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Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — Umamaheswaram, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

These appeals arise out of O.S. No. 21 of 1955 on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Tenali. The plaintiff (Sri Rama Talkies, Tenali) owned a cinema-house (assessment No. 8662) built on a site owned by two different persons. The receiver was appointed in O.S. No. 85 of 1949 to manage the cinema business; two leases/cowle kabuliats were executed in respect of the premises: Exhibit A-9 (lease to D.W.1 effective from 16th October, 1950 at Rs. 2,295 per month) and Exhibit A-4 (subsequent lease to M. Venkatachalapathi Rao at an annual rent of Rs. 18,060).

The Municipality issued a "Special notice of property-tax" (Exhibit A-6), indicating reassessment and that the enhanced assessment would be collected from 1st October, 1950. The Municipal Council resolved to impose tax on a rental value it fixed (translated to Rs. 25,000 in one resolution), and property demand registers (Exhibits A-1 to A-3) recorded varied annual values for successive years.

The plaintiff filed a revision petition (Exhibit B-4) to the Commissioner and an appeal (Exhibit B-7) to the Municipal Council seeking relief from the enhancement. The Subordinate Judge held the enhancement illegal and arbitrary, found that provisions of the District Municipalities Act (the Act) were not effectively complied with, but dismissed the plaintiff's claim for refunds for the years 1951–1953 because the payments for those years were made voluntarily and not under protest. Both parties appealed: Appeal No. 536 by the plaintiff and Appeal No. 434 of 1956 by the Municipal Commissioner in respect of parts of the decree.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the suit is barred under section 354(2) of the District Municipalities Act (the Act).
  2. Whether the provisions of section 82(1) of the Act read with the Taxation Rules in Schedule IV were complied with in the assessment and collection of property-tax.
  3. Whether the plaintiff is entitled to a refund of property-tax for the years 1951–1953, given that payments for those years were not made "under protest" but voluntarily.
  4. Whether the Municipal Council's apportionment between building and machinery/equipment (for assessment purposes) was justified, and if not, what apportionment should be applied.

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's (Sri Rama Talkies) Arguments

  • The Municipality erred in levying property-tax on the basis of the rents shown in Exhibits A-9 and A-4 and is therefore liable to refund property-tax illegally collected.
  • The assessment improperly included the site (which belonged to two other owners) in the plaintiff's tax liability in breach of section 82(1) of the Act.
  • The rent figures relied upon (Exhibits A-9 and A-4) included charges for machinery, equipment and furniture and therefore did not represent the rent attributable to the building alone — the apportionment made by the Municipal Council was incorrect and arbitrary.
  • The notice (Exhibit A-6) was not in accordance with rule 4 of Schedule IV to the Act (it referred to rules 9 and 10 instead), and the retrospective assessments from October 1950 were therefore challenged.
  • The plaintiff sought refund of excess tax collected for seven half-years, contending payments were made under a mistake of law (particularly payments made by the Receiver pursuant to court direction) and thus recoverable.

Municipality's Arguments

  • The enhancement of property-tax was made in accordance with section 82 of the Act and the Taxation Rules in Schedule IV, and the assessment was valid.
  • The suit was barred under section 354(2) of the Act (i.e., the civil courts should not intervene where statutory appeals/procedures exist).
  • Payments for the years 1951–1953 were not made under protest and therefore the plaintiff could not recover those amounts; in support, reliance was placed on prior authority (including Udipi Municipal Council v. Vasudevacharya).
  • The Municipal Council had exercised its discretion in fixing annual values and apportioning rent and hiring charges, and such factual determinations were within the competence of the executive authority.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Udipi Municipal Council v. Vasudevacharya Passage that the executive authority can decide a question of fact and civil courts should not re-investigate facts; that the civil court cannot assume assessing authority's powers and investigate afresh. Cited by Municipality; the Court considered the passage but did not accept Udipi as laying down an absolute bar. The Court distinguished or declined to follow Udipi's restrictive approach where statutory provisions have not been effectively complied with.
Coimbatore Municipality v. G.S. Govindayyar Raghava Rao, J.'s view that exclusion of civil court jurisdiction is not to be readily inferred; civil courts can examine non-compliance with statutory provisions. The Court followed and preferred this view as correct and relied upon it to justify civil court interference where the provisions of the Act have not been effectively complied with.
Secretary of State v. Mask & Co. Authority for the proposition that exclusion of civil court jurisdiction must be explicit or clearly implied; observations of Lord Thankerton on limits of exclusion. Referred to in support of the proposition that civil courts retain jurisdiction to examine whether statutory provisions have been complied with; cited in discussing limits on excluding civil court review.
Manikyam v. Kakinada Municipal Council (Bench decision) Where assessment proceeded on an erroneous basis the Civil Court can declare the assessment invalid and ultra vires. Relied upon as supporting authority for the Court's view that civil courts may set aside assessments based on an incorrect basis.
Dhakeswari Cotton Mills v. Income Tax Commissioner, West Bengal Assessing authority is not entitled to make an assessment by pure guess; assessment must be based on evidence/materials. Quoted to underline the principle that assessments must be founded on evidence and not arbitrary conclusion; used by the Court to require a factual basis for municipal assessments.
Raghubal Mandal Harihar Mandal v. State of Bihar Assessing authority under Bihar Sales Tax Act cannot assess arbitrarily or without materials — must base assessment on materials. Followed Dhakeswari principle and used to reinforce that arbitrary assessments without basis are impermissible.
Municipal Council, Mangalore v. The Codial Bail Press; Municipal Council, Cuddalore v. Krishna Nambiar; Municipal Council, Kumbakonam v. Messrs Ralli Brothers Bench decisions construing section 354(2) of the Act to require inquiry whether provisions have been effectively complied with; mere semblance of compliance does not oust civil court jurisdiction. Relied upon to support the proposition that the civil court can examine whether the mode of assessment complies in substance with statutory requirements.
Salem Municipal Council v. S.V. Subramaniam Reviewed earlier Madras High Court decisions; did not lay down a rule different from the view that civil court will intervene when statutory provisions have not been in effect complied with. The Court noted this decision as consistent with its view that civil courts can interfere where there is non-compliance in substance with statutory requirements.
Municipal Commissioner v. Sambasiva Rao Expressed views in earlier single-judge decisions that diverge from other single-judge holdings (noted conflict among single-judge decisions). The Court discussed the conflict of single-judge decisions and rejected the restrictive approach that would bar civil court interference in cases of arbitrary assessment.
Chairman, Municipal Council, Rajahmundry v. Subba Rao Bench decision relied upon by the Subordinate Judge to hold that payments made without express protest are not recoverable. The Court held this authority no longer good law in light of the Supreme Court decision in Sales Tax Officer v. Kanhaiya Lal and therefore declined to follow it for denying refund.
Sales Tax Officer v. Kanhaiya Lal Supreme Court holding that payments of taxes made under mistake of law are recoverable; criticized earlier contrary authority. The Court followed this Supreme Court authority to hold that payments made under a mistake of law (including by the Receiver) were recoverable by the plaintiff.
Shiba Prasad Singh v. Srish Chandra Privy Council interpretation relating to section 72 of the Indian Contract Act (treatment of mistake of law). The Subordinate Judge had followed this Privy Council view earlier; the High Court declined to follow it in preference to the Supreme Court's decision in Sales Tax Officer v. Kanhaiya Lal.
Leman v. Damodarayya Referenced by Krishna Rao, J. in tracing relevant law (context in discussion of single-judge decisions). Mentioned in the Court's discussion of the jurisprudential background; used as part of tracing authority but not applied concretely to facts in the judgment.
Padmarraju v. Panchayat Board Samalkot Cited by plaintiff's counsel as authority suggesting the Court should quash assessment rather than apportion rent. The Court rejected the argument that Padmarraju required quashing rather than apportionment; the Court proceeded to apportion rent instead of quashing the assessment wholly.
Subbarayudu v. State Observation by Subba Rao, C.J. (then) that when single Judges differ they ought to refer the matter to a Bench (noted as obiter). The Court observed that the comment was obiter and not in accordance with prevailing practice; it did not adopt that procedural suggestion as binding.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court conducted a step-by-step analysis, constrained by the facts and the statutory provisions in issue:

  1. Section 82(1) — inclusion of site and building:
    • The Act provides that where a building has a different owner from the site, the tax liability for the building is separate. The Court found, on the face of Exhibit A-2 and other material, that the plaintiff had been assessed in respect of both the site and the building, even though the site belonged to two other owners and tax was separately collected from them.
    • The Court rejected the municipal clerk (D.W.2)'s explanation that the double entries were mere mistakes, and concluded that the Municipality violated the mandatory provisions of section 82(1) by collecting tax from the plaintiff for the site for the years 1951–1953.
  2. Section 82(2) — determination of annual value and apportionment:
    • The Court considered whether the rent figures in Exhibits A-9 and A-4 represented rent solely for the building or included machinery/equipment/value of hire. The Municipal Council had apportioned a small percentage to machinery/hire (roughly 10%) and fixed large annual values for the building (e.g., Rs. 25,000).
    • On the factual matrix (relative costs: building roughly Rs. 55,000; cine-equipment and other apparatus higher, and hiring charges / wear-and-tear for equipment greater), the Court concluded the Municipal Council's apportionment was arbitrary and capricious and not founded on data/evidence.
    • Applying the evidence before it (values in exhibits and the relative proportions), the Court held that the proper apportionment between building and machinery/equipment ought to be 2:3 (i.e., two-fifths to the building and three-fifths to machinery/equipment) for the relevant assessments.
  3. Role of civil courts under section 354(2):
    • The Court surveyed conflicting single-judge decisions, Privy Council observations and Bench decisions of the Madras High Court. It accepted the line of authority (including Coimbatore and Manikyam) that civil courts retain jurisdiction to set aside assessments where the statutory provisions have not been effectively complied with or where the mode of assessment is erroneous or based on an incorrect basis.
    • The Court rejected the rigid proposition that the civil court must always confine itself to the statutory appeals and cannot inquire into capricious or arbitrary assessments.
  4. Validity of the notice (Exhibit A-6):
    • Although the notice referred to rules 9 and 10 (and not rule 4), the Court found that in substance the notice informed the plaintiff of proposed retrospective reassessment from October 1950, and the plaintiff availed the revision and appeal remedies. The Court held the requirements of the Act had been complied with in effect and substance, even if not in literal/formal terms related to rule numbering.
  5. Recoverability of taxes paid (payments "under protest" or by mistake of law):
    • The Subordinate Judge had dismissed the plaintiff's claim for certain years because payments were made without express protest, relying on older Bench authority. The High Court examined later Supreme Court authority (Sales Tax Officer v. Kanhaiya Lal) which held that taxes paid under a mistake of law are recoverable.
    • The Court found that the Receiver (appointed by the Court) had paid taxes after exhausting revision and appeal remedies and that the payments were made under a mistake of law — i.e., when the Municipality had no right under the Act to collect tax from the plaintiff for the site and had not complied with section 82(1). Accordingly, the payments were recoverable.
  6. Practical directions and computation:
    • The Court set out specific computational directions: for the first four half-years the annual value of the building would be 2/5 of Rs. 27,540; for the subsequent three half-years it would be 2/5 of Rs. 18,060. From those amounts there would be a deduction of 10% (as provided by section 82(2)). The Subordinate Judge was directed to determine the property-tax payable on such annual values, deduct those taxes from the amounts actually collected, and refund the excess amounts with interest.
    • The Court directed the Subordinate Judge to work out the figures and submit a report within one month; time for filing objections to the report was fixed at 10 days after receipt.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: Assessee's appeal allowed; Decree modified.

Direct consequences for the parties (as ordered by the Court):

  • The Court held that the Municipality violated section 82(1) by collecting property-tax from the plaintiff in respect of the site for the years 1951–1953; the plaintiff was not liable for site tax for those years.
  • The Municipal Council's apportionment between building and machinery/equipment was held arbitrary; the Court apportioned the rent between building and equipment in the ratio 2:3 for the assessments in issue.
  • The plaintiff is entitled to recover the excess tax paid for the seven half-years mentioned in the plaint. The Subordinate Judge is directed to compute the correct tax (using the 2/5 rule for the building's share and allowing a 10% deduction under section 82(2)), deduct the tax properly payable from amounts actually collected, and refund the excess amounts.
  • Excess amounts found refundable will carry interest at 6% from the dates of collection.
  • The Subordinate Judge must work out figures and submit a report within one month; objections, if any, to be filed within 10 days of receipt of the report.

Broader legal implications: The Court applied and discussed extant authorities to reaffirm that civil courts may intervene where the provisions of the Act have not been effectively complied with and may set aside or correct assessments based on an erroneous basis or arbitrary apportionment. The judgment clarifies that a mere formal or literal adherence to procedure will not shield an assessment that is in substance inconsistent with statutory requirements.

Note: The decision contains extensive discussion of earlier authorities and chooses between competing single-judge views; the direct effect is the modification of the decree in favour of the assessee and the directions for computation and refund described above.


End of summary. The foregoing is a faithful condensation of the legal opinion delivered by Umamaheswaram, J., based exclusively on the provided text.

    Municipal Council Tenali By Commissioner v. Sri Rama Talkies Tenali .

    The Judgment of the Court was delivered by

    Umamaheswaram, J.

    2. Both these appeals arise out of O.S No. 21 of 1955 on the file of the ??? Judge's Court, Tenali. The plaintiff has preferred Appeal No. 536 ??? in so far as his suit was dismissed in regard to the refund of property-tax ??? years 1951 to 1953. Appeal No. 434 of 1956 was filed by the Municipal Commissioner Tenali, in so far as the suit was decreed for the refund of property-tax ??? second half-year 1950-1951 and for the year 1953-1954. The plaintiff contended ??? the Municipality erred in levying the property-tax on the basis of the rents ??? to be paid under Exhibits A-9 and A-4 and that he was consequently entitled ??? refund of the property-tax illegally collected from him. The Municipality ??? that the enhancement of the property-tax was in accordance with the provision ??? of section 82 of the District Municipalities Act, hereinafter referred to as ??? Act’ and that the suit was barred under section 354(2) of the Act. It was further contended that as the payments for the years 1951 to 1953 were not made under protest the plaintiff was not entitled to recover those amounts. The Subordinate Judge of Tenali held that the enhancement of the assessment was illegal and arbitrary and that the provisions of the Act have not been in effect complied with. The learned Subordinate Judge further found that as the payments for the years 1951 to 1953 were not made under protest but voluntarily, the plaintiff was not entitled to a refund of the property-tax for those two years. The plaintiff and the defendant have consequently preferred the above appeals.

    3. The main question that arises for consideration in the appeal is whether the suit is barred under section 354(2) of the Act, and whether the provisions of section 82(1) of the Act read with the Taxation Rules in Schedule IV have been ??? with. The second question that arises is whether the plaintiff is not ??? to a refund of the property-tax for the years 1951-1953 on the ground that ??? the payments voluntarily and not under protest. In order to appreciate ??? legal contentions, it is necessary to set out a few relevant facts.

    4. The plaintiff, Sri Rama Talkies, Tenali, is the owner of the cinema-house ??? in Ward No. XVIII, Tenali Municipality. The assessment number of the ??? is No. 8662. The site on which the cinema-house was constructed ??? to two owners and the plaintiff was bound to pay them a ground rent ???. The plaintiff was carrying on a cinema business in the building and ??? year 1950-1951, the annual value of the building was fixed at Rs. 6,600. As ??? were quarrels between the partners of Sri Rama Talkies, O.S 85 of 1949 ??? on the file of the Subordinate Judge's Court, Tenali, and a Receiver ??? to manage the cinema business. Under the instructions of the ??? the cinema hall along with the equipment and furniture contained therein ??? and D.W 1 was the highest bidder. The cowle kabuliat executed ??? D.W 1 in favour of the Receiver is marked as Exhibit A-9 and it is dated ???, 1951. The lease was to take effect from 16th October, 1950 and ??? agreed to be paid both for the building and the cinema equipment was ??? Rs. 2,295 per month. The lessee agreed to pay the ground rent ??? the owners thereof. As soon as the Commissioner was informed of the ??? called upon the Receiver to let him know the exact rate of monthly rent ??? D.W 1 had to pay him. The Receiver informed him that the rent that ??? lated was a sum of Rs. 2,295 per month. Exhibit B-19 contains the ??? from 27th August, 1951 to 19th September, 1951. The not proceeds ??? that the sum of Rs. 2,295 was agreed to be paid by D.W 1 the ??? reference to the machinery. On 31 August, 1951, the Tenali ??? Council passed a resolution that under rule 4 of Schedule IV to the ??? value of the building should be increased from Rs. 6,600 with ??? 1st October, 1950. A notice marked as Exhibit A-6 was issued to the ??? The notice is headed as ‘Special notice of property-tax’. The notice ??? have been issued under rules 9 and 10 of Schedule IV to the Act. It ??? by virtue of the power vested in the executive authority under rule 8 ??? IV to the Act, the assessment shown therein will be collected from ??? commencing from 1st October, 1950. The annual value was ??? fixed at Rs. 27,540 and the assessment of Rs. 3,221-11-6 for a half ??? proposed to be collected from the plaintiff from 1st October, 1950. The ??? was received by the plaintiff on 15th February, 1951. Thereupon the ??? filed a revision petition to the Commissioner, marked as Exhibit B-4. ??? was confirmed by the Commissioner. An appeal was filed to the Municipal ??? Tenali, marked as Exhibit B-7. The Municipal Council held here was no sufficient machinery for the Sri Rama Talkies, the value of the machinery might be fixed at Rs. 2,840. The annual value was fixed at a sum of Rs. 25,000 and the tax was proposed to be assessed on the amount. The concluding sentence of the order of the Municipal Council as translated is as follows:—

    “It is therefore resolved to impose a tax on Rs. 25,000 being the rental value of the building including the site, and to reduce the tax in excess of it.”

    5. The property demand registers that were produced by the Municipality are marked as Exhibits A-1 to A-3. Exhibit A-2 shows that for the year 1951-1952, the annual value of the premises is shown as Rs. 9,180 and the annual value of the building as Rs. 18,360. For the year 1952-1953, the annual value of the premises is shown as Rs. 8,334 and the annual value of the building as Rs. 16,606. For the year 1953-1954, the value of the premises is not shown but the value of ??? building is entered as Rs. 17,600. For the years 1954-1955 and 1955-1956 the ??? value of the building is shown as Rs. 16,000 and Rs. 11,280 respectively. As ??? lessee D.W 1 defaulted to pay the rent and the arrears of rent amounted Rs. 10,000, the Court cancelled the lease issued in favour of D.W 1. The evidence of D.W 1 shows that he was adjudicated as an insolvent and that there ??? still arrears of rent payable by him to the plaintiff. The Court directed ??? Receiver to auction the cinema-house including the equipment and furniture, ??? M. Venkatachalapathi Rao became the highest bidder. A certified copy of ??? cowle kabuliat in favour of the Receiver is marked as Exhibit A-4. The ??? that he agreed to pay for the building and the cinema-equipment, etc. ??? Rs. 18,060 per year. He also agreed to pay the ground rent to the owners ???. As the rent that was agreed to be paid under Exhibt A-4 was less that ??? rent agreed to be paid under Exhibit A-9, the Receiver filed an application ??? the Commissioner to reduce the property-tax payable by Sri Rama Talkie ??? the application, he reserved his right on behalf of the partners of Sri Rama ??? to file a suit to impeach the previous enhancement of property-tax. ??? Exhibit B-11 dated 27th July, 1953, deducting he rent for the furniture, ??? 10 per cent the annual value was fixed at Rs. 16,000. The ??? was filed by the Receiver as against the order of the Commissioner was on 19th July, 1954. The suit was thereupon filed by the plaintiff for ??? the excess property-tax that was collected by the Municipality.

    6. Section 82(1) of the Act provides that every building shall be ??? together with its site and other adjacent premises occupied as an ??? thereto unless the owner of the building is a different person from the ??? such site or premises. Section 82(2) of the Act enacts that the annual ??? lands shall be deemed to be gross annual rent at which they may ??? expected to be let from month to month or from year less a deduction ??? case of buildings, of 10 per cent of that portion of such annual rent whit ??? to buildings alone apart from the sites and the adjacent lands appurtenance thereto. Under sub-clause (b) of the proviso the ??? machinery and furniture shall be excluded from the valuations under ??? It is clear from Exhibit A-2 that the plaintiff was assessed to property-??? of both the site and the building. As already stated, the value ??? for the years 1951-1952 and 1952-1953 was fixed at Rs. 9,180 and Rs. ??? as the building was concerned, the annual value was fixed for those two ??? Rs. 18,360 and Rs. 16,606. It is not disputed that the site belonged to two ??? rent owners and that property-tax was separately collected by the Municipal ??? from them. Under section 82(1) of the Act, the plaintiff was liable to pay ??? property-tax only in respect of the annual value of the building. The clerk ??? Municipality who was examined as D.W 2 stated that by mistake the ??? Rs. 27,540 was wrongly apportioned under the two heads, premises and ??? He stated that the property-tax was collected only in respect of the building on the annual value of Rs. 27,540. We are not inclined to accept his evidence and hold that the figures were entered under the two headings of the annual value of premises and annual value of the buildings by mistake. We consequently hold that the provisions of section 82(1) of the Act are violated. The plaintiff was not liable to pay the tax in respect of the site for the two years. It is only the owners of the site that had to be proceeded against for the collection of the property-tax in respect of the site on which the cinema-house was constructed. We agree with the learned Subordinate Judge in his conclusion in paragraph 15 of the judgment that the defendant-Municipality did not comply with the mandatory provisions of section 82(1) of the Act in collecting the property-tax from the plaintiff for the years 1951-1953.

    7. The next question that arises for consideration is whether the provisions of section 82(2) of the Act have been duly complied with. If the building is not ??? let and the gross annual rent of such a building cannot be estimated the executive authority, the annual value of the premises according to sub-clause (a) of the proviso shall be deemed to be 6 per cent of the total estimated ??? of the land and the estimated present cost of erecting a building after ??? for depreciation a reasonable amount which shall in no case be less than ??? cent, of such cost. It is contended by Sri Sambasiva Rao, the learned ??? advocate for the Municipality, that as the cinema-house was leased out under ??? A-9 and A-4, the terms of proviso (a) do not apply to the case, ??? Sarma, the learned Advocate for the plaintiff, Sri Rama Talkies, ??? that the rent fixed under Exhibit A-9 and Exhibit A-4 does not represents ??? rent for the buliding only but represents also the rent for the cine-equipment ??? furniture, etc. The Receiver stated that the actual cost of erecting ??? was Rs. 55,000, and that the value of the cine-equipment, etc., ??? to Rs. 74,500. Details of the value of the cinema-equipment, fire proof equipment for running the cinema-show, electrical fans, furniture, etc., ??? in Exhibits B-4, B-7, B-10 and B-13. There is no evidence in ??? to come to the conclusion that the figures mentioned by the Receiver ???. What is spoken to by D.W 1, the lessee, was that he had to ??? further machinery for running the cinema amounting to Rs. 26,000. ??? that by purchasing the missing parts at a cost of Rs. 10,000, ??? have been in a position to run the cinema and that he did not do so ??? such as the spare parts would have no re-sale value. The question that ??? or decision in the appeals is whether the Municipal Council was justified ??? the rental value of the building at a sum of Rs. 25,000 and the ??? of the machinery, etc., at Rs. 2,840. A similar question arises whether ??? of the second lease Exhibit A-4, the Municipal Council was justified ??? the rent for the cinema-equipment, etc., at 10 per cent Sri M.B Rama ??? learned Advocate for the Sri Rama Talkies, strenuously contended ??? fixed for the building was unduly excessive and that the rent fixed ??? cine-equipment, etc., was unduly low. His contention was that the ??? Council acted arbitrarily and the apportionment of the rent made ??? Municipal Council Was wholly irregular and illegal. It is really surprise ??? or the hiring charges for cinema-equipment, etc., of the value ??? was fixed by the Municipal Council at Rs. 2,580 under Exhibit ??? a sum of Rs. 1,600 under Exhibit B-11. There can be no doubt that the ??? and the wear and tear of the cine-equipment and the furniture, ??? will be greater than that of the building, and the rent for the cine-equipment, etc., would, be more than the rent for the building. The proportion of the cost of the building to the cost of machinery, etc., is roughly 2:3. The evidence also discloses that D.W 1 took up a lease of the cinema-house more as a speculator than as a prudent owner. He fell into arrears within two years, after taking up the lease and he was adjudicated as an insolvent thereafter. Though he denied that he owed arrears of rent to the extent of Rs. 30,000, he admitted that he still owed Rs. 11;000. When the same premises was leased to M. Venkatachalapathi Rao, it fetched only a rent of Rs. 18,060.

    8. In determining the annual value, section 82(2) provides that what has to be taken into account is the gross annual rent at which the building may reasonably be expected to be let from month to month or from year to year. We are inclined to think on the facts of this case that the rent fixed under Exhibits A-9 and A-4 should have been apportioned between the building and the machinery and furniture in the ratio of 2:3. In so fixing the ratio, we take into account the respective values of the building and the machinery and furniture which were leased out under Exhibits A-9 and A-4 as also the fact that the hiring charges ??? the machinery and furniture will be more than for the building.

    9. Sri Sambasiva Rao, the learned Advocate for the Municipality, contend ??? that inasmuch as the Municipal Council took into account the rent for the ??? and furniture and fixed at Rs. 2,780 and Rs. 1,760 respectively, it ??? be held that the terms of section 82(2) of the Act have been duly complied ??? In support of this contention, he relied upon the decision of a single Judgment Udipi Municipal Council v. Vasudevacharya.1 The passage relied is at page 63 ??? is in the following terms:—

    “It (executive authority) had power to determine and determined the question ??? fact on the evidence and materials available and its conclusion was that the land in ??? was not used exclusively for agricultural purposes. It may be that a different ??? on the facts is possible. All that can be said for the respondents is that the executive ??? authority of the Municipal Council came to a wrong conclusion on a matter of fact ??? was within its competence to decide. If so, their remedy was by way of an appeal to ??? Municipal Council. The civil Court cannot assume the powers of the assessing author ??? and investigate the facts afresh to find out whether its conclusion on the facts is correct:”

    10. Viswanatha Sastri, J., took the view that the correctness of the find ??? the executive authority whether the site assessed was or was not used exclusion ??? agricultural purposes could not be challenged before the civil Court ??? different note was struck by Raghava Rao, J., in Combatore Muncipality v. ??? Govindayyar . 1953-1 M.L.J 128. The learned Judge rightly followed the judgment of the ??? Council in Secretary of State v. Mask & Co.,3 and held that it is settled law ??? exclusion of the jurisdiction of the civil Courts is not to be readily ??? that such exclusion must either be explicitly expressed or clearly ??? observations of Lord Thankerton were followed. It was observed by the ??? Committee as follows:—

    “It is also well-settled that even if jurisdiction is so excluded, the civil Courts ??? jurisdiction to examine into cases where the provisions of the Act have not been ??? with, or the statutory tribunal has not acted in conformity with the fundamental ??? of judicial procedure.”

    11. At page 690, column (2), the learned 3 Judge differed from Viswanatha Sastri, J. ??? in Udipi Manicipal Council v. Vasadevacharya, and observed as follows:—

    “I am, however, with respect not prepared to accept this decision as correct if it should bp taken as meaning that however arbitrary, capricious or perverse the assessment of the Municipality on the statutory basis may be the assessee must content himself with an appeal under the Act and cannot resort to suit for relief.”

    12. We are inclined to accept the view of Raghava Rao, J., as being correct.

    13. So far as this Court is concerned, there are two decisions of single Judge's. In an unreported judgment in S.A No. 862 of 1955, dated 17th October, 1958. Krishna Rao, J., traced the law from Leman v. Damodarayya, and reviewed, all the authorities. He followed the view of Raghava Rao, J., Coimbatore Municipality v. G.S Govindayyar, in preference to the view of Viswanath's Sastri, in Udipi Municipal Council v. Vasudevacharya. Where any express provision of the Act is contravened or an erroneous view is taken of the provisions, the Civil Court is bound to interfere with the wrong assessment made by the executive authority or the Municipal Council it is true that the question whether there has been a substantial compliance with the provisions of the Act is a question of fact depending on the particular circumstances of each case. A contrary view was sounded by Sanjeeva Row Nayudu, J., in Municipal Commissioner v. Sambasiva Rao . 1958 2 An. W.R 466.. At page 471, the learned Judge clearly stated that in the view that he had taken of the facts, it was unnecessary to examine the various decisions cited before him. The learned Judge observed at page 472 that the observations made by Raghava Rad, J., in Coimbatore Municipality v. G.S Govindayyar, were obiter. It is of interest to note that while remarking that the observations of Raghava Rao, J., were purely obiter, the learned Judge proceeded to make observations which are equally obiter. It was further observed that in view of the conflict of the several decisions of single Judges, Raghava Rao, J., ought to have referred the matter to a Bench. The practice of the Madras High Court was never to refer the matter to a Bench if a single Judge differed from another single Judge. The decision of a single Judge is not binding upon another single Judge. No doubt, in the interests of certainly of Law, Subba Rao, C.J (as he then was), observed in Subbarayudu ??? v. State . 1958 A.L.T 53 Crl = 1955 An. W.R 150, that whenever a single Judge differed from the judgment of another single Judge, he ought to refer the matter to a Bench. The observations of Subba Rao, C.J (as he then was), are only obiter and are not in accordance with the practice prevailing in the Madras High Court. We are not inclined to agree with Sanjeeva Row Nayudu, J., that the civil Court is not entitled to interfere when the executive authority or the Municipal Council acted in a capricious or arbitrary manner and the provisions of the Act have consequently not been in effect complied with. The view taken by us is supported by a recent Bench decision of this Court in Manikyam v. Kakinada Municipal Council, by Commissioner . 1959 A.L.T 875 = 1959 2 An. W.R 492.. The learned Judges in effect differed from the view expressed by, Viswanatha Sastri, J., in Udipi Muncipal Council v. Vasudevacharva, and held that where a Court comes to the conclusion that the assessment has proceeded on an erroneous basis, the assessment may be set aside. Their conclusoin is stated in the following terms:

    “It is well-established that where the mode of assessment is found to be erroneous or based on an incorrect basis, the Civil Court can always declare the assessment to be invalid and ultra vires”.

    14. Dealing with the provisions of the Indian Income Tax Act, the Supreme Court held in Dhakeswari Cotton Mills v. Income Tax Commissioner, West Bengal . 1955 A.T.L 16 Civil = 1955 S.C.J 122., that in making the assessment, under sub-section (3) of section 23 of the Income-tax Act, the Income-tax Officer is not entitled to make a pure guess and make an assessment without reference to any evidence or any materials at all. Following that decision, the Supreme Court held in Raghubal Mandal Harihar Mandal v. State of Bihar, that the assessing authority, purporting to act under section 10(2)(b) of the Bihar Sales Tax Act (VI of 1944) cannot assess the amount of tax due from a dealer more or less arbitrarily or without basing the, assessment on any materials whatsoever and on pure guess.

    15. The Bench decisions of the Madras High Court in Municipal Council, Mangalore v. The Codial Bail Press, Municipal Council, Cuddalore v. Krishna Nambiar and The Municipal Council, Kumbakonam v. Messrs Ralli Brothers, place a similar construction on the terms of section 354(2) of the Act. What has to be decided in each case is whether the provisions of the Act have been in effect complied with. A mere pretence of a semblance of following the provisions of the Act does not oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court under the provisions of section 9 of the Civil Procedure Code.

    16. Sri Sambasiva Rao, the learned Advocate of the Municipality, invited our attention to a recent Judgment of the Madras High Court in Salem Municipal Council v. S.V Subramaniam. Ramaswami, J., delivering the judgment of the Division Bench, has reviewed all the earlier cases of the Madras High Court. That decision does not, in our opinion, lay down a rule different from what we have already stated. It is no doubt true that this Court will not sit as an appellate or a revisional Court as against the decision of the executive authority or the Municipal Council but will certainly interfere when the provisions of the Act have not been in effect or in substance complied with.

    17. On the facts of the case, we are inclined to take the view that inasmuch as the Municipal Council has not given any cogent reasons for apportioning the rent or the hiring charges for the cine-equipment, etc., at roughly 10 per cent of the Municipal Council is quite arbitrary and capricious and is not data or evidence. For the reasons stated supra, we are inclined to apportionment of the rent, between the building and the cine-equipment, etc., should be in the ratio of 2:3.

    18. It was strenuously contended by Sri Rama Sarma, the learned Advocate for the Sri Rama Talokies on the strength of some observations in Udipi Municipal Council v. Vasudevacharya, and in Padmarraju v. Panchayat Board Samalkot, that this Court is not entitled to apportion the rent but should quash the assessment in its entirety. We are not inclined to agree that those observations lay down any such rule. No direct authority dealing with this question has been cited before us. When the plaintiff is seeking a refund of the property-tax alleged to have been paid in excess, we are certainly entitled to decide what is the proper assessment on the building in order to direct refund of the excess amount that is illegally collected by the Municipality.

    19. The next question that was argued by Sri Rama Sarma was that the notice marked as Exhibit A-6 is not in accordance with the terms of rule 4 of Schedule IV to the Act, Rule 4(1) is as follows:—

    “If at any time it appears to the council that any person or property has been inadequately assessed or inadvertently or improperly omitted from the assessment relating to any tax, or that there is any clerical or arithmetical error in the said books it may direct the executive authority to amend the said books in such manner as it deems just or necessary:

    Provided that no such direction shall be given where it involves an increase in the assessment, unless the person concerned shall have been afforded a reasonable opportunity to show cause to the council why the assessment should not be amended as proposed.”

    20. It is true, as Sri Rama Sarma contends, that the notice Exhibit A-6 does not refer to rule 4 but only to rules 9 and 10. The notice however states in clear terms that Sri Rama Talkies was proposed to be assessed from the second half-year of 1950. The mere fact that a wrong rule is referred to in the notice does not lead us to the conclusion that the notice was not issued under rule 4. The revision petition filed by the plaintiff to the Commissioner as also the appeal filed to the Municipal Council clearly show that the plaintiff understood that the notice was issued under rule 4. The objections raised by him in the revision petition and the memorandum of appeal are to the effect that the assessment ought not to have been made retrospectively from October, 1950. We are inclined to think that the provisions of the Act have in effect and in substance been complied with though not literally. The plaintiff, who had an opportunity to make representations and also preferred a revision and an appeal to the executive authority and to the Municipal Council respectively is not entitled to rely on a mere technicality and contend that inasmuch as no reference was made to rule 4 in Exhibit A-6, the assessments for the three half-years beginning with October, 1950, are invalid. We consequently do not agree with the Subordinate Judge on this aspect of the matter.

    21. The last question that remains to be decided is whether the Subordinate Judge was justified in dismissing the plaintiff's claim for refund of the excess property-tax for the years 1951 to 1953. The learned Subordinate Judge relied upon the Bench decision of the Madras High Court in Chairman, Municipal Council, Rajahmundry v. Subba Rao, for coming to this conclusion. The learned Judges held that where an assessee paid the profession-tax demanded from him without any express protest accompanying the payments, the fact that the payments were made in pursuance of the usual demand notice served on him, which stated that in default of payment his property will be distrained, does not make the payment an involuntary payment and that consequently no suit will lie to recover such payments. The correctness of this decision has been doubted by the Supreme Court in Sales Tax Officer v. Kanhaiya Lal. Bhagwati, J., delivering the judgment off the Supreme Court, held that the decision wrongly proceeded on the basis that the payments of taxes, which were made under mistake of law, were not recoverable. We are inclined to think that the decision relied on by the Subordinate Judge is no longer good law in view of the decision of the Supreme Court referred to Supra. The learned Judge followed the decision of the Privy Council in Shiba Prasad Singh v. Srish Chandra, and held that the interpretation placed by the Privy Council on section 72 of the Indian Contract Act was the correct one. The view taken by the Courts in England, America and Australia as to the Effect of mistake of law was not adopted by the Supreme Court. He further observed that:

    “to hold that tax paid by mistake of law cannot be recovered under section 72 will be not to interpret the law but to make a law by adding some such words as ‘otherwise than by way of taxes’ after the word ‘paid’.”

    22. We respectfully follow that decision. The defences that might be open, viz., estoppel or waiver, do not arise for consideration on the facts of this case. What Sri Sambasiva Rao contended was that the payments were not made under a mistake of law. We are not inclined to agree with this contention. The plaintiff preferred a revision petition and an appeal in regard to the property-tax sought to be collected for the three half-years beginning with October, 1950. The Receiver was unsuccessful in both the revision petition and in the appeal. As a Receiver appointed by the Court, he paid the taxes which were subsequently demanded from him. When we are clearly of the opinion that under the provisions of the Act, the Municipality could not collect, it cannot be held that the payments made by the Plaintiff were not made under a mistake of law or were made voluntarily. We consequently hold that the plaintiff is entitled to recover the excess tax for all the seven half-years mentioned in the plaint.

    23. We direct the Subordinate Judge to work out the figures and decide what amounts have to be refunded for the seven half-years and submit a report within a month from the receipt of the records in the lower Court. Time for filing objections 10 days after the receipt of the report.

    24. For the first four half-years, the annual value of the building will be fixed, at 2/5 of Rs. 27,540, and for the subsequent three half-years at 2/5 of Rs. 18,060. From those amounts, there will be a deduction of 10 percent, according to the terms of section 82(2) of the Act. The property-tax payable on such annual value will be determined by the Subordinate Judge and those taxes will be deducted from the amounts actually collected from the plaintiff. The excess amounts will carry interest at 6 per cent from the dates of collection.

    25. M.S.K

    Assessee's appeal allowed:
    Decree modified.

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    Municipal Council Tenali By Commissioner v. Sri Rama Talkies Tenali .
    (Mar 4, 1960)