Venkatachala, J.:— Is it permissible to a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal (“Claims Tribunal”) constituted under Section 110-1 of the Motor Vehicles Act, 1939 (“Act”) to entertain an application for compensation made under Section 110-A of the Act, if not made within six months of the occurrence of the accident ? and if so permissible, when?
2. If a Claims Tribunal fails to entertain such an application and makes an award accordingly, is it open to the High Court in an appeal preferred against such an award by an aggrieved person under S. 110-D of the Act to entertain such an application?
are the two important questions which arise for our determination in this Miscellaneous First Appeal.
2. One Byrappa, a blacksmith, was severely injured on September 26, 1976 in a motor accident, as a result of which he died on the very same day. He left behind his widow, three minor sons, one minor daughter and one married daughter. The widow and the children made an application for compensation on September 26, 1977 under Section 110-A(1) of the Act before the Claims Tribunal, Bijapur. As the application was filed after the expiry of the period of six months from the date of occurrence of the accident, the time allowed for making such an application under Section 110-A (3) of the Act, another application purporting to be under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, 1963 (“Limitation Act”) supported by an affidavit showing cause for entertainment of the application for compensation filed after the expiry of time, was also filed.
3. The Claims Tribunal issued notices to the persons against whom the claim for compensation was made by the widow and children of the deceased. Pursuant to the notices received by the persons against whom the claim for compensation was made, they appeared and objected to the entertainment of the application filed after the expiry of time. The tribunal, despite an elaborate enquiry held by it on the application filed under Section 5 of the Limitation Act, did not choose to entertain the application made under Section 110-A(1) of the Act, as, in its view, the widow was not prevented by ‘sufficient cause’ in making the application in-time. Consequently, the Tribunal dismissed the claim application filed under Section 110-A(1) of the Act and made an award of dismissal dated March 23, 1978.
4. The widow and her children, who were aggrieved against the award of dismissal made by the Claims Tribunal, having preferred therefrom before this Court an appeal under Section 110-D of the Act, the appeal is now before us for consideration.
5. While the appellants in the appeal are the aforementioned widow and children of the deceased Byrappa, the respondents in the appeal are the owner, the insurer and the driver of the motor vehicle, out of the use of which the motor accident in question occurred resulting in the death of Byrappa.
6. We wish to state at the outset that though the appellants had made an application under Section 5 of the Limitation Act showing cause as to why they sought from the Claims Tribunal entertainment of their application for compensation filed after the expiry of time allowed by law, it is not in dispute before us that the said application has been treated by the Claims Tribunal as an application made under the proviso to Section 110-A(3) of the Act and is disposed off as one made under that provision.
7. Learned counsel appearing for the contesting parties, having conceded before us that the said course adopted by the Claims Tribunal being the right and proper course which it ought to have adopted, submitted that it would be necessary for us to determine the questions which have arisen for our consideration in this appeal as if the application made under Section 5 of the Limitation Act by the Appellants was an application made by them under the proviso to Section 110-A(3) of the Act.
8. As we agree with the submission made by the learned counsel for the contesting parties, we propose to determine the questions which arise for our consideration in the appeal having regard to the scope of the proviso to Section 110-A(3) of the Act. But we wish to enumerate at this stage the factors which, according to the appellants, have constituted sufficient cause for entertaining their application for compensation filed after the expiry of the time allowed for two reasons, to wit, (i) that the said factors are now not in dispute and (ii) that such factors could be of assistance in deciding whether the Tribunal has, either rightly or erroneously, not chosen to entertain the application for compensation filed by the appellants after the expiry of the time allowed, the factors being:
(a) that the deceased Byrappa, the victim of the motor accident, was the sole bread earner of the family of the appellants at the time of his death;
(b) that ever since the death of Byrappa, the appellants are living on the charity of one Manappa, a distant cousin of the first appellant;
(c) that appellant-1 is an illiterate lady, while appellants 2 to 5 are minor children and appellant-6 is the married daughter;
(d) that due to the unbearable sorrow which appellant-1 had to undergo by reason of the death of her husband as a result of the motor accident, she became unconscious and she was admitted to the dispensary of P.W 2—Dr. S.H Menasagi;
(e) that appellant-1 though regained her consciousness about 8 or 10 days after the death of her husband, she had continued to be an inpatient in the hospital for over a period of two months for further treatment;
(f) that appellant-1 was being attended to by the Doctor till August 1977 in her house;
(g) that P.W 2—Dr. S.H Menasagi—had received only Rs. 350 from Manappa out of a sum of Rs. 735 receivable by him from appellant-1 towards medical treatment;
(h) that she was in a place far away from the place where the Claims Tribunal was located and was in a virtual state of helplessness;
(i) that she was ignorant of the fact that the application for compensation had to be filed within six months from the date of occurrence of the accident.
The existence of the said factors, which, according to the appellants, constituted sufficient cause for entertaining their application for compensation filed after the expiry of the time allowed, are not in any way doubted by the Claims Tribunal. But, according of the Claims Tribunal, the said factors constituted sufficient cause for not filing the application for compensation till August 11, 1977, the date on which she was summoned by the Magistrate's Court for being examined in the Criminal Case instituted against the driver of the motor vehicle, who had caused the motor accident resulting in the death of the husband of the first appellant and not till December 26, 1977, the date of filing of the application. The Claims Tribunal has found that she admitted before the Tribunal when examined in support of her application for condonation of delay that while she was cross-examined in the Magistrate's Court, she had made an admission to the effect that she had come to know that she could claim compensation in a Court for death of her husband. The Tribunal has proceeded to treat that admission of knowledge of her right to make an application for compensation as one which disentitled her to seek condonation of delay of about one month which had occurred thereafter in filing the application for compensation and has consequently refused to condone that delay.
9. To find whether the factors enumerated above alone should have constituted sufficient cause for entertaining the application for compensation filed by the appellants after the delay of about one month from the date of examination of appellant-1 in the Magistrate's Court or whether her admission before the Claims Tribunal when cross-examined that she had told before the Magistrate's Court that she had come to know about her right to make an application for compensation, disentitled her to ask the Tribunal to entertain the application for compensation filed a month thereafter, are matters which have arisen for our consideration in this appeal.
10. As the said matters, in our view, have to be considered and decided in the light of our answers to the questions formulated by us at the commencement of this judgment, we will now deal with them.
11. Is it permissible to a Motor Accidents Claims Tribunal constituted under Section 110(1) of the Act to entertain an application for compensation made under Section 110-A of the Act, if not made within six months of the occurrence of the accident? and if so permissible, when? is the first question.
12. Section 110-A in so far it would be relevant for determination of the said questions reads thus:
“110-A. Application for Compensation:—
(1) An application for compensation arising out of an accident of the nature specified in sub-section (1) of Section 110 may be made—
(a) ******
(b) *******
(c) ******
(2) ********
(3) No application for compensation under this section shall be entertained unless it is made within six months of the occurrence of the accident:
Provided that the Claims Tribunal may entertain the application after the expiry of the said period of six months if it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time.”
While sub-section (3) stipulates a period of six months for entertaining an application from the date of occurrence of the accident, the proviso thereto confers power on the Claims Tribunal to entertain an application for compensation filed after the expiry of the period of six months for sufficient cause. Thus, the power to entertain an application for compensation filed after the expiry of the period of six months of the occurrence of the accident is undoubtedly vested in the Claims Tribunal and it could entertain such an application after the expiry of the period allowed only when it is satisfied that the applicant was prevented by sufficient cause from making the application in time. What is “sufficient cause” about which the Claims Tribunal has to be satisfied, if it has to entertain an application for compensation filed beyond the time allowed, it cannot be in doubt, is a matter, which has to be decided by the Claims Tribunal in exercise of its discretion, which is, of course, a judicial discretion and not an arbitrary discretion. As to whether in deciding as to what cause is sufficient, cause in its discretion, it has to necessarily bear in mind the purpose intended to be achieved by the legislature in conferring such a power on the Claims Tribunal. This situation makes us refer to the purpose of the provisions of the Act dealing with adjudication upon a claim for compensation in respect of motor accidents.
13. A perusal of Sections 110 to 110-F of the Act makes it clear that they are intended to help the applicants entitled to grant of compensation in respect of accidents involving death or bodily injury to persons arising out of the use of a motor vehicle in obtaining compensation not only cheaply, but also quickly. There can be no doubt that the legisature in enacting the said provisions has taken note of, not only the increase in the number of victims of motor accidents in the, days of motor civilization, but also the plight to which such victims or their dependants would be put to if they had to seek compensation from Court of Civil Jurisdiction by paying Court Fee payable thereon. Thus, there can be no doubt that the legislation brought about by Sections 110 to 110-F is in the nature of beneficial legislation, in that its object is to make the victims of the motor accidents or their dependants to get compensation cheaply and quickly. In fact Section 110-A(3) and proviso thereto, which are in the form of a special legislation as regards limitation, are incorporated in the group of provisions of the Act, which are intended to help the victims of motor accidents or their dependants to obtain relief by way of compensation, would clearly indicate the intention of the legislature that the claims for compensation arising from motor accidents should be settled as early as possible. But, the fact that the proviso to sub-section (3) does not prescribe the maximum period within which an application for compensation could be made in itself shows that the object of the legislature is to invest the Claims Tribunal with an unlimited power of extension of time for making a claim. Thus, when the object of the said provisions is to enable the victims of the motor accidents or their dependants to obtain compensation, the words “sufficient cause” found in the proviso must receive necessarily a liberal construction in the hands of the Claims Tribunal as would ensure to the victims of the motor accident or their dependants, the benefits of the legislation.
14. There is another aspect of the matter which requires our consideration. The period of limitation for instituting an action before a Civil Court claiming compensation arising out of a motor accident prior to the coming into force of sub-section (3) of Section 110-A along with associate provisions, was two years, cannot be overlooked. Besides, the words “sufficient cause” in Section 5 of the Limitation Act should receive a liberal construction so as to advance substantial justice when no negligence nor inaction nor want of bona fides is imputable to the person making the application for excusing the delay, is well settled (vide Rameshwar Singh v. State of Jammu and Kashmir): (1971) 2 SCC 715 : AIR 1972 SC 102 and Mrs. Sandhya Ravi Sarkar v. Smt. Sudha Rani: ((1978) 2 SCC 116 : AIR 1978 SC 537). Thus when the law existing prior to the beneficial legislation provided for a period of limitation of two years and when the power conferred on Courts under Section 5 of the Limitation Act is sufficiently wide in its scope, afortiorari it has to be stressed that the words “sufficient cause” found in the proviso to Section 110-A(3) of the Act should receive a more liberal construction so as to advance the purpose of the beneficial provisions in Sections 110 to 110-F, to wit, to give relief to the unfortunate victims of motor accidents or their dependants.
15. It is no doubt true that what is sufficient cause in each case would depend upon the peculiar features of the case to be decided by the Claims Tribunal in exercise of its discretion and it would be essentially a question of fact. Even so, the Claims Tribunal cannot afford to ignore the realities of life leaning more on legal legerdemain and sophistry rather than being informed by the humanitarian considerations. It is a matter of common experience and knowledge that when the bread-winner of a family dies leaving behind him a young widow and minor children, the shock that the widow would receive would be lamentable. She would be buried in deep depth of despondency. It requires in some cases months together for her to attain normalcy. The Claims Tribunal should not show its unawareness to such common situations. It should liberally exercise the power of condonation of delay so as to advance substantial justice and the intendment of the legislature to assist the helpless victims of the motor accidents. It is needless to say that the Tribunal should make a pragmatic approach to the facts of the case bearing in mind the practical import and intendment of the legislature.
16. The next question which arises for our determination is as to whether the Claims Tribunal has exercised its power under the said proviso as would advance the purpose for which it is conferred it on?
17. In our view, the Claims Tribunal, having accepted the aforesaid factors as those which would constitute sufficient cause for extending the period of limitation, ought not to have refused to extend such period by another month having regard to the same factors. The Claims Tribunal, while holding that the admission of the first appellant made when examined before it to the effect that she had admitted when examined in the Magistrate's Court a few days earlier that she had come to know that she could make an application for compensation in a Court, was in itself sufficient to refuse to entertain the application for compensation filed about a month later is, in our view, a hypothetical approach made by it. It is hard to say that even if she had come to know that she could claim compensation for the death of her husband in a Court, she had knowledge that the claim for compensation was already barred by time. The Claims Tribunal appears to have equated her knowledge about her right to make a claim for compensation with the knowledge that the claim for compensation was already barred by time. This being the fundamental mistaken reason for the Claims Tribunal to refuse to condone the delay, we have to conclude that the Claims Tribunal has not exercised its discretion in the matter of condonation of delay in accordance with the settled principles governing such matter.
18. From the factors enumerated above, it becomes apparent that appellant-1 had established the existence of factors such as illeteracy, ignorance, desperation, financial stringency and illness among others as the causes for the delay in making the application for compensation, a little belatedly. The said factors, in our view, in abundant measure, constituted sufficient cause for condoning the delay and there was no reason to refuse to entertain the application by the Claims Tribunal on a hypertechnical and wrong view of certain fact adverted to above. Hence, we consider it just and appropriate to set aside the award of the Claims Tribunal and entertain the application for compensation filed under Section 110-A(1) by holding that the aforesaid factors established by appellant-1 constitute sufficient cause for entertaining the application filed a little belatedly.
19. In Sheikhpura Transport Co. Ltd. v. Northern India Transporters Insurance Co. Ltd.(1) while dealing with a case for claim for compensation which arose under the Act, but in which the Tribunal had not chosen to condone the delay in making the claim, but the High Court had chosen to do so, this is what the Supreme Court has observed in para 3 of its judgment:
“It is conceded that under law, the tribunal had jurisdiction to condone the delay in making the claim. The tribunal had not chosen to condone the delay. But the High Court has in its discretion condoned the delay. It is seen that the wife of Bachan Singh was an illeterate lady. She appears to have been quite helpless. In fact in her petition she specifically stated that she had no assistance and therefore she requested the Court to give her the assistance of some lawyer. We do not think that we will be justified in interfering with the discretion exercised by the High Court in condoning the delay in question.”
The observations of the Supreme Court since show that illiteracy, helplessness and financial stringency of a person constitute sufficient cause for condoning the delay in making an application for compensation and when the Claims Tribunal does not choose to condone the delay, it is open to the High Court to condone the delay, we derive sustenance for the views we have expressed as regards when a Claims Tribunal cannot entertain an application for compensation filed belatedly, and when the High Court can entertain the application, if the Claims Tribunal does not choose to entertain such application.
20. For the foregoing reasons, we allow the appeal, set aside the award, allow the interlocutory application filed by the appellants before the Claims Tribunal seeking entertainment of the application for compensation filed belatedly and direct the Claims Tribunal to dispose of the application for compensation filed by the appellants under Section 110-A(1) of the Act on merits after affording reasonable opportunity to parties to adduce evidence.