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  • provisions of S. 28 of the Specific Relief Act
  • 8.28 (1) of the Specific Relief Act,
  • S. 28 of the Specific Relief Act
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citation codes
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  • provisions of S. 28 of the Specific Relief Act
  • 8.28 (1) of the Specific Relief Act,
  • S. 28 of the Specific Relief Act
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The present appeal is by defendants 1 to 5 against an order passed by the Additional Sub-Judge, Salem, in R.E.P. No. 226 of 1986 in O.S. No. 546 of 1984. The first respondent (plaintiff in the original suit) had filed a suit for specific performance based on an agreement of sale. After contest, a decree dated 4.8.1986 was passed in favour of the first respondent directing the defendants to receive the balance of Rs. 5,30,275 and execute a sale within two months, failing which the sale deed would be executed by the court; the defendants were also directed to pay costs.

The plaintiff (first respondent) served a notice on 18.9.1986 asking the defendants to fix a date for execution of the sale deed so the plaintiff could be ready at the Sub-Registrar's Office with stamp papers and the balance sale price. The first defendant (first appellant) replied on 26.9.1986 asserting that the plaintiff must also deposit the sale price into court and that the notice was not maintainable without such deposit; he also contended that the decree failed to specify the period for deposit as required by O.20, R.12-A, C.P.C.

The plaintiff filed an execution petition on 6.10.1986 (R.E.P. No. 226 of 1986 under O.21, R.34 C.P.C.) seeking direction to execute the sale deed or for the court to execute it. The first defendant opposed the execution petition reiterating that the purchase money had not been deposited, that the decree omitted an operative portion specifying deposit and period, and that the executing court lacked jurisdiction. The learned Additional Sub-Judge passed a one-line order: "For deposit of balance of sale consideration—24.3.1987." Aggrieved by that order, defendants 1 to 5 filed this appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the executing court had jurisdiction to permit the plaintiff to deposit the balance of sale consideration on a fixed future date when the original decree did not provide for deposit of the balance of sale consideration.
  2. Whether the executing court could, in execution proceedings under O.21, R.34 C.P.C., extend time for deposit of the purchase money or whether that relief must be sought before the court which passed the decree (particularly in view of O.20, R.12-A, C.P.C. and S.28 of the Specific Relief Act).
  3. Whether a one-line, non-speaking order passed by the executing court without consideration of the parties' contentions is sustainable.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments (Defendants 1 to 5)

  • The decree required the defendants to execute the sale deed within two months after receipt of the balance of sale consideration; because the plaintiff had not deposited the amount, the execution petition filed without deposit was not maintainable.
  • The executing court has no power in execution proceedings to grant time to deposit the balance of sale consideration; time-extension or provision should be made only by application to the court which passed the decree (original side), not in execution under O.21, R.34 C.P.C.
  • The decree allegedly failed to comply with O.20, R.12-A, C.P.C. by omitting to specify the period for deposit, rendering the decree defective in its operative portion.
  • The one-line order passed by the executing court was non-speaking and did not address the objections raised; therefore it was erroneous and liable to be set aside.

Respondent's Arguments (First Respondent / Plaintiff)

  • The decree dated 4.8.1986 was a preliminary decree and the court has ample power to extend time.
  • Although the amount had not been deposited at the time of filing the execution petition, after the executing court's order the amount was deposited on 23.3.1987 as directed by that court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Resham Singh v. Manmohan Singh, A.I.R. 1985 Punjab & Haryana 193 Held that an executing Court could not execute a decree where the amount was not deposited within the time allowed under the terms of the decree; extension of time would vary the trial court's decree and could not be done by a court that was functus officio. The court relied on this decision to support the proposition that an executing court lacks power to extend time for deposit when such extension would vary the decree; the executing court's grant of time was described as beyond its jurisdiction.
K. Kalpana Saraswathi v. P.S.S. Somasundaram Chettiar, A.I.R. 1980 S.C. 512 (also referred with earlier references) Held that a decree for specific performance is, in practical effect, a preliminary decree and that the court which passed the decree retained control and could extend time; the condition of dismissal for non-payment within prescribed time could not be imposed in the light of S.28 of the Specific Relief Act. The court cited this authority for the principle that the original court (and appellate court) may extend time and that the decree is preliminary; but it emphasized that such extension must be sought from the court which passed the decree and not by way of execution proceedings.
Vaiyapuri Reddy v. Sivalinga Reddiar, 1969; 82 L.W. 703 = 1970-1 M.L.J. 92 Considered a case where decree did not specify period for payment; the court upheld an order of the original side granting 30 days for deposit under S.28 of the Specific Relief Act and reiterated that a decree for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree with the original court retaining control. The court relied on this decision to distinguish circumstances where the original court, under S.28, could extend time; it used the decision to show that extension by the original court is permissible but that the executing court in the present case did not have that power.
Abdul Shaker v. Abdul Rahima, 7 L.W. 217 = A.I.R. 1923 Mad. 284 Held that a decree for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree and that the original court keeps control and has power to make necessary orders including extension of time. Used to support the proposition that specific performance decrees are preliminary and that the original court may grant extensions; it reinforced the court's view that the executing court was not the correct forum to grant time for deposit.
Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar, A.I.R. 1967 S.C. 868 Stated that where a contract relates to the sale of immovable property, it is normally presumed that time is not of the essence of the contract. Relied upon by earlier decisions (and noted by this court) to show that courts may not treat time as strictly of the essence in such contracts, which bears on whether a rescission or dismissal is automatic; the present court nonetheless required that proper procedure be followed (i.e., apply to the decree‑passing court).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded in two main strands of analysis: (1) procedural adequacy of the order passed by the executing court, and (2) jurisdictional scope of the executing court to permit deposit of the balance sale consideration when the original decree did not specify the deposit provision or period.

First, the court criticised the lower court's one-line order as non-speaking and having shown no consideration of the parties' contentions. The court emphasised that passing such a terse order without addressing objections (including objections as to maintainability and jurisdiction) was erroneous and was a separate ground to set aside the order.

Second, on the jurisdictional point the court examined the relevant legal principles and authorities. The court acknowledged that the decree directed the defendants to execute the sale deed after receiving the balance amount, and that the first defendant had put the plaintiff on notice that the plaintiff was bound to deposit the balance within the said time. The plaintiff had not deposited the amount before filing the execution petition.

The court surveyed authorities: it noted Resham Singh (and related decisions) which held that an executing court could not execute a decree where the purchase money was not deposited within the time fixed by the decree and that extending time in execution would vary the decree (an act a court that was functus officio could not do). It also examined authorities such as Vaiyapuri Reddy, Abdul Shaker and K. Kalpana Saraswathi which treat a decree for specific performance as in the nature of a preliminary decree and recognise the original court's continuing control, including power under S.28 of the Specific Relief Act to grant further time in appropriate circumstances.

Applying these precedents, the court concluded that the executing court did not have jurisdiction to permit the plaintiff to deposit the balance long after the two month period mentioned in the decree had expired. The proper remedy for the plaintiff was to apply to the court which passed the decree for making provision in the decree fixing the time for payment (or for extension under S.28 where applicable), and only after such steps and deposit should an execution petition be filed.

Therefore, the order of the executing court permitting deposit on a future date was held to be without jurisdiction and liable to be set aside. The court additionally faulted the lower court for not passing a speaking order addressing the parties' contentions.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed and the order passed by the executing court is set aside. The court held that the executing court's order permitting the plaintiff to deposit the balance of sale consideration after the prescribed period was without jurisdiction and that the one-line non-speaking order was erroneous.

Implications and immediate consequences:

  • The order of the executing court ("For deposit of balance of sale consideration—24.3.1987") is set aside.
  • There will be no order as to costs.
  • The first respondent (plaintiff) is permitted to take necessary steps before the court which passed the decree to obtain provision for deposit of the sale price in pursuance of that decree (i.e., apply to the original decree‑passing court for extension or to make the necessary provision), and thereafter may seek execution as appropriate.
  • The Additional Sub-Judge (who passed the impugned order) is to be informed of this judgment; the office is directed to communicate the judgment to the concerned judge and to put him on notice to follow the procedure under O.20, R.12-A, C.P.C. in future. The court warned that repetition of such non-speaking orders may attract serious notice.

The court did not purport to lay down a new, novel legal principle beyond applying and reconciling existing authorities; the decision directs that the correct procedural route is to apply to the court which passed the decree for extension or provision regarding deposit, rather than seeking that relief in execution proceedings.

    S.P Arthanari Mudaliar & 4 Others v. A. Ponnusamt & 2 Others

    JUDGMENT

    1. This appeal is directed by defendants 1 to 5 against the order passed by the Additional Sub-Judge, Salem, in R.E P. No. 226 of 1986 in O. S. No. 546 of 1984. The facts which are necessary for the disposal of the appeal are briefly as follows:—The as first respnodent herein filed a suit in the Additional Sub Court, Salem, against appellants 1 to 5 (defendants 1 to 5) and respondents 2 and 3 (defendants 6 and 7) for the relief of specific performance on the basis of an agreement of sale. After contest, the court passed a decree on 48-1986 in favour of the first respondent herein and directed the defendants to receive the balance of Rs. 5,30,275 and execute a sale within two months and if they failed to do so the sale deed would be executed by court. The defendants were also directed to pay the costs of the suit to the plaintiff. The first respondent issued a notice through his lawyer on 189.1986 calling upon the defendants to fix a date and appoint a time for execution of the sale deed on or before 3.10.1986 so as to enable the plaintiff to get read at the Sub Registrar's Office to take the sale with required stamp papers and balance of sale price, within a week of the receipt of the said notice. The first defendant, who is the first appellant herein, sent a reply dated 26.9.1986 wherein it is stated that the time fixed for execution of the sale deed will also be applicable to the plaintiff and that so far no deposit of the sale price was made into court and that in the absence of depositing the balance of the sale price in Court, the abovesaid notice is not maintainable. Farther, strict compliance of the decree dated 4.8.1986 is warranted or else the claim would be void. The plaintiff filed execution petition on 6.10.1986 in R.A.P No. 226 of 1986 under O. 21, R. 34 Code of Civil Procedure directing the defendants to execute the sale deed in favour of the plaintiff and in default to execute the salt by court. The said peti-tion was opposed by the first defendant, who is the first appellant herein, in his counter, wherein it is stated that the decree is not framed in accordance with the provisions of O. 20. R.I2-A, C.R.C, specifying the period within which the payment should be made. As such, there is an omission in the decree regarding the deposit of the purchase money and the period within which the payment should he made by the plaintiff and hence the decree cannot be operated in the absence of such operative portion. Further, the executing court has no jurisdiction to entertain the decree in the absence of deposit of the sale consideration. There is absolutely nothing to show in the affidavit filed by the decree-holder whether the purchase money has bees deposited or not. Since the purchase money has not been deposited prior to the filing of the execution petition, the execution petition is liable to be dismissed. The learned Sub Judge passed an one line order as follows: “For deposit of balance of sale consideration—24.3.1987”

    Aggrieved by the same, this appeal is filed.

    2. The learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. K. Doraisami, submitted that even though the decree directed the defendants to execute a sale deed within two months from the date of the decree after receipt of the balance of sale consideration, the present execution petition, filed without depositi g the amount even after the reply notice Wherein it is reiterated, is not maintainable. Further, the executing court has no power to grant timet or deposit of the balance of the sale consideration and the same has to be done only by filing necessary application before the court which passed the decree in the suit side and that it cannot be done in execution side under O. 21, R. 34 C.P.C Further, the order passed by the court below is not a Speaking one and the learned Subordinate Judge has hot at ail considered the Objections raised by the first appellant as to the maintainability of the execution petition and the power of the executing Court to extend the time for deposit of the balance of sale consideration. On the other hand, the learned counsel for the first respondent submits that the decree passed on 4.8.1986 is only a preliminary decree and that the court has got ample power to extend time and that in this case though the amount was not deposited already, subsequent to the passing of the impugned order by the learned Subordinate Judge, the amount was now deposited on 23.3.1987, as directed by the executing court.

    3. The question to be considered is whether the Order passed by the executing court permitting the plaintiff to deposit the balance of sale consideration oh a fixed date is correct, when the original decree does not provide for deposit of the balance of sale consideration. At the outset, it has to be mentioned that it is highly regretable that the learned Additional Sub Judge has passed the one line order which is a non-speaking one and which is not permitted and there is absolutely nothing to show that the learned Sub Judge has considered the contentions raised by the parties in passing the said order. The learned Sub Judge has forgotten that it is an appealable one. Thus the impugned order is liable to be set aside on that ground alone.

    4. Next, we have to see the scope of the executing court to grant such a relief when the deposit of the balance of the sale consideration was not made within a time of two months within which the defendants were directed to execute the sale deed after receiving the balance of sale consideration. In the instant case, even though there is no specific provision directing the plaintiff to deposit the balance of purchase money within two months, yet it is seen that there is a provision in the decree directing the defendants to execute the sale deed after receivmg the balanceof Rs. 1,30,275. To a notice issued by the plaintiff on 18.9.1986, the first defendant has Categorically stated that the period mentioned therein equally applies to five plaintiff also for depositing the balance of Sate consideration within the said time and without depositing the said amount it is not open to the plaintiff to call upon the defendants to execute the sale deed and the plaintiff was put on notice that he is bound to deposit the balance of sale consideration. But admittedly, the plaintiff has not deposited the amount even after the said reply received and also before ever he filed the execution petition. Only in the execution petition, the court granted time for payment of the sale consideration by 24.3.1987

    5. In this connection, the learned counsel for the appellants, Mr. Doraisami, drew ray attention to the decision reported in Resham Singh v. Manmohan Singh A.I.R 1985 Punjab & Haryana 193., where the earlier decision of this Court in K. Saraswathi v. P.S.S Somasundaram Chettiar 1 A.I.R 1985 Punjab & Haryana 193., and the appeal against the said judgment which is reported in K. Kalpana Saraswathi v. P.S.S Somasundaram Chettiar 1980 93 L.W 51 S.N-Krishna Iyer, J.= A.I.R 1980 S.C 512., and other decisions of other High Courts were considered. That was also a case where in a suit for specific performance of agreement to sell, a conditional decree was passed in favour of the plaintiffs. According to the decree, a sum of Rs. 50,500 was to be paid within one month, failing which the plaintiff's suit was to stand dismissed. No appeal was filed by either party against the said decree of the trial court which had become final between the parties. Admittedly, the plaintiffs did not deposit the amount of the decree within the time allowed. They sought execution of the decree by filing an application. The decree holder also filed an application under Ss. 148 and 151, C.P.C, for extending time for depositing the sale price and condoning the delay for depositing the same. In the circumstances, it was held:—

    “Held, that the executing Court could not execute the decree as the amount was not deposited within the time allowed according to the terms of the decree, the suit stood dismissed automatically. The extension of the time for depositing the sale price would be varying the decree of the trial Court which could not be done as the Court has become functus officio after passing the said decree.”

    My attention was also drawn to the decision of this Court reported in Vaiyapuri Reddy v. Sivalinga Reddiar 1969; 82 L.W 703 = 1970-1 M.L.J 92., where Alagiriswami, J., (as he then was) had an occasion to consider a similar case where the decree did not provide the period within which the plaintiff should pay the consideration of the sale price, but only provided that the defendant should execute the sale deed and in the event of failure, the sale deed would be executed by court and registered. The defendant filed an application under S. 28 of the Specific Relief Act for rescinding the contract and in the said application, the plaintiff filed a counter contending that he is always ready and willing to performance his part of the contract and pay the purchase money and take reconveyance. The learned Judge relied on the earlier Bench decision of this Court in Abdul Shaker v. Abdul Rahima 7 L.W 217=A.I.R 1923 Mad. 284, where it was held that a decree for specific performance is in the nature of a preliminary decree, the original Court keeping control over the action and having full power to make any just and necessary orders therein including, in appropriate cases, the extension of the time and that the contract is not determined by mere failure of the plaintiff to pay the amount within the specified time. It was also held in the said decision that it is in the nature of a preliminary decree and not a final decree. The learned Judge in that case also relied on the earlier decision of the Supreme Court in Gomathinayagam Pillai v. Palaniswami Nadar A.I.R 1967 S.C 868., whereinit was held that if the contract relates to a sale of immovable property, it would normally be presumed that time was not the essence of the contract. The Court finally upheld the order passed by the court in the original side which granted 30 days for depositing in view of S. 28 of the Specific Relief Act. That is not the case here. As discussed already, in the above quoted case, a petition was filed before the court which passed the decree for rescinding the contract under S. 28 of the Specific Relief Act and that the court instead of rescinding the contract extended time and that was upheld.

    6. Applying the ratio laid down in the above decision, it cannot be said that the executing court has got power to extend time for depositing the balance of sale consideration. Further, it is brought to my notice that in view of O. 20, R.I2-A, C.P.C, the Court should have specified the period within which the payment should be made. In the instant case the Additional Sub Judge who passed the decree has not specified the time. Hence the proper course open to the plaintiff is to apply to the said court for making provision in the decree for fixing the time within which the payment should be made. That should be done only by filing necessary application before the court which passed the decree and not by way of execution. S. 28 of the Specific Relief Act deals with rescission in certain circumstances of contracts for the sale or lease of immovable property, the specific performance of which has been decreed. Even under 8.28 (1) of the Specific Relief Act, the court is empowered to grant further time to the purchaser to pay the sale price. That it is only in the preliminary decree and not in the final decree is also reiterated in K. Kalpana Saraswathi v. P.S.S Somasundaram Chettiar, while dealing with the judgment of this Court in K. Saraswathi v. P.S.S, Somasundaram Chettiar. The Supreme Court observed that the condition that the suit will be dismissed on non-payment of the sale price within the prescribed time, could not be imposed in the light of the provisions of S. 28 of the Specific Relief Act as the proper course in that situation was to pass a decree for specific performance which would, for all practical purposes, be a preliminary decree. The suit would continue and be under the control of the Court until appropriate motion was made by either party for passing a final decree. It is further held in para 4 of the judgment:

    “It is perfectly open to the Court in control of a suit for specific performance to extend the time for deposit, and this Court may do so even' now to enable the plaintiff to get the advantage of the agreement to sell in her favour.”

    The above decision laid down that the decree already passed is only a preliminary decree and that it is open to either party to apply for passing final decree in pursuance of the same and it is open to the court which passed the decree to extend time, so also the appellate court; but not the executing court as is done in this case. The decision relied on by the learned counsel for the appellants had gone to the extend of saying that to extend the time for depositing the sale price will be varying the decree of the trial Court which could not be done as the Court has become functus officio after passing the said decree.

    7. In the light of the principles laid down in the decisions quoted above, since the plaintiff has not deposited the amount within two months time mentioned in the decree for the defendants to execute the sale deed, the proper course for the plaintiff would be to approach the court which passed the decree for extending the time for deposit, and after making such deposit to file execution petition. But', the order passed by the executing court permitting the plaintiff to deposit the amount long after the period expired is without jurisdiction and it is liable to be set aside on that ground also. Further, as already stated, the court below had not at all adverted its mind to the merits and demerits of the contentions raised by both parties and passed a speaking order. But on the other hand the court below passed a one line order which reads: “For deposit of balance of sale consideration— 24-3-1987.” Such attitude of the lower court is to be deprecated. On the said ground also, the order is liable to be reversed.

    8. For all these reasons, the appeal is allowed and the order passed by the court below is set aside. In the circumstances, of the case, there will be no order as to costs. It is open to the first respondent (plaintiff) to take necessary steps before the court which passed the decree regarding deposit of the sale price in pursuance of the decree passed by the said court in the light of, the observations made in this judgment.

    Note: The office is directed to communicate this judgment to the concerned judge also who passed the impugned order, so that he would not repeat the same mistake in future, and also putting on his notice that if such thing is repeated, serious note will be taken by this Court as similar instances have already been brought to the notice of this Court previously The Sub Judge is directed to be informed that in future he should follow the procedure laid down under O. 20, R. 12-A, C.P.C by specifying time for deposit of purchase money by the plaintiff in case a decree for specific performance of agreement for sale is passed.

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    S.P Arthanari Mudaliar & 4 Others v. A. Ponnusamt & 2 Others
    (Oct 7, 1987)