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  • Rule 96(1) and (2) of the Karnataka Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred as the Rules). Respondent-3,
  • Sec. 18 of the Karnataka (Cinemas) Regulation Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Section 18
  • provisions of Sec. 298 of the Assam Municipal Act.
  • Mysore Cinemas Regulation Act, 1952,
  • 9.7. Rule 96(4) of the Rules
  • Rule 96 of the Rules,
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 96(1) and (2) of the Karnataka Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred as the Rules). Respondent-3,
  • Sec. 18 of the Karnataka (Cinemas) Regulation Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as the Act). Section 18
  • provisions of Sec. 298 of the Assam Municipal Act.
  • Mysore Cinemas Regulation Act, 1952,
  • 9.7. Rule 96(4) of the Rules
  • Rule 96 of the Rules,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, owner of a touring talkies, applied to the District Magistrate (DM), Tumkur, for a no objection certificate (NOC) to run a touring talkies in Turuvekere. The DM called for objections under Rule 96(1) and (2) of the Karnataka Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1971. Respondent-3 (who had a licence for a permanent cinema theatre) and respondents 4–9 (residents of Turuvekere) filed objections (Ext. A). The DM fixed a hearing for 1-3-1977 which was adjourned to 30-8-1977. On 30-8-1977 the Advocate for respondents 3–9 was absent; the DM heard the petitioner's counsel, reserved orders, and later (after an inspection on 23-9-1977) granted the NOC by order dated 27-9-1977 (Exhibit B).

Respondents 3–9 filed a revision petition under Section 18 of the Karnataka (Cinemas) Regulation Act, 1964 challenging the DM's order. Section 18 permits the State Government to call for records and pass such orders as it thinks fit in respect of original orders against which no appeal lies. The State Government allowed the revision on 30-1-1978, set aside the DM's order dated 27-9-1977, and remanded the matter to the licensing authority for fresh disposal after giving respondents 3–9 an opportunity for the oral hearing they had requested by application dated 5-9-1977. The petitioner challenged the State Government's revisional order by presenting the present writ petition.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether Rule 96 of the Karnataka Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1971 confers a right to an oral hearing for objectors (respondents 3–9) when an application for a no objection certificate is considered by the licensing authority.
  2. Whether the State Government, in exercise of its revisional power under Section 18 of the Karnataka (Cinemas) Regulation Act, 1964, exceeded its jurisdiction or acted illegally in setting aside the licensing authority's order on the ground that respondents 3–9 had not been given the oral hearing they requested.
  3. Whether failing to give an oral hearing (where requested) amounts to a violation of principles of natural justice in the facts of this case.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Under Rule 96 the licensing authority is only obliged to "consider the objections" and that consideration does not include a right to oral hearing for objectors; therefore the DM did not commit illegality by not granting oral hearing to respondents 3–9.
  • The State Government erred in setting aside the licensing authority's order under Section 18 on the basis that oral hearing was not given, because Rule 96 does not create any statutory right to personal hearing for objectors.
  • The petitioner relied on State of Assam v. Gauhati Municipal Board to support the contention that where statute's provisions are complied with and parties do not ask for a personal hearing, natural justice does not require the State to call for a personal hearing.
  • The petitioner also relied on other authorities (listed below) to support the contention that the revisional action was improper; and raised a concern that the State Government had relied on the DM's report and a certificate from respondent 3 which, the petitioner argued, might prejudice the petitioner's case on remand.

Respondents 3–9 / Objectors' Position

  • Respondents 3–9 filed objections to the petitioner's application and had their Advocate scheduled to be heard; when the Advocate was absent on 30-8-1977 (attending a family marriage in Shimoga), they thereafter filed an application on 5-9-1977 requesting the DM to hear their Advocate before passing final orders.
  • Their pleaded position (as reflected in the revision) was that they should be given the oral opportunity to address arguments before the licensing authority passed the final order on the petitioner's application.

State Government's Reasoning (as extracted from the revisional order)

  • The State Government noted that the application by the first objector dated 5-9-1977 prayed for an opportunity to address arguments but the DM passed the order on 27-9-1977 without passing any orders on that application, despite there being sufficient time (between 5-9-1977 and 27-9-1977) to decide the application.
  • On that basis the State Government concluded that the DM's order "lacks legality and propriety" and allowed the revision under Section 18, setting aside the DM's order and remanding for disposal in accordance with law after giving the requested hearing.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
State of Assam v. Gauhati Municipal Board Illustrates that where statutory provisions (Sec. 298 of the Assam Municipal Act) are complied with and the concerned body does not request a personal hearing or to produce materials, principles of natural justice do not require the State to call the body for personal hearing. The Court accepted the import of this authority to the extent that if, on the facts, an opportunity of oral hearing is demanded, that opportunity should be given before overruling objections; but noted the distinction that where a personal hearing is not sought, natural justice may not demand it.
D.S. Krishnappa Gowda v. State of Mysore Holds that the Government should give an opportunity of hearing before passing an appellate order under the Mysore Cinemas Regulation Act, 1952; and refers to an earlier decision (W.P. 638 of 1958) where no statutory right to oral hearing existed for objectors pre-grant of an NOC. The Court observed that the decision supports the proposition that denial of hearing can violate natural justice depending on facts; but clarified that the cited case did not address the precise scope of revisional power under provisions similar to Section 18 nor the situation where the licensing authority had itself decided to hear and then not heard the objectors.
Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India The opinion refers to this decision as one of several authorities relied upon by the petitioner (no detailed principle from the case is extracted in the opinion). The Court noted that this and the other listed decisions (see below) do not support the petitioner's contention that the State Government exceeded its jurisdiction in allowing the revision on the ground of lack of oral hearing.
Union of India v. Jyoti Prakash Mitter Referred to by the petitioner (the opinion does not set out the specific rule cited from this authority). The Court found that this decision did not assist the petitioner's contention in this case; overall the Court treated the cited set of cases as showing that the question of personal hearing depends on the statute and facts.
United Karnataka Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Goverdhana Rao Referred to by the petitioner (the opinion does not extract a specific principle from this decision). The Court concluded this authority did not support the petitioner's argument that the State Government exceeded its revisional power.
Shyam Murari Lal Saxena v. District Magistrate Referred to by the petitioner (no particular rule is quoted in the opinion). The Court treated this authority as not advancing the petitioner's contention that the revisional order was beyond the State Government's jurisdiction; the Court emphasized instead that the requirement of personal hearing depends on statutory scheme and facts.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court reviewed the chronology and statutory framework and applied the following reasoning steps, drawing only on the materials and findings in the opinion:

  1. The DM complied with Rule 96 by calling for objections and by proceeding to consider the matter. The licensing authority had fixed a date for hearing (which indicates an intention to give oral hearing) and the hearing was adjourned to 30-8-1977; on that date the objectors' Advocate was absent.
  2. After the hearing date when the Advocate was absent, respondents 3–9 filed an application on 5-9-1977 requesting the DM to hear their Advocate before passing final orders. The DM did not pass any order on that application and, after inspecting the site on 23-9-1977, passed the order on 27-9-1977 granting the NOC.
  3. Respondents 3–9 invoked Section 18 and the State Government, exercising revisional power, set aside the DM's order and remanded the matter to the licensing authority with directions to give respondents 3–9 an opportunity for oral hearing as they had requested.
  4. The petitioner argued that Rule 96's requirement to "consider the objections" did not include oral hearing, relying on the Supreme Court decision in State of Assam v. Gauhati Municipal Board. The Court considered the Assam decision, noting its holding that where a party does not ask for personal hearing, natural justice does not automatically require it; but the Court also drew from that decision the converse proposition that if an oral hearing is demanded in the given facts and circumstances, that should be provided before overruling objections.
  5. The Court observed that here the licensing authority initially intended to give a personal hearing (by fixing a hearing date) and that respondents 3–9 later sought an oral hearing by application dated 5-9-1977. Given these facts — the prior fixation of a hearing date, the subsequent application, the DM's failure to pass any order on that application, and the time available between 5-9-1977 and 27-9-1977 — the State Government reasonably concluded that fairness required that the objectors be given an opportunity of oral hearing.
  6. The Court examined other precedents relied upon by the petitioner and concluded that they do not establish that the State Government exceeded its power under Section 18 by setting aside the DM's order; rather, those cases show that the necessity of a personal hearing turns on the particular statutory scheme and the facts of each case.
  7. The petitioner contended the State Government had based its decision on the DM's report regarding distance and on a certificate by respondent 3, which the petitioner said would prejudice the remand. The Court found that the State Government's order did not rest on any findings based on that report or certificate but only on the failure to provide the requested opportunity of hearing; the DM on remand must decide the matter independently on the materials before him.
  8. On these facts and legal principles, the State Government's exercise of revisional power under Section 18 to set aside the DM's order and to direct that respondents 3–9 be given an opportunity of oral hearing was within its jurisdiction and not illegal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is dismissed and the rule is discharged.

Implications:

  • The State Government's revisional order of 30-1-1978, which set aside the District Magistrate's order dated 27-9-1977 and remanded the matter to the licensing authority for fresh disposal after giving respondents 3–9 an opportunity of oral hearing, is upheld by the Court.
  • On remand, the District Magistrate/licensing authority must proceed afresh and record independent findings based on the materials before him; he must give respondents 3–9 the opportunity of hearing as directed by the State Government.
  • The Court did not treat this decision as creating any new general rule settling when oral hearings are required; rather, it emphasised that whether oral hearing is required depends on the statutory scheme and the facts and circumstances of each case. The opinion does not purport to lay down a broader precedent beyond the circumstances of this matter.

    Nanjappa S. v. State Of Karnataka

    1. The petitioner, who is the owner of a touring talkies, filed an application before the District Magistrate, Tumkur, for the grant of a no objection certificate for running a touring talkies in Turuvekere. The District Magistrate called for objections in accordance with Rule 96(1) and (2) of the Karnataka Cinemas (Regulation) Rules, 1971 (hereinafter referred as the ‘Rules’). Respondent-3, who had by then secured a licence for establishing a permanent cinema theatre, ad also respondents 4 to 9 who are residents of Turuvekere Town in which the petitioner wanted to run his touring talkies, filed their objections (Ext. A). The District Magistrate issued notices to the petitioner and also to the objectors fixing the date of hearing on 1-3-1977 and the same was adjourned to 30-8-1977. On 30-8-1977, the Advocate for respondents 3 to 9 remained absent. The District Magistrate proceeded to hear the Counsel for the petitioner and reserved the orders. On 5-9-1977 respondents 3 to 9 made an, application before the Dist. Magistrate requesting him to hear their Advocate before passing final orders. The reason given in the said application was that their Advocate was unable to be present on 30-8-1977 as he had proceeded to Shimoga to attend his brother's marriage on that day. The Dist. Magistrate did not pass any order on the said application. On 23-9-1977, the Dist. Magistrate inspected the spot and thereafter passed the order dated 27-9-1977 granting the no objection certificate asked for by the petitioner (vide Exhibit B).

    2. Against the said order, respondents 3 to 9 preferred a revision petition before the State Govt. under Sec. 18 of the Karnataka (Cinemas) Regulation Act, 1964 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the Act’). Section 18 empowers the State Govt. to call for and examine the records in respect of any original order passed under the provisions of the Act against which no appeal lies under Ses. 10 or 17 for the purpose of satisfying itself as to the legality or propriety of such order, and to pass such order in reference thereto, as it thinks fit. It is not disputed that under Sec. 10 no appeal lies at the instance of an objector to the grant of a no objection certificate. Respondents 3 to 9 being objectors could not, therefore, maintain their appeal before the Divisional Commissioner and hence they presented the revision petition under Sec. 18. The State Govt. gave notice to both parties and after hearing them made the order dated 30-1-1978, allowing the revision petition and setting aside the order of the Dist. Magistrate dated 27-9-1977 in favour of the petitioner and remanded the matter to the licensing authority for fresh disposal in accordance with law after giving an opportunity of hearing to respondents 3 to 9 to advance their arguments as prayed for by them in their application dated 5-9-1977. Aggrievet by the said order, the petitioner has presented this writ petition.

    3. Though several grounds are set out in the writ petition, at the time of hearing, the following contention only was urged by the learned Counsel for the petitioner in support of the writ petition:

    Under Rule 96 of the Rules, there is no right of oral hearing for respondents 3 to 9 who were only objectors and, therefore, the State Govt. was in error, in setting aside the order of the licensing authority on the ground that oral hearing was not given to respondents 3 to 9 as requested by them in their application dated 5-9-1977.

    4. Elaborating the contention, it was urged for the petitioner that Rule 96 only makes it obligatory for the licensing authority to consider the objections preferred to the application for the grant of a no objection certificate and the consideration contemplated in the said Rule does not include oral hearing, and, therefore, as the Dist. Magistrate did not commit any illegality in not giving oral hearing to respondents 3 to 9, it was not open for the Govt. to set aside his order on the said ground in exercise of its revisional power under Sec. 18 of the Act. In support of the above submission, the petitioner placed reliance on the decision of the Supreme Court in State of Assam v. Gauhati Municipal Board(1). In the said case, which came up for consideration under the provisions of the Assam Muncipal Act, with reference to the question whether there should be personal hearing or not before the Govt. passes an order of supersession after receiving the reply from the concerned municipality to the show cause notice issued by the Govt., the Supreme Court held that there was no requirement of personal hearing under the provisions of Sec. 298 of the Assam Municipal Act. The relevant portion of the judgment reads as follows:

    “However, we are definitely of opinion that the provisions of Sec. 298 being fully complied with it cannot be said that there was violation of principles of natural justice in this case when the Board never demanded what is called a personal hearing and never intimated to the Govt. that it would like to product materials in support of its explanation at some later stage. Therefore, where a provision like Sec. 298 is fully complied with as in this case and the Board does not ask for an opportunity for personal hearing or for production of mate rials in support of its explanation, principles of natural justice do not require that the State Govt. should ask the Board to appear for a personal hearing and to produce materials in support of the explanation. In the absence of any demand by the Board of the nature indicated above, we cannot agree with the High Court that merely because the Govt. did not call upon the Board to appear for a personal hearing and to produce material in support of its explanation it violated the principles of natual justice”.

    5. What follows from the above decision is that if on the facts and in the circumstances of a given case an opportunity of oral hearing is demanded, that opportunity should be given before passing an order overruling the objections. In the present cage, in the first instance, the Dist. Magistrate himself had decided to give personal hearing and the case was ported for hearing on 30-8-77. On that day, the Counsel for respondents 3 to 9 could not attend at the hearing on account of his personal inconvenience. But, long before the order was passed by the Dist. Magistrate, an application was made on 5-9-1977 requesting the licensing authority to give as opportunity of hearing before passing the final order. The opportunity asked for was not given and no order was passed on the said application. In this behalf, the State Govt. has stated as follows in the impugned order:

    “It will be seen that though the first objector's application was filed on 5-9-1977 praying for an opportunity to address his argument, the learned Dist. Magistrate has actually passed order on 27-9-1977 without passing any orders on the application filed on 5-9-1977 even though there was enough time between 5-9-1977 to 27-9-1977 for him to pass appropriate orders on the said application. It is clear that the order dated 27-9-1977 of the Dist. Magistrate which is challenged in the revision petition, lacks legality and propriety and therefore the circumstances of this case justify interference under Section 18 of the Act”.

    6. From the revisional order it is clear that the State Govt. came to the conclusion that, on the facts and in the circumstances of this case the licensing authority ought to have granted the request made in the application filed on behalf of respondents 3 to 9 on 5-9-1977 to give them an oral hearing, and as such hearing was not given, the order of the licensing authority should be set aside and a direction should be given to the licensing authority to dispose of the application of the petitioner for grant of a no objection certificate after giving opportunity to respondents 3 to 9.

    7. Rule 96(4) of the Rules provides that the licensing authority shall consider the objections, if any, received from the members of the public. The contention of the petitioner is that such consideration does not include the giving of oral hearing. Whether oral hearing should be given in a given case or not is a matter which has to be decided with reference to the facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case, the District Magistrate himself had decided to give oral hearing. Respondents 3 to 9 were not heard on 30-8-1977 for the reason that their Advocate was not present. All that the Govt. has done in exercise of its revisional power is to hold that as an application had been filed or 5-9-1977 long before the final order was passed, the District Magistrate ought to have given an opportunity of being heard to respondents 3 to 9 and thereafter the final order should have been passed. The Govt. is given the power of revision under Sec. 18 of the Act to examine the legality and propriety of the order against which the revision petition is entertained and to pass appropriate orders as it thinks fit. In coming to the condlusion that in the circumstances of this case it was necessary to grant the application made by respondents 3 to 9 on 5-9-1977 seeking an opportunity of hearing at the hands of the licensing authority, the Govt. has not committed any illegality and his only exercised its legitimate power under Sec. 18 of the Act.

    8. In support of the contention urged for the petitioner, reliance was also placed on the decision in D.S Krishnappa Gowda v. State of Mys(2). In the said case, this Court held that the Govt. before passing an appellate Order under the Mysore Cinemas Regulation Act, 1952, should have given an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned. Reliance was placed on para-9 of the said judgment in which there is reference to an earlier decision rendered in W.P 638 of 1958 in which it was held that before a no objection certificate is granted by the Dist. Magistrate, there was no right of oral hearing and the only right the concerned person had was to file objections. From the said decision, it is clear that even though there was no right created by the statute to ask for a personal hearing in an appeal presented to the Govt., this Court came to the conclusion that not hearing the parties would amount to violation of the principles of natural justice. Further, the effect of the decision rendered is W.P 638/58 is that in a writ petition this Court would not interfere when oral hearing was denied to an objector. This Count neither dealt with the scope of the revisional power of the State Govt. under provisions similar to Section 18 of the Act, nor with a case where hearing was denied even after the Licensing Authority had decided to hear the objectors and did not hear, inspite of the reasons furnished explaining the absence of the Advocate for the party on the date fixed for hearing. Whether an opportunity of hearing should have been given or not and whether not giving of an opportunity amounts to violation of the principles of natural justice depends upon, the facts and circumstances of each case. In the present case, the State Govt. has come to the conclusion that in order to ensure a just and fair decision an opportunity should have been given and on that basis the revision petition has been allowed. It cannot be said that the State Govt. has exceeded its power under Section 18 of the Act in doing so.

    9. The petitioner next placed reliance on the following decisions; (i) Madhya Pradesh Industries Ltd. v. Union of India(3); (ii) Union Of India v. Jyoti Prakash Mitter† (4); (iii) United Karnataka Insurance Co. Ltd. v. Goverdhana Rao(5) and (iv) Shyam Murari Lal Saxena v. District Magistrate(6). These decisions do not in any way support the contention of the petitioner that the State Govt. exceeded its jurisdiction in setting aside the order of Licensing Authority on the ground of not acceding to the request of respondents 3 to 9 to give them a hearing before passing final orders. On a consideration of all these cases, it becomes clear that the question of personal hearing has to be determined with reference to the concerned statute and the facts and circumstances of each case.

    10. Therefore, I am of the opinion that in the present case when the State Govt., in exercising its power of revision under Sec. 18 of the Act, has felt that in fairness to the objectors, opportunity of hearing Should have been given by the Licensing Authority before passing final orders, the decision of the Govt. does not suffer from the vice of any illegality or exceeding of the jurisdiction vested in the Govt. under Sec. 18 of the Act and cannot also be regarded as having caused any substantial injury to the petitioner. It was, however, pointed out on behalf of the petitioner that the State Govt., in disposing of the revision petition, relied on the report submitted by the Dist. Magistrate on the question of the distance between the girls' hostel run by the Social Welfare Dept and the site in question and also on a certificate produced by respondent 3, and it was contended that this will prejudice the case of the petitioner before the Dist. Magistrate. On a reading of the impugned order, it is clear that the State Govt. has not given any finding on the basis of the said report which according to petitioner was secured behind his back. Order of the Govt. is only based on the denial of the opportunity of hearing to respondents 3 to 9 though sought for by their application dated 5-9-1977 and not on any other finding. Therefore, in disposing of the application of the petitioner for the grant of no objection certificate, the Dist. Magistrate has to proceed on the basis of the materials before him and has to record his independent findings and not on the basis that there is any finding recorded by the State Govt. on the question of distance between the permanent cinema theatre and the girls' hostel.

    11. For the reasons aforesaid, the rule is discharged and the writ petition is dismissed.

    12. No costs.

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    Comments

    Nanjappa S. v. State Of Karnataka
    (Mar 15, 1978)