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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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  • Order 39, Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Section 50 of the Copy Right Act, 1957
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Order 39, Rules 1 & 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure,
  • Section 50 of the Copy Right Act, 1957
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, engaged in manufacturing and marketing window/split type air conditioners under the trademark "PRINCE" since 1979, applied for registration of the trademark and associated logo in 1983. The plaintiff claimed to have acquired goodwill and reputation through continuous use and substantial advertising. In May 1992, the plaintiff discovered that the defendant began selling air conditioners under the mark "PRINCE AIR CON" with a deceptively similar logo, allegedly harming the plaintiff's reputation and goodwill. The plaintiff filed a passing off suit seeking a permanent injunction against the defendant's use of the mark and rendition of accounts for profits derived from such use. Alongside the suit, the plaintiff filed an application for interim relief under Order 39, Rules 1 and 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.

The defendant opposed the application, arguing that the plaintiff had unclean hands due to dismissal of its trademark registration application, that the defendant was prior user of the mark "PRINCE REFRIGERATION" since 1974, and that the plaintiff was not the lawful proprietor but an infringer of other registered trademarks such as "PRINCESS". The defendant contended the plaintiff was therefore not entitled to injunction relief.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff, by prior user of the trademark "PRINCE", has acquired goodwill and reputation sufficient to sustain a passing off action against the defendant's use of "PRINCE AIR CON".
  2. Whether the dismissal of the plaintiff's trademark registration application affects its right to seek relief in a passing off suit.
  3. Whether the plaintiff, not being the original originator of the trademark and allegedly infringing third party trademarks, is entitled to an interim injunction against the defendant.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The plaintiff has been marketing air conditioners under the mark "PRINCE" since June 1981, incurring substantial advertising expenses and achieving increasing sales.
  • The plaintiff has acquired goodwill and reputation through continuous use of the mark prior to the defendant's adoption.
  • The defendant started selling air conditioners only in 1988 and did not use any trademark initially; registration with sales tax authorities occurred only in 1990.
  • The defendant has not provided evidence of prior use or sales figures to establish earlier use of the mark.
  • The defendant's use of "PRINCE AIR CON" is deceptively similar and constitutes passing off, causing damage to the plaintiff's goodwill.

Defendant's Arguments

  • The plaintiff approached the court with unclean hands by not disclosing dismissal of its trademark registration application.
  • The defendant claims prior adoption and continuous use of the trademark "PRINCE REFRIGERATION" since April 1974.
  • The plaintiff is not the lawful owner or originator of the trademark "PRINCE" and is infringing on registered trademarks such as "PRINCESS" and others registered in favor of third parties.
  • The plaintiff is not entitled to injunction relief due to these factors.
  • The defendant cited prior registrations of similar or identical marks by third parties, challenging the plaintiff's claim of originality.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutta Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories, AIR 1965 SC 980 Distinction between passing off and trademark infringement; passing off as a common law remedy for deceit without requiring plaintiff's trademark registration or use. Used to clarify that registration of a trademark is not essential in passing off action and use by the defendant of plaintiff's mark is not necessary.
Draper v. Trist, 1939 3 All England Reports 513 Basis of passing off action is injury to goodwill by defendant passing off goods as those of plaintiff. Supported the understanding that interference with goodwill results in damage presumed by law.
Capital Plastic Industries v. Kappy Plastic Industries, FAOCS No. 85/88 Referenced by defendant to argue against plaintiff's entitlement to injunction in trademark disputes. Court observed that this precedent pertains to trademark infringement actions and is not applicable to passing off claims in this case.
Prem Singh v. Ceeam Auto Industries, AIR 1990 Delhi 233 Illustrates that a plaintiff aware of third party's prior registration may still maintain passing off action; registration irrelevant in passing off. Distinguished from infringement cases; cited to support plaintiff's prima facie case for passing off despite not being original originator.
Century Traders v. M/s. Electronics Ltd., AIR 1978 Delhi 250 Established that confusion caused by use of deceptively similar marks can cause irreparable injury warranting injunction. Cited to emphasize balance of convenience favoring plaintiff and risk of irreparable harm from defendant's use of "PRINCE AIR CON".

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the nature of passing off actions, emphasizing that registration of a trademark is not determinative and prior user with acquired goodwill is the critical factor. The dismissal of the plaintiff's trademark registration application was held irrelevant to the passing off claim. The plaintiff demonstrated prima facie use of the mark "PRINCE" since 1981 with supporting sales and advertising evidence, while the defendant failed to establish prior use or sales under its mark.

The court rejected the defendant’s argument that the plaintiff’s lack of originality or alleged infringement of other trademarks barred relief, noting that such disputes are between the plaintiff and the registered owners and do not affect the plaintiff’s passing off claim against the defendant. Reliance on precedents concerning trademark infringement was distinguished from passing off principles applicable here.

Balancing the interests, the court found the plaintiff’s case strong enough at this stage to warrant protection of its goodwill against deceptive use by the defendant. The likelihood of confusion and potential irreparable injury supported granting interim relief.

Holding and Implications

The court granted an interim injunction restraining the defendant from selling, offering for sale, or dealing in air conditioners under the mark "PRINCE AIR CON" or any similar mark until the final decision of the suit.

This decision protects the plaintiff’s prima facie proprietary rights and goodwill in the mark "PRINCE" pending final adjudication. The court clarified that this interim order is a prima facie view and does not express any opinion on the ultimate merits of the case. No new legal precedent was established; the ruling applies the established principles of passing off to the facts presented.

    Coolways India v. Princo Air Conditioning And Refrigeration .

    D.K Jain, J.:— The plaintiff, claiming to be a proprietary concern, engaged in the business of manufacturing and marketing of window/split type air conditioners and parts there of under its reputed trade mark “PRINCE” since the year 1979 and by virtue of continuous user thereof acquired goodwill and reputation in the trade, in May, 1983, applied for the registration of its trade mark “PRINCE” in respect of air-conditioners, also applied for registration of the artistic work for the logo used along with its trade mark “PRINCE” which was duly registered under the Copy Right Act in August, 1983, Alleging to have enormous sales and to have spent substantial amount on advertisement, acquired invaluable reputation and to have come to know in May, 1992 that the defendant has dishonestly started selling and offering for sale air-conditioners under the trade mark “PRINCE AIR CON” and using a logo/monogram which is dcceptivelv and confusingly similar to the plaintiff's trade mark and the logo/monograph used by the plaintiff, affecting his reputation and goodwill has filed this suit, in passing off action, for permanent injunction restraining the defendant, its employees, servants and agents etc., from using the Trade Mark “PRINCE AIR CON” in relation to his air-conditioners and for rendition of accounts in respect of profits made by the defendant by using plaintiff's Trade Mark. Along with the suit, an application under order 39, rules 1 & 2 of the code of civil procedure, for interim relief in terms of the prayer for permanent injunction against the defendant/respondent has been filed.

    2. The application is resisted by the defendant, mainly on the pleas: the plaintiff has come to the court with unclean hand, inasmuch as it has not disclosed that its application of registration of the trade mark “PRINCE” stands dismissed, the defendant is the prior in adoption of trade mark “PRINCE REFRIGERATION” with key portion of “PRINCE”, which trade mark it is using continuously, extensively and uninterruptedly since April 1974, the plaintiff is not the lawful owner and proprietor or the originator of the trade mark “PRINCE” and is in fact an infringer of registered trade mark of M/s Electronics Ltd., who are the owners and proprietors of the trade mark “PRINCESS”; the same trade mark also stands registered in respect of heating apparatus, heaters, ovens etc. in the name of some other person. It is, therefore, pleaded that the plaintiff is not entitled to any injunction against the defendant. I have heard Id. counsel for the parties.

    3. An action for passing off is in respect of goods for which marks have not been registered but in respect of which mark, over a period of time, the user has acquired proprietary rights. While spelling out salient features of distinction between an action for passing off and action for infringement of a trade mark, the Supreme Court in Kaviraj Pandit Durga Dutta Sharma v. Navaratna Pharmaceutical Laboratories . AIR 1965 SC 980., observed that an action for passing off is a common law remedy being in substance an acticn for deceit, that is, a passing off by a person of his own goods as those of another and unlike in an action for infringement of trade mark, where user of the plaintiff's trade mark is sine quo non of such an action, in an acttion for passing off use by the defendant of the trade mark of the plaintiff is not essential.

    4. As observed by Goddard L.J In Draper v. Trist . 1939 3 All England Reports 513 at p. 526., in passing off action the true basis of action is that the passing off by the defendant of his goods as goods of the plaintiff, injures the right of property being his right to the goodwill of his business. The law assumes or presumes, that, if the goodwill of a man's business has been interfered with by passing off goods, damages result therefrom.

    5. In an action for passing off, in order to succeed in getting an interim injunction, all that the plaintiff has to establish is user of the mark prior in point of time than the impugned user by the defendants. The registration of the mark or similar mark prior in point of time to user by the plaintiff is irrelevant in an action for passing off and the mere presence of the mark in the register maintained by the trade mark registry does not prove its user by the persons in whose names the mark is registered and is irrelevant for the purposes of deciding the application for interim injunction unless evidence has been led or is available of user of their registered trade mark.

    6. The disclosure or non-disclosure of any move by the plaintiff for registration of his trade mark or its outcome therefore has no material bearing in an action for passing off.

    7. The action is for passing off and in the effort to show that the mark of the defendant is deceptively similar to the mark of the plaintiff, and that the plaintiff has been the prior in user of the mark “PRINCE” and has acquired a goodwill in the said trade mark, Mr. Pfaveen Anand, Id. counsel for the plaintiff, has invited my attention to various documents placed on record by both the parties. In particular, he relies on pages 32 to 42 of the documents filed with the replication of the plaintiff, indicating that the plaintiff, has been marketing his goods under the mark “PRINCE” since June, 1981 and the expenses incurred on publicity right from June, 1993, on para 5 of the plaint, indicating that the plaintiff's sales for the goods with the mark “PRINCE” had risen from approximately Rs. 2 lacs in the year 1993 to approximately Rs. 26 lacs in the year 1991. He has also made a reference to the defendant's documents on pages 20 to 22 and 30 to 35, according to which, on defendant's own showing, it has started selling air conditioners in the years 1988 and that too without any trade mark and that the defendant applied for registration with the sales tax authorities in the year 1988 and got the registration number only in July, 1990. The defendant has not placed on record any material to show that he is prior in user of the said trade mark, nor has he indicated his sales figures for any of the years.

    8. The evidence brought on record by the plaintiff, prima facie, tends to indicate that the plaintiff, by use of the mark “PRINCE” in respect of the air-conditions prior to the defendant had acquired a reputation and goodwill in the use of the mark “PRINCE” in respect of the said goods and passing off goods under the mark “PRINCE AIR CON”, appearing as deceptive, by the defendant would result in invasion of the plaintiff's mark entitling him to the relief of injunction against the defendant.

    9. On the defendant's last objection that the plaintiff and the defendant are both pirtors and consequently, the plaintiff is not entitled to the relief sought for in the application, the defendant has placed on record copy of; (1) trade mark Journal page No. 528, which shows that the trade mark “PRINCESS” in respect of air-conditioning apparatus and air cooling devices has been registered in the name of M/s. Electronics Ltd., New Delhi at No. 241, 250 dated 23.3.1967, (ii) page No. 671 which shows that the trade mark “PRINCE” in respect of room heating apparatus, electrical immersion heaters, etc. is registered in favour of some other persons trading under the name and style of Prince Electric Works, Amritsar and (iii) Search Report for trade mark “PRINCE” in respect of air-conditioning devices in favour of Lorinda Mai & Sons, New Delhi, and it has been strenuously argued by Mr. Ghiraiya, Learned counsel for the defendent that the plaintiff has not shown that he is the originator of the trade mark “PRINCE”. He relies on a bench decision of this court in Capital Plastic Industries…Plaintiff; v. Kappy Plastic Industries…Defendant. . FAOCS No. 85/88., and a Single Bench decision in Prem Singh v. Ceeam Auto Industries . AIR 1990 Delhi 233., to contend that the plaintiff is not entitled to interim injunction.

    10. It is true that in the present case it may not be possible for the plaintiff to show that he is the original originator of the trade mark “PRINCE” and the defendant may perhaps be within his right to oppose the said trade mark being registered in the name of the plaintiff, but in a gassing off action, registration of a trade mark is irrelevant. What has to be seen is whether the plaintiff has acquired a reputation, goodwill in a mark which he is using in trading his goods uninterruptedly for quite some time and somebody else is attempting to pass off his goods under that mark. The contention that a plaintiff himself using usurping or infringing a third party's registered trade mark is debarred from claiming the relief of injunction, in my view, is a meritless plea. This is a matter between the plaintiff and the party in whose favour trade mark is registered. Only he can object to it. It is not for a third person to take up issue for him and claim protection on that score. It is not disputed by the defendant that no action for infringement of trade mark has been initiated against the plaintiff by any of the parties, in whose name the said trade mark is claimed as registered. There is no reason why a person, competing in trade, is allowed to make use of the reputation and goodwill of another person by attaching to his product a name or description with which he has no natural association. In Prem Singh v. Ceeam Auto Industries (supra), the plaintiff in that case was well aware that a third party had got the trade mark registered in the year 1962, prior to the plaintiff's in the year 1981 and it has also moved a petition under Section 50 of the Copy Right Act, 1957 against the plaintiff. The said party was also contesting the registration in favour of the plaintiff. Century Traders case . AIR 1978 Delhi 250., applicable to the present case, was distinguished on the facts of Prem Singh case (supra). Both the judgments (supra) relied upon by the Id. counsel for the defendant pertain to an action for infringement of trade mark and the ratios laid thereunder have no application on the facts of the present case. As noticed earlier, the plaintiff has been in actual use of the trade mark “PRINCE” since about 10 years and thus, has a prima facie case. Invasion of his property right should be protected. The balance of convenience is, thus, in favour of the plaintiff. As held in Century Traders case (supra) the likely confusion that may be caused if the defendant/respondent is allowed to use the mark “PRINCE AIR CON” will cause irreparable injury to the plaintiff.

    11. For the aforesaid reasons I restrain the defendantly an interim injunction from selling or offering for sale or otherwise dealing in the air conditioners with mark “PRINCE AIR CON” or any similar mark till the final decision of the suit. All what is stated hereinabove is a prima facie view of the matter for the purpose of disposal of the present application and shall not be construed as expression of opinion on the merits of the case.

    12. I.A stands disposed of with no order as to costs.

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    Comments

    Coolways India v. Princo Air Conditioning And Refrigeration .
    (Nov 30, 1992)