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  • Section 117 of the Code of 1898. Sub-sections (6) and (7) of the 1973 Code
  • provisions of Section 116(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • Section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 116(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
  • Section 116((3) of he Criminal Procedure Code,
  • sub-section (6) of Section 116 of the Code,
  • sub-sections (3) and (6) of Section 116
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 116
  • Sub-section (6) of Section 116
  • Section 116(6) of the Code,
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Section 117 of the Code of 1898. Sub-sections (6) and (7) of the 1973 Code
  • provisions of Section 116(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code
  • Section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure
  • Section 116(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code.
  • Section 116((3) of he Criminal Procedure Code,
  • sub-section (6) of Section 116 of the Code,
  • sub-sections (3) and (6) of Section 116
  • Sub-section (1) of Section 116
  • Sub-section (6) of Section 116
  • Section 116(6) of the Code,
Smart Summary

Judgment Summary — B.S. Kapadia, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision arises from chapter proceedings initiated by the petitioner against opponents Nos. 1 to 7. The petitioner alleged that on 17-7-1982 opponent No.1 threatened to "finish" the petitioner and his family; the petitioner and his two sons were present. The petitioner said he and his family feared injury and could not go to the fields alone, and accordingly applied on 26-7-1982 before the Executive Magistrate, Karjan (Chapter Case No. 159/82) for security/bond to maintain peace and good behaviour.

While the application was pending, on 2-9-1982 opponents Nos. 1 and 5 allegedly damaged the petitioner's mud wall and gave further threats. The Executive Magistrate recorded evidence of the petitioner and his two sons (Narendra and Kirtikumar) and the Head Constable, and by order dated 14-5-1984 required opponents Nos. 1 to 7 to furnish personal bonds of Rs.500 each for not committing breach of peace for six months.

The opponents appealed (Criminal Appeal No. 61/84). The Additional Sessions Judge, Vadodara allowed the appeal by order dated 23-10-1985 and set aside the Magistrate's order. The petitioner filed the present criminal revision against that order of the Additional Sessions Judge.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the learned Additional Sessions Judge wrongly construed Section 116(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code in concluding that the chapter proceedings were not completed within six months and therefore the Executive Magistrate lacked jurisdiction to pass the order.
  2. Whether the learned Additional Sessions Judge misappreciated the evidence of the petitioner and his sons and therefore wrongly set aside the Executive Magistrate's preventive order.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant (petitioner) — submissions summarized

  • Contended that the Additional Sessions Judge wrongly construed Section 116(6) CrPC and erred in holding that proceedings were not completed within six months.
  • Argued that "from the date of its commencement" for computing the six months should be taken from the date on which recording of evidence began (here, 20-4-1983), relying on the Full Bench Orissa decision in Sona Khan v. State.
  • Pointed to an application dated 14-7-1983 (by opponent No.1) whose back-sheet noted that papers were not earlier received from the Nagar Panchayat and Police Sub-Inspector and that papers were produced that day and the proceedings would proceed further — the petitioner relied on that event as a timely direction extending the period.

Respondents (opponents Nos. 1 to 7) — submissions summarized

  • Maintained that the Sessions Judge correctly interpreted Section 116(6) because the Executive Magistrate's order was passed after the six-month period, and therefore the Magistrate lacked jurisdiction.
  • Argued that the evidence was properly appreciated by the Sessions Judge.
  • Submitted that any extension of time requires special reasons recorded by the Magistrate and extensions should not be blanket or unlimited.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Madhu Limaye's Case (1970) 3 SCC 739 : AIR 1971 SC 2481 Principle that a Magistrate can ask for an interim bond only after commencement of the inquiry; interim bond not to be used to postpone inquiry without testing allegations. The court relied on this Supreme Court precedent to support the position that 'commencement of inquiry' requires the Magistrate to test allegations and that interim bonds should follow such commencement.
Sona Khan v. State (Full Bench, Orissa High Court) — 1981 Criminal Law Journal, p.39 Interpretation that 'commencement of enquiry' for sub-sections (3) and (6) of Section 116 refers to the same stage; commencement does not necessarily await oral evidence and the inquiry must test allegations by an acceptable judicial method. The court accepted and followed the Full Bench's reasoning, adopting its conclusion that commencement occurs when the Magistrate attempts to put allegations to the test (which may not require oral evidence in all cases).
Uchhaba Jena's Case (1977) 44 Cut (referenced) Earlier case considered by the Full Bench regarding the meaning of 'commencement of inquiry' and its alignment with other provisions. The Full Bench (Sona Khan) had agreed with the Division Bench view in Uchhaba Jena's Case; the present court accepted the Full Bench's view which in turn referenced Uchhaba Jena.
Ramdeo Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1985 Criminal Law Journal, p.436 Holds that extensions under Section 116(6) must be for special reasons recorded in writing, and extensions should not be blanket or unfettered; repeated extensions discouraged. The court relied on this authority to support the position that an extension must be justified by special reasons and that such extensions cannot be treated as blanket; the court applied this reasoning to conclude that the proceedings could not be continued indefinitely and that, on the facts, the statutory period (and extended period) expired.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in two main strands: (A) evaluation of the evidence and the correctness of the Sessions Judge's factual appreciation; and (B) legal interpretation of Section 116(6) CrPC as to commencement and computation of the six-month period and the scope for extension.

1. Appreciation of evidence (preventive/procedure context)

The court emphasized that chapter proceedings under the relevant provisions are preventive in nature, intended to avert breaches of the peace and to be dealt with urgently. Because of this preventive character, the inquiry does not require the same detailed evidentiary approach as a full criminal trial; minor contradictions in witness statements do not automatically indicate falsehood. The court held that the Additional Sessions Judge wrongly elevated minor inconsistencies between the three witnesses (the petitioner and his two sons) and unduly relied on the Head Constable's statement that there was no breach of peace. The court found that the Magistrate had applied an acceptable method to test allegations and that the Sessions Judge erred in rejecting the petitioner's version on that basis.

2. Interpretation and application of Section 116(6) CrPC (time computation and extensions)

The court reviewed Section 116(6), noting it mandates completion of inquiry within six months from the date of commencement and that the consequence of non-completion is termination of proceedings unless the Magistrate, for special reasons recorded in writing before expiry, directs otherwise.

The court adopted the reasoning of the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court in Sona Khan (and the Supreme Court decision in Madhu Limaye) that 'commencement of inquiry' is the same concept in sub-sections (3) and (6) of Section 116 and refers to the stage when the Magistrate legally attempts to put allegations to the test (which may include the recording of evidence, affidavits, documentary evidence or other acceptable judicial processes). The court disagreed with the proposition that commencement awaits oral evidence alone.

Applying those principles to the facts, the court accepted the petitioner's submission that recording of evidence commenced on 20-4-1983 and therefore the six-month period ran from that date to 20-10-1983. The Executive Magistrate's final order was dated 14-5-1984, beyond that six-month window.

The court then examined whether a lawful extension had been given within the statutory period. An application dated 14-7-1983 by opponent No.1 sought termination; the back-sheet of that application recorded that delays were due to papers not having been received from the Nagar Panchayat and the Police Sub-Inspector, and that those papers were produced on 14-7-1983 and the proceedings would proceed. The Executive Magistrate accordingly ordered the proceedings to proceed. The court treated the Magistrate's explanation (non-receipt of papers) as a "special reason" recorded before the expiry of the six-month period and accepted that this could justify an extension. Even calculating the six-month period from the date of that extension (14-7-1983), the extended six-month period would have expired on or before 14-1-1984, yet the proceedings were completed only on 14-5-1984.

The court also accepted the respondents' submission, supported by Ramdeo Yadav, that extensions must be for special reasons and not blanket; repeated or unfettered extensions are discouraged and cannot be used to defeat the legislatively mandated expeditious character of such proceedings.

On the basis of the foregoing, the court concluded that the proceedings were not completed within six months computed either from the commencement date (20-4-1983) or from the date of the Magistrate's recorded special reason (14-7-1983). Under Section 116(6), the proceedings therefore stood terminated.

Holding and Implications

Final Holding: The criminal revision application fails and is dismissed; the rule is discharged.

Implications:

  • The Additional Sessions Judge was found to have erred in his appreciation of the evidence but was correct on the statutory-time point under Section 116(6) CrPC; because the proceedings were not completed within the statutory period (nor within the extended period on the facts), the chapter proceedings stood terminated.
  • The practical effect is that the order of the Executive Magistrate dated 14-5-1984 (requiring bonds) could not stand because the statutory inquiry had terminated; the petitioner's challenge in revision therefore fails.
  • The court noted that, notwithstanding termination, if future incidents occur that threaten public peace, the parties remain free to take appropriate steps for prevention under the law.
  • No broader new precedent was proclaimed by this opinion beyond the court's application of existing authority (Madhu Limaye, Sona Khan Full Bench and Ramdeo Yadav) to the facts of this case.

Outcome on the petition: CRIMINAL REVISION APPLICATION DISMISSED. Rule discharged.

    Motilal Jivanbhai Patel v. Jesangbhai Nagjibhai Patel And Others

    B.S Kapadia, J.:— The present revision application is arising out of the chapter proceedings which were initiated at the instance of the present petitioner against the opponents Nos. 1 to 7. It is alleged that on 17-7-1982 at about 9.00 or 9.30 a.m the petitioner was sitting on his ota with his two sons and at that time the opponent No. 1 Jesangbhai Nagjibhai Patel came there and gave a threat that he would finish the petitioner and his family. However, the petitioner did not give any reply to him and he silently went inside his house. It is also alleged that there were number of chapter cases between the petitioner and the opponents and number of criminal cases have been filed by them. In that view of the matter, the petitioner and his family members have apprehension that the opponents Nos. 1 to 7 will cause injury to the petitioner and his family members. It is also alleged that the petitioner is unable to go to his field all alone and, therefore, he made an application for taking security of the opponents Nos. 1 to 7 for maintaining peace and keeping good behaviour. That application was made on 26-7-1982 before the learned Executive Magistrate, Karjan and it was numbered as Chapter Case No. 159/82.

    2. During the pendency of the said application there was one incident on 2-9-1982. At about 1.30 p.m on that day the opponents Nos. 1 and 5 came to the petitioner and they put dent on the mud-Wall of the house of the petitioner. At that time the opponent Nos. 1 and 5 gave a threat to the petitioner. After recording the evidence of the petitioner as well as his two sons Narendra and Kirtikumar as also the statement of the Head Constable, the learned Executive Magistrate passed the order for taking personal bonds of Rs. 500/- each of the opponents Nos. 1 to 7 for not committing breach of peace for the period of six months. The said order was passed on 14-5-1984.

    3. The opponents herein preferred an appeal being the Criminal Appeal No. 61/84 and the learned Additional Sessions Judge, Vadodara by his order dated 23-10-1985 allowed the said appeal and set aside the order passed by the learned Executive Magistrate. The present revision application is preferred against the said order of the learned Additional Sessions Judge setting aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate.

    4. Mr. K.R Vyas, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner submits that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has wrongly construed the provisions of Section 116(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code and wrongly came to the conclusion that the proceedings before the learned Executive Magistrate were not completed within six months as required under Section 116(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code and, therefore, the order passed by the learned Additional Sessions Judge should be set aside.

    5. Mr. M.M Shastri, the learned Advocate appearing for the opponents Nos. 1 to 7 submits that the learned Sessions Judge has rightly construed the provisions of Section 116(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code as the learned Executive Magistrate has passed the order after six months of the commencement of the proceedings. He also sub-mite that the learned Magistrate had no jurisdiction to pass such an order and that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has rightly set aside the order passed by the learned Magistrate. He further submits that the evidence is property appreciated by the learned Sessions Judge.

    6. It may be stated at the outset that the learned Additional Sessions Judge is not appreciating the evidence of the witnesses in a criminal trial where the offence is already committed. These provisions of chapter cases are made for the purpose of preventing commission of offences. Therefore, the approach of the learned Additional Sessions Judge should be to find out the truth or the information and allegations. It should not be the case that on the basis of false allegations, the proceedings are started. Under the circumstances, it is not necessary to draw inference on minor contradictions here and there in the evidence of the witnesses. These proceedings do not envisage the detailed evidence because these are urgent proceedings and they are required to be proceeded with urgently as the final order is to be passed within six months from the date of commencement as per the policy of the legislature. However, the learned Additional Sessions Judge considered the evidence in para 9 of his judgment and he found that there was little contradiction because Motibhai in his evidence has stated that the opponent No. 1 uttered the words “you and your family would be finished.” This is the free translation of the said words, but actual words used were While Narendra in his deposition stated that the opponent uttered the words “you would be finished.” i.e While Kirtikumar in his deposition has stated that the opponent No. 1 uttered the words “he and his family would be finished.” i.e Really speaking there is no contradiction at all. If the learned Judge is appreciating the evidence in the case of preventive measure in this fashion, possibly there would be no case in which there would not be any contradiction. At times minor contradictions are bound to be there, but that does not mean that they are telling lie. Further, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has given undue importance to the evidence of the Head Constable when he has stated that there was no breach of peace. These are the proceedings to prevent the breach of peace and this is the very essence of the proceedings. The learned Additional Sessions Judge has lost sight of the proceedings that these proceedings are initiated to prevent breach of peace. Thus, the learned Additional Sessions Judge has wrongly rejected the version of the three persons, i.e the petitioner and his two sons on the point of allegations made in the complaint for initiating proceedings. In that view of the matter, I agree with Mr. Vyas, the learned Advocate appearing for the petitioner that the learned Additional Sessions Judge has failed to properly appreciate the evidence and has come to the wrong conclusion in holding that the learned Executive Magistrate has erred in relying on the evidence of the petitioner and his sons.

    7. The second point raised by Mr. Vyas, appearing for the petitioner is an interesting point. Section 116(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code provides that the inquiry under this Section shall be completed within a period of six months from the date of its commencement and if such inquiry is not so completed, the proceedings under this Chapter shall, on the expiry of the said period, stand terminated unless for special reasons to be recorded in writing, the Magistrate otherwise directs.

    8. As stated earlier, the very purpose of initiating the proceedings under Section 107 is for taking security for keeping peace where there is likelihood of breach of peace or disturb the public trnaquillity or to do any wrongful act that may probably occasion a breach of peace or disturb the public tranquillity. If the proceedings are not completed within the prescribed period as provided in Sub-section (6) of Section 116 what would be the consequences that are also provided in the said Sub-section. The said Sub-section (6) clearly provides that if the proceedings are” not completed within such period, the proceedings under this Chapter shall, on the expiry of the said period, stand terminated. This is the consequence prescribed by law and therefore, that rule is mandatory. However, the learned Magistrate is also given the discretion to direct otherwise that means to coninue the proceedings, but for that purpose special reasons are required to be recorded in writing and these reasons are to be recorded before the expiry of the said period.

    9. Mr. Vyas submits that “from the date of its commencement” means from the date on which the evidence is recorded because according to him, the Magistrate has to proceed with the matter under Section 116 after the order under Section 111 has been read over to the persons present in the court or when any person appears or is brought before a Magistrate in compliance with, or in execution of a summons or warrant, issued under Section 113. In view of Sub-section (1) of Section 116 Mr. Vyas submits that “from the date of its commencement” means “from the date on which the recording of evidence begins”. In support of his submission Mr. Vyas has relied on the judgment of the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court reported in 1981 Criminal Law Journal, page 39 in the case of Sona Khan v. State. In the said judgment it is observed as under:

    “Section 116 of the Code of 1973 corresponds to Section 117 of the Code of 1898. Sub-sections (6) and (7) of the 1973 Code are new provisions. Old Sub-section (3) commenced with “pending the completion of the enquiry.” The new Sub-section (3), however, starts with “after the commencement and before the completion of the enquiry.” This change has been made so as to put the matter beyond doubt that an interim bond can be called for only after the commencement of the enquiry and before its completion. The amendment gives effect to the Supreme Court decision in Madhu Limaye's Case in (1970) 3 SCC 739 : AIR 1971 SC 2481 ……”

    10. It was held by the Supreme Court in the said Madhu Limaye's Case as under:

    “……A Magistrate can ask for an interim bond only if he cannot complete the enquiry and “during the completion of enquiry” postulates a commencement of the enquiry, which means commencing of a trial according to the summons procedure. The power to ask for an interim bond is not given to the Magistrate to postpone the case and hear nobody and yet ask a person to furnish a bond for good conduct……”

    11. It was held on the facts of that case that if interim bonds were required from the petitioners the Magistrate ought to have entered upon the enquiry and satisfied himself, at least, prima facie about the truth of the information in relation to the alleged facts. Without making any inquiry neither could the Magistrate order the petitioners to be detained nor require them to execute a bond with or without surety. The Full Bench of the Orissa High Court further observed in the aforesaid case as under:

    “In view of the ratio in Madhu Limaye's Case and the language of the new Code, there is no scope for the proposition that without commencement of inquiry, an order for interim bond can be made. Inquiry does not commence as soon as the delinquent appears and the notice under Section 112 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is read out to him. The Supreme Court has emphasised on the position that bare allegations cannot form the foundation of the order for a bond and failing furnishing of it detention of the delinquent. The allegations have got to be tested. It may be that in a particular case, oral evidence may not be necessary to test the truth or otherwise of the allegations. Affidavits may be enough. There may be documentary evidence which might substitute oral evidence which necessitates examination of witnesses. Parties may agree that the allegations are true and therefore, there may not be any necessity of looking for evidence. Situations arising in daily life cannot be catalogued and discretion must be left to the Magistrate to deal with particular situations as may arise before him in different cases, but the mandate of the law is that the inquiry must proceed to ascertain the truth of the allegations by application of his judicial mind and look for materials which would substitute allegations into facts. The inquiry contemplated is an acceptable legal process by which allegations can be converted into facts. What that process would be should be left to the discretion of the Magistrate with reference to facts of each case, but he must adopt an acceptable judicial method for testing the allegations and recording findings of fact with reference to the acceptability or otherwise of such allegations.

    12. After the aforesaid observations on the point of interim bond as required under Section 116((3) of he Criminal Procedure Code, the Full Bench further considered as to when the enquiry commences for the purpose of computing the period stipulated under Sub-section (6) of Section 116 of the Code, It is observed in para 8 of the said judgment that “commencement of enquiry is a concept common to sub-sections (3) and (6). The mandate in sub-section (1) is that after appearance of the delinquent, the order has to be read out and inquiry has to follow. The provision itself is preventive and is intended to meet emergent situations. The purpose is to maintain public peace and tranquility. Parliament has held out a mandate that the inquiry must be expeditious. As pointed out in Madhu Limaye's Case it is not open to the Magistrate to defer the inquiry and call for an inteirm bond. As we have already indicated, commencement of inquiry starts when the Magistrate attempts in a legal way to put the allegations to test for finding out whether they are facts. Both sub-sections (3) and (6) of Section 116 refer to this stage as the commencement of inquiry. The Supreme Court rightly pointed out in Madhu Limaye's Case that it is not an inquiry within an inquiry. Ordinarily, the interim bond is asked for on the allegations forming the foundation for the basic proceeding. There may be instances where fresh allegations also come up and become material for an interim bond. Yet, ‘commencement of inquiry’ in sub-sections (3) and (6) in our opinion, refers to the same stage. It is one of the well accepted rules of interpredation that if the same phrase occurs in the same section at different places and there is no indication of legislative intent that a different meaning is intended thereby, both the phrases have to be given the same meaning. ……” With these observations the Full Bench agreed with the Division Bench in Uchhaba Jena's Case (1977) 44 Cut that its view that ‘commencement of inquiry’ in sub-sections (3) and (6) refers to the same stage. Further, it may be pointed out that so far as the proposition that the inquiry does not commence until the oral evidence is led, as laid down in that case was held to be not a correct position by the Full Bench and accordingly the reference was answered by the Full Bench. The Full Bench has considered the judgment in Madhu Limaye's Case delivered by the Supreme Court as well as the scheme of the Code. I do not find any reason to disagree with the view of the Full Bench of the Orissa High Court and I fully agree with the same.

    13. Mr. Vyas appearing for the petitioner states that in this case the learned Magistrate has put to test the allegations for finding out whether they are facts, when the recording of evidence was started on 20-4-1983 and therefore, the period should be commenced from 20th April, 1983 in view of the Full Bench judgment of the Orissa High Court. I agree with him and the period of six months should be counted from the said date. Even considering the period from that date the proceedings should have been completed on 20-10-1983. Here in this case the proceedings were completed by the learned Executive Magistrate on 14-5-1984. In that view of the matter the proceedings would stand terminated after 20-10-1983 unless there was extension, of the period by the order made by the learned Magistrate.

    14. However, at this state Mr. Vyas also brings to my notice that on 14-7-1983 application was made by the opponent No. 1 for treating these proceedings as terminated as the matter has not been completed within six months as required under Section 116(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code. However, on the back-side of the said application it is mentioned that the applicant is not at fault for the delay. The papers were not received from the Nagar Panchayat and the Police Sub-Inspector and, therefore, there was delay. Today (14-7-1983) papers have been produced and the proceedings would proceed further.” In that view of the matter the proceedings were ordered to be proceeded with. Therefore, Mr. Vyas submits that in view of this there was a direction made on the said application and the said application was given within the period of six months namely 20th April 1983.

    15. Mr. Shastri appearing for the opponents Nos. 1 and 7 submits that there should be special reasons recorded by the Magistrate and there should not be ordinary reasons. I fully agree with him. What would be the special reasons would depend upon the facts of each case. Here in this case the special reason given by the learned Executive Magistrate is that he had not received the papers from the Nagar Panchayat and the Police Sub-Inspector. Looking to the facts and circumstances of the case, it cannot be stated that it is not a special reason and hence, six months' period would begin to run from that date and he has already given special reasons before the expiry of six months' period. From that date also the proceedings should have been completed on or before 14-1-1984, but the proceedings have not been completed within six months' time.

    16. Mr. Shastri appearing for the opponents Nos. 1 to 7 submits that once when the time is extended it cannot be extended again and there should not be blanket extension. He also submits that the proceedings are not completed within the extended time. He relied on the judgment in the case of Ramdeo Yadav v. State of Bihar, 1985 Criminal Law Journal, page 436 wherein it is observed as under:

    “Having given a careful consideration to the language of Section 116(6) of the Code, I find that the intention of the legislation in limiting the period of six months from the date of the initiation of the proceedings had a special significance i.e to conclude such an emergent proceeding within a very short time but for which, the very purpose of taking such a proceeding would be defeated. It is just in order to meet some special situation in the proceeding, not being concluded within the statutory period of six months, that the legislation provided for an extension and that too by an order of the Magistrate assigning special reasons therefor and not otherwise. The very scheme and intent behind such an extension presupposes an extension not beyond the main statutory period.”

    17. It is further observed in para 6 of the said judgment as under:

    “6. Taking the worst position that in case the proceedings are not concluded within the extended period, and considering some extraordinary measures, further extension or extensions may be required, but even those extensions will require further special reasons by the Magistrate, although such repeated extension should be discouraged, since that would be providing unfettered power to a Magistrate to continue the proceedings for an unreasonably long period which is not the purpose of an emergent proceeding. In my view, in no case, can the extension granted by a Magistrate be taken to be a blanket and unfettered extension.”

    18. The observations made by the learned Judge in the aforesaid case are consistent with the intention of the Legislature as indicated in Section 116(6) of the Criminal Procedure Code and I fully agree with the said observations. Here in this case there is no further application.

    19. In that view of the matter the proceedings are not completed within six months within the date of the commencement as well as from six months' period from the date of extension, i.e from 14-7-1983 and therefore, the proceedings stands terminated. The learned Sessions Judge is, therefore, right on this point. It may be stated that the proceedings were initiated on 26-7-1982 and by the order dated 14-5-1984 the opponents were required to give the bonds for the period of six months. In that view of the matter those six months are over and because of the bonds or otherwise, no untoward incident has taken place thereafter still however in future if any such occasion arises the parties would be at liberty to take appropriate action for the prevention of any such incident which would involve breach of public peace. In result the criminal revision application fails and stands dismissed. Rule discharged.

    20. Rule discharged.

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    Comments

    Motilal Jivanbhai Patel v. Jesangbhai Nagjibhai Patel And Others
    (Apr 8, 1986)