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  • CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE AMENDMENT ACT
  • Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred
  • sub-section (1) of Section 92 of the Code. In sub-section (1)
  • Civil Courts Act of 1964 (Karnataka Act No. 21 of 1964)
  • Section 92 of the Code. In sub-section (1)
  • sub-section (1) of Section 92 of the Code.
  • aspect.9. Section 92 of the Code
  • Section 92 of the C.P Code
  • Section 115 of the Code.
  • Slum Clearance Act,
  • Section 104(1)(ffa).
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE AMENDMENT ACT
  • Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred
  • sub-section (1) of Section 92 of the Code. In sub-section (1)
  • Civil Courts Act of 1964 (Karnataka Act No. 21 of 1964)
  • Section 92 of the Code. In sub-section (1)
  • sub-section (1) of Section 92 of the Code.
  • aspect.9. Section 92 of the Code
  • Section 92 of the C.P Code
  • Section 115 of the Code.
  • Slum Clearance Act,
  • Section 104(1)(ffa).
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This revision petition was filed by defendant No. 3 and challenges an order dated 12-9-1979 of the Additional District Judge, Dakshina Kannada, Mangalore, made on I.A. No. XI in O.S. No. 22 of 1977 (the suit filed by the respondent plaintiffs). During the hearing the Court exercised suo motu powers to allow the parties to challenge additional orders: defendant No. 3 was permitted to challenge the earlier order dated 23-8-1977 on I.A. No. I, and the plaintiffs were permitted to challenge the 12-9-1979 order.

The plaintiffs claim to be followers of the United Basel Mission Church (UBMC) and oppose the Basel Mission's decision of 9-5-1961 to merge the UBMC with the Church of South India (CSI). There is prior litigation between the parties decided by this Court on 19-4-1974 in Salvador Nicholas Mathias v. The District Church Council of the United Basel Mission Church of South Kanara and Coorg, which is on appeal to the Supreme Court (Civil Appeal No. 84 of 1975) and in respect of which the Supreme Court refused a stay of execution.

On 23-8-1977 the plaintiffs presented a plaint in the District Court for a scheme to manage UBMC properties and, together with the plaint, filed several applications including I.A. No. I (seeking leave under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure to file the plaint as a suit) and I.A. No. II (seeking permission to sue in a representative capacity). The Principal District Judge directed the papers to the Additional District Judge, who on 23-8-1977 allowed I.A. No. I without notifying the defendants. Defendants (including defendant No. 3) later filed written statements and raised objections, including that leave had been granted without notice and therefore the suit was not maintainable. Issue No. 15 was framed in the suit on whether the suit was bad for want of prior leave to institute the same. Defendant No. 3 filed I.A. No. XI (28-2-1979) seeking that Issue No. 15 be heard as a preliminary issue; the District Judge by order dated 12-9-1979 rejected that application and directed Issue No. 15 to be tried along with other issues.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. What is the nature of an order made on an application seeking leave under Section 92 of the Code?
  2. Whether the opponents named in an application seeking leave are required to be notified and heard?
  3. What is the scope of inquiry in an application made under Section 92 of the Code?
  4. Whether an order granting leave under Section 92 of the Code can be agitated (challenged) in the suit itself?
  5. What is the proper procedure to be followed in a proceeding under Section 92 of the Code?
  6. Whether the order granting leave is or is not liable to be set aside?

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner / Defendant No. 3 (represented by Sri V. Krishnamurthy)

  • Contended that the power exercised by a Court under Section 92 is judicial (not administrative) in nature, and therefore proper judicial procedure must be followed.
  • Argued that opponents named in an application under Section 92 are entitled to be notified and heard, invoking the audi alteram partem principle of natural justice.
  • Maintained that an application under Section 92 calls for a limited inquiry and that opponents should be allowed to show threshold bars (for example, absence of a public trust or previous adjudication).
  • Submitted that an order granting leave is a distinct judicial order which must precede institution of the suit and is challengeable by separate proceedings (revision) rather than being litigable within the suit.

Respondents / Plaintiffs (represented by Sri B.P. Holla)

  • Initially the Court below and the plaintiffs treated an order under Section 92 as administrative and argued (or acted on the view) that leave could be granted without notice to defendants.
  • Sri Holla argued that opponents are not required to be notified and heard in every Section 92 application and that whether notice should be given is a matter for the Court to decide in each case.
  • He further argued that a Section 92 application is not a lis between parties in the conventional sense and likened it to administrative steps such as admissions or issuance of a rule nisi; he relied strongly on P.N. Eswara Iyer v. The Registrar, Supreme Court of India to support the contention that oral hearing is not always required.
  • After remand arguments, Sri Holla sought to sustain the impugned order on special grounds including (i) that defendants' rights to contest remain intact despite the order; (ii) the suit has been registered and proceeded with for considerable time; (iii) interference now would cause grave failure of justice to plaintiffs; and (iv) urgent interim orders require a registered suit.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Salvador Nicholas Mathias v. The District Church Council of the United Basel Mission Church of South Kanara and Coorg Background interlocutory judgment between parties decided by this Court (19-4-1974) and pending before the Supreme Court. Used as factual and procedural background to explain the ongoing dispute and to show that related litigation had already produced a decree the Supreme Court refused to stay.
Government of Mysore v. J.V. Bhat Applied rule of statutory construction that judicial powers affecting rights imply adherence to fundamental rules of judicial procedure (Maxwell's principle). Praised as authority for applying the implied duty to act judicially and for applying the principle that parties affected should have an opportunity to defend themselves.
Mohindersingh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner Referenced as a Supreme Court exposition on principles of natural justice. Used to show that the Supreme Court has exhaustively dealt with natural justice principles; supported the conclusion that audi alteram partem applies.
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India Referenced among Supreme Court rulings restating principles of natural justice and due process. Relied upon to reinforce that principles of natural justice must be applied to procedures affecting rights.
A.K. Kraipak v. Union of India Shows that even where an order is administrative, principles of natural justice may still apply. Cited to support the proposition that exclusion of natural justice principles cannot be presumed merely because an order is characterized administrative or quasi-judicial.
P.N. Eswara Iyer v. The Registrar, Supreme Court of India Supreme Court ruling on exclusion of oral hearing in a specific context (review petitions decided by circulation unless Court otherwise directs). Relied upon by respondents' counsel to argue that oral hearing may not be required; the Court below's view (and this Court) held that Eswara Iyer's ratio did not apply to Section 92 proceedings.
Siemen Engineering and Manufacturing Company of India Limited v. The Union of India Supreme Court observation that reasons must be given in quasi-judicial processes; rule requiring reasons is a basic principle of natural justice. Quoted to support the requirement that courts exercise judicial powers with reasons and that mere pretence of compliance with giving reasons is insufficient.
Swami Parmatmanand Saraswati v. Ramji Tripathi Authority for the proposition that a suit under Section 92 is of a special nature. Used to explain the special character of Section 92 suits and to indicate the limited scope of inquiry on an application for leave.
Wiseman v. Borneman Quoted as characterisation of fair play in action and principles of natural justice (Lord Morris' phrasing). Used by way of illustration of the audi alteram partem principle and "fair play in action".
R. v. Chancellor of Cambridge Historical judicial statement illustrating the long-standing requirement that a party be given an opportunity to make a defence. Quoted to illustrate the deep-seated nature of the audi alteram partem principle and to support the view that affected parties must be heard before adverse decisions are taken.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court addressed each of the formulated points in sequence and applied the relevant law and principles strictly as set out in the opinion text.

  1. Nature of a Section 92 order:

    The Court concluded that an order on an application seeking leave under Section 92 is judicial in nature (not administrative). The amendment effected by the Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act transferred the power to grant leave from the Advocate General to the Court itself; that transfer did not make the power administrative. Because the order is subject to appeal or revision, it bears attributes of a judicial order and must be treated as such. The District Judge's characterization of the order as administrative was held to be illegal and a material irregularity affecting jurisdiction.

  2. Requirement of notice and hearing:

    The Court held that opponents named in a Section 92 application are entitled to notice and an opportunity to be heard in accordance with the audi alteram partem principle. The Court applied a rule of statutory interpretation (Maxwell) that where statutes confer judicial powers affecting rights, the statute is understood to imply that such powers will be exercised in accordance with fundamental rules of judicial procedure, including a hearing for those to be prejudicially affected. The opinion cites Supreme Court authority applying the same principle and rejects the view that Section 92 excludes natural justice requirements.

  3. Scope of inquiry under Section 92:

    The Court held that the inquiry at the leave stage is limited. The Court's function in an application under Section 92 is to remove an initial bar to instituting a suit (i.e., to decide whether leave should be granted), not to finally decide controversies that will arise in the suit. The proper considerations are (i) existence of a public trust; (ii) allegations of breach or necessity for directions; (iii) whether the proposed suit is in the public or trust interest; and (iv) whether the relief claimed is one of those specified in Section 92(1). Opponents may show that the prerequisites are absent or that other threshold bars apply, but the hearing is not to be an exhaustive trial on merits.

  4. Whether leave can be challenged in the suit itself:

    The Court held that an order granting leave is a distinct and separable judicial order that must precede institution of the suit. Because such an order is independently subject to revision (and refusal to grant leave is appealable), its validity cannot be litigated or decided within the substantive suit; instead it must be challenged in a separate proceeding (for example, revision). Accordingly, framing Issue No. 15 to litigate the validity of the leave within the suit (and the order refusing preliminary hearing on that issue) was impermissible.

  5. Proper procedure under Section 92:

    The Court reasoned that the prior procedure (before 1-2-1977) required applicants to obtain the Advocate General's consent in writing and to file a copy of the proposed plaint. Since the amendment transferred the power to the Court without altering other procedural provisions, the same procedure should be followed: applicants must make an application for leave before the Court, annex a copy of the proposed plaint, and if leave is granted the plaintiffs must then present the plaint with a copy of the leave order and proper court fee so it may be registered as a suit. Instituting a suit without prior leave (a condition precedent) was described as impermissible.

  6. Whether the leave order is liable to be set aside (remedial conclusion):

    Applying the conclusions reached above, the Court found the order made by the learned District Judge on I.A. No. I (granting leave without notice) could not be sustained. The consequence was that registration and continuance of the suit based on that order could not properly arise. The Court declined to reject I.A. No. I outright; instead it set aside the impugned order and directed that the application be registered as a Civil Miscellaneous Petition (treating the plaint as the proposed plaint) and disposed of in accordance with the law and the observations in the opinion. The Court also directed that the Principal District Judge deal with the remanded matter. The Court emphasised that errors of the lower Court were serious and could not be validated by delay or by length of proceedings that had occurred subsequently.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The civil revision petition is allowed. The Court set aside the order dated 23-3-1977 of the learned District Judge on I.A. No. I (as stated in the operative paragraph of the opinion) and directed the District Judge to register the said application as a Civil Miscellaneous Petition, treating the plaint as the proposed plaint and dealing with the other interim applications (except I.A. No. II) as applications in that petition, to be disposed of according to law and the observations in the opinion. The Court further directed that if leave is ultimately granted the plaint be treated as the plaint and registered without insisting on fresh court fee; that the Civil Miscellaneous Petition and any suit to be registered shall be dealt with by the Principal District Judge; and declared the civil revision petition allowed. Parties to bear their own costs so far.

Implications:

  • The order granting leave under Section 92 which was made without notice and hearing was declared unsustainable; the proper remedy chosen was to set aside that order and remand the matter for treatment as a Civil Miscellaneous Petition with the appropriate procedure and hearing safeguarded.
  • The opinion establishes that Section 92 leave decisions are judicial acts requiring notice, opportunity to be heard, reasons and limited inquiry at the leave stage; they are not to be treated as mere administrative steps.
  • The Court directed administrative action at the High Court level (placing the order before the Chief Justice) to consider framing rules to regulate proceedings under Section 92, signalling procedural reform rather than laying down a novel substantive rule of law on those points beyond the conclusions stated.

Direct consequences recorded in the opinion: the order(s) identified were set aside and the matter remanded for proper procedure; the Principal District Judge is to hear the remanded petition; each party to bear its own costs to date.

    The Church Of South India, Trust Association, Company By Its Secretary, P.I Chandy v. Rev. D.I Ananda, Udipi Taluk And Others

    Puttaswamy, J.:— This revision petition is by defendant No. 3 and is directed against the order dated 12-9-1979 of the Additional District Judge, Dakshina Kannada, Mangalore on I.A No. XI in O.S 22 of 1977 filed by the respondent plaintiffs. While the challenge of defendant No. 3 is limited to the said order, it was found that the substantial order that affected was the order dated 23-8-1977 of the learned District Judge on I.A No. I that had not been challenged by it and that the order challenged before me really affect the interests of the plaintiffs which has not been challenged by them. But, in order to do complete and substantial justice in the case and exercising the suo motu powers conferred on this Court, I permitted defendant No. 3 to challenge the order dated 23-8-1977 on I.A No. I and the plaintiffs to challenge, the order dated 12-9-1979 on I.A No. XI. Both sides have taken notice of the same and have argued their cases in full on that basis. In order to appreciate the several interesting questions that arise for determination of the aforesaid orders, it is necessary to notice the facts that are not in dispute in the first instance. In the course of my order, I will refer to the petitioner as defendant No. 3 and the respondents as plaintiffs.

    2. The plaintiffs claim to be the followers of a Church called the United Basel Mission Church in India of the District of South Kanara and Coorg (hereinafter referred to as the UBMC founded by the Evangelical Missionary Society in Basel (hereinafter referred to as the Basel Mission). According to the plaintiffs, the UBMC is a presbyterian Church fundamentally different in faith, doctrine, tradition, practices and forms of worship from the Episcopal Church known by the name of the Church of South India (hereinafter referred to as the CSI), a Church stated to have been inaugurated on 27-9-1947 by the Union of the South India United Church, The South India Province of the Methodist Church and the Churches of the dioceses of Madras. Dornakal, Tinnevelly and Travan-core & Cochin in the Church of India, Burma and Ceylon. On 9-5-1961 the Basel Mission had decided to merge the UBMC with the CSI which is opposed by the plaintiffs and several others on various grounds. Between the parties, there have been a number of disputes and one of them has been ultimately decided by this Court on 19-4-1974 in R.S.A No. 741 of 1971 reported in Salvador Nicholas Mathias v. The District Church Council of the United Basel Mission Church of South Kanara and Coorg(1) which is pending in appeal before the Supreme Court of India in Civil Appeal No. 84 of 1975. In the said appeal, the Supreme Court has refused the prayer of the appellants for stay of the execution of the decree passed by this Court.

    3. The UBMC owns extensive immovable properties in the Districts of Dakshina Kannada and Coorg. As a sequel to the judgment and decree of this Court in the aforesaid appeal, the plaintiffs for themselves and representing the other followers, on 23-8-1977 presented a plaint in the Court of the District Judge, Dakshina Kannada, for settling scheme for the proper and due administration and management of the properties of the UBMC in respect of the properties mentioned in the plaint schedules and for the proper and due administration of its affairs, its properties, institution assets and activities in accordance with its constitution as it is or by making necessary changes tharein, or in the alternative by making the necessary provision for the same in the scheme to be settled and for certain other incidental reliefs. Along with the said plaint, the plaintiffs filed several applications, but we are concerned only with I.A No. I. In I.A No. I filed under Section 92 of the Code of Civil Procedure (hereinafter referred to as the Code) the plaintiffs sought the leave of the Court to file a plaint and institute the same as a suit under Section 92 of the Code. In I.A No. II, the plaintiffs sought the leave of the Court to permit them to sue in a representative capacity. On the presentation of the said plaint and the applications, the office examined papers regarding the Court fee paid and such other matters, registered the plaint as O.S No. 22 of 1972 and placed the several applications filed thereto before the Principal District Judge Sri P.A Kulkarni, for orders who made an order in these terms:

    “Place it before Additional District Judge and made it over to Additional District Judge for disposal.

    Sd/P.A Kulkarni,

    23-8-1977.”

    In obedience to the said order, the papers were placed before the Additional District Judge, Sri P.B Chougule, who on the very same day, without notifying the defendants on I.A No. I made an order allowing the said application in these terms.

    “Sri N.S Rao for the plaintiffs submits that an order under Section 92 of the C.P Code granting leave to his clients being on administrative order, the same may be granted without notice to the defendants. I agree with him and allow I.A No. I. Plaintiffs are granted leave to file the plaint under Section 92 of C.P Code.

    Sri P. Madhava Rao files four Vakalaths for defendants 4 to 8, 11, 16, 29, 39 and 40. Issue suit summons to the remaining defendants. Objections to I.A.S 2 to 7 and appearance of other defendants by 7/9.

    Sd/- P.B Chougule.”

    Sri P. Madhava Rao, who suo motu entered appearance and to filed power for defendants 4 to 8, 11, 16, 29, 39 & 40 does not appear have sought for time to file objections to I.A No. and does not appear to have been also heard on that application. In due course the other defendants in the case were served. On various dates, defendant No. 3 and others have filed heir written statements resisting the said suit and objections to the other applications. Defendant No. 3 and others have inter alia, urged that the leave granted to the plaintiffs for institution of the same without notice to them considering their objections was invalid and the suit, there fore, was not maintainable. On an examination of the pleadings, the Court below has framed several issues one of which is issue No. 15 touching on the aforesaid plea of the defendants. Issue No. 15 reads thus:

    “Whether the suit is bad in law for want of prior leave of the Court to imstitnte the same.”?

    On 28-2-1979, defendant No. 3 filed I.A No. XI to hear issue No. 15 as a preliminary issue which was opposed by the plaintiffs. On an examination of the contentions urged in support of that application, the learned District Judge by his order dated 12-9-79, has rejected the said application and has ordered that the said issue should be tried along with the other issues, the validity of which is challenged by defendant No. 3 in this revision petition.

    4. But, as noticed earlier, arguments covered a wide range and calls for determination of the validity of the orders dated 23-8-1977 on I.A No. I and 12-9-1979 on I.A No. XI and to facilitate a proper discussion, it is useful to formulate the points that arise for determination in the case and deal with them seriatim. On an examination of the contentions urged before me the following points arise for determination in the case:

    (I) What is the nature of an order made on an application seeking for leave under Section 92 of the Code?

    (II) Whether the opponents named in an application seeking for leave are required to be notified and heard?

    (III) What is the scope of inquiry in an application made under Section 92 of the Code?

    (IV) Whether an order granting leave under Section 92 of the Cede can be agitated in the suit itself?

    (V) What is the proper procedure to be followed in a proceeding under Section 92 of the Code?

    (VI) Whether the order granting leave is or is not liable to be set aside?

    5. Sri V. Krishnamurthy, learned counsel for the petitioner and Sri B.P Holla, learned counsel for the respondents, have addressed elaborate arguments in support of their respective cases, naturally relying on a large number of rulings, that will be noticed by me at the appropriate stages.

    6. As noticed earlier, the plaintiffs filed I.A and other applications along with the suit, which has been registered and proceeded with, as if it was an ordinary civil suit filed before a civil Court. Unfortunately, now the plaintiffs nor the Court below, really focused their attention to the special procedure made before instituting a suit under Section 92 of the Code which had been amended by the Civil Procedure Code Amendment Act 104 of 1976 (hereinafter referred to as the Amendment Act) that came into force on 1-2-1977. On both the occasions, the learned District Judge was of the view that an order made under Section 92 was an administrative order and that before making such an order, defendants were not required to be notified and they had no right to object the application.

    7. Re: Point No. 1

    What is the nature of an order made on an application seeking for leave under section 92 of the code?

    Sri Krishnamurthy urged that the power exercised by a Court under Section 92 is judicial and is not administrative.

    8. Sri Holla, in my opinion, rightly did not support the stand taken by the plaintiffs or the view expressed by the learned District Judge on the two occasions on this aspect.

    9. Section 92 of the Code as it stood prior to its amendment by the Amendment Act, empowered the Advocate General of the State or two or more persons having an interest in a public trust to institute a suit with the prior consent in writing of the Advocate General for any of the reliefs specified therein. When the Advocate General of the State, as the leader of the Bar and the principal Law Officer of the State, institutes a suit for alleged breach of any public trust, the Court was bounds to entertain the suit and proceed with its trial as in any other suit. A suit instituted by the Advocate General, in reality is a suit instituted by the State Government. Apart from the Advocate General, it was also open to two or more persons interested in a public trust to institute a suit. But, they could not do so without the consent in writing of the Advocate General. Before instituting their suit, Section 92 required such persons to move the Advocate General of the State, prima facie convince him of their case and obtain his conset in writing and then only institute their suit annexing the consent in writing given by the Advocate General. Any two or more persons could institute a suit only with the consent in writing of the Advocate General and not otherwise. In the absence of a consent in writing by the Advocate General, a suit filed by two or more persons could not be entertained by a Civil Court much less could it proceed with its trial. The consent in writing of the Advocate General was a condition precedent for instituting the suit by two or more persons. The Advocate General exercising power under Section 92 of the Code was not a court and, therefore, the power exercised by him was not judicial but was only administrative or quasi judicial. Such was the position prior to 1-2-1977.

    10. By the amendment Act certain important amendments were effected, to Section 92 of the Code. In sub-section (1) the power conferred on the Advocate General to institute a suit was retained. But, the power conferred on him, to give his consent in writing to two or more persons to institute a suit was taken away from him and that by making a textual change is now conferred on the Court itself before which the suit had to be instituted, either by the Advocate General or by two or more persons. For the words the consent in writing of the Advocate General occurring in sub-section (1), the words the leave of the Court have been substituted. Except for the above, there are no other changes effected in sub-section (1) of Section 92 of the Code. In sub-section (1) a new clause, viz., clause (cc) was added and then a new sub-section, viz., sub-section (3) to give effect to the doctrine of cy pres were added to Section 92 and they are not relevant in deciding the question. Any two or more persons having an interest in the public trust before instituting a suit have now to obtain the leave of the Court and then only can institute their suit. The word leave in the context means permission. Before instituting a suit two or more persons have to make an application, satisfy the court that its permission was necessary to institute a suit in respect of a public trust for any of the reliefs enumerated in sub-section (1) of Section 92 of the Code.

    11. In the code or the Karnataka Civil Courts Act of 1964 (Karnataka Act No. 21 of 1964) that makes provision for the constitution, powers and jurisdiction of the Civil Courts in our State, the term Court is not denned. But Section 2(b) of the said Act defines Civil Court as a District Court, Court of a Civil judge or a Munsiff.

    12. Court (curia) signifies the King's palace or mansion and is more especially the place where justice is judicially administered (vide Jacob, Law Dictionary, ‘Courts’). In our Country Courts are established and functioning under the Constitution or the laws made by the Union parliament or the State Legislatures. Court is a place where justice is administered and has come to mean the persons who exercise judicial functions under the authority derived either directly or indirectly from the Sovereign [vide para 701 of Halsbury's Laws of England (Fourth Edition) (Vol. 10)]. At least two of the important attributes of a Court in Anglosaxon jurisprudence substantially adopted in our Country is that it exercises its judicial functions openly and after hearing the parties, to a cause. A Court may exercise limited administration functions. The primary or main function of a Court is to administer justice or decide causes that are brought up before it. Administrative functions or administrative orders are terms that generally employed in dealing with executive functions of Government and not dealing with exercise of judicial functions by Courts. An elaborate discussion into the origin, growth and development of administrative law in England or in our Country is wholly unnecessary for this case. Suffice to know what is administrative law in brief is which is best set out by Wide and Phillips in their Constitutional Law (7th Edition) in these words:

    “Administrative law is a branch of public law which is concerned with the composition, powers, duties, rights and liabilities of the various organs of Government which are engaged on administration. The emphasis should be on the exercise of power as well as on its control. Nor is the control entrusted solely or indeed mainly to the Courts; it is rather by higher administrative authority, itself directly responsible to Parliament through Ministers, that the actions of the executive are reviewed.”

    13. An order refusing leave to two or more persons is appealable to the Court to which an appeal would lie from that Court (Vide Section 104(1)(ffa). But, an order granting leave, though not appealable, is revisable by this Court under Section 115 of the Code. An ultimate order made by the High Court in a proceeding under Section 92 of the Code, can be interfered by the Supreme Court either under Article 133 or under Article 136 of the Constitution as the case may be. An order that is subject to an appeal or revision, can never be said to be an administrative order. By any test, an order made under Section 92 of the Code is clearly a judicial order and the learned District Judge in holding to the contrary and dealing with the application on that basis, has committed an illegality or material irregularity affecting his jurisdiction.

    14. Re: Point No. II

    Whether the opponents named in an application seeking for leave are required to be notified and heard?

    Sri Krishnamurthy urged that in an application made under Section 92 of the Code, the opponents are entitled to be notified and heard on the application of one of the basic principles of natural justice, viz., audi alterum partern.

    15. Sri Holla urged that in an application under Section 92 of the Code, the opponents are not required to be notified and heard and whether the same should be done or not in a given case was for the Court itself to decide.

    16. On the finding recorded by me on point No. I, it follows that an application made under section 92 has to be dealt as any other substantive application in which a Court normally notifies the opponent and provides him an opportunity of hearing. A Court deciding an application or a cause before it, without notice and an opportunity of hearing to an opponent, is abhorrent to the concept of justice. Section 92 or any other provision of the Code, does not exclude a notice and an opportunity of hearing to an opponent before the Court makes its order in favour of two or more persons. In that situation, it would be proper to apply the following rule of construction of statutes stated by Maxwell on the interpretation of statutes (11th Edition) at page 358 under the heading Implied Duty to Act Judicially in these words:

    “In giving judicial powers to affect prejudicially the rights of person or property, a statute is understood as silently implying, when it does not expressly provide, the condition or qualification that the power is to be exercised in accordance with the fundamental rules of judicial procedure, such, for instance, as that which requires that, before its exercise, the person sought to be prejudicially affected shall have an opportunity of defending himself.”

    In the Government of Mysore v. J.V Bhat(2) the Supreme Court in upholding the validity of the Karnataka Slum Clearance Act, has applied the above principle. Applying the above rule of construction, there is no reason to exclude the application of the principles of natural justice to a proceeding under Section 92 of the code.

    17. The law relating to natural justice is now so well settled by a large number of rulings of the Supreme Court and the English Courts and it will be an idle parade of scholarship to notice the origin, development and the present state of law thereto.

    18. One of the basic principles of natural justice referred to as ‘ideal justice’ by Roscoe Pound [Jurisprudence (Vol. II) (Chapter 13 ‘Justice According to Law’) p. 359] or ‘fair play in action’ by Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in Wiseman v. Borneman(3) is audi alteram partem or both sides shall be heard, requires that a decision should not be taken without notifying the opponent and providing him an opportunity of hearing in opposition to a case made against him, Marshal in his treatise on ‘Natural Justice’ (1959 Edition) states ‘that the origin of this principle is alleged to be traceable to the dawn of time.’ A picturesque statement is made by Foretescue, J., in R. v. Chancellor of Cambridge(4) in these words;

    “The laws of God and man both give the party an opportunity to make his defence, if he has any. I remember to have heard it observed by a very learned man upon such an occasion, that even God himself did not pass sentence upon Adam, before he was called upon to make his defence. Adam (says God) where are thou? Has thou not eaten of the tree, where of I commanded thee that thou shouldst not eat? And the same question was put to Eve also.

    In Mohindersingh Gill v. The Chief Election Commissioner(5) and Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India(6) the Supreme Court has exhaustively dealt and restated the principle. Assurance that the order is an administrative order, even then there is no reason to exclude the principle of natural justice to a proceeding under Section 92 of the Code (Vide A.K Kraipak v. Union of India(7).

    19. Sri Holla urged that in an application made under Section 92 of the Code, there is no lis and the matter was exclusively between the applicant and the Court and, in any event, was analogous to an order of admission or issue of Rule nisi and, therefore, it was not necessary to notify and hear an opponent. In support of his contention Sri Holla strongly relied on the latest ruling of the Supreme Court in P.N Eswara Iyer v. The Registrar, Supreme Court of India(8).

    20. Whether leave should be granted or not is undoubtedly for the Court to decide. But by reason of that only, the opponents do not lose their right to oppose the application and satisfy the Court that leave should not be granted. A fortiori there is no reason to exclude the principle of audi alteram partem to such a proceeding. A decision on an application made under Section 92 cannot by stretch of imagination be compared to an admission of a case or issue of Rule nisi in a writ petition.

    21. In Eswara Iyer's case, the Supreme Court was examining the validity of a rule excluding the application of principle of oral hearing to a review petition filed before it and had to be decided by circulation unless the Court thought otherwise. In my opinion, the ratio in Eswara Iyer's case does not bear on the question that arises for determination.

    22. An order that is subject to appeal or revision cannot be made by a subordinate Court without applying its mind and without giving reasons in support of its order and the same would be clearly arbitrary. When administrative and quasi judicial authorities are required to give reasons, a Court exercising judicial powers and whose order is subject to an appeal or revision, is bound to give reasons in support of its conclusion. In this connection it is opposite to note the following observations of the Supreme Court in The Siemen Engineering and Manufacturing Company of India Limited v. the Union of India(9):

    “The rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order is, like the principle of audi alteram partem a basic principle of natural justice which must inform every quasi judicial process and this rule must be observed in its proper spirit and mere pretence of compliance with it would not satisfy the requirement of law”.

    23. An examination of the order made by the learned District Judge on I.A No. I shows that he has disregarded the two basic principles of natural justice viz., the principle of audi alteram partem and the rule requiring reasons to be given in support of an order and in so doing he has acted illegally and-with material irregularity affecting his jurisdiction.

    24. Re: Point No. III.

    What is the scope of inquiry in an application made under section 92 of the code?

    In considering an application under section 92 of the Code and granting leave if it so decides, the Court only lifts an initial impediment or a bar on the persons that claim to have an interest in a public trust to institute a suit in a Court without finally deciding any of the controversies in the suit to be filed by such persons. Any expression of opinion by the Court on an application is only for the purpose of that application and does not bind the parties or the Court itself which has to finally decide the suit.

    25. A suit filed under Section 92 of the Code is a suit of a special nature (vide Swami Parmatmanand Saraswati v. Ramji Tripathi(10) In considering application for grant of leave, the Court has to consider (i) whether there is a public trust; (ii) whether there are allegations alleging breach of trust or the directions of the Court was necessary for the administration of such a trust; (iii) that the suit to be filed must not only be in the interest of the plaintiffs individually but in the interest of the public or in the interest of the trust itself; and (iv) that the relief to be claimed in the suit should be for one of the reliefs mentioned in Section 92 of the Code. While considering an application, the Court has to see only the allegations made in the application and the proposed plaint, without holding an inquiry into the truth or otherwise of those allegations. Even the opponents are only entitled to show that all or any of the factors necessary to give leave do not exist or any other threshold bar like a previous suit filed by two or more persons on the very same allegations for the very same reliefs had been dismissed by that or another Court. What pleas can be urged as threshold bar cannot be exhaustively enumerated but has to be decided on the facts and circumstances of each case. An inquiry under Section 92 is very limited. An examination of the order made by the learned District Judge discloses that he has not really applied his mind and has not found that leave was necessary to be granted and in that view also it is clear that he has acted with material irregularity affecting his jurisdiction.

    26. Re: Point No. IV.

    Whether an order granting leave under section 92 of tie code can be agitated in the suit itself?

    Prior to 1-2-1977, the legal position was that any two or more persons before instituting a suit were required to obtain the consent of the Advocate General in writing and then only file the suit. From 1-2-1977 that power conferred on the Advocate General is taken away and is conferred on the Court itself. An order granting leave must preceed the institution of the suit and is a condition precedent for the institution of the suit. Without an order granting leave, the suit cannot be instituted. Even though an order granting leave does not take away the defences that are available to the defendants or the necessity of the plaintiffs to prove their case, that order is a separate and distinct order that is subject to an appeal in the case of refusal or revision in the case of Grant. Such an order made by a Court subject to its interference in an appeal or revision becomes final and cannot be challenged and decided in the suit itself. An order granting leave can be challenged by a defendant in a separate proceeding and cannot be challenged by him in the suit and the Court deciding the suit cannot go into the validity of the order granting leave. For these reasons, the defence urged by defendant No. 3 and others and issue No. 15 framed by the Court and the order made thereto on 12-9-1979 on I.A No. XI were misconceived and impermissible.

    27. Re: Point No. V.

    What is the proper procedure to be followed in a proceeding under section 92 of the Code?

    Before 1-2-1977 any two or more persons had to approach the Advocate General, obtain his consent and then only institute a such in civil court. The amendment made has only transferred that power to the Court itself, without making any other changes in the procedure to be followed. While seeking the consent of the Advocate General in writing the parties had to file a copy of the plaint to be filed by them, to the Court. As the Legislature has not made any other changes except transferring the power to the Court, it is reasonable to hold that the same procedure that existed prior to 1-2-1977 had to be followed by the Court also. An application for seeking leave by two or more persons annexing a copy of the plaint they propose to file should be made before Court and that application in the first instance has to be decided by the Court. When the Court grants leave, the persons who have obtained leave have to present their plaint with necessary Court fee thereon along with a copy of the order granting them leave and then only such a plaint had to be registered as suit and dealt in accordance with the Code. When a Court refuses to grant leave and if that order becomes final, the question of those persons instituting a suit, registering a suit and further proceedings thereon would not arise. A suit to be filed under Section 92 of the Code being a suit of special in nature, cannot be instituted as any other ordinary suit. Institution of a suit without the leave of the Court that being a condition precedent, would be putting the cart before horse which is impermissible.

    28 Re: Point No. VI.

    Whether the order granting leave is or is not liable to be set aside?

    On the conclusions reached by me on points I to V, it follows that the order made by the learned District Judge on I.A No. I cannot be sustained for which reason the registrations and continuance of the suit also would not arise. In this view the question of setting aside the order made on I.A No. XI does not really arise. While the above is the position, Sri Holla sought to sustain the order made on I.A No. I on certain special grounds, viz., (i) that the right of the defendants to contest the suit on all the grounds available to them is not affected by the order made on I.A No. I; (ii) that in view of the order made on I.A No. I, the suit has been registered on 23-8-1977 and has been proceeded with till 4-1-1980 on which day, this Court stayed the further proceedings in the suit; (iii) that the suit itself is now ready for trial and any interference at this belated stage would cause grave failure of justice to the plaintiffs without in any way benefiting the defendants in the matter: and (iv) that unless a suit is registered, the Court cannot make urgent interim orders on the several applications filed.

    29. On 23-8-1977, the order granting leave was made by the learned District Judge without notice to the defendants. In their defence the defendants, without realising the order made and the necessity to challenge the said order in a revision before this Court have challenged the validity of the gnaw in their written statement. For the initial wrong step taken by them, the plaintiffs alone have to be blamed, though it is true the Court without realising what it was doing, has dealt with the matter mechanically and in a casual manner. But, these factors and the time so far spent by either of the parties cannot validate what was invalid at the threshold itself. Whoever may be responsible for the illegalities and irregularities, this Court cannot ignore them and permit the proceedings to continue all in the name of delay or the time spent so far before the lower Court. In my opinion, the errors committed by the Court are so serious, that they cannot be ignored for any of the reasons urged by Sri Holla.

    30. In the normal circumstances, it would have been proper to set aside the order on I.A No. I and reject the same reserving liberty to make a fresh application. But, in the peculiar circumstances, it would not be proper to reject I.A No. I in its entirety. On the other hand, it would be proper to set aside the order made on I.A No. I and direct the Court below to register that application as a substantive application namely, as a Civil Miscellaneous petition treating the plaint filed along with that application as the proposed plaint and the other applications for interim reliefs as made in the Civil Miscellaneous Petition and dispose of them in accordance with law in the light of the observations made in this order.

    31. A proceeding under Section 92 and a suit to be filed thereto invariably raises complicated questions of fact and law and, therefore, such matters in the absence of any valid reasons should generally be dealt by the Principal District Judge of the Court who is more experienced rather than by an Additional District Judge with lesser experience. I am distressed to note that Shri P.A Kulkarni should have allotted the case to the Additional District Judge of his Court, who made a mess of this matter resulting in waste of Public time and avoidable injury to all the parties. A little reflection of the learned counsel for the plaintiffs and the learned District Judge at the initial stages would have avoided the unfortunate developments in this case. In this view, it is necessary to direct the Principal District Judge to deal with the remanded case.

    32. Before parting with this case, it is necessary to point out the urgent necessity to frame proper rules to deal with the applications to be made under Section 92 of the Code.

    33. An application under Section 92 has to be treated as an independent and substantive application and decided by a Court in the first instance. Order XXXVII-A of the Code made by this Court regulating interlocutory applications in a suit, has no application to an application to be made under Section 92 of the Code. In order to avoid the lapses that has happened in the present case, it is necessary for this Court in exercise of the power conferred by part X of the Code of frame rules regulating the applications to be made under Section 92 of the Code. In order to enable this Court to examine the matter in depth and frame necessary Rules thereto, I direct the Registrar to place a copy of this order before the Hon'ble the Chief Justice for taking such action as is necessary in that behalf.

    34. In the light of my above discussion, I make the following orders and directions.

    (i) I allow this revision petition, set aside the order dated 23-3-1977 of the learned District Judge on I.A No. I and direct the District Judge to register the said application as a Civil Miscellaneous Petition treating the plaint filed as the proposed plaint filed by them and the other application for interim reliefs except I.A No. II as made in the said Civil Miscellaneous petition and dispose of them in accordance with law and in the light of the observations made in this order.

    (ii) If ultimately the Court grants leave, the plaint filed shall be treated as the plaint, registered and disposed of without insisting the plaintiffs to pay fresh Court fee thereon.

    (iii) The Civil Miscellaneous Petition and the suit, if any, to be registered, shall be dealt by the Principal District Judge of the Court.

    35. Civil revision petition allowed.

    36. In the circumstances of the case, I direct the parties to bear their own costs throughout so far.

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