1. In this revision, the tenant under the Tamil Nadu Buildings (Lease & Rent Control) Act (Act 18 of 1960), hereinafter referred to as the Act is the petitioner. The respondent herein is the landlord within the meaning of the Act. The landlord sought the eviction of the tenant under S. 10 (3) (a) (i) of the Act, on the ground that he required the buildings bearing Panchayat door Nos. 95, 95-A and 95-B, Thiruthuraipundi Road, Muthupet, Thiruthuraipundi Taluk, for his own occupation. Both the Rent Controller as well as the Appellate-Authority countenanced the case of the landlord and the tenant faced an order of eviction by orders of Court. The present revision is directed against the orders of the Appellate Authority.

2. Though the findings are concurrent by the Tribunals under the Act, yet, I am obliged to interfere in revision in view of the fact that the orders of the Tribunals suffer infirmities on account of a misconception of the correct position of law applicable to the facts of the case. Certain facts are not in dispute and cannot be disputed. Admittedly, the buildings bear three door numbers. Each of these three door numbers was let out at different points of time, the first in 1967, the second after 1968 and the third in 1970. The premises bearing door No. 95-B is being used for banking business; the premises bearing door No. 95-A is being used for cooking purposes and the premises bearing door No. 95 is being used as a bedroom. From October, 1970, a console, dated tent of Rs. 100 is being paid for all the three premises. Mr. M. Srinivasan, learned counsel for the petitioner, urges two points in the main for upsetting the decisions of the Tribunals below. The first contention is that when admittedly there are three premises let out, two for residential purposes and the third one for non-residential purposes and at different points of time, a single petition would not lie to evict the tenant from the three premises. The Appellate Authority has chosen to refer to a decision of the Supreme Court in Gopalakriskna Chetti v. Ganesan (1976) 1 M.L.J. 27 (S.C.) for the proposition that a single petition with regard to two different tenancies in the same premises, one for residential purpose and the other for non-residential purpose, is maintainable when the tenancy is one. The Appellate Authority has chosen to treat the tenancy as a single tenancy in view of the fact that from a later point of time a consolidated rent of Rs. 100 is being paid and received as between the parties. The facts of the case dealt with by the Supreme Court are different and they are not similar to the facts of the present case. There, the premises was same and the tenancy was also single and in the said circumstances the Supreme Court found justification for countenancing a single petition when two purposes, one residential and the other non-residential, were served obviously by two different portions of the same premises. Such is not the case here. Here, we are faced with three different premises, bearing different door numbers. Each door number may constitute a ‘building’ within the meaning of S. 2 (2) of the Act. Each building serves a different purpose. In Gopalakrishna Chetti v. Ganesan 1976 1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 27 the case advanced by the landlord was one under S. 14(1)(b) of the Act. Here, the landlord seeks eviction under S. 10 (3)(a)(i) of the Act. Anantanarayanan, C.J. in Umsalma Bibi v. Lakkia Gowder 80 L.W. 165 was confronted with a case involving several tenements and the learned Judge was called upon to decide as to whether a single application for eviction could be maintained under S. 14 (1)(b) of the Act. After considering the definition of a building under S. 2 (2) of the Act, the learned Judge opined that the landlord must file separate applications for each building or tenement as defined in the Act for the purpose of S. 14 (1)(b) of the Act. But, the learned Judge, however, declined to interfere in revision on the ground that no prejudice has been caused to the tenants by the composite application filed by the landlord, Anantanarayanan, C.J. in Govindasami Naicker v. Karwar 82 L.W. 137. reiterated the principle which the learned Judge evolved in Umsalma Bibi v. Lakkia Gowder 80 L.W. 165, that in all such cases the real question is, whether there has been any prejudice caused to the tenant by the said procedure of filing a single petition.

3. In the present case, there are three different premises; two serve purposes residential and the third one serves purposes non-residential. The provision that is sought to be set in motion by the landlord against the tenant is under S. 10 (3) (a) (i) of the Act. The question that comes up for consideration is, whether the landlord can seek eviction of the tenant under S. 10 (3) (a) (a) (i) of the Act, where the premises is nonresidential and when he could not make out a case for his requirement of the nonresidential premises, which the provisions of S. 10 (3) (a) (2) or (3) alone would be applicable as the case may be. Merely because a consolidated rent is being paid for the three premises from a particular point of time it is not permissible for the landlord to club the three premises together for seeking the relief against the tenant only under S. 10 (3) (a) (i) of the Act. It is very doubtful as to whether the tenancy in respect of all the three premises, can be said to be a single one. This apart, admittedly this is not a case where the portions serving different purposes, residential and non-residential, are in one and the same premises, so as to attract the dictum of the Supreme Court recognised in Gopalakrishna Chetti v. Ganesan, 1976 1 M.L.J. (S.C.) 27. The factors to be considered for a case under S. 10 (3) (a) (i) of the Act would be entirely different from the factors to be considered in a case under S. 10 (3) (a) (2) or (3) of the Act. Hence, when the premises form different units and each will come within the meaning of a ‘building’ under S. 2 (2) of the Act and the purposes, which they serve would be different the clubbing of these premises together for the purpose of obtaining reliefs under the provisions of the Act will cause prejudice to the tenant. In this view, a single petition which the landlord resorted to for evicting the tenant from the three premises cannot be countenanced.

4. The second point urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner is equally tenable. Learned counsel for the petitioner points out that the landlord set the law in motion under S. 10 (3) (a) (i) of the Act, which should be invoked only where the premises let out is residential and where the requirement of the landlord is also residential. In the instant case, one of the premises is non-residential, the same being used for banking business. The landlord has not projected a case that he requires the non-residential premises for any non-residential purpose within the meaning of S. 10 (3) (a) (2) of the Act, S. 10 (3) (a) (3) being applicable only to a non-residential building which is used for the purpose of keeping a vehicle or adapted for such use. By clubbing the three premises together, the landlord cannot seek the eviction of the tenant from the non-residential premises when he has not set forth a case for that relief. Venkatadri, J. in Bathool Bai v. Vidyanathan 1966 2 M.L.J. 412=79 L.W. 612 dealt with a case where the main and the substantial purpose of the letting was for residence and the learned Judge held that merely because the tenant (a Doctor) was using a part of the premises for his business of running a pharmacy and that too, without the consent of the landlord, it will not disentitle the landlord from applying for possession of the building under S. 10 (3) (a) of the Act. The learned Judge referred to a decision of the Supreme Court in Dr. Gopaldas Verma v. S.K. Bharatwaj A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 337 and distinguished the same on facts. In Gopaldas Verma v. Bharadwaj A.I.R. 1963 S.C. 337, the premises in dispute was only let for residential purposes but later with the consent of the landlord, a portion of the premises was used for non-residential purposes and the Supreme Court held that where the premises are let for residential purposes and it is shown that they are used by the tenant incidentally for commercial, professional or other purposes with the consent of the landlord, the landlord is not entitled to eject the tenant even if he proves that he needs the premises bona fide for his personal use, because the premises have by their user ceased to be premises let for residential purposes alone. In Miss.Sanyal v. Gianchand A.I.R..1968 S.C. 438 the ratio in Dr. Gopaldas Verma v. Bharadwaj was reiterated by the Supreme Court. In Miss.Sanyal v. Gianchand A.I.R..1968 S.C. 438 the Supreme Court was considering a case under S. 13(1 J (e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act 1952, which runs as follows:—

"1. Notwithstanding anything to the contrary contained in any other law or any contract, no decree or order for the recovery of possession of any premises shall be passed by any Court in favour of the landlord against any tenant (including a tenant whose tenancy is terminated);"

"Provided that nothing in this sub-Section shall apply to any suit or other proceeding for such recovery of possession if the Court is satisfied.. (e) that the premises let for residential purposes are required bona fide by the landlord who is the owner of such premises for occupation as a residence for himself or his family and that he has no other suitable accommodation;"

"Explanation—For the purpose of this clause, ‘residential premises’ includes any premises which having been let for and used as a residence are, without the consent of the landlord, used incidentally for commercial or other purposes"

From the above extract it is clear that the expressions used in S. 13 (1)(e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952 are more specific than those used in the Tamil Nadu Act. But, that does not take away the impact of the ruling which would apply with equal force to the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act also. In Miss, Sanyal v. Gianchand A.I.R..1968 S.C. 438 a part of the premises was used for a girl's school and the rest for residential purposes and the landlord set the law in motion under S. 13 (1) (e) of the Delhi and Ajmer Rent Control Act, 1952. The two courts below declined to countenance the case of the landlord under the said provision. However, the High Court of Punjab (Delhi Bench) in revision petition, thought fit to pass a decree in ejectment limited to that portion of the house which was used for residential purposes by the tenant and remanded the case to the Rent Controller for demarcating the portions. On appeal to the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court, while setting aside the judgment of the High Court, observed as follows:—

"The jurisdiction of the Court may be exercised under S. 13(1)(e) of the Act only when the premises are let for residential purposes and not when the premises being let for composite purposes, are used in specific portions for purposes residential and non-residential. The contract of tenancy is a single and indivisible contract, and in the absence of any statutory provision to that effect it is not open to the Court to divide it into two contrasts—one of letting for residential purposes, and the other for non-residential purposes, and to grant relief under S. 13 (1)(e) of the Act limited to the portion of the demised property which is being used for residential purposes"

When relief in respect of a single premises which could be used for purpose residential and non-residential cannot be the subject-matter of proceedings for eviction on the ground of residential requirement, the bar would be much more stringent where the case involves different premises used for different purposes. The action of the landlord seeking remedies under S. 10 (3) (a) (i) of the Act in respect of a premises used for non-residential purpose is not only a misconception but is also absolutely unsustainable.

5. In a recent pronouncement, Sengottuvelan, J. in T.N. Lakshmanan v. S.P. Hajee-Alavudeen Sahib Sons C.R.P. 2759 of 1979#1511979 1 MLJ.NR. C. 15 while dealing with a ease under S. 10 (3) (a) (i) of the Act, his held that the landlord can ask for eviction of a residential building for residential purpose only, and a non-residential building for nonresidential purposes only. I am in entire agreement with the learned Judge. The two points urged by the learned counsel for the petitioner are sustained.

6. In view of the above discussion, I find that the petition for eviction as laid down by the landlord, against the tenant cannot be sustained and reliefs cannot be accorded in such, a petition. Hence, this revision is allowed and the orders of the Tribunals below are set aside and the R.C.O.P. 18 of 1974 on the file of the Rent Controller (District Munsif), Thiruthuraipundi will stand dismissed. However, I deem fit not to allow costs throughout. The landlord will be at liberty to set the appropriate law in motion for seeking the requisite reliefs in respect of all or any of the premises concerned, if facts warrant the same, by filing the necessary application or applications, as the case may be.