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  • Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act of 1937
  • provision in sub-section 3 of section 3
  • Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act
  • Hindu Womea's Rights to Property Act
  • Amendment Act of 1947
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  • Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act of 1937
  • provision in sub-section 3 of section 3
  • Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act
  • Hindu Womea's Rights to Property Act
  • Amendment Act of 1947
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

In 1927 Gnanambal and others executed a settlement deed dedicating certain properties to the Annadhanam Charity of Ayyan Papakudi Choultry. The dedication appointed Ramaswami Konar as trustee, and directed that he and after him his heirs should manage the properties and perform the charity. Ramaswami Konar had two wives. By his first wife he had a son, Kartik Kone (the defendant in the present appeal). The second wife was Bhagyathammal (the plaintiff), who had a daughter, Chinna Ponnu.

After Ramaswami Konar's death in 1942, Bhagyathammal was permitted to remain in possession of half the trust estate. In 1955 Kartik Kone filed suit O.S. No. 248 (District Munsif's Court, Madurai Taluk) seeking recovery of trust properties from Bhagyathammal and her daughter. The trial court dismissed the suit, but on appeal Kartik succeeded and obtained a decree for recovery of possession and mesne profits. The matter proceeded to a second appeal (S.A. No. 905 of 1959) before this Court. Kailasam, J., in that second appeal confirmed the validity of the trust, held that the heirs of Ramaswami Konar inherited the trust estate, and concluded that the right of trusteeship is "property" within the meaning of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act so that Bhagyathammal (the widow) was entitled to inherit the trusteeship and be a co-trustee with Kartik. The decree in the second appeal was modified to declare Bhagyathammal entitled to joint management, while directing her to take appropriate steps by separate proceedings to work out her rights.

Pursuant to that decree, Bhagyathammal filed the present suit seeking joint possession of the trust properties with Kartik Kone and a direction for him to render accounts. The defendant resisted, arguing among other things that (a) in the earlier appeal Bhagyathammal repudiated the trust and no issue on co-trusteeship was decided, (b) she had lost any rights by adverse possession, and (c) because succession opened in 1942 (prior to an amendment extending the Act to agricultural lands), she could not benefit under the Act as amended. The trial court rejected most of the defendant's contentions but refused to grant joint possession on the basis that Bhagyathammal had not surrendered possession of part of the properties as directed in S.A. No. 905 of 1959. Both parties appealed; the Subordinate Judge allowed Bhagyathammal's appeal and dismissed the defendant's. The defendant then preferred the present second appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Is the mere right of management of the trust conferred upon Ramaswami Konar and his heirs, without any beneficial interest in the properties being available to the trustees, heritable property as understood in law?
  2. Is such property within the scope of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act?
  3. Given that the Act was amended in 1947 to bring agricultural lands within its scope, and succession opened in 1942, can Bhagyathammal claim any rights under that Act?
  4. Did this Court in S.A. No. 905 of 1959 render an enforceable decision that Bhagyathammal was entitled to joint trusteeship, or were the Court's observations on that point mere obiter dicta?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's (Defendant's) Arguments — as advanced by Mr. V.K. Thiruvenkatachari

  • Relied heavily on Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi (1945) 1 M.L.J. 108 to contend that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act applies only to property beneficially owned and not to mere trusteeship.
  • Argued that the word "property" should be narrowly construed for the Act (and that a wider constitutional meaning of "property" should not be imported into the Act).
  • Contended that because the 1947 amendment bringing agricultural lands within the Act was not retrospective, Bhagyathammal (whose succession opened in 1942) could not claim under the amended Act.
  • Asserted that in the earlier litigation Bhagyathammal repudiated the trust and therefore the earlier decision did not confer rights of co-trusteeship upon her.

Respondent's (Plaintiff's) Arguments — as advanced by Mr. M. S. Venkatarama Iyer

  • Argued that an office or right of management (even without beneficial interest or emoluments) can be "property" and devolve by inheritance; cited authorities holding an office may be hereditary and regarded as immovable property under Hindu law.
  • Contended that observations in Umayal Achi were distinguished or explained in later decisions and do not preclude operation of the Act to trusteeship rights.
  • Maintained that even if the trustee has no beneficial interest in the trust property, the right of management is a proprietary interest which falls within the expression "property" in the Act.
  • Argued that the decision in S.A. No. 905 of 1959 directly determined Bhagyathammal's right to joint management (and that the decree embodied that decision), so the matter is res judicata and the defendant cannot now dispute it.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi (1945) 1 M.L.J. 108 The Federal Court suggested the Act was intended to apply only to property beneficially owned by the propositus and not to rights in the nature of trusteeship; observed that in case of an office the qualification of a "woman's estate" may be meaningless. The Court considered this decision but concluded its observations should be read in light of facts and later authorities; it rejected the appellant's contention that Umayal Achi precludes application of the Act to mere trusteeship.
Ranganatham Chetti v. Murugappa Chetty I.L.R. 29 Madras 283 Recognised that management/manager-ship of a hereditary Hindu temple could devolve on descendants even where no beneficial interest in the endowed property was available to the manager. Used as authority for the proposition that trusteeship/management rights can devolve by inheritance and be treated as property under Hindu law.
Manchur v. Bhupendranath A.I.R. 1932 Calcutta 791 Held that the office of a Shebeith is hereditary and regarded in Hindu law as immovable property (in a case where the Shebeith had a beneficial interest). Relied on to support the view that a religious office/Shebeithship may be regarded as property and hereditary.
Ramachar v. Venkatachar A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 661 Supports the view that a grant without words of limitation conveys an estate on inheritance — right of management passes by inheritance to natural heirs. Relied upon to show the accepted principle that management rights pass by inheritance where grant is silent on succession.
Shahar Bhanoo v. Aga Mohammad Jaffar Bindaneem (34 Indian Appeals) 46 Recognised that a female descendant may have a right to succeed to a trust office, though the court may appoint another in the interest of trust administration. Used to demonstrate that a woman's right to succeed is not denied by Hindu law though practical considerations may affect appointment.
Raj Kali Kuer v. Ram Rattan A.I.R. (1955) S.C. 493 Held a religious office can be hereditary and the right to such an office is in the nature of property under Hindu law; duties are primary and rights/emoluments appurtenant. Relied on to show a female may succeed to certain hereditary office-rights, subject to suitability for discharge of duties.
Angurbala v. Debabrata A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 293 Supreme Court held that Shebeithship may carry a personal proprietary interest even where no emoluments are attached; Section 3(1) of the Act speaks of "any property" and includes such interests; the Court qualified the Federal Court decision in Umayal Achi. Central to the Court's conclusion: Angurbala supports that trusteeship or Shebeith rights (including where no emoluments attach) can be "property" within the Act and that the Act applies to such interests.
Suryanarayanamurthi v. Seshamma A.I.R. 1950 Madras 103 Madras High Court decision illustrating that observations in Umayal Achi were too wide and should be read narrowly. The Court noted that the Supreme Court in Angurbala approved the Madras High Court decision; used as supportive authority for extending the Act to trusteeship-type interests.
Rajlakshmi Desi v. Banamali Sen A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 33 Explains the test of res judicata: identity of title is key and where a former court had competency, res judicata applies. Cited to support that the earlier second appeal decision (S.A. No. 905 of 1959) determining Bhagyathammal's title operates as res judicata.
Kolu Nambiar v. Chathu Nambiar 52 I.C. 158 Held that a matter could be 'in issue' under Section 11 CPC even if an express issue was not framed, if the decision on it was accessory to the decree. Applied to show that a question decided and embodied in a decree is substantially in issue and can operate as res judicata.
Sankara Mahalinga Chettiar v. Muthulakshmi 33 M.L.J. 740 Held that even an unnecessary finding if embodied in the decree will operate as res judicata. Relied upon to support the conclusion that the decree in S.A. No. 905 of 1959, containing the declaration of joint management, is binding and precludes re-litigation.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded step by step to address the enumerated issues using statutory interpretation, principles of Hindu law on succession to offices, and precedent:

  1. Nature of trusteeship as property: The Court reviewed treatises (Mulla and Halsbury) and decisions (Ranganatham Chetti, Manchur, Ramachar) showing that a Shebeith or manager's position blends elements of office and proprietary interest, and that the right of management or trusteeship can devolve by inheritance and be regarded as immovable property under Hindu law. The Court concluded that the right of trusteeship/management, even where no beneficial interest or emoluments attach, is a form of property to which a woman may succeed except where the office's spiritual duties make a woman's succession impracticable.
  2. Applicability of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act: The Court examined the purpose and text of the 1937 Act (especially Section 3) and observed the Act was intended to enlarge widow's rights. A plain reading of "property" in the Act appears wide. The Court considered the Federal Court's narrower view in Umayal Achi but found that later decisions, especially the Supreme Court's decision in Angurbala v. Debabrata, clarified that property as used in the Act includes interests of the nature of Shebeithship or trusteeship, including where no emoluments are attached. The Court therefore rejected the narrow construction urged by the appellant.
  3. Effect of the 1947 amendment: The Court explained that the 1947 amendment merely made the Act applicable to agricultural lands (previously outside the scope for constitutional/state-legislative reasons) and does not alter the character of the trusteeship-office itself. Because the office is distinct from the dedicated land, the amendment does not affect whether the office-right devolves under the Act. Thus the appellant's argument that succession opening in 1942 defeats any claim under the Act was rejected.
  4. Whether the earlier Second Appeal's decision was binding or merely obiter: The Court examined S.A. No. 905 of 1959 and noted that the question of Bhagyathammal's title to joint management was argued by both sides in that appeal and a clear conclusion was reached by Kailasam, J., that the Act applied and Bhagyathammal was entitled to joint management. Importantly, that determination was incorporated into the decree of the second appeal as a declaratory clause allowing Bhagyathammal to take steps by separate proceedings to work out her rights. The Court relied on authorities (Rajlakshmi Desi, Kolu Nambiar, Sankara Mahalinga Chettiar) to reason that a finding embodied in a decree has res judicata effect. Consequently, Kartik Kone could not at this stage dispute the decree unless he could show it was a nullity (which he did not).

Holding and Implications

Holding: THE APPEAL IS DISMISSED.

The Court affirmed the following concrete outcomes, based on the opinion:

  • The right of trusteeship or management of the trust properties is "property" under Hindu law and a woman can succeed to such property (subject to exceptions where spiritual duties prevent it).
  • The Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act applies to such rights of trusteeship (including where no emoluments are attached), and the 1947 amendment extending the Act to agricultural lands does not negate succession to the office when succession opened prior to the amendment.
  • The decree in S.A. No. 905 of 1959, which declared Bhagyathammal entitled to joint management and permitted her to take steps to work out her rights, is binding and operates as res judicata; the defendant cannot relitigate the right to joint management determined in that decree.
  • The present appeal is dismissed with costs.

Broader implications: The Court applied existing authorities (including Angurbala v. Debabrata) to confirm that trusteeship/Shebeith-type rights are within the ambit of "property" in the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act. The opinion primarily resolves the parties' rights in the present litigation and enforces the prior decree; it does not state that it sets a new precedent beyond the application of existing case law and statutory interpretation described above.

    Karthian Kone, Co-Trustee Of Ayan Papakudi Choultry Charity v. Baghyathammal Co-Trustee Of Ayan Papakudi Choultry Charity.

    (SRINIVASAN, J.)

    In order to understand the point that arises for consideration in this appeal, a few facts relating to a prior litigation between the sane parties have to be set out.

    One Gnanambal and certain others execu-ted a settlement deed dated 4th July, 1927 endowing certain properties for the Annadha-nam Charity of Ayyan Papakudi Choultry. The validity of this trust is so longer in Issue. One Ramaswanal Konar was appointed as the trustee by the settlor and he and after him his heirs were directed to manage the properties and perform the charity. This Rama-swami Konar had two wives. By the first wife, Kartik Kone, the present defendant, was his son. The second wife is the plaintiff is the suit and she has a daughter, one Chiana Ponnu. For reasons that are not germane Bhagyathammal, the second wife, was allowed to be in possession of half the trust estate after the death of her husband, Ramaswami Konar, in 1942. In 1955, Kartik Kone, the present defendant, filed a suit O S. No. 248 of 1955, District Munsif's Court, Madurai Taluk, seeking to recover possession of the trust properties from Bhagyathammal and her daughter. Now, it appears that Bhagyathammal had purported to execute a settlement deed in favour of her daughter, Chinna Ponnu. It was claimed in that suit that Bhagyathammal took possession on behalf of the plaintiff Kartik Kone under an arrangement to manage the properties on his behalf and to render an account thereof. The suit was accordingly laid for recovery of possession and for accounts. That suit was dismissed by the trial Court. But, on appeal, however, Kartik Kone succeeded and a decree was granted in his favour for recovery of possession and for mesne profits. The matter came before this Court in S.A. No. 905 of 1959. Kailasam, J, who heard the second appeal, confirmed the finding that the trust created by Gnanambal was genuine and had been acted upon. He rejected the contention that the properties were not affected by any trust and held that after the death of Ramaswamy Kone bis heirs inherited the trust estate. It was also contended before the learned Judge that even if there was a dedication of the properties, on the death of Ramaswami Kone. Bhagyathammal, his widow would also be entitled to the management of the properties along with Kartik Kone, the son of Ramaswami Kone. The learned Judge dealt with this contention and came to the conclusion that the right of trusteeship is property within the meaning of that expression under the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act and that the widow of Ramaswamy Kone was entitled to inherit this property, that is to say, to be a co-trustee along with her stepson, Kartik Kone (Son of Ramaswamy Kone by the first wife). The decree of the lower appellate court was accordingly modified granting a declaration in favour of Bhagyathammal that she was also entitled to joint management along with Kartik Kene of the trust properties. But Bhagyathammal was directed to take appropriate steps by separate proceedings to work out her rights to joint management.

    It was in pursuance of the right recognized by the above decree that Bhagyathammal filed the present suit, praying for a decree for joint possession of the trust properties along with the defendant Kartik Kone and for a direction to him to render accounts in respect of the trust properties. Her claim were resisted by the defendant, firstly, on the ground that the decision of this Court in S.A. 905 of 1959 did not confer any rights upon her, for the reason that in that earlier suit Bhagyathammal in fact repudiated the trust and there was no issue which went into the question of her rights to co-trusteeship. This contention was negatived. The defendant's contention that Bhagyathammal lost through adverse possession any rights in relation to trusteeship was also rejected by the trial court. The further contention that since the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act of 1937 was amended only in 1946 bringing within its scope agricultural lands, and, as the trust properties consist of agricultural lands, Bhagyathammal could not benefit under the Act as amended, for succession opened in 1942 prior to the amendment, was also negatived by the trial Court, holding that the decision of this Court in S.A. 905 of 1959 denied such a plea being available to the defendant. Though the trial court found in favour of Bhagyathammal on almost all the issues, it yet refused t grant a decrees for joint possession. This was based on the ground that she being in possession of part of the trust properties had not surrendered possession as directed in S.A. No. 905 of 1959, and that for this reason the suit as framed seeking joint possession only of the rest of the properties was not maintainable.

    Both sides appealed. The learned Subordinate Judge accepted the appeal of Bhagyathammal and dismissed that of the defendant. The defendant prefers this Second appeal.

    The principal questions raised in this second appeal are:

    (1) Is the mere right of management of the trust conferred upon Ramaswami Kone and this heirs, without any beneficial interest in the properties being available to the trustees, heritable property as understood in law?

    (2) Is such property within the scope of the separation of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act?

    (3) The amendment of the Act in 1947 bringing within its scope agricultural lands not being restrespective in operation, can Bhagyathammal claim any rights under that Act? and

    (4) On the question whether Bhagyathammal was entitled to joint trusteeship along with the defendant, did this Court in S A. 90S of 1959 render an enforceable decision, or are the observations of the Court in this regard mere obiter dicta?

    In dealing with the first three questions, Mr. V.K. Thiruvenkatacharl, learned Counsel for the appellant, has placed considerable reliance upon Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Aehi (1945) 1 M.L J. 108 a decision of the Federal Court. It is the contention of the learned counsel that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act would apply only to property which is beneficially owned and not to anything in the nature of a mere trusteeship. Certain observations of Varadachariar, J. have been relied upon in pursuing this line of argument. It is further contended that the expression “property” may have a far wider connotation in the Constitution that it has in municipal law and that such wider connotation cannot be applied in construing that expression in the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act. On the other side. Mr. M. S, Venkararama Iyer, for the respondent, urges that even apart from any additional right created by the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act in favour of female members of a joint Hindu family, numerous cases have held that an office, even though devoid of any beneficial interest in any property or emoluments attached to it, devolves by inheritance and that an office cannot In all cases be equated to property consisting of lands or other emoluments. It is next urged that the observations of Varadachariar, J, In the case cited above have been distinguished and explained in later decisions. It is claimed that if the office is regarded as distinct from any properties which the office-holder is called upon to manage, it can nevertheless be property within the meaning of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act. The fact that agricultural lands were brought within the scope of the Act only in 1947 would not therefore prevent a female member also succeeding to the property in a mere office in 1942, and no question of retrospective operation of the amendment of 1947 would therefore arise. It is next contended that though in the pleadings of Bhagyathammal in the earlier suit, the question of her right to joint trusteeship was not raised, it was nevertheless argued by both the sides during the course of the second appeal and a decision was in fact rendered by Kailasam, J. therein and that decision was incorporated in the decree in the second appeal. It is further said that the defendant-appellant himself sought a review of that decision which was dismissed. He could have appealed against the decree which embodied the decision that Bhagyathammal was entitled to joint trusteeship. Having failed to do so, that matter has become final and it is not open to the appellant at the present stage to deny the operative force of the decree in that second appeal. We shall row proceed to consider those questions.

    In Mulla's Hindu Law (13th Edn.) at page 445, the position of a Shebeith is explained as one where by virtue of his office he is also the administrator of the property attached to the temple of which he is the Shebaith, it is said that both the element of office and property or duties and personal interest are blended together and neither can be detached from the other. As regards the properly, he is in the position of a trustee, but as regards the service, to the temple and the duties that appertain to it, he is in the position of a holder of an office or dignity. It is not impossible therefore for the one to exist without the other, trough in cases where the Shebeith has a beneficial interest in the property, the two no doubt exist jointly. According to Halsbury's Laws of England (Second Edn-), Volume 33-paragraph 357. at common law, trust property devolves in the same way as property to which a person is beneficially entitled, and, consequently, on the death of a sole or surviving trustee, all personal estate which was vested in him upon any trust devolves upon his personal representatives It would follow from this that the office of trusteeship would also follow the line of devolution of personal or real property. This legal position is recognised in a very early decision of the Privy Council in Ranganatham Chetti v. Murugappa Chetty I.L.R. 29 Madras 283, The facts of that, case show that the manager ship of a Hindu temple which was hereditary is the family of the sole manager and no beneficial interest in the endowed property or income was available to the manager, devolved on his descendants. The question in that case arise as to the validity of an internal arrangement with regard to the management, which was upheld That was no doubt a case of male heirs succeeding to that interest in the trusteeship. But the principle enunciated in Halsbury's Laws of England that the trust estate devolves on the personal representatives is recognised in this decision Manchur v. Bhupendranath A.I.R. 1932 Calcutta 791 was no doubt concerned with a Shebeitbship which had a beneficial interest in the endowed property. But it was held therein that the office of a Shebeith is hereditary and is regarded in Hindu Law as imoveable property. It was further held that while a founder of a trust in competent to lay down the rules of succession to the office, he cannot create any estate unknown to Hindu Law and if any rule of succession to the office provides for the office to be held by some only among the heirs of the founder to the exclusion of others in the line of succession, thereby deviating from the line of Hindu inheritance such a rule would be invalid. It is also the accepted position in law that even if the grant says nothing about the succession, the right of management passes by inheritance to the natural heirs of the donee. This is based upon the principle that a grant without any words of limitation conveys an estate on inheritance (See Mayne's Hindu Law-11th Edn. Paragraph 808). This view finds support in Ramachar v. Venkatachar A.I.R. 1938 Mad. 661.

    Nor can it be contended that a woman by reason of her sex is denied the right to succeed. In Shahar Bhanoo v. Aga Mohammad Jaffar Bindaneem 34 Indian Appeals, 46 was considered a case where the court bad to exercise a discretion in the selection of a trustee. A female descendant claimed an absolute right to be appointed, but the Privy Council observed that though she had a right to succeed, still the Court which had to exercise is discretion in the matter was right in appointing another person in preference to the female claimant who could at best discharge many of the duties only by a deputy. The point to notice in so far as this decision is concerned is that the Judicial Committee did net deny the right of the female descendant to succeed, but upheld the order of appointment of another person in the interest of the trust. Such a right in a female was also upheld in the case of a Shebeithi in Raj Kali Kuer v. Ram Rattan A.I.R. (1955) S.C. 493. This decision also laid down that a religious office can be hereditary and that the right to such an office is in the nature of property under the Hindu Law. Their Lordships observe also that in respect of such officers, especially where they are attached to public institutions, the duties are to be regarded as primary and the rights and emoluments only appurtenant to the duties. If, therefore, it is found that the recognition of a female's right to succeed to the hereditary office of Poojari in a temple held by her husband is incompatible with her due discharge of the duties of the office, her right to succeed must be negatived, but there is no legal prohibition against a woman holding a Muthavalliship when the trust by its nature involves no spiritual duties such as a woman could not properly discharge in person or by deputy, and in coming to that conclusion they relied upon the Privy Council decision is Shahar Bhanoo v. Aga Mohammad Jaffar Bindaneem 34 Indian Appeals, 46.

    We thus reach the conclusion that the right of trusteeship or the right of management of trust properties, whether the trustee has or has not a beneficial interest in the properties dedicated to the trust, is property and regarded as immovable property under the Hindu Law to which a woman can also succeed, except in eases where the functions required to be discharged by the trustee involve spiritual duties which a woman cannot properly discharge.

    Prior to the passing of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act, the position in Hindu Law was that a woman cannot succeed to the property of her husband in the presence of her son. The Act was intended to enlarge the rights of the widow and to remove the obstacles that stood in the way of her succession. As the preamble to the Act indicates, it was intended to confer better rights upon women in respect of property. Undoubtedly, if succession to Ramaswami Kone had opened prior to this Act, since the defendant, son of Ramaswami Kone, was alive, Bhagyathammal, his step-mother, could have no rights in relation to the trust property. S. 3 of the Act provided by Sub-S 2, that when a Hindu, governed by say school of Hindu Law other than the Dhayabbaga school or by customary law dies, having at the time of his death an interest in a Hindu joint family property, hit widow shall have the same interest in the property as he himself had. But this interest was declared by Sub-S. 3 to be a limited inter left, known as the Hindu Woman's Estate. Sub-S. 1 of this section deals among other things with separate property, left by a Hindu governed by the Mithakshara Law dying intestate, and it states that his widow shall be entitled to the same share as a son in respect of the property left by the Hindu. The same qualification that such an interest shall be a limited interest known as the Hindu Woman's estate applied in this case. A plain reading of this section would appear to cover any kind of property, for the wide amplitude of the expression ‘property’ is nowhere whittled down by any of the provisions of the Act. It is no doubt true that in 1947, the Act was amended to bring within its scope agricultural lands. That was for the reason that agricultural lands came within List 2 of the VII Sch to the Constitution and could be legislated upon only by the State Legislature, But locking at the right to management as property, independent of the thing to be managed, namely, agricultural land, the subsequent amendment in no way affects the interpretation that should normally be placed upon the expression ‘property’. It is however the contention of Mr. V.K. Thiruvenkatacbari that the pronouncement of the Federal Court in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi (1945)1 M.L.J. 108 gives a limited construction to the word ‘ property ‘ in relation to the rights sought to be conferred upon women. It is claimed for the other side however that this limitation sought to be inferred from this decision has not been accepted in later decisions.

    Umayal Achi v. Lakshm Achi (1945)1 M.L.J. 108 was really concerned with the validity of the Act. In so far as we are concerned, the contention that it was ultra vires the Indian Legislature was advanced only to the extent that agricultural lands could be comprehended within the several term ‘property’. It was further contended that the court could not recognise the validity of the Act by excluding agricultural land from its operation. The majority of the court held that the Act was validly enacted, though the Act could not affect the devolution of agricultural land. The question which is more pertinent to the present case arose in this manner. One Aronachalam Chettiar died leaving behind him two widows. He had no male issue, and he, by will, appointed two relaticns as executors and entrusted to them the management of his large estate under the numerous religious and charitable trusts. The plaintiff in the suit was the widow of a predeceased son, and the two surviving wives were the defendants in the suit. The plaintiff in assertion of the rights created in favour of the widow of a predeased son by the 1937 Act claimed a share in the estate. The genuineness of the will left by the testator was put in issue and it was affirmed. It was also held that the executors were not entitled to remain in possession till the three widows made adoptions which were permitted by the will. The trial court granted the plaintiff a half share in all the immovable properties and the movable assets, but dismissed the plaintiff's claim to a share in the trusteeship of the religious and charitable endowments. On appeal, the High Court modified the decree limiting the plaintiff's right only in respect of immovable properties other than agricultural properties. One of the questions brought before the Federal Court wag whether the rejection of the plaintiff's claim to a share in the management of the religious and charitable trusts was correct. Varadacbariar, J., observed to at he was inclined to agree with the High Court in the view that it took that the Act was intended to apply only to property beneficially owned by the prepositus and not to anything in the nature of a trusteeship. He said:

    "The Hindu Law has no doubt regarded trusteeship as property for certain purposes and it has long been established that the title to the management of religious and charitable trusts follows the line of inheritance from the founder where no other arrangement has been made therefore. The question is whether the heirs are to be determined according to the ordinary Hindu Law or according to the previsions of Act XVIII of 1937 In view of the limited objective of the Act, the ordinary rule of Hindu Law must furnish the rule of succession That the Act was intended to deal only with private property is shown by the provision in sub-section 3 of section 3 to the effect that the interest devolving on a Hindu Widow under the preceding sub-sections shall be only the limited interest known as a Woman's estate. This provision will be appropriate enough in relation to private property where the woman's estate is different from the interest taken by a male heir. But, in respect of trusteeship or other similar office, the law makes no difference between interest taken by a male heir and the interest taken by a female heir"
    .

    It will be seen from the above passage that the principal reason why this limited cons-traction was adopted was, firstly, that the Act would apply only to property which was beneficially owned, and secondly, that in the case of an office such as a trustee, though it is property, the qualification that the interest inherited by the widow should be a woman's estate would be meaningless. Spense, C.J., did not amplify this aspect of the matter but contented himself with expressing his general agreement with the views of Varadachari, J., Though Zafrulla Khan, J., the other learned judge, differed from the majority, with regard to the validity of the Act, he also purported to be in agreement on those other questions with Varadachariar, J. It is Mr. Thiruvenkata-chari's argument that this decision cuts at the root of the claim of the plaintiff in the present case Bhagyathammal, for both of the reasons mentioned above; firstly, neither Ramaswami Kone, the first trustee, nor his heirs can have any benificial interest in the trust properties; and secondly, since the law relating to trustee-ship makes no difference between the interest taken by a male and a female heirs, sub-Section 3 of Section 3 of the Act, which limits the interest taken by a female as a Hindu Women's estate should necessarily indicate that the property dealt with by Section 3 of the Act should be something other than the office of a trusteeship. On the other hand, Mr. M.S. Venkatarama Iyer contends that even these observations do not cut d own the measure of the expression ‘property’ used in the Act and that, in fact, in a later decision, the Supreme Court has not altogether approved of the limitations placed in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi (1945) 1 M.L.J. 108). This case was considered by the Supreme Court in Angurbala v. Debabrata (A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 293). The facts of that case were these. One Mrityunjayan, and his adoptive mother dedicated certain properties to the diety. The adoptive mother of Mrityunjayan had been performing the worship of the deity, and the document executed jointly by Mrityunjayan and his adoptive mother provided for a remuneration of 25 percent of the net income of the debutter property to the Shebeith or Shebeiths for the time being. The document provided that after the death of the adoptive mother, her son Mrityunjayan shall become the Shebeith, after his death his wife and after her death, the heirs of Mrityunjayan wereto be the Shebeiths. The wife of Mrityunjayan dying, Mrityunjayan married the plaintiff, Angurbala, and she brought the suit claiming to be entitled to the Shebeithship jointly with the defendant, her step-son, the son born to the first wife. As Mrityunjayan died in 1942 after the passing of the Hilda Women's Rights to property Act, she claimed to succeed along with her step-son as a co-heir under the provisions of that Act. The trial court in that case held that the plaintiff was neither the sole Shebeith nor entitled to claim Shebeith rights jointly with the defendant and that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act was inapplicable to devolution of Shebeith rights. On appeal, a Bench of the Calcutta High Court relied on the decision of the Federal Court in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi (1945) 1 M.L.J. 108) and denied the right of the plaintiff to succeed to Shebeitbisbip. The principal contention raised before their Lordships of the Supreme Court was that Shebeithiship being property, it would devolve under the above said Act upon both the plaintiff and the defendant jointly. Even assuming that the expression ‘property’ does not include Shebeitbi right, it was argued that succession to Shebeithiship was governed by the ordinary rales of inheritance in respect of secular property under the Hindu Law, and since the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act amended the general law of inheritance in certain natters, the same alteration should be reeognised in regard to succession to Shebeithship as well. For the other side, it was urged that the expression ‘property’ in the Act was net used in a wide and unlimited sense and that the Act could not have bad in its conterlation any rules of succession relating to the somewhat anomalous type of property which Shebeithship amounted to. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court had accordingly to consider whether the Act includes within its scope property of such a character as Shebaithship. They refer to the several decisions which pronounced upon the character of Shebeithship. They point out that Shebeithship may not be a mere office, for the Shebeith has not only duties to discharge but also a beneficial interest in the debutter property. At this point, we may refer to the principal argument to Mr. Thiruvenkatachari that this decision of the Supreme Court dealt with debutter property in which the Shebeith has a beneficial interest and whatever observations their Lordships of the Supreme Court may have made in commenting upon Umayal Achi v. Lakshmt Achi (1945) 1. M.L.J. 108 this decision must be confined only to such property in which the trustee has a beneficial interest, while, in the present case, the trustee has no such interest. This is the point of distinction which Mr. Thiruvenkatachari seeks to establish in support of his contention that this decision has net affected the principal basis of the decision in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi (1945) 1. M.L.J. 108. But, their Lordships of the Supreme Court in this decision say:—

    "Even where no emoluments are attached to the office of Shebeith; he enjoys some sort of right or Interest in the endowed property which partially at least has the character of a proprietary right. Thus, in the conception of a Shebeith, both the elements of office and property and duties and personal interest are mixed up and blended together and one of the elements cannot be detached from the other. It is presence of this personal or beneficial interest in the endowed property which invests Shebeithship with the character of proprietary rights and attaches to it the legal incidence of property."

    Clearly then, this decision postulates the principle that it is not only beneficial interest in the trust properry that makes it property but a personal interest of the nature of a proprietary right, even in cases where no emoluments are attached to the office, that is to say, where the trustee is not conferred with the right of taking for his personal benefit any part of the income of the debutter property. That a proprietory right exists even in the absence of a beneficial interest in the debutter property and that this proprietary right is of the nature of property recognised by Hindu Law is definitely stated by their Lordships herein.

    They next deal with the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act and point out that Section 3 (1) of the Act abrogates the general rule of Hindu Law according to which a widow succeeds to her deceased husband's property only in default of male issue and gives her the same share as a son along with or in default of male issue. Observing that Sec. 3 (1) of the Act speaks of any property, they say that the expression ‘prima facte’ includes all forms or types of interest answering to the description of property in law, such' property being heritable property. They repell the argument that the creation of the limited interest known as the Hindu Woman's, estate would be unmeaning in relation to Shebeithship. They point out that where under the ordinary law of inheritance, a She beithi right devolves upon a female heir in the absence of any male issue, her rights would be restricted in the same manner, that is to say, when a Hindu female heir succeeds to the property of a male propositus, she cannot transmit the interest which she inherits to her own heir upon her death and the property would go after her death not to her heirs but to the heirs of the last male owner. This limitation applies irrespective of whether the property is ordinary property or the property denoted by a Shebeithi right. And finally they conclude that there is nothing in any of the previsions of the Act from which an infers once can be drawn that the expression ‘property ‘used in S. 3 (1) has a limited or restricted interpretation and is not applicable to Shebeithship which is recognised as property in Hindu Law.

    Having reached the above conclusion on a consideration of the meaning of the expression of ‘property’ in general and its implication in the light of the provisions of the Act, they discuss the actual decision in Umayal Achi v. Lakshi Achi (1945) 1. M.L.J. 108. Dealing with the view expressed by Varadachariar, J., that this Act was intended to apply only to properties beneficially owned by the propositus and not to rights in the nature of trusteeship, they say:

    "It seems to us that property construed, this decision does not stand in the way of the appellant In the first place, we do not know at all what the nature of these trusts was. The learned Judge observed himself in his judgment that there was little or no evidence as to the terms of the foundations in respect of any of the trusts ‘managed ‘by the deceased. This observation taken along with the terms of the documents referred to in the judgment would go to show that the deceased was a mere manager of t he trusts and in respect of some, of them at least, he was the manager jointly with others Varadachariar, J., observed with reference to the documents relied upon that they only provided for’ management by his heirs."

    They only express what we feel amounts to a qualified approval of the observations of Varadachariar, J., and conclude that these observations should be construed in the light of the facts and the actual decision in that case. They again say that trusteeship is net certainly equivalent to Shebeithship and observe that if trusteeship, even it is regarded as property, carries with it no emoluments or beneficial interest for the trustee and consists of nothing else but a bundle of obligations and duties, it might possibly be said that giving a share in inch rights to a Hindu widow would not in any way improve her position. Read however in the light of the earlier observation of their Lordships of the Supreme Court that the expression' property ‘ as used in the Act would include property in the nature of trusteeship, which does not take in any beneficial interest in the de butter property, there is no reason to doubt the actual conclusion reached, namely, that the Act would take in such property as well. In fact, their Lordships approve of a decision of a Bench of the Madras High Court in Suryanarayanamurthi v. Seshamma A.I.R. 1950 Madras. 103. In that case, the High Court pointed out that the observations in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi (1945) 1 M.L.J. 108 were somewhat wide a view which their Lordships of the Supreme Court concurred in.

    We are unable to agree with the contention of Mr. Thiruvenkatachari that the decision in Umayal Achi v. Lakshmi Achi (1945) 1 M.L.J. 108 has been approved in full by the Supreme Court in Angurbala v. Debabrala A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 293 and that the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act does not take in property of the nature involved in this case, namely a mere trusteeship with no emoluments attached thereto, or where the trustee has no beneficial interest in the trust property. Even from first principals, If mere trusteeship is property recognised by the Hindu Law, a view which is affirmed by their Lordships in Angurbala v. Debabrala A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 293 there is nothing in this Act which excludes it from the scope of property which a Hindu female can inherit. Their Lordships clearly lay down that under the ordinary rules of inheritance, a female could succeed to such property even in the absence of any beneficial interest and the only limitation which the Hindu Law laid being that after the death of the widow the heirs to the office would have to be found from among the heirs of the last male owner. We see no reason therefore to hold that notwithstanding the absence of any beneficial interest in the trust property the widow could not succeed along with the male Issue.

    We also see no substance in the argument that, if at all, the widow could only claim to succeed under the Amendment Act of 1947 and that this Act not being retrospective In operation, She could not claim such rights under the Act. By the 1947 Amendment of the Act what was done was merely to make the Act applicable to agricultural lands. The 1937 Act being a piece of Central legislation could not legislate with regard to agricultural lands and succession thereto and it was the shortcoming in that Act that was sought to be removed by the amendment in 1947. It seems to us that this argument proceeds on the mistaken conception that the office itself can be equated to land which formed the debutter property. As hrs been pointed out by the Supreme Court itself in Angurbala v. Debabrata A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 293 the office itself without any regard to the beneficial interest in the trust property would be in the nature of property in which the trustee can claim a proprietory right. The fact that the Act was amended in 1947 does not affect the question that we have to consider. In our view, the office being distinct from the property, the amendment has no effect upon the devolution.

    We referred to the earlier decision of this Court In S.A. No. 905 of 1959. That Second appeal came to be filed by Bhagyathammal against the decision of the courts below in the suit filed by Kartik Kone, the present defendant, for recovery of part of the trust properties from the possession of Bhagyathammal, till the stage of the Second Appeal, Bhagyathammal had not put forward any claim to joint trusteeship. She even questioned the validity of the trust and urged that the trust did not at all come into existance. This Court held in the second appeal that the trust had been validly created and was acted upon and proceeded to consider whether Bhagyathammal would be entitled to the mangement of the trust estate along with the defendant Kartik Kone. This question was principally considered in the light of the Hindu Women's Rights to Property Act and the learned Judge came to the conclusion that the Hindu Womea's Rights to Property Act is applicable to the right of management in the nature of trusteeship and that Bhagyathammal would be entitled to joint management. The learned Judge in coming to that conclusion relied apon the decision of the Madras High Court in Suryanarayana Chari v. Seshamma A.I.R. 1950 Mad. 103and of the Supreme Court in Angurbala v. Debabrata A.I.R. 1951 S.C. 293. It is the contention of Mr. M.S. Venkatarama Iyer that tins question was put in issue at the time of the hearing of the second appeal and the matter Was argued by both sides and the above conclusion that Bhagyathammal was entitled to joint management with Kartik Kone was reached. It is said accordingly to this decision operates as res judicata against the present defendant and it is claimed that Kartik Kone cannot any longer question the right of Bhagyathammal so declared in the second appeal. For the other side, it is contended that having regard to the stand taken by Bhagyathammal in the earlier stages of the litigation, these observations must be regarded only as obiter and to have no binding force.

    It seems to as that this Court undoubtedly embarked upon a determination of the question of title of Bhagyathammal and that question was in the nature of a question of law. In Rajlakshmi Desi v. Banamali Sen A.I.R. 1953 S.C. 33 their Lordships point out that the test of res judicata is the identity of title in the two litigations and that so long as the competency of the former court to try the subsequent suit cannot be denied, the general rule of res judicata applies. Even apart from this, the defendant Kartik Kone against whom the point was decided in the second appeal, sought to have judgment of the court reviewed. Undoubtedly, Kartik Kone could have appealed against the decision, for otherwise it is difficult to see how a review application could at all have been maintained. The learned Judge in deal lag with the review application pointed out that though the question was raised for the first time in the second appeal, at the time of the hearing as objection was raised, and, as we said earlier, both sides argued the question, before the learned Judge rendered his decision in the second appeal. We may further point out that far from the observations of the learned Judge being in the nature of an obiter dicta , the actual decision on this point was incorporated la the decree in the second appeal, the clause of the decree reading thus:

    "That the first defendant (Bhagyathammal) shall also be entitled to joint management along with the plaintiff (Kartik Kone) of the trust properties and the first defendant shall be at liberty to take appropriate steps to work oat her rights to joint management by way of separate proceedings."

    There is accordingly a decree embodying the decision of the Court and it seems to us that it eaa no longer be maintained that the observations are merely obiter dicta having no executable force. It is not open to Kartik Kone to question the decree unless be can say it is nullity which it obviously is not. In Kolu Nambiar v. Chathu Nambiar 52 I.C. 158, this Court held that a matter could be in issue under S. 11 of the Civil Procedure Code even though an express issue had not been framed. It would be in issue if the decision about it is accessary for the decree. They say farther that if the finding has been arrived on a matter which is not accessary for the disposal of the suit and It is not made the basis of the decree which is given in spite of it, that matter cannot be said to have been substantially in issue between the parties and such finding would be more in the nature of obiter dicta It follows that where the finding was incorporated in a decree, the position would clearly be otherwise. This has been emphasised in Sankara Mahalinga Chettiar v. Muthulakshmi 33 M.L.J. 740, where it was held that though a finding might be unnecessary, yet if it is embodied in the decree, it will operate as res judicata.

    It seems to us accordingly that the contention of the appellant that the decree in the second appeal S.A. No. 905 of 1959 is not res judicata and that in spite of that decree, he can still raise the question that Bhagyathammal is not entitled to joint rights of management has to be negatived.

    It follows that the appeal fails and it is dismissed with costs.

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