1. In these criminal revision petitions orders passed by the various Sessions Judges in the State in revision and also inter-locutory orders passed by the Magistrates have been challenged.

2. As these criminal revision petitions give rise to certain common questions of law they have been heard together and disposed of by a common order. The question that arises for decision in Cr. RPs. 571, 577 to 579 and 274 of 1974 is whether a revision under S. 397 Cr. PC, 1973 (to be hereinafter referred to as the ‘New Code’) is maintainable before this Court against the order passed by the Sessions Judge in revision under the Crl. PC, 1898 (to he hereinafter referred, to as the ‘Old Code’) before the New Code came into force on 1-4-1974.

3. The question that arises for decision in Crl. RPs. 576 and 632 to 643 of 1974 is whether a revision is maintainable before this Court against an inter-locutory order passed before the New Code came into force.

4. These questions arise in this way. In Crl. R.P 571 of 1974 the petitioner has challenged the judgment d/. 11-1-1974 passed by the 2nd Addl. Sessions Judge, Bangalore, in Crl. R.P 34 of 1973, dismissing the appeal filed by him and confirming the order dt. 30-7-1973, passed by the JMFC, Doddaballapur, in CC. 781 of 1971, wherein the learned Magistrate has held that at best the accused would have committed an offence under S. 447 IPC and posted it for statement under S. 242 Crl. P.C

5. In Crl. R.P 577 of 1974, the State (Petitioner) has challenged the order passed by the Sessions Judge, Bijapur, on 19-2-1974 in Crl. R.P 29 of 1973 dismissing the revision petition and confirming the judgment d/. 5-7-73 passed by the Addl. Munsiff and JMFC, Bagalkot in CC. 984 of 1973, wherein the petitioner was convicted for offences under Ss. 279, 337, and 338, IPC and sentencing him to pay a fine of Rs. 50 for each offence and in default ta suffer simple imprisonment for three days for each default.

6. In Crl. R.P 578 of 1974 the petitioners have challenged the order d/. 2-5-1974 passed by the Prl Sessions Judge, Belgaum, in Crl. R.A 22 of 1974 dismissing the appeal as not maintainable and confirming the order d/. 1-1-1974 passed by the JMFC, Belgaum City, in CC. 76 of 1974 ordering summons to the petitioners to appear before the Court on a complaint filed by the complainant for offences punishable under Ss. 126, 127 read with S. 276 of the Mysojre (Karnataka) Municipalities Act, 1964, and under Sec. 420 read with Sec. 34 of IPC.

7. In Crl. R.P 579 of 1974, the petitioner has challenged the order d/. 9-1-1974 passed by the Sessions Judge, Raichur, in Crl. R.P 14 of 1973 dismissing the revision petition and confirming the order d/. 2-6-1974 passed by the Munsiff-Magistrate, Raichur, in CC. 428 of 1973 discharging the accused in that case for an offence under Sec. 500 IPC.

8. In Crl. R.P 274 of 1974 the petitioner has challenged the order d/. 10-12-1973 passed by the Sessions Judge, Dharwar, in Crl. R.P 34 of 1973 dismissing the revision petition and confirming the order d/. 31-7-1973 passed by the JMFC, II Court, Hubli, in CC. 473 of 1973 discharging the accused, for offences under Ss. 406 and 409 I.P.C

9. In Crl. R.P 576 of 1974 the petitioner has challenged, the order d/. 10-7-1974 passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, 5th Court, Bangalore City, in CC. 45 of 1968 rejecting the application of the accused filed under S. 432 Crl. PC (Old Code) for making reference to the High Court on a point of law.

10. In Crl. R.Ps 632 to 643 of 1974 the petitioners have challenged the order d/. 1-1-1974 passed by the JMFC, Belgaum City in CC. 76 of 1974 registering the case and issuing summons to the petitioners for offences under Ss. 126, 127 read with S. 276 of the Karnataka Municipalities Act, and under S. 420 IPC read with S. 35 IPC.

11. Before considering the questions which arise for decision, it is necessary to bear in mind the relevant provisions under the New Code. Section 397(2) reads as under:

“The powers of revision conferred) by sub-sec. (1) shall not be exercised in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceeding.”

12. Sub-section (3) of Section 397 reads thus:

“If an application under this section has been made by any person either to the. High Court or to the Sessions Judge, no further application by the same person shall be entertained by the other of them.”

13. sub-sec. (2) bars the exercise of powers of revision in relation to any interlocutory order passed in any appeal, inquiry, trial or other proceedings, sub-sec. (3) of S. 397 Crl. PC (New Code) has given a choices to a person either to approach the High Court or the Sessions Judges to challenge the correctness, legality or propriety of an order and if he approaches any one of them, further application, by the same person is barred to the other of them.

14. The next relevant provision necessary for the questions involved in these petitions is S. 484(1) and (2) of the New Code. It reads as under:

“484(1). The Code of Criminal Procedure 1898, is hereby repealed, (a) If, immediately before the date on which this Code comes into force there is any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending, then such appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation shall be disposed of, continued, held or made, as the case may be, in accordance with the provisions of the Crl. PC, 1898, as in force immediately before such commencement (hereinafter referred to as the Old Code), as if this Code had not come into force.”

15. The provisions quoted above repeal the Old Code. But, an appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation which is pending immediately before the date on which the New Coda came into, force shall be disposed of, continued, held or made, as the case may be, in acordance with the provisions of the Old Code, as in force immediacy before such commencement.

16. The contentions raised at the Bar by the learned Advocates appearing for the petitioners are:

(1) Revision is a right vested in the litigant and it cannot be taken away by the New Code and it should be dealt with under the Old Code.

(2) Revision is a proceeding in continuation of the previous proceeding. Therefore, it must be dealt with according to the provisions of the Old Code.

(3) Even after the disposal of the revision petition the criminal proceedings are deemed to be pending before that Court until the expiry of the period of limitation. Therefore it has to be dealt with according to the provisions of the Old Code.

17. The respondents' Advocates contended that these revision petitions cannot be said to be pending in this Court immediately before the date on which the New Code came into force Therefore these revision petitions are to be dealt with according to the provisions of the New Coda.

18. In the light of the provisions of law quoted above, left me consider the validity of the contentions raised on behalf of the parties.

19. The first contention raised on behalf of the petitioners is untenable in view of the enunciation of the law by the Supreme Court in Pranab Kumar Mitra v. State of West Bengal(1). The Supreme Court has held that the revisional powers of the High Court vested in it by S. 438 read with S. 435, do not create any right in the litigant, but only conserve the power of the High Court to see that justice is done in accordance with the recognised rule of criminal jurisprudence and that subordinate Criminal Courts do not exceed their jurisdiction, or abuse their powers vested in them by the Old Code.

20. In the New Code, the corresponding provisions of S. 435(1) and 439(1) are retained in their original form in Ss. 395(1) and 397(1) of the New Code. Therefore, even under the provisions of the New Code, in view of the elucidation of the law by the Supreme Court, it is futile to contend that the revisional powers of the High Court created a right in the litigant. Therefore this contention fails.

21. As regards the second contention that the revision is a proceeding in continuation of the previous proceeding, the High Court of Himachala Pradesh in Surinder Singh v. Inder Sain(2) has given a complete answer. D.B Lal, J. in para 2 of the judgment has observed thus:

“At the outset, the learned Advocate General submitted that the present revision petition having been filed on April 30, 1974 will not be entertainable, being prohibited under S. 397 of the New Crl. PC (1973). The learned Counsel appearing for the petitioner, however, referred to S. 384 of the New Code of Crl. PC and sought assistance thereunder. According to the learned Counsel, proceedings in revision should be considered to be in continuation of either trial pending before the Magistrate or the first revision submitted to the Sessions Judge. I am afraid, the proposition advanced by the learned Counsel cannot be sustained under law. It would indeed be wrong to say that a proceeding in revision can he considered to be in continuation of the original proceeding from which it may arise. The learned Counsel referred to Garikapati Veeraya v. Subbiah Choudhary (AIR 1957 SC 540). But the mandate that emerges from that decision, with great respect to their Lordships is not applicable. Their Lordships were considering a certain appeal that was filed in continuation of the suit filed before the enforcement of the Constn and in that connection observed that the legal remedy of appeal was really a step in the series of proceedings all connected by some intrinsic unity and could be regarded as one legal proceeding. In the present case we are dealing with a revision and not with an appeal. It can hardly be considered that a remedy by way of revision is inherent or embedded in any manner in the original proceeding instituted before a Magistrate. Therefore, in my opinion the analogy cannot be drawn from a civil remedy of appeal, as contra-distinguished from a special remedy of criminal revision provided under the Crl. PC. In a, criminal revision there is not even a right reposed in the petitioner to be heard on merit. It is nonetheless a discretionary remedy to be granted or refused by the Court in the exigency of situation. Apart from this in the above noted decision their Lordships Lave themselves mentioned that the position would be different where the legislature itself had taken away expressly the remedy. In that contingency even the appeal would not be entertain able. If we peruse sub-sec. (3) of Section 397 of the present Code, we find that the remedy of a second revision is clearly barred therein……..”

22. I am in respectful agreement with the observations made in the above decision of the High Court of Himachala Pradesh. It is therefore not possible to accede to, the contention that a revision should be considered to be in continuation of the original proceedings from which it has arisen. This contention therefore fails.

23. In support of the third contention Mr. Gunjal, learned Counsel for the petitioner in Crl. R.P 274 of 1974 urged that if a person could file a second revision petition under the Old Code within the period of limitation and if the said period was to expire after 1-4-1974 then, the petition filed by him after 1-4-1974 but before the expiry of the period of limitation, the second revision petition is still maintainable under the Old Code. He invited my attention to the provisions of S. 484 sub-cluase (3). It reads as under:

“Where the period prescribed for an application or other proceeding under the Old Code had expired on or before the commencement of this Code, nothing in this Code shall be construed as enabling any such application to be made or proceeding to be commeced under this Code by reason only of the fact that a longer period therefor is prescribed by this Code or provisions are made in this Code for the extention of time.”

24. The above provision merely lays down that where the period prescribed for an application or other proceeding under the Old Code had expired on or before the commencement of the New Code, the New Code cannot be construed to enable any such application to be made or proceeding to be commenced under the New Code by reason of the fact that a longer period is prescribed under the New Code or provisions are made in the New Code for extension of time. This section does not lay down that where the period prescribed for an application or other proceeding extends beyond the date on which the New Code came into fores, that such application or proceeding are governed by the provisions of the Old Code. If this was the intention of the legislature, it would have expressly said so. Therefore, it is not possible to accept the contention of Shri J.S Gunjal. The above provision expressly denies the extension of the period of limitation to a litigant in criminal case.

25. Therefore, the question for determination is whether revision applications instituted in this Court after the New Code came into force are governed by the provisions of the Old Code or the New Code. This question involves the interpretation of the words “If immediately before the date on which the, New Code came into force there is an appeal, application, trial enquiry or investigation pending “. In S. 484(2)(a) of the New Code, in the opening sentence the principal clause is in the present tense. The intention of the legislature has to be gathered from the words used in the section. If there is an appeal or application pending immediately before the date on which the New Code came into force, such appeal or application shall be disposed of according to the provisions of the Old Code and further, if there is trial, enquiry or investigation pending immediately before the date on which the New Code came into force such trial shall be continued, enquiry held and investigation made in accordance with the provisions of the Old Coder. The words “there is any appeal, application, trial, inquiry or investigation pending” has direct reference to the time and the Court in which such proceeding was pending. These words cannot be construed to mean and include the Courts to which such proceeding may come or instituted at subsequent stages. Therefore, I am of the view that the subsequent stages arising out of any proceeding pending in any Court before the commencement of the New Code are not governed by the provisions of the Old Code, but are governed by the provisions of the New Code. In this view of the matter, it is clear, that under S. 397 of the New Code the present revision petitions which arose out of the revision petitions filed before the Sessions Court after the New Code came into force are not maintainable.

26. There is another reason which supports the above view. In my opinion, the intendment of the legislature in incorporating the drastic changes in the New Code is to shorten the duration of the trial and expedite disposal of the criminal cases in the Criminal Courts. That object would be defeated if the subsequent stages of a pending proceeding instituted after 1-4-1974 are to be governed by the provisions of the Old Code, as those proceedings would involve delay in their disposal. Therefore, I am of the view, that where a revision petition by a person is dismissed by the Sessions Judge before 1-4-1974 his order is final and no second revision petition by the same person lies before the High Court as the power of the revision vested in the High Court does not create any right in favour of such person. Since these criminal revision petitions are instituted by the same person or persons before this Court after 1-4-1974, it cannot be said that they are pending before this Court immediately before the date on which the New Code came into force. Therefore, the Crl. R.Ps 571, 576 to 579 and 274 of 1974 are not maintainable.

27. Let me now examine the question of maintainability of Crl. R.Ps 576, 632 to 643 of 1974 which era filed against the interlocutory orders passed after the New Code came into force.

28. Crl. R.P 576 of 1974 is against the order passed by the Metropolitan Magistrate, 5th Court, Bangalore, rejecting the application filed, by the accused under S. 432(2) of the Old Code for making reference to the High Court on the point of law.

29. In Crl. R.Ps 632 to 643 of 1974, the challenge is against the order parsed by the JMFC, Belgaum City, registering a case and issuing of summons to the petitioner-accused fop various offences under the Mysore Municipalities Act, 1964 and the Indian Penal Code.

30. The question for consideration is whether the orders parsed by the Magistrate in these criminal revision petitions are interlocutory orders.

31. The New Code does not define the words ‘interlocutory orders’. In Kuppuswamy Rao v. The King(3), the principle of law relating to final and interlocutory order is ???. Kania, C.J in para 6 of the judgment has observed thus:

“The question then is what is the meaning of “judgment, decree or final order of a High Court” in this section? The expression “final order” has been judicially interpreted and its meaning is now well settled. In Salavian v. Warner ((1891) 1 QB 734 : 60 LJQB 624) Lord Esher, MR. discussed the meaning of the expression ‘final order’ in these terms:

‘If their decision, whichever way it is given, will, if it stands, finally dispose of the matter in dispute, I think that for the purpose of these rules, it is final. On the other hand, if their decision, if given in one way, will finally dispose of the matter in dispute, but, if given in the other, will allow the action to go on, then I think it is not final, but interlocutory’”

32. Fry, LJ. remarked as follows:

“I conceive that an order is ‘final’ only where it is made upon an application or other proceeding which must, whether such application or other proceeding fail or succeed, determine the action. Conversely I think that an order is ‘interlocutory’ where it cannot be affirmed that in either event the action will be determined.”

33. Lopes, LJ. said as follows:

“I think that a judgment or order would be final within the meaning of the rules, when, whichever way it went, it would finally determine the rights of the parties.

In Bozson v. Altrinchay Urban Dist Council (No. (1), (1903) 1 KB 547 : 72 LJKB 271) Lord Alverstone, C.J held that the real test for determining the question was: ‘Does the judgment or order, as made finally dispose of the rights of the parties’?”

34. In para 11 of the judgment Kania, C.J has observed thus:

“….We have noticed above, the meaning given to the expression ‘final order’ by the English and Indian Courts. Those decisions were in civil cases. We think that the same meaning should be given to that expression in criminal cases also, that is to say, it must be an order which finally determines the points in dispute and brings the case to an end.”

35. The meaning at the words ‘interlocutory order’ has been interpreted by the Supremo Court in State of U.P v. Sujan Singh(4). In para 8 of the judgment, the Supreme Court hap observed thus:

“The learned Counsel for the appellant contended that the order of the High Court d/. Nov. 23, 1962, in the Crl. R. was a final order within the meaning of Art. 134(1) of the Constn. The material part of the said article reads:

‘An appeal shall lie to the Supreme Court from any judgment, final order or sentence in a criminal proceeding of a High Court in the territory of India……..’

We find it difficult to hold that the order under appeal is a final order within the meaning of the said article. In Seth Premchand Satramdas v. State of Bibar (1950 SCR 799 at page 804) it was held that an order of the Patna High Court dismissing an application under S. 21(3) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act, 1944, to direct the Board of Revenue) Bihar, to state a case and to refer it to the High Court was not a ‘final order’. This Court, speaking through Fazl Ali, J., defined the expression ‘final order’ thus:

‘It seems to us that the order appealed against in this case, cannot be regarded as a final order, because it does not of its own force bind or affect the rights of the parties’.

Though this definition is given in a different context, it will equally apply to that expression in Art. 134 of the Constn. Can it be said that the Special Judge in allowing the petition of the respondents to call fop the production of a document from the Union Govt. is a final order in the criminal proceeding? The criminal proceedings were taken against the respondents for an offence under S. 6(1)(a) of the Prevention of Corruption Act, 1947. The proceedings are now pending in the Court of the Special Judge. In the course of those proceedings the respondents filed an application for the production of a document by the Union Govt. and that was allowed by the Court. The said order is only an interlocutory order pending the proceedings. It does not purport to decide the rights of the parties, namely, the State of U.P and the accused. It enables the accused to have the said document duly proved and exhibited in the case. It relates only to a procedural step for adducing evidence. The High Court confirmed that order in revision. But the learned Counsel contends that it negatives the claim of privilege made by the Union Govt. and, therefore, it decides against the right of the Union Govt. to withhold the production of the document. Assuming that the order decides some right of the Union Govt. on which we do not express any opinion, the Union Govt. is neither a party to the criminal proceedings nor is it a party either before the High Court or before us. The indirect effect of that order on a third party to the proceedings, who does not seek to question that order, does not deprive the order of its interlocutory character. We, therefore, hold that the order made by the High Court is not a final order within the meaning of Art. 134(1) of the Constitution.”

36. In the light of the enunciation of the law by the Federal Court and the Supreme Court I will proceed to examine whether the orders challenged in these criminal revision petitions are interlocutory orders or not.

37. In Crl. R.P 576 of 1974 the order challenged is the order rejecting the request to refer certain matters to the High Court. This is clearly an order passed on an interlocutory application. It does not finally determine the points in dispute and bring the case to an end. Therefore, it must be construed as an Interlocutory Order. Similarly in Crl. R.Ps 632 to 643 of 1974, the petitioners have challenged the orders taking cognizance and issuing of summons to the petitioner-accused. The Magistrate taking cognizance and issuing summons to the accused to appear before the Court is not a final order. It is also in the nature of an interlocutory order and it cannot be challenged under S. 397 of the New Cade.

38. The provisions of S. 497(2) bars the exercise of revisional powers under sub-sec. (1) of the said section with regard to interlocutory orders. Therefore, I am of opinion that Crl. R.Ps 576 and 632 to 643 of 1974 are not maintainable.

39. Mr. W.K Joshi the learned Counsel the petitioners, however, contended that if a criminal revision petition under S. 397 is not maintainable, the same may be, converted into criminal petition filed under S. 482 of the Code and the relief granted to the petitioners.

40. It is true that the High Court has got inherent powers to interfere with the proceedings of a Subordinate Criminal Court at any stage of a proceeding, if it finds, that there is abuse of process of Court if any, or otherwise to secure ends of justice. This power should be sparingly exercised. The inherent powers can be exercised in cases where on account of a legal flaw or the alleged facts do not constitute an offence. In Crl. R.Ps 632 to 643 of 1974, a bare statement of facts of the cape is insufficient to convince this Court that these cases are fit cases for interference at an intermediate stage by invoking the inherent powers of the Court. Further the amitted circumstances of the case would not show that it would be a mock trial if the case is allowed to be proceeded with. Therefore, it is not possible to accede to the request of Mr. W.K Joshi. In this view of the matte, Crl. R.Ps 576 and 632 to 643 of 1974 are not maintainable.

41. In the result, criminal revision petitions are dismissed as not maintainable.