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Summary of Judgment — Antony Dominic, J (CR)

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner is the father of Shafeek (the detenu). The detenu is described as an activist of the Communist Party of India (Branch Secretary, Punalur Market Road Branch) and of the All India Youth Federation in Punalur.

The detenu was accused in multiple criminal cases (Crime Nos. 949 of 2008, 902 of 2009, 1296 of 2010, 1319 of 2010, 1136 of 2011, 146 of 2013 and 147 of 2013) registered at Punalur Police Station for offences under the Indian Penal Code and the Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act.

On 16.2.2013 the 4th respondent made Ext.P4 report to the 3rd respondent. Based on that, the 6th respondent submitted Ext.P6 report under Section 3 of the Kerala Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 to the 2nd respondent requesting classification of the detenu as a "known rowdy" under Section 2(p) and detention under Section 3 of the Act.

The 2nd respondent issued an order dated 27.5.2013 classifying the detenu as a known rowdy and ordering his detention; Exts.P1, P2 and P3 (memo for executing the detention order, the grounds of detention and the Jail Admission Authorisation) were issued on 27.5.2013 pursuant to that order. The detenu was arrested and detained on 9.6.2013 and has been undergoing detention since then.

The petitioner (the detenu's father) filed the present writ petition seeking to impugn the detention order and for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus to set the detenu at liberty. The court heard the petitioner’s counsel and the Additional Director General of Prosecution appearing for the respondents.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the requirement of Section 3(3) of the Kerala Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 (that the detention order be approved by Government within 12 days) was complied with.
  2. Whether the detenu was entitled to the benefit of the Vth proviso to Section 2(p) of the Act (exclusion for mere presence as a member of a recognised political party in certain incidents).
  3. Whether Crime Nos. 146 and 147 of 2013 (in which the detenu was later acquitted) should be excluded from consideration in classifying the detenu as a "known rowdy".
  4. Whether relevant documents relied upon by the detaining authority were supplied to the detenu (including service of the detention order, FIRs, prior detention order and Advisory Board report).
  5. Whether the detention order was vitiated by mala fides of the 4th respondent.
  6. Whether the detaining authority had the requisite subjective and objective satisfaction to classify and detain the detenu as a "known rowdy" under Section 2(p) and Section 3 of the Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Section 3(3) of the Act was not complied with because the detention order dated 27.5.2013 was not approved by the Government within 12 days (approval was on 19.6.2013).
  • The detenu was entitled to the Vth proviso to Section 2(p) (i.e., his involvement was merely by presence as a member of a recognised political party during party agitation/protest/programme with prior information to police/Magistrate).
  • Crime Nos. 146 and 147 of 2013 — in which the detenu was acquitted on 23.9.2013 and 9.9.2013 respectively — should not have been relied upon for detention.
  • Relevant documents were not supplied to the detenu: the detention order (27.5.2013), the FIRs of relied cases, the earlier detention order that was revoked, and the Advisory Board report.
  • The detention order was vitiated by mala fides of the 4th respondent, who had reason to be antagonistic to the detenu and thus made the report leading to detention.
  • The detention order lacked the required subjective and objective satisfaction of the detaining authority (relying on precedents concerning satisfaction in preventive detention cases).

Respondents' Arguments

  • The Additional Director General of Prosecution contradicted the petitioner's contentions and provided counter-affidavits.
  • The respondents produced and made available the files maintained by them to substantiate their submissions, including evidence of service of documents and signatures acknowledging receipt by the detenu on 9/6/2013.
  • Respondents contended compliance with Section 3(3) (approval within the statutory period as interpreted) and asserted that the materials before the detaining authority justified classification and detention.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sruthi v. State Of Kerala (2009 KHC 1207) Clarification of the principle relied on by the court regarding reliance on post-detention developments (as to whether subsequent acquittals/developments can undermine detention) and the validity of detention where some cited facts may be invalid but minimum conditions remain satisfied. The court relied on this authority to support the view that subsequent developments (acquittals after the detention order) cannot be profitably relied upon by the detenu to invalidate the detention, and to uphold that Section 7(4) preserves validity when some cited facts may be invalid but the minimum conditions are met.
Fousiya v. State of Kerala (2012 (3) KHC 131) Same position as Sruthi — clarification about the effect of developments subsequent to the detention order and the protective operation of provisions like Section 7(4). The court cited this judgment alongside Sruthi to reject the petitioner's contention that later acquittals should negate the detention, applying it to validate the detention despite later developments.
Radha Thankappan v. State of Kerala (2009 (3) KHC 7) Principles regarding the requirement of subjective and objective satisfaction by detaining authority in preventive detention cases. The court reviewed this authority (and related authorities) as supporting general principles but held that those principles did not undermine the detention on the facts before it, because the detaining authority had considered materials and formed the requisite satisfaction.
Praseetha v. The State Of Kerala (2009 (4) KHC 382) Principles concerning subjective and objective satisfaction for preventive detention orders. The court considered this precedent but found that, on the facts and materials before the 2nd respondent, the requirements of subjective and objective satisfaction were met and thus the precedent did not assist the petitioner.
Sreedevi v. State of Kerala (2012 KHC 575) Authority on the legal standards for satisfaction required in detention orders (subjective/objective satisfaction). The court examined this case along with the other authorities and concluded that those principles did not render the impugned detention unlawful in the present facts; the detaining authority had properly formed satisfaction on available materials.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court addressed the petitioner's contentions sequentially and applied statutory text and precedents referenced in the record to the facts:

  1. Section 3(3) compliance:

    The court quoted Section 3(3), noting that the 12-day period for approval of a detention order is to be reckoned from the date of detention (not the date of the order). The detenu was detained on 9.6.2013 and the Government approved the detention on 19.6.2013. Because approval occurred within 12 days from detention, the court held the statutory requirement was satisfied and rejected the contention of non-compliance.

  2. Vth proviso to Section 2(p):

    The court explained the purpose of the Vth proviso: to exclude offences where a person, as a member of a recognised political party, is involved merely by presence without any overt act, and where the incident arose from general involvement in a party-organised agitation/protest/programme with prior information given to police or Magistrate. The court found that the grounds of detention allege overt acts by the detenu and do not show that the incidents arose from such a party-organised programme with prior information to authorities. Therefore, the proviso did not apply and the petitioner's contention failed.

  3. Relevance of Crime Nos. 146 and 147 of 2013 (subsequent acquittals):

    The court noted the detention order was issued on 9.6.2013 while the acquittals relied upon occurred on 23.9.2013 and 9.9.2013 — developments subsequent to detention. It concluded that subsequent developments cannot be profitably relied upon to invalidate the detention order. Further, even excluding those two cases, the statutory requirement of three separate instances specified in Section 2(p) was still met on the materials before the detaining authority. The court also relied on Section 7(4) of the Act, which provides that an order shall not be invalid merely because one or more cited facts are vague, non-existent, irrelevant or invalid so long as minimum conditions are satisfied. The court cited Sruthi and Fousiya as precedents clarifying this position and thereby rejected the petitioner's argument.

  4. Non-supply of documents:

    The court observed that the petition's pleadings specifically covered non-supply of the detention order but did not cover all alleged non-supply complaints (FIRs, previous detention order and Advisory Board report). The respondents produced files showing that the detention order and the other documents were served on the detenu, and that the detenu had signed acknowledgements of receipt on 9/6/2013. On that basis, the court found this contention to be without merit.

  5. Alleged mala fides of the 4th respondent:

    The court noted that while mala fides can be a ground in preventive detention cases, a party alleging mala fides must implead the person against whom mala fides are alleged in their personal capacity and make specific allegations. The petitioner had not impleaded the 4th respondent personally. Moreover, the court described the sequence of administrative consideration: the 4th respondent made a report to the 6th respondent, who applied his mind and made a report under Section 3 to the 2nd respondent; the 2nd respondent considered the matter, issued the detention order which was approved and confirmed by the Government. In these circumstances the court declined to accept that the order was vitiated by mala fides of the 4th respondent.

  6. Subjective and objective satisfaction of detaining authority:

    The court considered precedents cited by the petitioner on the standards of subjective and objective satisfaction (Radha Thankappan, Praseetha, Sreedevi) but examined whether those principles defeated the detention on the material before it. The court observed that the detenu was involved in more than three cases involving offences specified in Section 2(t) and that those cases satisfied Section 2(p)'s requirements. The 6th respondent reported to the 2nd respondent recommending classification as a known rowdy and detention. The 2nd respondent considered the materials and was satisfied that classification and detention were necessary to prevent anti-social activities under Section 2(a). The court concluded that neither the objective nor subjective satisfaction of the 2nd respondent was shown to be wanting, and rejected this contention.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition is dismissed.

Implications:

  • The direct effect of the decision is that the detention order classifying the detenu as a "known rowdy" and detaining him under the Kerala Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act, 2007 is upheld; the petition to quash that order and secure the detenu's release by habeas corpus was refused.
  • The court did not indicate that it was laying down any new legal principle; it applied statutory interpretation and existing authorities to the facts and rejected the petitioner's challenges. (The opinion does not discuss any broader precedent-setting implications.)

This summary is confined to and derived exclusively from the contents of the provided opinion.

    Fazaludin v. State Of Kerala

    JUDGMENT

    ANTONY DOMINIC, J ‘CR’

    Petitioner is the father of Shafeek (hereinafter referred to as the detenu for short). Detenu is an activist of Communist party of India and is the Branch Secretary of Punalur Market Road Branch of the party. He is also an activist of All India Youth Federation in Punalur. He was accused in Crime Nos. 949 of 2008, 902 of 2009, 1296 of 2010, 1319 of 2010, 1136 of 2011, 146 of 2013 and 147 of 2013, all registered at Punalur Police Station for offences under the Indian Penal Code and Prevention of Damage to Public Property Act.

    2. Pleadings show that narrating the involvement of the detenu in the aforesaid cases, 4th respondent made Ext.P4 report to the 3rd respondent on 16.2.2013 On the basis of the said report, additional 6 respondent submitted Ext.P6 report under Section 3 of the Kerala Anti Social Activities (Prevention) Act 2007 (hereinafter referred to as the Act for short) to the second respondent. In Ext.P6 report, second respondent was requested to initiate action against the detenu under the Act for classifying him as a known rowdy under Section 2(p) of the Act and to detain him under Section 3 thereof.

    3. On the basis of the report thus received, second respondent initiated action under the Act and issued order dated 27.5.2013 classifying the detenu as a known rowdy and ordering his detention as recommended in Ext.P6 Ext.P1, P2 and P3 are the memo for executing the detention order, the grounds of detention and the Jail Admission Authorisation, which were all issued on 27.5.2013 in pursuance to the detention order. Based on the detention order, the detenu was arrested and detained on 9.6.2013 and since then, he is undergoing detention. It is in this background, this writ petition has been filed by his father seeking to impugn the order of detention and praying for a writ of habeas corpus to set the detenu at liberty.

    4. We heard the learned counsel for the petitioner and learned Additional Director General of Prosecution, who appeared for the respondents.

    5. The contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner are that Section 3(3) of the Act was not complied with, that the detenu was entitled to the protection of the Vth proviso to Section 2(p), that Crime Nos. 146 and 147 of 2013 in which the detenu was acquitted on 23.9.2013 and 9.9.2013 by Exts.P22 and P23 judgments respectively should not have been relied on, that relevant documents were not supplied to the detenu, that the order is vitiated for malafides of the 4 respondent and that the order is bad for absence of subjective and objective satisfaction of the detaining authority.

    6. Referring to the counter affidavits filed by the respondents, learned ADGP sought to contradict each one of these contentions and he also made available the files maintained by the respondents in order to substantiate his submissions.

    7. The first contention raised is that Section 3(3) of the Act was not complied with. Learned counsel contended that Section 3(3) of the Act provides that the detention order shall be approved by the government within 12 days of the issuance of the order. It was contended that the detention order issued on 27.5.2013 was approved by the Government only on 19.6.2013 and therefore, according to him, Section 3(3) is violated. Section 3(3) of the Act reads thus:-

    “3. Power to make orders for detaining Known Goondas and Known Rowdies - (1) xxxx

    (2) xxxxx

    (3) When any order is made under this section by the authorised officer under sub-section(2), he shall forthwith report the fact to the Government and the Director General of Police, Kerala, together with a copy of the order and supporting records which, in his opinion, have a bearing on the matter and no such order shall remain in force for more than 12 days, excluding public holidays, from the date of detention of such Known Goonda or Known Rowdy, unless, in the meantime, it has been approved by the Government or by the Secretary, Home Department if generally so authorised in this regard by the Government”.

    8. A plain reading of this Section, makes it clear that the 12 days' period specified for the approval of the detention order, has to be reckoned, not from the date of the order, but from the date of detention. In so far as this case is concerned, the detenu was detained on 9.6.2013 and the Government approved the order of detention on 19.6.2013 If that be so, the approval of the order of detention in terms of Section 3(3) of the Act is well within the 12 days period specified therein. Therefore, we are unable to accept the contention raised by the learned counsel.

    9. The second contention raised by the counsel was that the detenu was eligible to claim the benefit of the Vth proviso to Section 2(p) of the Act. Section 2(p) defines known rowdy and its Vth proviso reads thus:-

    “2. Definitions - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires -

    (a) to (o) xxxxxxxxxxxxx

    (p) “known rowdy” means any person, who had been, by reason of acts done within the previous seven years as calculated from the date of the order imposing any restriction or detention under this Act, -

    (i) made guilty, by a competent Court at least once for an offence of the nature under item (i) of clause (t) of Section 2 or any offence notified as such under the said clause; or

    (ii) made guilty, by a competent Court at least twice for any offence of the nature mentioned under item (ii) of clause (t) of Section 2 or any offence notified as such under the said clause; or

    (iii) found, on investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer or other authority, on complaints initiated by persons other than police officers, in three separate instances not forming part of the same transaction to have committed any offence mentioned in clause (t) of Section 2.

    Provided that any offence committed by a person:-

    (i) xxxx

    (ii) xxxxx

    (iii) xxxxx

    (iv) xxxxxx

    (v) as a member of a recognised political party, by virtue of his involvement merely by his presence, but without any overt act constituting the offence mentioned in clause (t) of Section 2 without being involved in any criminal conspiracy facilitating the same, in an incident which occurred due to the general involvement of the workers of that party in an agitation or protest or programme organised by the party with prior information given to the police officer or Magistrate having jurisdiction; or

    vi) by virtue of his involvement in a criminal act committed by him before he had attained the age of eighteen years”.

    10. Reading of the Vth proviso to Section 2(p) reveals that what is sought to be achieved by the legislature by incorporating this provision is to exclude from the offences which are to be reckoned in terms of Section 2(p)(i) to (iii) cases where a person as a member of a recognised political party gets involved in a case by his mere presence and without any overt act constituting the offence. However, to claim the benefit, the incident which led to the case, should also have occurred due to the general involvement of the workers of the party during an agitation or protest or programme organized by it with prior information given to the police officer or the Magistrate having jurisdiction.

    11. Learned counsel for both sides took us through the grounds of detention which contains the details of the cases that were relied on against the detenu. In all these cases, there are allegations of overt acts against the detenu. The allegations also do not disclose that these cases arose out of general involvement of the workers of the party of the detenu during an agitation or protest or programme organized by the party. Further, it also does not establish that the incident which gave rise to the allegations were during any programme of the party which was organized with prior information given to the police officer or Magistrate. In other words, the materials available before this court shows that the Vth proviso to Section 2(p) of the Act is not attracted to the cases, which were relied on against the detenu. Therefore, this contention raised by the petitioner also does not merit acceptance.

    12. Learned counsel then contended that Crime Nos. 146 and 147 of 2013 should not have been taken into account by the detaining party. This argument was raised on the basis that in these cases, the detenu was acquitted on 23.9.2013 and 9.9.2013 respectively. In this case, the detenu was detained on the basis that he is a known rowdy and that detention is on the basis of Section 2(p)(iii) which reads thus:-

    “2. Definitions - In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires -

    (a) to (o) xxxxxxxxxxxxx

    (p) “known rowdy” means any person, who had been, by reason of acts done within the previous seven years as calculated from the date of the order imposing any restriction or detention under this Act, -

    (i) xxxxxx

    (ii) xxxxxxx

    (iii) found, on investigation or enquiry by a competent police officer or other authority, on complaints initiated by persons other than police officers, in three separate instances not forming part of the same transaction to have committed any offence mentioned in clause (t) of Section 2”.

    13. Reading of this provision shows that if on investigation, the detenu is found to have committed the offences specified in Section 2(t) in three separate instances not forming part of the same transaction, the ingredients of the section are attracted. The fact that as on the date of the detention order, all the seven cases were pending against the detenue is undisputed. In this case, the detention order was issued on 9.6.2013 and the acquittal claimed were only on 23.9.2013 and 9.9.2013 Having regard to the language of Section 2(p) we are inclined to think that a development subsequent to the order of detention cannot be profitably relied on by the detenu. Secondly, even if these two cases are excluded, still the requirement of three separate instances specified in Section 2(p) is satisfied in this case. Even apart from that, such a situation is saved by Section 7(4) of the Act which reads thus:-

    “7. Grounds of order of detention to be disclosed -

    (1) xxxxxxxxx

    (2)xxxxxxxxxx

    (3)xxxxxxxxxx

    (4) The order of detention shall not be deemed to be invalid merely because one or more of the facts or circumstances cited among the grounds are vague, non-existent, irrelevant or invalid for any reason whatsoever and such order shall be deemed to have been made by the Government or the Authorised Officer after having been satisfied about the need for detention with reference to the remaining facts and circumstances, provided that the minimum conditions for being classified as a known goonda or known rowdy are satisfied”.

    14. This position has also been clarified by this court in the judgments in Sruthi v. State Of Kerala (2009 KHC 1207) and Fousiya v. State of Kerala (2012 (3) KHC 131). For those reasons, this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner also is only to be rejected.

    15. Further contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that the relevant documents, which were relied on by the detaining authority, were not supplied to him. In this context, specific grievance of the learned counsel was that the detention order issued on 27/5/13 was not served on the detenu. Further, he also contended that the FIR of the cases relied, the earlier detention order that was revoked on the basis of the report of the Advisory Board and the report of the Advisory Board were not supplied to the detenu.

    16. In so far as the non supply of the detention order is concerned, that is covered by the pleadings in grounds (a) and (e) of the writ petition, whereas, the complaint regarding the alleged non supply of the FIR, the previous detention order and the report of the Advisory Board, are not covered by the pleadings in the petition.

    17. However, the learned Additional Director General of Prosecution made available the files which show that the detention order and the other documents which were allegedly not served on the detenu, were in fact served on him, and that the detenu has signed copies thereof, in acknowledgment of its receipt. Such signatures have been affixed by the detenu on 9/6/13, when he was detained pursuant to the order of detention. Therefore, we are unable to entertain this contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner.

    18. The next contention raised by the learned counsel was that the order was vitiated by mala fides of the 4 respondent. He referred to the averments in para 5 of the writ petition, which according to the learned counsel, establishes that the 4 respondent had reason to be antagonistic to the detenu and that it was therefore that he made the report, which led to the detention order in question. Therefore, counsel contended that the detention order is the result of mala fides of the 4 respondent and hence is illegal.

    19. Although it is true that even in a case of preventive detention, the detenu is entitled to take a plea that the order of detention is vitiated on account of mala fides of any one of the officials, who are involved in the process, it is elementary that when a plea of mala fides is urged by a litigant, the person against whom mala fides are alleged, should be impleaded in the case, in his personal capacity, and that, specific allegations should be levelled against him. In so far as this case is concerned, the allegations of mala fides are levelled against the 4 respondent, but however, the petitioner has not chosen to implead the 4 respondent in his personal capacity. In such a situation, this Court will not be justified in taking cognizance of the plea of mala fides now urged before us. Secondly, the 4 respondent made his report to the 6 respondent, who on receipt thereof, applied his mind to the allegations and on being satisfied, made his report under Section 3 of the Act to the 2nd respondent. The 2 respondent considered the entire matter and issued the order of detention, which was approved, and thereafter, confirmed by the Government. In such a case, we cannot accept the contention that the detention order is vitiated due to the mala fides of the 4 respondent.

    20. The last contention raised by the learned counsel for the petitioner was that both subjective and objective satisfaction, for classifying the detenu as a ‘known rowdy’ under Section 2(p) and for his detention were vitiated. In this context, he relied on the judgments of this Court in Radha Thankappan v. State of Kerala (2009 (3) KHC 7), Praseetha v. The State Of Kerala (2009 (4) KHC 382) and Sreedevi v. State of Kerala (2012 KHC 575). We have gone through these judgments and we have no quarrel with the principle of law laid down in those judgments as well. However, the question is whether those principles have any application in so far as the facts of this case are concerned.

    21. In so far as this case is concerned, admittedly the detenu was involved in more than three cases involving offences specified in Section 2(t) of the Act and such cases satisfied the requirements of Section 2(p) also. It was considering the said situation that the report was made by the 6 respondent to the 2 respondent, recommending classification of the detenu as a ‘known rowdy’ and his detention under Section 3 of the Act.

    22. The detention order shows that these materials thus supplied by the 6 respondent were considered by the 2 respondent in exercise of his powers under Section 3(2) and on the materials that were available before him, he was satisfied that the detenu was liable to be classified as a ‘known rowdy’ under Section 2(p) of the Act and that in order to prevent the detenu from carrying on anti-social activities as defined in Section 2(a) of the Act, it is necessary to keep him in preventive detention. Therefore, neither in the process of objective satisfaction nor in the process of subjective satisfaction, has the 2 respondent committed any illegality, justifying the petitioner to raise such a contention before us. We are not impressed by this contentions either.

    Thus, we do not find substance in any one of the contentions raised before us and therefore the writ petition is only to be dismissed and we do so.

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    Fazaludin v. State Of Kerala
    (Nov 13, 2013)