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Citation Codes
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citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • Nadu Civil Courts and Madras City Civil Court's Amendment Act, 1995
  • Amendment Act of 1995,
  • O.9, Rule 30, C.P.C.
  • O.9, Rule 30.
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
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Acts
  • Nadu Civil Courts and Madras City Civil Court's Amendment Act, 1995
  • Amendment Act of 1995,
  • O.9, Rule 30, C.P.C.
  • O.9, Rule 30.
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioners are the defendants in a suit originally filed as C.S.No.3 of 1994 in the Court for recovery of Rs.1,82,865 with interest. The petitioners filed a written statement in 1994. After an amendment (Tamil Nadu Civil Courts and Madras City Civil Court's Amendment Act, 1995) enhancing the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court, the suit was transferred in 1996 to the City Civil Court as O.S.No.1653 of 1996. The petitioners (or their counsel) did not appear when the suit was heard in the City Civil Court, and an ex parte decree was passed on 19.11.1998. The petitioners discovered the decree only when execution proceedings issued; they filed I.A.No.109 of 1999 seeking condonation of 369 days' delay in applying to set aside the ex parte decree. The learned Judge below dismissed that application relying on a 1997 decision (Krishnammal v. Arulmighu Madanagopalaswamy Temple). The petitioners then filed the present civil revision petition (C.R.P.) challenging the dismissal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the delay of 369 days in applying to set aside an ex parte decree arising from a statutory transfer of the suit should be condoned.
  2. Whether a transferee court (City Civil Court) or the courts generally owe a duty to issue fresh notice to parties or their counsel when suits are transferred en masse under the Amendment Act of 1995.
  3. Whether a counsel's failure to inform their client about a statutory transfer can constitute a bona fide reason for delay sufficient to set aside an ex parte decree.
  4. Whether the petitioners' remedy, as contended by the respondent, should have been by way of appeal rather than under Order IX, Rule 30 C.P.C. (the Court did not decide this question but it was raised).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioners' Arguments (as advanced by Mr. Jeyesh Dolia)

  • The delay in applying to set aside the ex parte decree was not deliberate but arose from a bona fide mistake: when many suits were transferred en masse from the High Court to the City Civil Court, counsel failed to note or communicate the transfer to the petitioners.
  • The petitioners had filed a written statement promptly in 1994, which demonstrates they were not seeking to delay the matter intentionally.
  • The party should not be penalised for a lapse of their counsel; systemic mass-transfers created scope for bona fide mistakes.
  • The petitioner relied on two authorities (Ellapuram Panchayat Union v. Shri Bahavaniamman Devasthanam and Narmada Nursery K.G. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner) to support the contention that counsel's lapse could be excused in appropriate circumstances.

Respondent's Arguments (as advanced by Mr. S.B.S. Raman)

  • The transfer to the City Civil Court occurred because of statutory enhancement of pecuniary jurisdiction; such statutory transfers do not oblige the courts to issue individual notices to parties.
  • The lists of transferred cases were posted on notice boards in the High Court, Lower Court and the Bar Association; the first hearing in the transferee court was on 19.4.1996, and thereafter issues were framed and the suit proceeded through trial until ex parte decree on 19.11.1998.
  • The petitioners were represented by counsel while the suit was pending in the High Court and therefore cannot say they had no knowledge of the transfer.
  • The respondent submitted the appropriate remedy may have been an appeal rather than an application under Order IX, Rule 30 C.P.C., and contended there was no merit in the civil revision petition.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Krishnammal and another v. Arulmighu Madanagopalaswamy Temple represented by its Executive Officer, Perambalur, (1997) 1 L.W. 276; (1997) 1 MLJ 29 The transferee court owes no duty to issue fresh summons where parties were represented by counsel before the transferor court; a mistake by counsel in not informing clients was not accepted as bona fide in the facts of that case. The court below relied on this authority to dismiss the petitioners' application. The present Court examined the decision and distinguished it on the facts: in Krishnammal the transferor court had informed counsel and the plaintiff engaged counsel at the transferee court on first hearing; here the Court found the petitioners' counsel's lapse to be bona fide given the mass transfer and listing practices.
Ellapuram Panchayat Union v. Shri Bahavaniamman Devasthanam, 94 L.W. 256 Deals with transfer of an appeal from one court to another; held that respondent had sufficient knowledge of the pendency in transferee court and a claimed prevention by sufficient cause was rejected on facts. Relied upon by the petitioners' counsel. The Court considered the authority but noted its factual outcome (insufficient excuse) and contrasted it with the facts of the present case.
Narmada Nursery K.G. and Junior School M.P. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and another, J.T. (1999) 10 S.C. 406 The opinion records that the petitioner relied on this decision; the text does not set out a specific principle from it. Cited by the petitioners' counsel in support of their contention. The Court's opinion does not elaborate a specific application of this authority to the facts, beyond noting it was relied upon by petitioner.
K. Janarthan and another v. R. Thilak Kumar, (1992) 2 L.W. 505 Case involved transfer after statutory enhancement of pecuniary jurisdiction; on facts the defendants were found to have had ample knowledge of proceedings and had not acted for long years; the Court there declined relief. The Court treated this decision as similar in many respects to the instant case but distinguished it on a material factual point: in K. Janarthan the defendant had not filed a written statement for years and was found to have ample knowledge; in the present case the petitioners filed a written statement promptly, supporting a finding of bona fide mistake.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by accepting the undisputed factual matrix: the Amendment Act of 1995 enhanced the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court and caused numerous suits (including the present one) to be transferred from the High Court to the City Civil Court in stages. The lists of transferred cases were periodically posted on notice boards, and the petitioners were represented by counsel when the suit was pending in the High Court.

The Court reviewed the authorities relied upon by both sides, particularly Krishnammal and K. Janarthan, and distilled the governing practical points: while a transferee court generally does not owe a duty to individual litigants to issue fresh notices in statutory transfers (and prior decisions had held counsel's failure to inform clients could not always be accepted as a bona fide excuse), courts had also recognised the desirability that every effort be made to notify litigants of transfers until procedural provisions are made for this.

Applying those principles to the facts, the Court performed a fact-sensitive inquiry:

  • It noted that in Krishnammal the transferor court had informed counsel and the plaintiff had attended the first hearing in the transferee court, which supported refusal of relief there; by contrast, in the present case the petitioners had filed a written statement promptly and there was no factual indication of deliberate delay or mala fides.
  • The Court emphasised that the mass transfer created practical difficulties: lists often contained only case numbers (not full identifying details), and the Court acknowledged both counsel agreed that the lists commonly showed numbers only. This practical circumstance made a counsel's failure to note and communicate the transfer susceptible of being a bona fide lapse in this context.
  • The Court distinguished K. Janarthan on the ground that in that case the defendants had been dilatory (no written statement for years) and had knowledge of proceedings; whereas here petitioners demonstrated diligence by filing a written statement in 1994, and there was no evidence of intent to delay.
  • The Court declined to enter upon the question whether the appropriate procedural remedy was an appeal or an application under Order IX, Rule 30 C.P.C., because the civil revision petition before it was confined to condonation of delay; the Court therefore decided only the condonation issue.

On balance, the Court found that the petitioners' failure to appear resulted from a bona fide mistake attributable to the nature of the mass transfer and the manner of listing, and not from a contumacious litigant's deliberate conduct. Having found some bona fides in the petitioners' conduct, the Court set aside the lower court's order dismissing the application, but did so only on terms designed to demonstrate the petitioners' bona fides.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The civil revision petition is allowed on condition. The petitioners must deposit Rs.50,000 to the credit of the suit within six weeks from the date of receipt of the order; failing which the civil revision petition shall stand dismissed. The Court set aside the order of the court below on these terms. No costs were awarded and the connected C.M.P. was closed.

Implications: The direct effect is that the petitioners obtain conditional relief (their challenge to the dismissal is allowed subject to the security deposit). The opinion is fact-specific: the Court distinguished prior authorities and emphasised the factual circumstances (prompt filing of written statement; mass transfer listing practices) that supported a finding of bona fide mistake by counsel. The Court did not purport to lay down a new general rule beyond these fact-sensitive conclusions and expressly did not decide whether the correct procedural remedy was an appeal or an application under Order IX, Rule 30 C.P.C.

Note: This summary is based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion and does not add or infer facts not present in the text.

    Ashok U. Samat Others v. M/S. Shanthi Builders

    1. The defendants are the petitioners.

    2. The petitioners filed I.A.No.109 of 1999 for condonation of delay of 369 days in setting aside the ex parte decree dated 19.11.1998. The respondent filed C.S.No.3 of 1994 in this Court for recovery of Rs.1,82,865 with interest. The petitioners set out their defence in their written statement filed in 1994. Subsequently, in 1996, the suit was transferred to City Civil Court and numbered as O.S.No.1653 of 1996. According to the petitioners, neither they nor their counsel were served with any notice of transfer of the said C.S. from this Court to the City Court and therefore, they did not appear. Only when execution proceedings were filed, they received the notice and they came to know on 8.12.1999 that the suit had been decreed ex parte as early as 19.11.1998. According to the petitioners, delay was not deliberate one and had to be condoned.

    3. The respondent filed their counter stating that the transfer was occasioned by the enhancement of pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court and when such transfers are made, the courts were not obliged to issue notice to the parties. According to the respondents, when the petitioners were represented by counsel in the High Court, they ought not to find that the court were not having issued notice. The respondent therefore prayed that the application may be dismissed.

    4. The learned Judge dismissed the application relying on the judgment reported in Krishnammal and another v. Arulmighu Madanagopalaswamy Temple represented by its Executive Officer, Perambalur Krishnammal and another v. Arulmighu Madanagopalaswamy Temple represented by its Executive Officer, Perambalur Krishnammal and another v. Arulmighu Madanagopalaswamy Temple represented by its Executive Officer, Perambalur , (1997)1 MLJ. 29: (1997)1 L.W. 276.

    5. Mr.Jeyesh Dolia, learned counsel for the petitioner vehemently argued that when large number of suits were transferred from the High Court to the City Civil Court, then there was scope for a bona fide mistake in the counsel taking note of the transfer and informing the parties. He submitted that very fact that the written statement was filed immediately showing that the petitioners were not interested in delaying the matter and if they had not appeared in the court on the date of hearing, it is only because they were not aware of the dates, the counsel had not informed. He urged that the party should not suffer on account of the counsel's lapses. He relied on two decisions as one reported in Ellapuram Panchayat Union v. Shri Bahavaniamman Devasthanam Ellapuram Panchayat Union v. Shri Bahavaniamman Devasthanam Ellapuram Panchayat Union v. Shri Bahavaniamman Devasthanam , 94 L.W. 256 and the other Narmada Nursery K.G. and Junior School M.P. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and another Narmada Nursery K.G. and Junior School M.P. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and another Narmada Nursery K.G. and Junior School M.P. v. Regional Provident Fund Commissioner and another , J.T. (1999)10 S.C. 406.

    6. In reply, Mr.S.B.S.Raman, learned counsel for the respondent submitted that it was not as if the transfer came into effect on all of a sudden. The list of transferred cases had been pasted on notice board in the High Court, Lower Court and the Bar Association and the first date of hearing was 19.4.1996. Thereafter, in due course, issues were framed and the suit was ready for trial. The plaintiff's evidence was recorded and completed on 13.11.1998. The suit was adjourned day after day till 19.11.1998. Since there was no representation, the suit was decreed on merits. Therefore, the remedy of the petitioner is if there was only an appeal and not under O.9, Rule 30. According to the learned counsel for the respondent, there was no merit in the civil revision petition.

    7. There is no dispute that Tamil Nadu Civil Courts and Madras City Civil Court's Amendment Act, 1995 enhanced the pecuniary jurisdiction of the City Civil Court, Chennai. Therefore, all the suits which were valid upto Rs.1 lakhs were transferred from High Court to City Civil Court. They were transferred in two or three stages and as stated in the counter filed by the respondent in this C.R.P., the lists were also periodically posted on the notice board. It is also not in dispute that the petitioners were represented by counsel while the suit was pending in the High Court. The transfer of the suit was not at the instance of either party where notice would necessarily go to other side, it was a statutory transfer and in such statutory transfers, notice is not given to the individual parties. In the decision relied on by the learned counsel for the petitioner reported in Ellapuram Panchayat Union v. Shri Bhavaniammal Devasthanam Ellapuram Panchayat Union v. Shri Bhavaniammal Devasthanam Ellapuram Panchayat Union v. Shri Bhavaniammal Devasthanam , 94 L.W. 256. dealt with the transfer of an appeal from one court to another. This Court held on facts that the respondent did have sufficient knowledge of the pendency of the appeal in the transferee court and his explanation that he was prevented by sufficient cause to appear in the appeal was not accepted. However, the learned Judge held in this case that,

    In the absence of any provision to that effect either under the C.P.C. or under the Civil Rules of Practice and circular orders, every effort should be made by courts to put the litigants on notice of the transfer of pending litigation, be it the trial court or the appellate court as the case may be. It is very necessary and desirable may, even imperative till such time as provision in this regard is made either under the C.P.C. or under the Civil Rules of Practice and circular orders that there should be an inflexible adherence to this requirement regarding notice; as otherwise, courts cannot adjudicate upon the rival claims of the litigations before it after giving an effective and adequate hearing to both sides, which is the bedrock of our system of administration of justice.

    The learned Judge has referred to in the decision reported in Krishnammal and another v. Arulmughu Madanagopalaswamy Temple represented by its Executive Officer, Perambalur Krishnammal and another v. Arulmughu Madanagopalaswamy Temple represented by its Executive Officer, Perambalur Krishnammal and another v. Arulmughu Madanagopalaswamy Temple represented by its Executive Officer, Perambalur , (1997)1 L.W. 276 which was relied on by the court below to dismiss the application filed by the petitioners. In that case, the suit was originally filed by the District Munsif, Perambalur. For administrative reasons, it was transferred to District Munsif Court, Ariyalur. The plaintiff filed vakalath and notice was ordered to the defendants. The defendants did not appear and subsequently, an ex parte decree was passed. The learned Judge held that the transferee court owed no duty to inform about the transfer especially his parties are represented by the counsel before the transferor court and therefore, there was no necessity for issue of fresh summons to the defendants by the transferee court. In fact, the learned Judge in this case also found that the transferor court had informed the respective counsel about the transfer of the suit and only on that basis, the plaintiff had engaged the counsel before the transferee court on the very first hearing date. Therefore, the learned Judge came to the conclusion of the facts that a mistake of the counsel in not informing the clients about the transfer of the suit was not a bona fide mistake and the reason given for the delay could not be accepted. The circular issued by this Court to Sub Court for its guidance is extracted in this judgment which was relied upon with great vehemence by the learned counsel for the petitioner.

    When suits, appeals or other proceedings retransferred from one court to another court, the transferor court shall post before it, the cases to a particular date and take endorsement of the advocates, who have already entered appearance for the parties that they are aware of the suits, appeals or the proceedings being transferred to a particular suit and only thereafter forward the papers to the transferee court.

    Therefore, according to the learned counsel for the petitioner, this Court ought to have taken endorsement before posting the case to the transferee court. In the same judgment, there is a reference to the another judgment reported in K.Janarthan and another v. R.Thilak Kumar K.Janarthan and another v. R.Thilak Kumar K.Janarthan and another v. R.Thilak Kumar (1992)2 L.W. 505. That was a case which is very similar to the instant case. The suit was registered in 1977. Vakalath was filed on behalf of the defendants in 1978. On the passing of the act 34 of 1980 which enhanced the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Civil Court, the suit was transferred to Civil Court and numbered as O.S. 2353 of 1981. The court directed fresh summons and the matter was periodically adjourned and ultimately, the defendants were set ex parte and the suit was decreed in 1986. In 1988, the application was filed for setting aside the ex parte decree on the ground that the defendants came to know of the matter only then. This Court set aside the order of the trial court condoning the delay and allowed the C.R.P. The finding of the learned Judge is extracted hereunder:

    The respondent had been duly served not only in the application for permission to file the suit as an indigent person, but also in the suit after it was registered in the court. He did not file any written statement for over four years when the suit was pending in this Court. Thereafter when the matter was pending for about five years in the City Civil Court he did not move his little finger to appear in the suit or contest the same. I have found on facts that he had ample knowledge of the proceedings and he appears in court in 1988 for the first time and seeks to set aside the decree which has been obtained by the petitioners after toiling in courts for a period of about eleven years.

    The learned Judge also held that notwithstanding the fact that the Registry only lists the case numbers and not the names (as in the instant case) the party ought to have gone to the City Court and ascertained the position.

    8. Though it is true that the City Civil Court owes no duty either to the litigant or to the counsel to issue fresh notice when the cases are transferred, this case appears to be one of bona fide mistake. In the decision reported in Krishnammal and another v. Arulmighu Madanagopalaswamy Temple represented by its Executive Officer, Perambalur Krishnammal and another v. Arulmighu Madanagopalaswamy Temple represented by its Executive Officer, Perambalur Krishnammal and another v. Arulmighu Madanagopalaswamy Temple represented by its Executive Officer, Perambalur , (1997)1 L.W. 276 the transferor court had issued notice and the plaintiff had appeared on the very first hearing date. Therefore, the learned Judge refused to accept the reason given by the defendants that they had no notice. In the decision reported in K.Janarthan and another v. R.Thilak Kumar K.Janarthan and another v. R.Thilak Kumar K.Janarthan and another v. R.Thilak Kumar, (1992)2 L.W. 505 on facts, it was found that the defendants were aware of the proceedings in the City Civil Court and further more, their conduct shows that they were not interested in conducting the proceedings. On the other hand, they only wanted to protract the proceedings as long as they could.

    9. In this case, it is seen that the defendants had filed written statement promptly. There is nothing to show that they had been wanting in diligence in conducting the case. The failure of the counsel appears to be a bona fide lapse, since, it was a mass transfer of cases and it is common knowledge that the list provided only the numbers and not other details. This was accepted by the counsel on both sides.

    10. After the matter was heard and orders were reserved on 8.9.2000, the learned counsel for the petitioners mentioned that he would like to bring to the knowledge of this Court that in some cases, the City Civil Court had issued notice to the counsel to appear on a particular date in cases of transfer, and he produced on 14.9.2000 xerox copies of such notices issued by the III Additional Judge. City Civil Court, Chennai in A.S.No.96 of 1999 and the II Assistant Judge, City Civil Court, Chennai in O.S.No.8471 of 1996. The learned counsel for the respondent submitted that these were rare instance and not in common practice and therefore, the counsel for the petitioners cannot take shelter under this excuse. The learned counsel for the respondent is right. When the cases were transferred to enmasse to the City Civil Court after the Amendment Act of 1995, neither this Court not the City Court issued notices to either counsel or the parties as a matter of course. In almost all aspects, this case is similar to the one reported in K.Janarthan and another v. Thilak Kumar K.Janarthan and another v. Thilak Kumar K.Janarthan and another v. Thilak Kumar, (1992)2 L.W. 505. But in one material aspect, it is different. The defendant in that case dragged the matter and did not file the written statement for over four years and the learned Judge found on facts that he had ample knowledge of the proceedings in this case. It is not so here. The petitioner had promptly filed the written statement and there is nothing to show that he had deliberately delayed the matter. Therefore, I am willing to hold that this was a bona fide mistake and not a lapse of a cantankerous or recalcitrant litigant. I am not going into the question whether the petitioner ought to have filed an appeal or an application under O.9, Rule 30, C.P.C. This civil revision petition is only restricted to the condonation of the delay in filing the application. Since on fact, I find that there is some bona fide in the conduct of the petitioner, I am setting aside the order of the court below but on terms.

    11. The civil revision petition is therefore allowed on condition that the petitioner deposits Rs.50,000 to the credit of the suit to show their bona fides within six weeks from the date of receipt of this order, failing which the C.R.P. shall stand dismissed. No costs. Consequently, the connected C.M.P. is closed.

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    Ashok U. Samat Others v. M/S. Shanthi Builders
    (Sep 20, 2000)