AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Since these provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act
  • Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses, Rates Control Act, 1947,
  • Section 4, 6 and 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act
  • DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT 1958
  • SECTION 50 DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT
  • Order VII Rule 11 CPC
  • Order VII Rule 11
  • Rent Control Act
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Since these provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act
  • Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses, Rates Control Act, 1947,
  • Section 4, 6 and 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act
  • DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT 1958
  • SECTION 50 DELHI RENT CONTROL ACT
  • Order VII Rule 11 CPC
  • Order VII Rule 11
  • Rent Control Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of Opinion — Shiv Narayan Dhingra, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner challenged an order dated 1 September 2005 of the learned Civil Judge which dismissed the petitioner's application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC seeking rejection of the respondent's suit. The respondent (plaintiff) had filed a suit for delivery of possession of premises No. 40-42, Janpath, New Delhi (comprising a service station, store office, workshop shed, open areas and WCs). The petitioner had taken the premises on monthly rent of Rs. 400 in or about 1956 and used it as a vehicle service and repair workshop.

The plaintiff alleged that the defendant had lost protection under the Delhi Rent Control Act (DRC Act) and had become a "tenant at sufferance" and served a notice dated 21 December 2001 for vacant peaceful possession. The plaintiff valued the suit for court-fee purposes at Rs. 4,800 and claimed mesne profits (undertaking to pay court-fee on mesne profits as fixed).

The petitioner sought rejection of the suit under Order VII Rule 11 arguing that the DRC Act applied (because the agreed rent was Rs. 400) and that a civil suit was not maintainable in view of Section 50 of the DRC Act. The petitioner also relied on earlier eviction petitions dismissed up to the Supreme Court and contended lack of cause of action and non-pleading of material facts. The trial court framed a preliminary issue and passed the impugned order refusing to dismiss the suit; the present petition challenges that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a civil suit for recovery of possession before the Civil Judge is maintainable in respect of premises for which rent was fixed at Rs. 400 per month in 1956, given the provisions and amendments of the Delhi Rent Control Act (including an amendment excluding properties with rental value above Rs. 3,500 per month) and the judicial striking down of Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the DRC Act in an earlier decision.
  2. Whether the question of whether the premises falls within the purview of the Delhi Rent Control Act (or is outside it) can be decided at the stage of an Order VII Rule 11 application or requires evidence (i.e., whether it is a mixed question of law and fact requiring trial).
  3. Whether valuation of the suit at Rs. 4,800 (annual rent basis) for court-fee purposes is appropriate, or whether the plaintiff should have valued it at present market value (particularly if the defendant is treated as a trespasser).

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner / Defendant's Arguments

  • The agreed monthly rent was Rs. 400 and therefore provisions of the Delhi Rent Control Act applied to the premises; the civil suit was not maintainable in view of Section 50 of the DRC Act.
  • The Civil Court (trial court) lacked jurisdiction unless the rent exceeded Rs. 3,500 per month (an amendment threshold), so the suit should have been dismissed at the preliminary stage.
  • The plaintiff had previously filed eviction petitions which were dismissed up to the Supreme Court.
  • The plaintiff did not plead material facts in the plaint; there was no cause of action disclosed.
  • If the petitioner were a trespasser, the plaintiff should have valued the suit at the market value of the premises; valuation at Rs. 4,800 indicates reliance on annual rent and suggests the premises remain within the DRC Act, making the suit liable to be dismissed.

Respondent / Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The petitioner had become a tenant at sufferance and the Rs. 400 monthly rent fixed in 1956 was frozen only because of Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the DRC Act, which had been struck down in Raghunandan Saran Ashok Saran v. UOI (2002 RLR 149).
  • Since those provisions were struck down as violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21, the 1956 rent must be considered in present value terms taking into account inflation and wholesale price indices; the equivalent of Rs. 400 in 1956 would be not less than Rs. 9,500 in 2002 by Government WPI figures, placing the premises outside the DRC Act threshold.
  • The petitioner had sub-let the premises to Compact Motors Ltd. at market rent in a "camouflage" manner to evade statutory provisions; this suppression of sub-letting would cause the premises to fall outside the purview of the DRC Act.
  • The plaintiff argued that he was not required to set out in the pleadings the full evidence; he needed only to allege that the premises were outside the DRC Act and that the manner in which it came to be outside the Act would be proved at trial.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raghunandan Saran Ashok Saran v. Union of India, 2002 RLR 149 Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act were struck down as violative of Articles 14, 19(1)(g) and 21 of the Constitution. The court relied on this decision to observe that the rent fixed in 1956 (Rs. 400) was no longer to be treated as immutable; the present value must be considered in determining whether the premises fall within the DRC Act.
Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs. v. Union of India and Anr., (2008) 5 SCC 287; 2008 (102) DRJ 393 [SC] Surveyed jurisprudence and noted a definite shift in the Court's approach to interpreting rent control legislation, describing earlier judicial leaning in favour of tenants and a different later trend. The court quoted and relied on Satyawati to contextualise the changed judicial approach to rent control laws and to support the proposition that rent-control provisions must be examined in light of changing circumstances and principles such as Article 14.
Mohinder Kumar and Others v. State of Haryana and Another [1985 (4) SCC 221] Example of earlier judicial tendency to interpret rent control legislation in ways beneficial to tenants. Cited within Satyawati (as discussed in the opinion) to illustrate prior trends; the present court noted these earlier cases while discussing the shift in approach.
Prabhakaran Nair and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others Example of earlier tenant-favouring interpretations of rent control legislation (cited in Satyawati). Referred to as part of the jurisprudential background demonstrating earlier tenant-oriented interpretations; used to show the historical context for current approach.
D.C. Bhatia and Others v. Union of India and Another [1995 (1) SCC 104] Another earlier case showing courts' inclination to safeguard tenants under rent control laws. Referenced in the opinion (via Satyawati) to demonstrate earlier judicial reliance on tenant-protective readings; used as background for changed approach.
C.N. Rudramurthy v. K. Barkathulla Khan [1998 (8) SCC 275] Earlier authority exemplifying tenant-favouring tendency in rent-control adjudication. Cited as part of the Satyawati analysis; the present court used the collected observations to frame the contemporary approach to rent-control issues.
Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Others v. State of Maharashtra & Another Considered whether freezing/pegging rent to a historical date was arbitrary under Article 14; held pegging could be arbitrary but declined to strike down provisions for other reasons (e.g., lapse). Quoted for observations on the need to balance tenant protection with periodic revision so that laws do not confer disproportionate benefits; used to support the view that historical rents may need reassessment in present times.
Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal [2002 (5) SCC 397] Observed that rent control laws are loaded in favour of tenants but courts must adopt a balanced approach; a legislature's provision may become arbitrary over time and may be struck down later. Invoked to support the proposition that statutes reasonable at enactment can become arbitrary with changed circumstances and that courts must examine such issues when they arise.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded step-by-step from the factual matrix and the authorities:

  1. Historical rent fixation and statutory change: The premises had been let at Rs. 400 per month in 1956. That figure, the court observed, had been effectively "frozen" by Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the DRC Act, but those sections were struck down in Raghunandan Saran Ashok Saran as violative of constitutional provisions. Therefore the court reasoned the 1956 rent cannot be treated as unchanged for purposes of jurisdictional thresholds set by subsequent legislation/amendments.
  2. Mixed question of law and fact: The court agreed with the trial court that whether the premises fell within the DRC Act or were outside it could not be decided merely on the basis of the historic rent amount (Rs. 400) or the plaint's valuation (Rs. 4,800). That determination involves factual inquiries (for example, alleged sub-letting and camouflage arrangements) and legal questions (application of statutory provisions and their post-decisional effect), thus constituting a mixed question of law and fact which requires evidence.
  3. Economic and contextual analysis: The court illustrated by comparing prices, wages and asset values from 1956 to later years (gold, sugar, wheat, land values, salaries) to emphasize that monetary figures from decades earlier cannot be mechanically read as having the same present-day meaning. It relied on the authorities discussing constitutional review of rent-control pegging and the need for periodic revision (Malpe Vishwanath and Joginder Pal) to justify treating historic rent in present-value terms.
  4. On alleged camouflage/sub-letting: The court accepted as a matter for evidence the respondent's allegation that the petitioner had sub-let the premises to Compact Motors Ltd. at market rent in a camouflage arrangement. Determination of such allegations could not be made at the prima facie stage and required trial.
  5. Valuation for court-fee: The court reasoned that since the landlord was receiving an actual return (annual rent basis) and could not know the amount of mesne profit the court would eventually fix, it would be unjust to require the landlord to pay court-fee on market value to obtain possession. Therefore valuing the suit on the basis of annual rent received (Rs. 4,800) was held to be a correct and reasonable approach for court-fee purposes in the circumstances.
  6. Conclusion from analysis: Because the question of DRC Act applicability and the true present-day value of the historically fixed rent were mixed questions requiring evidence, a summary rejection at the Order VII Rule 11 stage was inappropriate; the trial court's approach in framing a preliminary issue and reserving factual determination for trial was correct.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

The petition is dismissed.

Immediate consequences for the parties:

  • The writ/petition challenging the trial court's refusal to reject the suit under Order VII Rule 11 is dismissed; the trial court's order is upheld.
  • The suit for recovery of possession will proceed so that factual and legal issues (including whether the premises fall within the Delhi Rent Control Act and whether camouflage sub-letting occurred) can be determined on evidence at trial.
  • The plaintiff's valuation of the suit at Rs. 4,800 on an annual-rent basis for court-fee purposes is accepted by the court as reasonable in the circumstances; the landlord is not required to pay court-fee on market value in order to prosecute the suit for possession and potential mesne profits.

Broader implications (as discussed in the opinion):

The court recorded and endorsed the view — supported by cited precedents — that historical rent fixations may need to be considered in present-value terms when assessing jurisdictional thresholds and the real intent and effect of rent-control legislation. However, the court did not decide the ultimate merits of those broader legal questions in this petition; it left them to be adjudicated after evidence at the trial stage. No novel legal rule was declared in this order beyond application of existing authorities and the procedural conclusion that the matter requires evidential determination.

Note: This summary is limited to and based exclusively on the content of the provided opinion. It does not add, infer or invent facts or holdings beyond those expressly stated in the opinion.

    Pearey Lal Workshop P. Ltd. v. Raghunandan Saran Ashok Saran.

    Shiv Narayan Dhingra, J.— The petitioner is aggrieved by an order dated 1st September, 2005 passed by the learned Civil Judge dismissing an application of the petitioner under Order VII Rule 11 for rejection of the suit.

    2. The respondent/plaintiff filed a suit for delivery of possession of premises No. 40-42, Janpath, New Delhi comprising of a Service Station, Store Office, Workshop Shed, Two open Areas, Two WCs on the ground floor which petitioner had taken on monthly rent of Rs. 400/- some time in year 1956 and used as a vehicle service and repair workshop. The respondent in the suit contended that by effect/action/implication of law, the defendant lost the protection of provision of Delhi Rent Control Act, 1958 with regard to the suit premises because of rent recoverable and by virtue of the value of the consideration being received by the defendant in the suit premises. Defendant had become “tenant at sufferance”. The plaintiff served a notice dated 21st December, 2001 on the defendant asking the defendant to deliver the vacant peaceful possession of the premises. Since the peaceful possession of the premises had not been handed over despite notice, the plaintiff filed a suit for recovery of possession. The plaintiff valued the suit for the purpose of Court Fee at Rs. 4800/-. The plaintiff also claimed mesne profit and undertook to pay Court Fee on the mesne profit the Court may determine after evidence.

    3. In the application under Order VII Rule 11 CPC petitioner/defendant took a stand that the agreed monthly rent payable by the petitioner was Rs. 400/- and provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act would, therefore, be applicable to the suit premises.

    The civil suit for recovery of possession filed by the respondent before the Civil Judge was not maintainable in view of Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. It was stated that the plaintiff/respondent earlier also filed eviction petitions which were dismissed right upto Supreme Court.

    4. In view of the objection taken by the petitioner regarding maintainability of the suit, trial court framed a preliminary issue and passed the impugned order. The order is challenged on the ground that the trial court failed to exercise jurisdiction vested in it by not dismissing the suit though the rent payable by the petitioner was Rs. 400/- per month. It is submitted that the Civil Court has jurisdiction only if the rent was more than Rs. 3500/-. The petitioner continues to be a protected tenant under Delhi Rent Control Act and only eviction petition under Delhi Rent Control Act would lie. It is also submitted that the respondent plaintiff had not pleaded material facts in the plaint and the trial court did mention about it but still not dismissed the suit on this ground. There was no cause of action disclosed in the plaint and the order of the trial court was bad in law.

    5. During arguments, it was contended by the counsel for the petitioner that in case the petitioner was not considered as a tenant and was considered as a trespasser and recovery of the premises was sought from the petitioner as a trespasser, the respondent/plaintiff was supposed to value the suit at the market value of the premises. However, the respondent had valued the suit at value of Rs. 4800/- which only shows that the property has been valued at annual rent being paid by petitioner. The suit was therefore, liable to be dismissed since it was covered under the Delhi Rent Control Act.

    6. It is evident that the premises was let out to the petitioner at monthly rent of Rs. 400/- sometime in year 1956. The respondent herein had earlier challenged the virus of the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act regarding fixing of standard rent. This court in Raghunandan Saran Ashok Saran v. UOI, 2002 RLR 149 allowed the petition and Section 4, 6 and 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act were struck down being violative of articles 14, 19(1) g & 21 of the constitution of india. The question which arises is whether a suit for recovery of a premises before Civil Judge would be maintainable where the rent was fixed at Rs. 400/- per month about 50 years back. The respondent argued his matter in person and submitted that the petitioner was tenant at sufferance. The petitioner was let out the premises at Rs. 400/- in 1956. This Rs. 400/- per month fixed in 1956 stood frozen in time only because of Sections 4, 6 and 9 of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Since these provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act have been struck down being violative of Constitution of India, the value of Rs. 400/- in 1956 has to be considered after taking into account the inflation, fall in value of rupees and change in the whole sale price index since 1956 till date and if the value of this Rs. 400/- is considered in this context, then this amount would not be less than Rs. 9,500/- in the year 2002 in terms of Government of India published figures of whole sale price index. It is submitted that under no circumstance, the value of Rs. 400/- which was fixed as rent 1956 can be considered as Rs. 400/- in 2002 when the suit was filed and the premises would be outside the purview of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Since by a notice the petitioner had demanded peaceful vacant possession of the premises giving adequate time to the petitioner as per law, the petitioner was within its right to file a civil suit. It is also submitted that though the petitioner had taken the premises on rent in 1956 at Rs. 400/- per month, but it had further sub-let the premises to Compact Motors Ltd. at market rent in a camouflage manner in order to evade the statutory provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act as well as the NDMC Act 1954 relating to levy of property tax. He submitted that the petitioner suppressed the factum of sub-letting to Compact Motors Limited and because of sub-letting the premises went out of provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act. Regarding non-mentioning of these facts in the plaint respondent submitted that he was not supposed to give evidence in the pleadings. He was only supposed to give the fact of the premises being outside the purview of Delhi Rent Control Act. How it went out of purview of DRC Act was decided was a subject matter of evidence & law and he would prove the same.

    7. In a recent case Satyawati Sharma (Dead) by LRs. v. Union of India and Anr., (2008) 5 SCC 287 : 2008 (102) DRJ 393 [SC], the Supreme Court had occasion to devolve upon the provisions of Delhi Rent Control Act and observed as under:

    “12. Before proceeding further we consider it necessary to observe that there has been a definite shift in the Court's approach while interpreting the rent control legislations. An analysis of the judgments of 1950s' to early 1990s' would indicate that in majority of cases the courts heavily leaned in favour of an interpretation which would benefit the tenant Mohinder Kumar and Others v. State of Haryana and Another [1985 (4) SCC 221], Prabhakaran Nair and Others v. State of Tamil Nadu and Others (supra), D.C Bhatia and Others v. Union of India and Another [1995 (1) SCC 104] and C.N Rudramurthy v. K. Barkathulla Khan [1998 (8) SCC 275]. In these and others case, the Court consistently held that the paramount object of every Rent Control Legislation is to provide safeguards for tenants against exploitation by landlords who seek to take undue advantage of the pressing need for accommodation of a large number of people looking for a house on rent for residence or business in the background of acute scarcity thereof. However, a different trend is clearly discernible in the latter judgments.

    13. In Malpe Vishwanath Acharya and Others v. State of Maharashtra & Another (supra), this Court considered the question whether determination and fixation of rent under the Bombay Rents, Hotel and Lodging Houses, Rates Control Act, 1947, by freezing or pegging down of rent as on 1.9.1940 or as on the date of first letting was arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of Article 14 of the Constitution. The three-Judge Bench answered the question in affirmative but declined to strike down the concerned provisions on the ground that the same were to lapse on 31.3.1998 Some of the observations made in that judgment are worth noticing. These are:

    “Insofar as social legislation, like the Rent Control Act is concerned, the law must strike a balance between rival interests and it should try to be just to all. The law ought not to be unjust to one and give a disproportionate benefit or protection to another section of the society. When there is shortage of accommodation it is desirable, nay, necessary that some protection should be given to the tenants in order to ensure that they are not exploited. At the same time such a law has to be revised periodically so as to ensure that a disproportionately larger benefit than the one which was intended is not given to the tenants. It is not as if the government does not take remedial measures to try and off set the effects of inflation. In order to provide fair wage to the salaried employees the government provides for payment of dearness and other allowances from time to time. Surprisingly this principle is lost sight of while providing for increase in the standard rent # the increases made even in 1987 are not adequate, fair or just and the provisions continue to be arbitrary in today's context.”

    “When enacting socially progressive legislation the need is greater to approach the problem from a holistic perspective and not to have narrow or short sighted parochial approach. Giving a greater than due emphasis to a vocal section of society results not merely in the miscarriage of justice but in the abdication of responsibility of the legislative authority. Social Legislation is treated with deference by the Courts not merely because the Legislature represents the people but also because in representing them the entire spectrum of views is expected to be taken into account. The Legislature is not shackled by the same constraints as the courts of law. But its power is coupled with a responsibility. It is also the responsibility of the courts to look at legislation from the altar of Article 14 of the Constitution. This Article is intended, as is obvious from its words, to check this tendency; giving undue preference to some over others.”

    14. In Joginder Pal v. Naval Kishore Behal. [2002 (5) SCC 397], the Court after noticing several judicial precedents on the subject observed as under:

    “The rent control legislations are heavily loaded in favour of the tenants treating them as weaker sections of the society requiring legislative protection against exploitation and unscrupulous devices of greedy landlords. The legislative intent has to be respected by the courts while interpreting the laws. But it is being uncharitable to legislatures if they are attributed with an intention that they lean only in favour of the tenants and while being fair to the tenants, go to the extent of being unfair to the landlords. The legislature is fair to the tenants and to the landlords—both. The courts have to adopt a reasonable and balanced approach while interpreting rent control legislations starting with an assumption that an equal treatment has been meted out to both the sections of the society. In spite of the overall balance tilting in favour of the tenants, while interpreting such of the provisions as take care of the interest of the landlord the court should not hesitate in leaning in favour of the landlords. Such provisions are engrafted in rent control legislations to take care of those situations where the landlords too are weak and feeble and feel humble,

    xxxxxxxxx

    32.……It is trite to say that a legislation which may be quite reasonable and rational at the time of its enactment may with the lapse of time and/or due to change of circumstances become arbitrary, unreasonable and violative of the doctrine of equality and even if the validity of such legislation may have been upheld at a given point of time, the Court may, in subsequent litigation, strike down the same if it is found that the rationale of classification has become non-existent.”

    8. The learned Civil Judge in this case had observed that whether the premises would fall within the purview of Delhi Rent Control Act or outside the purview of Delhi Rent Control Act cannot be adjudicated merely on the ground that the rent was Rs. 400/- or merely because of the plaintiff has valued the suit at Rs. 4800/- and this question had to be decided after evidence since it is a mixed question of law and fact. I consider that the learned Civil Judge was right in making this observation. In 1956 the premises at a prime location like Janpath near Connaught Place was let out at Rs. 400/- since it would have been the market rent of the premises prevalent at that time. The Gold used to cost Rs. 40/- per 10 gram in 1956. The rate of Sugar was two anna per K.G and Wheat used to sell at Rs. 4 or 5 per Mand (approx. 37 kg.). The value of the land in Connaught Place and surrounding areas may be at Rs. 10 or so per square yard. Value of none of the items has stood frozen in time. Neither the Gold is available today at Rs. 40 per Tola (11 grams), neither the other articles essential for life are available at the rate which was prevalent in 1956 nor the salaries of the persons stand frozen in time. The salary of a Clerk during those days used to be Rs. 15-20 per month. Today the Gold is available at more than Rs. 11,000/- per 10 grams. The value of land in Connaught Place is few lakhs per square yards, the value of one square feet constructed area may be in the range of Rs. 20,000/-, the salary of Clerk has risen to Rs. 15,000/- to 20,000/- p.m Thus, the value of Rs. 400/- in 1956 has to be looked today from the eyes of 2008 and it has to be seen as to what would have been the effective value of this Rs. 400/- fixed as rent in 1956, in order to determine the real intent of legislature. The legislature in 1988 amended provisions of drc act and a property with rental value above Rs. 3500/- per month went outside the purview of the Delhi Rent Control Act.

    9. With the passage of time, the law has changed in many spheres. However, in the sphere of Delhi Rent Control Act it still lies frozen because of the vested interests and lobbing by different groups. The political Will to implement the legislation enacted by the Parliament in 1995 has been absent. However, many other laws and regulations have kept march with time. MCD few years back implemented unit area system of property tax. The situation has arisen in certain areas where the property tax payable by the landlord in respect of the premises is Rs. 5000/- per month and the rent being realized by the landlord is Rs. 1000/- per month. No exemption has been given by MCD Act to those landlords whose premises are on lower rent to give tax on rent basis. I consider that time has come when the Court must take into account the real value of the rent for the premises which was fixed decades ago to determine the jurisdiction of the Rent Controller. Not one but many premises in areas of Connaught Place, Karol Bagh, Chandani Chowk etc. are not being used by the original tenants and the tenants have entered into camouflage agreements like partnership agreement, franchisee agreement, agency agreement, licence agreement to device ways to keep the premises within purview of DRC Act while actually they sub let the premises. The tenants are realizing rents at the rate of lakhs of rupees per month and the landlord is being paid in such cases Rs. 400/- or Rs. 500/- per month. This is highly unjust situation and this can be redeemed only by taking the present value of the rent per month as the value for jurisdiction, taking into account the corresponding whole sale price index inflation and other factors which have affected the value of real estate. Thus, it would be a question of law and fact both whether the premises would be covered by Delhi Rent Control Act or a suit before the Civil Court can be filed. A landlord, whose property worth several crores of rupees is in occupation of the tenant who is running business there, and may be earning lakhs of rupees per month, has a right to establish before the Court by bringing out facts and law that the Court must consider the real value of the rent fixed in 1956 as the rental value of the property in order to determine the jurisdiction.

    10. As far as the valuation of the suit is concerned, since the property is giving a return to the landlord only of Rs. 4800/- per month, and it is not known to the landlord what would be the amount of mesne profit which the Court may fix, the landlord who has already been deprived of rightful benefits of the property cannot be burdened with Court Fee on the basis of market value of property. If the Court cannot tell a tenant to pay rent at the present day market value of the property or taking into account the present value of rent of Rs. 400/- fixed in 1956, the Court cannot tell the landlord to pay the Court Fee on the present day market value in order to get the premises vacated. The valuation has been done on the basis of annual rent being received and in my opinion this is a correct valuation for the suit.

    11. I find no merits in this petition. The petition is hereby dismissed.

    Delhi Rent Control Act.
    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Pearey Lal Workshop P. Ltd. v. Raghunandan Saran Ashok Saran.
    (Nov 27, 2008)