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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Legal Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The Director, Intermediate Education, Government of Andhra Pradesh filed a batch of writ petitions challenging the maintainability of contempt applications (Nos.482/01, 865/01, 994/01, 964/01 and 962/01) which arose from common orders passed by the A.P. Administrative Tribunal in O.A. No.4672/95 dated 02-12-1999. The original tribunal proceedings involved SGBT teachers working in Tribal Welfare Ashram Schools contesting the applicability of certain sub-rules of the A.P. Intermediate Educational Service Rules regarding appointment by transfer and apportionment of vacancies for Junior Lecturers. The Tribunal issued directions on apportionment and norms; aggrieved parties moved this Court in W.P. No.21648 of 2000 and the Division Bench dismissed that writ petition by order dated 08-03-2001 while leaving certain matters to the State's discretion (including possibility of considering Tribal Welfare teachers and preparing joint seniority lists).

Subsequent to this Court's 08-03-2001 order, contempt applications were filed before the A.P. Administrative Tribunal (for example Contempt Application No.482 of 2001 filed on 10-06-2001) alleging non‑implementation of orders. The Tribunal entertained these contempt petitions and passed several interlocutory and other directions, including directions to prepare integrated seniority lists and stay on promotions until such lists were prepared. The petitioner (State) then approached this Court under Article 226 contending that (a) the Tribunal's orders had merged with this Court's orders and therefore contempt proceedings could not lie before the Tribunal, and (b) a contempt forum is limited to determining disobedience and cannot pass interim or further orders beyond that scope.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether, on the facts and circumstances, orders of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal, when challenged by a writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India, merge with the orders passed by this Court so that no contempt proceedings would lie before the A.P. Administrative Tribunal for alleged violation of the Tribunal's orders.
  2. Whether, on the facts and circumstances, the A.P. Administrative Tribunal, having entertained contempt proceedings, has jurisdiction to pass any interim order or other further orders in the course of those contempt proceedings.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (Petitioner / State) — Arguments

  • Counsel for the petitioner (Sri S. Satyanarayana Prasad) argued that the Tribunal's orders, having been challenged and considered by this Court in a writ under Article 226, merged with this Court's orders; consequently contempt proceedings for violation of those orders should lie only before this Court and not before the Tribunal.
  • The petitioner relied on authorities in support of the doctrine of merger and the limited scope of contempt proceedings (cases cited by counsel included Shankar v. Krishna (AIR 1970 SC 1), J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar ((1996) 6 SCC 291), Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (AIR 2000 SC 2587), and Smt. A. Santhi Kumari v. K. Ravi (2002 (6) ALT 326)).
  • It was further contended that the scope of contempt proceedings is restricted to determining disobedience of orders and does not permit the Tribunal to go into merits or to pass interim or further directions; if parties are aggrieved by subsequent actions they must file separate proceedings for appropriate reliefs.

Respondents — Arguments

  • Counsel for the contesting respondents contended that, in view of the principles laid down by the Supreme Court in L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997 (3) SCC 261) and T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Govt. of A.P. ((2001) 1 SCC 516), Administrative Tribunals retain the power to entertain contempt proceedings and therefore contempt need not be filed only in this Court; the principle of merger should not apply to deprive the Tribunal of contempt jurisdiction.
  • The respondents also relied upon a Division Bench decision of this Court in W.P. No.10242 of 1998 dated 04-04-2003 in support of their position.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Shankar v. Krishna (AIR 1970 SC 1) Doctrine of merger where an inferior court's order, after being subject to superior forum's revisional jurisdiction and dismissal there, merges with the superior order; appellate order cannot thereafter be separately attacked under Articles 226/227. The opinion cites Shankar for the general proposition of merger of orders when a superior forum disposes of a challenge and confirms that principle (paragraphs 12 and quoted passage).
J.S. Parihar v. Ganpat Duggar ((1996) 6 SCC 291) Once an order passed by Government based on Court directions is made, a fresh cause of action arises to seek redress in appropriate forum (discussed in context of Section 12 of Contempt of Courts Act). The Court cited this decision to highlight that a fresh cause of action may arise and to explain limits of contempt jurisdiction (paragraph 13 and quoted passage).
Kunhayammed v. State of Kerala (AIR 2000 SC 2587) Doctrine of merger: when a superior court disposes of the lis, the superior court's order becomes the final operative order; doctrine not of universal application—depends on nature of jurisdiction exercised by superior forum. The opinion cites Kunhayammed to explain the logic and limits of the merger doctrine and to emphasize that applicability depends on the nature of superior forum's jurisdiction (paragraph 14 and quoted passage).
Smt. A. Santhi Kumari v. K. Ravi (2002 (6) ALT 326) Application of merger in context of writ petitions and writ appeals; held that an order passed in a writ petition merges with the order in writ appeal and contempt petition may be not maintainable. Cited as authority supporting the plea of merger and related principles (paragraph 15).
T. V. Chowdary v. Riata Industrial Corpn (1998 (2) ALT 449) On scope and purport of contempt jurisdiction — limited to seeing whether Court order has been complied with or deliberately flouted. Cited to support the proposition that contempt jurisdiction is confined to determining compliance and not to re‑hearing merits or passing unrelated interim orders (paragraph 19).
Vijay Singh v. Mittanlal Hindoliya (1996 (6) SLR 622) Under Section 12 of Contempt of Courts Act — if respondent has not deliberately disobeyed the order, there is no power to issue further directions. Cited to support the limited remedial scope in contempt proceedings (paragraph 19).
Rabia Bee v. R. Subrahmanyam (1997 (2) ALT 818) Once an order is passed as per directions of the High Court, the Court before which compliance is sought cannot go into correctness of that order; the aggrieved party must seek redress in the appropriate forum. Cited to reinforce that contempt proceedings cannot be used to re-open correctness of orders and that remedies lie elsewhere (paragraph 20).
L. Chandra Kumar v. Union of India (1997 (3) SCC 261) Principles on jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunals (referenced in relation to tribunals' powers and scope following judicial review decisions). Cited by respondents to argue that Administrative Tribunals retain powers to entertain contempt proceedings; the Court considered this precedent in context with Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act (paragraphs 18 and 17).
T. Sudhakar Prasad v. Govt. of A.P. ((2001) 1 SCC 516) Directly considers Sections 17 & 30 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, and holds that Administrative Tribunals retain jurisdiction to punish for their contempt in respect of matters covered by Section 14(1), similar to High Court under Article 215 and Contempt of Courts Act. The Court relied on this decision to conclude that Administrative Tribunals have ample powers to entertain contempt applications independent of this Court's orders (paragraphs 17 and 18).
Division Bench — W.P. No.10242 of 1998 (dated 04‑04‑2003) Referred to by respondents in support of the contention that tribunals retain power to entertain contempt matters (specific principle not detailed in the provided opinion). The opinion records that respondents relied on this Division Bench decision; the Court considered it among the authorities in argument (paragraph 9).

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court framed the core question as: whether the Tribunal can entertain contempt proceedings after its orders were challenged in this Court (Article 226) and whether the Tribunal may pass interim or further orders while contempt proceedings are pending.

The Court first examined the relevant statutory framework. It noted that the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 (effective from 27-02-1985) expressly confers contempt powers on tribunals by Section 17, which provides that a Tribunal shall have and exercise the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in respect of contempt of itself as a High Court has, and that the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 apply with specified modifications (paragraphs 21, 23, 24 and 34).

On the question of merger, the Court analysed the doctrine as expounded in the authorities (Shankar, Kunhayammed and related cases). It acknowledged the general principle that when a superior forum finally disposes of a challenge, its order becomes the final operative order and the inferior forum's order merges into it. However, the Court emphasised that the doctrine of merger is not of universal application and depends on the nature and content of the superior forum's jurisdiction (paragraphs 12, 14).

Critically, the Court reconciled the merger doctrine with the specific statutory grant of contempt powers to tribunals under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act. The Court held that because Section 17 gives tribunals contempt jurisdiction equivalent to that of a High Court (and because the Act is a self-contained code including specific contempt power), the powers of the Tribunal and this Court to entertain contempt applications operate concurrently and independently; one does not override the other. The Court therefore concluded that the principle of merger cannot be applied so as to deprive the Tribunal of its statutory contempt jurisdiction (paragraphs 34, 50 and 51).

On the second issue — whether the Tribunal may pass interim or further orders while dealing with contempt proceedings — the Court reviewed authorities concerning the scope of contempt jurisdiction (T.V. Chowdary, Vijay Singh, Rabia Bee) and reiterated that the scope of contempt proceedings is restricted to determining whether an order has been complied with in substance or deliberately flouted. If it is found that there was no deliberate disobedience, there is no power to issue further directions. The Court held that the Tribunal, having entertained the contempt application in this matter, ought not to have issued the further directions it did; the enquiry should have been confined to whether there was any violation of the orders (paragraphs 19, 20 and 21).

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petitions were partly allowed. The Court held that:

  • Administrative Tribunals have statutory power under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 to entertain contempt proceedings independently and concurrently with this Court; therefore, the mere fact that Tribunal orders were challenged under Article 226 does not automatically deprive the Tribunal of contempt jurisdiction.
  • However, the scope of contempt proceedings is limited to determining whether an order has been disobeyed; a contempt forum (including the Tribunal) does not have power to go into the correctness of the underlying order or to pass interim or other further directions beyond what is necessary to determine and punish contempt.
  • Consequently, all further directions issued by the Tribunal pending the contempt proceedings in this matter were set aside, and the main contempt applications were directed to be disposed of in accordance with law after hearing both sides. The Court ordered no costs and made Rule Nisi absolute in the listed writ petitions (WPs 14460, 16717, 16935, 16775 and 16786 of 2003).

Implications:

  • The decision clarifies that statutory contempt powers conferred on Administrative Tribunals (Section 17) operate concurrently with this Court's powers and are not necessarily negated by subsequent judicial review proceedings under Article 226.
  • At the same time, the decision reaffirms the limited functional scope of contempt proceedings: contempt courts (including tribunals) are to focus on compliance and cannot use contempt proceedings as a vehicle to re‑open or re‑adjudge the merits of the original orders or to issue unrelated interim reliefs.
  • In the present case, the direct effect is that the Tribunal's interim/further directions issued during contempt proceedings were quashed and the substantive contempt applications must be adjudicated in accordance with law (hearing both sides) without those interim directions standing; the Court did not award costs.
  • No broader new precedent beyond interpretation and application of existing statutory and case law principles was announced; the Court applied established authorities and the statutory text to resolve the questions presented.

    Director, Intermediate Education, Government Of Andhra Pradesh v. Rama Prabhakara Rao And Others

    : (per the Hon'ble Sri. Justice B. Prakash Rao)

    Heard Sri S. Satyanarayana Prasad, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner and Sri Vidyasagar, Sri D.V. Seetarama Murthy, Sri D.V. Subrahmanya Sarma and Smt. K. Udayasree, the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the contesting respondents.

    2. Since the issue Involved in all these Writ Petitions is common, they are being taken up together for disposal.

    3. In these writ petitions, filed at the instance of the Director, Intermediate Education, Government of Andhra Pradesh, Nampally, Hyderabad, challenging the very maintainability of proceedings in the contempt applications Nos.482/01, 865/01, 994/01, 964/01 and 962/01 arising out of the common orders passed in O.A.No.4672/95 dated 02‑12‑1999 on the file of A.P. Administrative Tribunal, twin questions of importance arise for consideration are viz., (i) Whether, on the facts and circumstances, the orders of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal on being challenged in a Writ under Article 226 of the Constitution of India merge with the orders passed by this Court, and therefore, no contempt proceedings would lie before the A. P. Administrative Tribunal for violation of its orders; and (ii) Whether, on the facts and circumstances, the A.P. Administrative Tribunal having entertained the contempt proceedings has any jurisdiction to pass any interim order or further other orders.

    4. Since the Counsel on either side have restricted their submissions only on the scope of the aforesaid questions without touching of the facts on either side, it is not necessary to consider on merits. However, it would suffice to take into account the chequered events leading to the filing of this writ petition.

    5. On the applications filed by the SGBT teachers working in the Tribal Welfare Ashram Schools in the Tribal Welfare Department in O.A.No.4672 of 1995 along with batch of cases, filed under Section 19 of the A.P. Administrative Tribunal Act, 1985, the A.P. Administrative Tribunal disposed of the same by orders dated 02‑12‑1999. In the said proceedings a challenge was made to sub‑rule 3 (ii) (b) of A.P.Intermediate Educational Service Rules framed in G.O.Ms.No.302, dated 30‑12‑1993 the controversy was in regard to the appointment by transfer to the post of Junior Lecturers under Rule 3 in category‑8. As provided under category 1(b) of class (c), the appointment was by transfer from amongst the school assistants, including Hindi Pandits and Munshies in grade 1 category1 of Class‑D of A.P. School Educational Subordinate Service Rules or by recruitment by transfer from any other service. The contention of the applicants therein is that they are working in the said schools and therefore a provision also has to be made for their appointment. In the final orders, the A.P. Administrative Tribunal opined that 50% of the vacancies in the State in the category of Junior Lecturers were earmarked for direct recruits and the remaining 50% for recruitment by transfer to School Assistants of Andhra Pradesh, School Education Subordinate Service or recruitment by transfer or from any other service as defined in Rule 2(30) of A.P. State and Subordinate Service Rules. Further, it was directed that for laying down a method for apportioning to the 50% vacancies amongst the various sub‑groups and consequently lay down the norms judiciously. Thereafter, the matter was carried to this Court by the aggrieved persons in W.P.No.21648 of 2000, which was ultimately dismissed by the Division Bench of this Court, as per the orders dated 08‑03‑2001 holding that having regard to the absence of provisions in the special rules, the general rules cannot be made applicable and therefore it was left open for the State that in the event the State intends to appoint teachers, who were working in the Tribal Welfare Ashram School under the Social Welfare Department, they would also be eligible therefore and it was left open for the State to consider and prepare a joint seniority list, if it deemed expedient. Therefore, according to the petitioner, choice was left to the State and the orders of the Tribunal were merged with that of this Court and this Court, being a superior Court, the remedy of the aggrieved person for any non‑compliance or violation of the orders is only to approach this Court but not the Tribunal.

    6. However, an applicant in O.A.No.24 of 1997 has filed the contempt application on 10‑06‑2001 before the Tribunal in Contempt Application No.482 of 2001, whereupon the Tribunal after entertaining the said application passed various orders on several dates after issuing a Show Cause Notice.

    7. The petitioner has filed a counter‑affidavit on 20‑06‑2001 denying the allegation and stating that there is no willful disobedience. In spite of filing of the said counter affidavit, the Tribunal directed the Commissioner, Tribal Welfare to send a list of candidates, whereupon, the petitioner to prepare an Integrated list for effecting promotions in the post of junior lecturers and till that exercise Is completed, a further direction is given that there will be no promotion to the post of Junior Lecturers in the State. Thereafter, again the Tribunal has entertained another contempt application on 19‑03‑2002, whereupon, the Tribunal passed an order to the effect that the, earlier orders passed are extended and with further directions that the list submitted by the Commissioner, Tribal Welfare, shall be supplied to all the Regional Joint Directors and other seniority list shall be prepared by the Regional Joint Directors and they shall submit to the Court on 16‑04‑2002. Once again on 03‑05‑2002, the Tribunal passed another order to the effect that in so far as Zone‑V is concerned, adhoc promotions should be given on the basis of the seniority list, including the teachers working in Tribal Welfare Department of Adilabad and also on the basis of integrated seniority list and the entire such exercise shall be completed within a period of five weeks from the date of the order. On this, the petitioner, has approached this Court under Article 226 of Constitution of India, inter alia, contending as aforesaid that the very contempt application as has been filed and framed before the Tribunal is not maintainable, in view of the fact that the orders of the Tribunal stood merged with that of the orders of this Court in Writ Petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of India and therefore no contempt would lie there, but only in this Court. That apart, a further contention was also to the effect that in a contempt application, the scope is very limited to see whether there is any disobedience of the orders, but there is no power by going into merits and to pass any Interim or further orders. If at all the parties are aggrieved against any subsequent action taken, it would give rise to different cause of action to file a fresh application before the Tribunal and seek appropriate reliefs, but not seek direction in the very same contempt application.

    8. Sri S. Satyanarayana Prasad the learned Counsel appearing on behalf of the petitioner, relied on the decisions in Shankar V. Krishna, (AIR 1970 SC 1) J.S.Parihar V. Ganpat Duggar ((1996) 6 SCC 291) Kunhayammed V. State Of Kerala (AIR 2000 SC 2587) And Smt.A. Santhi Kumari, I.A.S., V. K.Ravi(2002 (6) ALT 326), in Support Of the plea of merger and also the principles governing therein. Further, he sought to place reliance on the decisions reported in T.V.Chowdary Vs. Riata Industrial Corpn(1998 (2) ALT 449), Vijay Singh V. Mittanlal Hindoliya (1996 (6) SLR 622, and Rabia Bee V. R.Subrahmanyam (1997(2) ALT 818, to the effect that in a contempt proceedings, no interim order and any further orders would be passed, except to see whether there is any violation of the orders passed.

    9. Repelling the said contentions, the counsel appearing on behalf of the respondents herein sought to contend that having regard to the principles laid down by the Apex Court in L. Chandra Kumar V. Union Of India (1997 (3) SCC 261) and latter decision in T.Sudhakar Prasad V. Govt. Of A.P.((2001) 1 SCC 516, ample powers are exist with the Tribunal to entertain the contempt proceedings and therefore, it cannot be said that the contempt proceedings have to be filed only in this Court and the principle of merger will not apply on the facts of the case. A further reliance was placed in support of the said plea on the decision of the Division Bench of this Court in W.P.No.10242 of 1998, dated 04‑04‑2003.

    10. Having considered the submissions made on either side and also on perusal of the material, the main question which arises for consideration is only as to the competency of the Tribunal to entertain the contempt proceedings on the merger of its order with that of this Court in the Writ proceedings and as to whether pending the contempt proceedings, the Tribunal has jurisdiction to pass any interim or further orders.

    11. There is no dispute to the facts, as submitted above, in regard to the filing of the applications before the Administrative Tribunal by the parties and the batch of cases having been disposed of on 02‑12‑1999 and thereafter the said orders having been challenged in a Writ petition under Article 226 of the Constitution of India. The said Writ Petition was disposed of by this Court on 08‑03‑2001 with certain directions. Thereupon, the parties complaining that the said orders having not been implemented, approached the Tribunal by way of contempt application. It is imperative to take note of the provisions of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, which has come into effect from 27‑02‑1985. Under the Chapter 3 of the aforesaid Act, apart from confirming the jurisdiction powers and authority on the administrative tribunals, a specific power of contempt has been conferred under Section 17 thereof, which reads as follows:

    "17. Power to punish for contempt. A Tribunal shall have, and exercise, the same jurisdiction, powers and authority in respect of contempt of itself as a High Court has and may exercise and, for this purpose, the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971 (80 of 1971), shall have effect subject to the modifications that:‑

    (a) the references therein to a High Court shall be construed as including a reference to such Tribunal:

    (b) the reference to the Advocate-General in Section 15 of the said Act shall be construed,‑

    (i) In relation to the Central Administrative Tribunal, as a reference to the Attorney‑General or the Solicitor‑General or the Additional Solicitor‑General; and

    (ii) in relation to an Administrative Tribunal for a State or a Joint Administrative Tribunal for two or more States, as a reference to the Advocate‑ General of the State or any of the States for which such Tribunal has been established."

    Under the above provision, the Tribunal has been conferred with the powers on par with the provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, as conferred on this Court to take action in respect of contempt of itself. Therefore, it cannot be said that unlike the situation existing prior to the enforcement of the aforesaid Act, no such power is vested with the Tribunal. The Act is self‑contained one with the inclusion of specific power of contempt. The powers of the Tribunal and this Court to entertain the application are quite independent of each other. Therefore, both such powers of contempt run concurrently and cannot be said that one overrides the other. Further, any order passed by this Court under Article 226 of the Constitution of India is only to correct any orders in exercise of powers of judicial review and not as any higher authority in the hierarchy of the remedial ladder under the Act.

    12. In Shankar's case (1 supra) considering the Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution of India vis-à-vis Sections 96, 115 and 38 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 29 of the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, the Supreme Court held as follows:

    "Where, on its revisional jurisdiction being invoked against the order of the appellate Court under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging House Rates Control Act, 1947, 'the High Court dismisses the revision, after hearing both the parties, the order of the appellate Court becomes merged with the order made in revision, and, thereafter the appellate order cannot be challenged or attacked by another set of proceedings in the High Court under Articles 226 and 227 of the Constitution. The principle of merger of orders of inferior Courts would not become affected or inapplicable by making any distinction between a petition for revision and an appeal."

    13. In J.S. Parihar's case (2 supra), considering the jurisdiction under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971, Supreme Court held as follows:

    "Once an order passed by the Government on the basis of the directions issued by the Court, there arises a fresh cause of action to seek redressal in an appropriate forum."

    14. In Kunhayammed's case (3 supra) Supreme Court held as follows:

    "The logic underlying the doctrine of merger is that there cannot be more than one decree or operative Orders governing the same subject‑matter at a given point of time. When a decree or order passed by inferior Court, tribunal or authority was subjected to a remedy available under the law before a superior forum then, though the decree or order under challenge continues to be effective and binding nevertheless its finality is put in jeopardy. Once the superior Court has disposed of the lis before it either way-whether the decree or order under appeal is set aside or modified or simply confirmed, it is the decree or order of the superior Court, tribunal or authority which is the final, binding and operative decree or order wherein merges the decree or order passed by the Court, tribunal or the authority below. However, the doctrine is not of universal or unlimited application. The nature of jurisdiction exercised by the superior forum and the content or subject matter of challenge laid or which could have been laid shall have to be kept in view. The superior jurisdiction should be capable of reversing, modifying or affirming the order put in issue before it. Under Article 136 of the Constitution the Supreme Court may reverse, modify or affirm the judgment‑decree or order appealed against while exercising its appellate jurisdiction and not while exercising the discretionary jurisdiction disposing of petition for special leave to appeal. The doctrine of merger can therefore be applied to the former and not to the latter."

    15. In Smt. A.Santhi Kumari's case (4 supra), Division Bench of this Court considering the provisions under Section 12 of the Contempt of Courts Act and Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, held that an order passed in Writ Petition merges with the order in Writ Appeal and therefore, the contempt petition is not maintainable.

    16. Having regard to the aforesaid principles, and especially in view of the specific provision as contained under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985 and the parallel provisions as contained under the Contempt of Courts Act, both operate in different fields, and the principles of merger thus cannot be made applicable.

    17. In T.Sudhakar Prasad's case (9 supra), directly considering the provisions of section 17 & 30 of the administrative tribunals act, 1985 and by taking into consideration the principles laid down in L.Chandra Kumar's case (8 supra), Supreme Court held that it cannot be said in view of the L.Chandra Kumar's case (8 supra) the Administrative Tribunals lost the right to hear on their own contempt, further Section 30 did not negate the right of the Administrative Tribunals and further held that the jurisdiction of Administrative Tribunals to punish for their contempt in respect of matters covered by Section 14(1) is the same as vested in High Court under Article 215 read with provisions of Contempt of Courts Act, 1971.

    18. In view of the aforesaid principles as laid down, it is quite clear that Administrative Tribunal has ample powers of its own to entertain the contempt application irrespective of the orders passed by this Court on judicial review.

    19. Coming to the second question, as to whether the Tribunal has any jurisdiction to pass any Interim orders or further orders on proceedings initiated for contempt, the power of contempt as conferred under Section 17 of the Administrative Tribunals Act, 1985, as pointed out above, is on par with the same power as conferred under the High Court not only under the Article 215 of Constitution of India, but also under provisions of the Contempt of Courts Act, 1971. Considering the similar question, the Division Bench of this court in T.V.Chowdary's case (5 supra), it was held that it is trite to say that the scope and purport of the contempt jurisdiction is to see whether the order of the Court has been complied with in substance or deliberately flouted. Similarly, in Vijay Singhs case (6 supra), considering the provisions of Section 12 of Contempt of Courts Act, Supreme Court it was held that once it is found that respondent has not deliberately disobeyed the order, there is no powers to issue further directions.

    20. In Rabia Bee's case (7 supra), Division Bench of this Court considering once again the scope of contempt proceedings held that once an order was passed, as per the directions of the High Court, the Court cannot go into correctness of the said order and it is the aggrieved party to seek redressal in appropriate forum.

    21. In the circumstances, it is now well established that scope of the contempt application is very much restricted only to see whether the order is flouted and therefore, it cannot be said that Contempt Court can issue interim or further directions. In the circumstances, the Tribunal in this case having entertained the application, ought not to have issued any further directions and the entire enquiry should have been restricted only to see whether there is any violation of the orders.

    22. In view of the aforesaid reasons, the Writ Petitions are partly allowed only to the extent that all the further directions given by the Tribunal pending the Contempt proceedings are set aside, and main Contempt Application has to be disposed of in accordance with law after hearing both sides. No costs.

    That Rule Nisi in WPs 14460, 16717, 16935, 16775 and 16786 of 2003 has been made absolute as above.

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    Director, Intermediate Education, Government Of Andhra Pradesh v. Rama Prabhakara Rao And Others
    (Apr 30, 2004)