v. Ammayee Ammal, AIR 1943 Mad 490 (L) Authority cited among cases that a plaintiff who is not party to a document need not seek cancellation to claim rights. Applied to support the reasoning that cancellation is not a precondition for seeking relief by a third party.
Vallabacharlu v. Rangacharlu, AIR 1937 Mad 449 (M) Another precedent for the rule that third parties can seek relief without suing for cancellation of documents. Used to reinforce the point that third parties are not obliged to sue for cancellation.
Athmaraman Chettiyar v. Saraswathi Ammal, AIR 1936 Mad 344 (N) Supports the same principle regarding the non-necessity of cancellation by third parties. Applied to the issue that the plaintiff need not seek cancellation to avoid ad valorem court-fee.
Venkatasiva Rao v. Venkatanarasimha Satyanarayanamurthy, AIR 1932 Mad 605 (O) Authority referred to among cases permitting plaintiffs not party to a document to obtain relief without cancellation. Referred to in support of the court's view on third-party relief and court-fee consequences.
AIR 1925 Mad 713 (referred again) Reaffirmation of the principle that court-fee is to be charged on the plaint as framed (same as Venkata Ramani). Reiterated in the opinion to underline that the court charges based on the plaint's actual averments.
Sankaran Nair v. Gopala Menon, 30 Mad 18 (P) Another authority cited for the principle that third parties need not seek cancellation of documents. Used to buttress the conclusion that cancellation is not necessary for third-party plaintiffs.
Kalianna Goundar v. Balasubramaniam, AIR 1947 Mad 237 (Q) Authority supporting the rule that third parties can ignore a challenged document and seek relief without cancellation. Relied on to confirm that the plaintiff's failure to pray for cancellation does not make the plaint improperly valued under the Court Fees Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The revisional court reviewed the preliminary issue raised on valuation for court-fee. The defendants' central contention was that the suit should be treated as one to set aside (cancel) the sale deed dated 12-3-1945 and therefore assessed on the market value (ad valorem) of Rs. 15,000. The learned District Munsif had rejected that contention and held the court-fee paid on the plaint (on the basis of ten times the annual revenue under Section 7 Cl. 5(b)) to be correct.

The court analysed the matter by reference to established authorities and statutory principle. It affirmed that for the purpose of court-fee the court must look to the allegations in the plaint, because the plaint's averments determine the class under which the suit falls for fee purposes; the court cannot go beyond the plaint to recharacterise the suit on the basis of the defendants' contentions. The Court Fees Act being a fiscal enactment must be strictly construed; in case of doubt it should be construed in favour of the subject but not so as to permit evasion by artful pleading.

The court emphasised the principle of "substance over form" — that the substance of the relief as disclosed by the plaint taken as a whole determines the class for fee purposes rather than the precise form of the prayer. However, it also noted that the court need not travel beyond the plaint allegations: if during trial it became apparent that the plaintiff was taking inconsistent positions for fee purposes and for trial, the court could require amendment to bind the plaintiff to a single case.

Critically, the court observed that cancellation presupposes that the person suing is an actual or constructive party to a valid and operative document; third parties prima facie are not bound by such a document and are not obliged to sue for cancellation. They can ignore the document and seek the appropriate relief on that footing while paying the proper court-fee appropriate to the plaint as framed.

Applying these principles to the present facts, the court concluded that on the plaint allegations no case for cancellation of the sale deed arose because the plaintiff was not a party to that deed and had alleged the deed to be a sham; therefore the plaintiff was not obliged to pray for cancellation and the court-fee paid was correct. The defendants' contention that the suit should be recharacterised for fee purposes was without merit.

Holding and Implications

Revision dismissed

Holding: The Civil Revision Petition was dismissed. The revisional court upheld the District Munsif's order that the court-fee paid on the plaint (calculated under Section 7 Cl. 5(b) as lands paying only revenue to the Government) was correct.

Implications: The direct effect is that the plaintiff's valuation and court-fee treatment stands; the plaintiff, being not a party to the sale deed and having pleaded it as a sham, need not seek cancellation of that deed to obtain relief, and the suit is to be assessed for court-fee on the basis of the plaint as framed. The opinion does not indicate the laying down of any new legal precedent beyond application of existing authorities.

K.S.B

    Thirupathiammal, In Re

    1. This is a Civil Revision Petition which is sought to be filed against the order made by the learned District Munsif, Erode, in O.S No. 152 of 1954. This was a suit filed by Arunachala Goundan for a declaration of his sole title to items 1 to 3, 5 to 9, 11 and 12 of the plaint properties and title in a half share in items 4 and 10 and for possession and mesne profits.

    2. The plaint allegations are: One S.A Krishnaswami Goundan and the 2nd defendant are the sons of the plaintiff. They constituted a joint Hindu family, of which the plaintiff was the manager. One Subbaraya Goundan filed I.P 146 of 1929 to declare him as an insolvent. The plaintiff herein was one of the creditors in that I.P The properties of the insolvent were sold in auction by the Official Receiver, Coimbator, on 16-8-1953.

    3. In that sale deft. 2, son of the plaintiff, for his father was the highest bidder and the sale was concluded in his favour and sale certificate was also issued in his name. From the date of sale the plaintiff was enjoying the properties by leasing them out, collecting rents etc. The 2nd defendant on account of misunderstandings between himself and plaintiff executed a fictitious sale deed in favour of the 1st defendant. Defendants 3 to 5 are the lessees thereof. The property G.S No. 347, dry A. 7-54 cents, is owned by the plaintiff and defendants 6 and 7 in moieties. The 1st defendant sold the half share belonging to the plaintiff therein to defendants 6 and 7. The 8th defendant has obtained sale of 5-15 cents in G.S No. 346 belonging to the plaintiff 9th defendant is a co-sharer with the plaintiff in G.S No. 9 and hence defendants 3 to 9 are impleaded.

    4. In this suit a preliminary issue was framed as to whether the suit had been properly valued for purposes of court-fee and jurisdiction.

    5. The controversy on the foot of which this preliminary issue had been framed is: The lands in dispute are lands paying only revenue to the Government within the meaning of Section 7 Cl. 5(b) of the Court fees Act and the plaintiff has paid Court-fee on the basis of ten times' the annual revenue. It is contended by the contesting defendants that this suit should be construed as one for setting aside the sale deed dated 12-3-1945 executed by the second defendant in favour of the first defendant and that accordingly the plaintiff should pay court-fee on the market value of the suit lands covered by the said sale deed which admittedly are worth Rs. 15,000.

    6. The learned District Munsif rejected the contention of the defendants and held that the court-fee paid on the plaint is correct. Hence this Revision petition by the defeated defendants.

    7. In Revision I consider that there are no merits whatsoever in this contention because on the plaint allegations no case has been made out for cancellation of the sale deed. It is well settled that a Court cannot go beyond the plaint allegations because it is the allegation in the plaint that determines the court-fee and the class under which the suit falls for the purpose of court-fee: The defendant's allegations and contentions are immaterial for this purpose: — ‘Kuttiammu v. Kalliani Amma, AIR 1943 Mad 474 (A); ‘Secy. of State v. Lakhanna,’ AIR 1933 Mad 430 (B); ‘T.R. Manikkam Pillai v. T.S. Murugesam Pillai’, AIR 1933 Mad 431 (C). While applying the provisions of the Act it should be remembered that the Act is a fiscal enactment and as such must be strictly construed and no extension of application of its provisions by analogy is permissible.

    8. In case of doubt the Act should be construed in favour of the subject. But at the same time it should not be construed so as to furnish a means of evasion. The amount of courts fee should not depend on the dexterity with which the pleadings may be drawn for the purpose of evading the payment of proper court-fee. A plaintiff cannot be allowed to evade payment of proper fee by omitting to ask for a relief when the success of his suit depends upon the relief being granted to him. So in order to determine the class under which a suit falls for the purpose of court-fee, the substance of the relief as disclosed in the plaint taken as a whole should be looked into and not the form of the prayer in which the relief is cast: — ‘Kayathan Roche v. Ohinnayya Roche’, AIR 1939 Mad 435 (D); ‘C. Athimoola Mudaliar v. Fathimathul Kubra Begam Saheba’, AIR 1936 Mad 383 (E); ‘Alagar Iyengar v. Srinivasa Alyangar’, AIR 1925 Mad 1248 (P); ‘Ramaswami Ayyangar v. Rangachariar’, AIR 1940 Mad 113 (G).

    9. But for this purpose it is not necessary to travel beyond the plaint allegations because assuming that in the course of the trial if it appears that it is the intention of the plaintiff to interpret the plaint in one way for the purpose of court-fee and in another way during the trial, the Court will be justified in returning the plaint for amendment so that the plaintiff be tied down to one specific case both for the purpose of court-fee and for trial see the unreported decision in ‘C.R.P No. 137 of 1947, D/- 13-2-1948 (G1)’. Court fee is to be charged on plaints as framed and not as they ought to be framed — ‘Venkata Ramani v. Narayanaswami’, AIR 1925 Mad 713 (H). In re. ‘Kallugudi Raehappa’, AIR 1938 Mad 645 (I). The court cannot treat a suit which does not include such a prayer as if it does so & demand court-fee from the plaintiff on a ‘ad valorem basis’ under clause (c) of S. 7(iv).

    10. In the present case on the plaint allegations the question of cancellation does not arise because the word ‘cancellation’ implies that the person suing should be an actual or constructive party to a valid and operative document. Prima facie third parties are not bound by a document of the description in question and are not obliged to sue for cancellation.

    11. They can ignore the document and ask for the appropriate relief that they may be entitled to on that footing and pay the proper court-fee thereon without asking for cancellation: — ‘Devaki Antarjanam v. Mariyakutti Umma’, AIR 1947 Mad 130 (J); ‘Ramanujam Pillai v. Ramaswami Pillai’, AIR 1946 Mad 181 (K); ‘Rangaswami Ayyangar v. Ammayee Ammal’, AIR 1943 Mad 490 (L); ‘Vallabacharlu v. Rangacharlu’, AIR 1937 Mad 449 (M); ‘Athmaraman Chettiyar v. Saraswathi Ammal’, AIR 1936 Mad 344 (N); “Venkatasiva Rao v. Venkatanarasimha Satyanarayanamurthy’, AIR 1932 Mad 605 (O) : AIR 1925 Mad 713 (11); ‘Sankaran Nair v. Gopala Menon’, 30 Mad 18 (P); ‘Kalianna Goundar v. Balasubramaniam’, AIR 1947 Mad 237 (Q).

    12. This is the conclusion arrived at by the learned District Munsif namely that the plaintiff not being a party to the above sale deed and the plaint allegations being to the effect that the said sale deed is a sham transaction, the plaintiff need not pray for cancellation of the document. This Civil Revision Petition consequently devoid of substance is hereby dismissed.

    K.S.B

    13. Revision dismissed.

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    Comments

    Thirupathiammal, In Re
    (Jan 18, 1955)