Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The respondents leased premises at Chandni Chowk, New Delhi, to the appellant by a registered lease deed dated 5th December 1975, following an original letting in 1958. The lease expired on 31st December 1984 but contained a renewal clause for five years, which the appellant exercised. Despite no new lease deed being executed, the appellant continued paying rent as per the renewal clause until 1st January 1990. The respondents sent a legal notice terminating the tenancy in March 1989, which the appellant contested, alleging partial termination was impermissible. The respondents clarified the disputed portion was a separate property.

Permission under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956, to institute eviction proceedings was sought and granted in August 1991. Subsequent notices terminating tenancy were served on the appellant, who failed to vacate. The Delhi Rental Control Act, 1958, did not apply due to the rental amount exceeding Rs. 3,500 per month. The respondents accepted rent cheques up to July 1991 but returned those from August 1991 onwards, pending permission under the Slum Act.

The respondents filed a suit for ejectment on 24th March 1992, initially seeking possession and later amending the suit to claim mesne profits/damages for use and occupation. The appellant contested the suit on grounds including jurisdiction, locus standi, and denial of liability for mesne profits. The suit was transferred to the District Courts following an amendment to the Delhi High Court Act, 1966, and after framing issues, trial proceeded with evidence from both parties. The trial court decreed possession in favor of the respondents and awarded mesne profits at Rs. 50 per square foot with 9% interest.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the trial court had pecuniary jurisdiction to award mesne profits exceeding the claimed amount and suit valuation.
  2. Whether the amendment to the plaint to include mesne profits was permissible and related back to the date of filing the suit.
  3. Whether mesne profits can be awarded at a rate higher than the amount claimed in the suit.
  4. Whether the appellant waived objections to pecuniary jurisdiction by participating in the trial without raising timely objections.
  5. Whether the evidence supported the trial court’s award of mesne profits and the rate fixed.
  6. Whether the interest rate of 9% on mesne profits awarded was appropriate.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The respondents did not claim mesne profits in the original plaint; the claim was introduced later by amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC.
  • The pecuniary jurisdiction of the trial court was limited to Rs. 5 lakhs, but the mesne profits awarded exceeded this amount, thus the court lacked jurisdiction.
  • No evidence was led after the amendment for mesne profits, so the decree was passed without evidence.
  • The mesne profits awarded at Rs. 50 per sq. ft. exceeded the highest amount claimed (Rs. 3,50,000 per month), going beyond the suit prayer and was therefore improper.
  • The suit valuation and pecuniary jurisdiction were incorrectly fixed by the respondents, and the suit should be dismissed on this ground.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The amendment to include mesne profits related back to the date of filing the suit and was permissible under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC.
  • The suit was correctly valued for court-fee and jurisdiction, and no objection was pressed by the appellant during trial.
  • The appellant waived any objection to pecuniary jurisdiction by participating in the trial without timely objection.
  • Mesne profits are awarded based on the market rent at the time of computation, which may be higher or lower than the claimed amount.
  • The evidence supported the mesne profits awarded, including lease deeds and witness testimony regarding prevailing rents.
  • The interest awarded at 9% per annum on mesne profits was appropriate and consistent with precedent.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Bahrein Petroleum Company Ltd. v. P.J Pappu, AIR 1966 SC 634 Waiver of objection to pecuniary jurisdiction if not raised at earliest opportunity Held the appellant waived jurisdictional objections by participating in trial without raising them timely.
Martin and Harris Ltd. v. VIth Additional Distt. Judge, (1998) 1 SCC 732 Estoppel against raising formal defects after joining issues on merits Supported the principle that failure to raise jurisdictional objections early estops the party from later contesting.
Asia Saran Singh v. Smt. Jamuna Devi, AIR 1985 Patna 67 & AIR 1987 Patna 1 Object of Section 21 CPC and Suit Valuation Act to prevent waste of judicial time by late jurisdictional objections Reinforced the principle that parties cannot object to jurisdiction after trial on merits without prior objection.
S. Kumar v. G.R Kathpalia & Anr., 1999 RLR 114 Mesne profits can be awarded at a rate higher than claimed based on evidence Applied to uphold mesne profits awarded at a rate higher than originally claimed due to evidence of market rent.
New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Renu Vohra, RSA No. 81/1996 Entitlement to interest on mesne profits under Section 2(12) CPC Supported awarding interest on mesne profits; interest rate fixed at 15% per annum in that case.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court analyzed the appellant’s objections primarily on pecuniary jurisdiction and the timing of the amendment to claim mesne profits. It noted that mesne profits are awarded for wrongful continuation of occupation after lawful termination of tenancy, based on market rent at the time of computation, as per Order 20 Rule 12 CPC.

The Court found the amendment under Order 6 Rule 17 CPC to include mesne profits permissible and relating back to the date of filing the suit, allowing the claim from that date. It observed that the appellant did not raise any objection to the pecuniary jurisdiction or valuation at the earliest opportunity or during trial, thereby waiving such objections under Section 21 CPC.

The Court referred to precedents establishing that failure to timely object to jurisdiction results in waiver and estoppel. It also noted that mesne profits may be awarded at a rate higher than claimed if supported by evidence, and the respondents had produced lease deeds and witness testimony evidencing a market rent higher than the amount claimed.

Regarding interest, the Court found the 9% simple interest awarded on mesne profits reasonable and consistent with legal principles and prior judgments. The Court concluded that no prejudice or failure of justice arose from the trial court’s jurisdiction or valuation, and the findings were supported by evidence.

Holding and Implications

The appeal is dismissed.

The Court upheld the trial court’s decree for possession and award of mesne profits with interest, confirming the appellant’s liability. The appellant’s objections regarding pecuniary jurisdiction and valuation were rejected due to waiver and lack of timely objection. The ruling affirms that amendments to include mesne profits may relate back to suit filing, and courts may award mesne profits at rates supported by evidence, even if higher than originally claimed. No new precedent was set; the decision directly affects the parties by affirming the trial court’s judgment and awarding costs to the respondents.

    Uco Bank v. Kalicharan & Sons & Ors.

    Gita Mittal, J.—By way of the present appeal, the appellant challenges the judgment and decree dated 23rd December, 1997 passed in Suit No. 617/1993 entitled Kalicharan and Sons v. UCO Bank by Sh. L.D Mual, learned Additional District Judge, Delhi.

    2. The facts giving rise to the present appeal are briefly set out hereafter.

    3. The respondents let out the premises bearing Nos. 364 and 384 to 390, Chandni Chowk, New Delhi-110006 comprising of ground floor, entire first floor, entire second floor to the appellant vide a registered lease deed dated 5th December, 1975. It is submitted that the original letting was of 1958 when these premises were let out to the appellant on a monthly rental of Rs. 4,000/- vide the registered lease deed dated 5th December, 1975 rent for these premises was increased to Rs. 10,000/-. The lease period expired on the 31st December, 1984. The lease deed contained a renewal clause and the appellant/defendant in the suit expressed his desire to renew the lease for a further period of five years as provided in the lease deed. However, the respondents/plaintiffs did not execute any new lease deed. As such the appellant continued to pay the monthly charges at the rate of Rs. 9,600/- per month in terms of the renewal clause for five years. A further period of five years expired on the 1st January, 1990.

    4. In these circumstances, the respondents through their Counsel sent a legal notice dated 14th March, 1989 by registered post acknowledgement due directing termination of the tenancy of the appellant of the said premises and calling upon the appellant/defendant to vacate and deliver possession of the premises to the plaintiffs at the end of 30th April, 1999 or at the end of its month of tenancy which would expire after 15 days of the receipt of the notice by the appellant-defendant.

    5. It has been stated that the appellant-defendant sent a reply dated 24th March, 1989 through Counsel to the above notice and it was pointed out that the premise No. 365, Chandni Chowk, New Delhi were also let out under the same lease to UCO Bank and as such the termination of the tenancy of a part of the property which was the subject matter of the tenancy was not permissible. Vide a letter dated 21st April, 1989, the respondent informed that the property No. 365 belong to M/s. Kalicharan and M/s. Shiv Charan and Sons and it was stated that the same was a separate property, and had been let out to the appellant-defendant vide a separate lease deed. It was, therefore, contended that the termination was not of a part of the tenanted property as alleged.

    6. On or around 22nd July, 1989, the respondents/plaintiffs instituted an application under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 in the Court of the Competent Authority, Slums, Delhi for permission to institute a suit or proceeding for obtaining a decree or order for eviction of the defendant from the said premises. The respondents/plaintiffs was granted permission to initiate eviction proceedings against the appellant-defendant only by an order dated 14th August, 1991 passed by the Court of Sh. B.V Choudhary, Competent Authority (Slums).

    7. In these circumstances, as a matter of abundant caution the respondent sent a notice dated 29th August, 1991 to the appellant by registered post, acknowledgement due as well as under certificate of posting to the head office of the appellant at Calcutta and also at the address of the said premises terminating its tenancy from the said premises and calling upon the defendant to vacate and deliver possession of the premises to the plaintiffs at the end of 1st October, 1991 or at the end of the month of its tenancy which would expire after 15 days from the receipt of the notice. This notice was addressed to the defendant on the said premises. The notice was also sent by registered post with acknowledgement due as well as under certificate of posting to the address of the defendant on 31st August, 1991 and was delivered to the appellant at Calcutta on 3rd September, 1991. This notice was served upon the appellant at the suit premises on 4th September, 1991.

    8. As the appellant-defendant failed to comply with the notice of demand, the respondents/plaintiffs was compelled to take further action.

    9. It has been pointed out that as the rental of the tenancy premises was more than Rs. 3,500/- per month, the provisions of the Delhi Rental Control Act, 1958 did not apply. The landlord was prevented from filing a suit for ejectment earlier on account of want of necessary permission under Section 19 of the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956.

    10. In the meantime, the respondents was encashing the cheques sent by the appellant towards the rental of the premises after the termination of the tenancy, without prejudice to its notice dated 14th March, 1989 and was receiving the cheque amount towards its claim of damages for use and occupation. Cheques up to the month of 19th July, 1991 were so accepted. Thereafter, cheques for the months of August, 1991 to January, 1992 though were sent to the respondents but were returned by the respondents to the appellant. This was so inasmuch as the application of the respondents/plaintiffs for the requisite permission under the Slum Areas (Improvement and Clearance) Act, 1956 was pending from 14th March, 1989 to July, 1991 and the permission was received only on the 14th August, 1991.

    11. That on or around the 24th March, 1992, the respondents/plaintiffs filed a suit for ejectment of the defendant on the original side of this Court. So far as the mesne profits are concerned, the respondents made the following averments in the plaint:

    “12. That the defendant is liable to pay mesne profits/damages for use and occupation of the said premises, after the termination of its tenancy of the same, to the plaintiffs at the present letting value of the said premises. The plaintiffs, to avoid the delay in the disposal of the present suit, are not claiming the damages for use and occupation/mesne profits in the present suit and a separate application is being filed to seek leave of this Hon'ble Court to sue the defendant separately for the relief of mesne profit/damages for use and occupation.

    13. That the cause of action for the present suit accrued to the plaintiffs against the defendant when the defendant failed to vacate the said premises as demanded in the notice dated 29.8.1991, which is Annexure ‘L’ hereto and continues from day to day.

    14. That the value of the suit for the purpose of Court-fee and jurisdiction is Rs. 1,15,200/- being the amount of the rent of the said premises to which the suit relates, payable for the next year, before the date of presenting the plaint. Appropriate Court-fee is paid on the plaint.”

    The plaintiffs (respondent) sought the following prayers:

    “(a) pass an order of ejectment in favour of the plaintiffs and against the defendant with respect of property Nos. 364 and 384 to 390, Chandni Chowk, Delhi, more particularly shown in red colour in the site plan filed with the plaint; and

    (b) award costs of the suit to the plaintiffs against the defendant; and/ or grant such other or further relief as may be deemed fit and proper in the facts and circumstances of the case.”

    12. Upon receipt of the summons, the defendant entered appearance in this Court and filed its written statement, inter alia, taking the pleas to the effect that the suit was barred under under Section 50 of the Delhi Rent Control Act; challenge to the locus standi of the respondents/plaintiffs on the ground that they were not the owners of the premises and the suit being barred for want of permission from the Competent Authority. Para 12 of the plaint relating to mesne profits was answered thus by the defendant in its written statement:

    “12. Contents of para 12 are absolutely misconceived, wrong and denied. The defendant is not liable to pay any mesne profits/damages as alleged or at all. There is no termination of tenancy. The answering defendant still continues to be the tenant of the premises. The plaintiffs are not entitled to claim any damages and/or mesne profits for use and occupation of the premises much less at the present letting value as alleged. The claim of the plaintiffs as regards the alleged mesne profits/damages is wrong, false, misconceived and denied in toto. The plaintiffs is not entitled to leave of this Hon'ble Court for suing defendant separately for the alleged relief of any mesne profit/damage.”

    13. On an application being IA 3754/1992, filed by the plaintiffs, this Court was pleased to pass an order on the 5th March, 1993 directing the defendant to pay the admitted rent of Rs. 9,600/- per month during the pendency of the suit and permitted the plaintiffs to receive the said amount without prejudice to their rights and contentions in the suit. The appellant was also directed to pay all arrears within a period of four weeks.

    14. It appears that on account of amendment to the Delhi High Court Act, 1966 which was given effect to by virtue of the Delhi High Court (Amendment) Act, 60 of 1991 which came into force from 9th November, 1992, the ordinary original civil jurisdiction of this Court was increased to such suits valuation of which exceeded Rs. 5 lakhs. As a consequence, all suits having jurisdictional value of less than Rs. 5 lakhs by virtue of the statutory amendment required to be transferred to the District Courts.

    15. So far as the jurisdiction and pecuniary hierarchy of Courts in the District Courts is concerned, suits/cases of which the jurisdictional value exceeded to Rs. 1 lakh were to be adjudicated upon by District/Additional District Judge and other suits/cases the jurisdictional value of which was below Rs. 1 lakh were required to stand jurisdiction to the subordinate Court for trial in accordance with law.

    16. In this view of the matter, the suit filed by the plaintiffs/respondents being Suit No. 1247/1992 was directed to be transferred to the Court of District Judge vide an order made on 27th September, 1993. Parties were directed to appear before the District Judge on the 9th November, 1993.

    17. After marking to the Court of learned Additional District Judge, the parties appeared after notices were served upon them. Upon consideration of the pleadings of the parties, vide an order dated 29th November, 1994, the learned Additional District Judge framed the following issues:

    “Issues.

    (1) Whether the plaintiffss are owners of premises?OPP

    (2) Whether the plaintiffss have locus standi and cause of action to file the present suit?OPP

    (3) Whether the notice of termination of tenancy is legal and valid?OPP

    (4) Whether the suit has been valued correctly for the purpose of Court-fee and jurisdiction?OPP

    (5) Whether the defts. are liable to pay mesne profits, at what rate, to what extent?OPP

    (6) Whether the suit is barred under Section 50 of DRC Act?OPD

    (7) Whether permission from Competent Authority under the Slum Act is necessary before filing of the suit?OPD

    (8) Whether the notice terminating the tenancy is partial for partial eviction?OPD

    (9) Whether the suit is barred under Order 2 Rule 2, CPC?OPD

    (10) Whether the permission of R.B.L is necessary before filing the suit?OPP

    (11) Whether the suit has been filed by duly authorised and competent person?OPP

    (12) Relief.”

    18. Perusal of the issues framed by the Trial Court shows that an issue No. 5 had been framed to the effect as to whether the defendant had a liability to pay mesne profit, and if it were so held then at what rate the mesne profit was payable and to what extent.

    19. Thereafter, it appears that the respondents/plaintiffs filed an application dated 7th September, 1995 under Order 6 Rule 17 seeking leave to incorporate a prayer for mesne profits and consequently amendment of the suit including the title as also para 12 of the prayer clause. The application was filed on the plea that the respondents/plaintiffs had already led evidence on issue No. 5 noticed above which was on mesne profits and that the plaintiffs had been cross-examined on the said aspect of the defendant without any objection. However, it had come to the respondents/plaintiffs attention that in the suit as filed originally there was no prayer for grant of mesne profits.

    20. By way of this application, the plaintiffs sought the following amendments:

    “(a) That the title of the suit be amended as under:

    “Suit for ejectment from immovable property and for recovery of future mesne profits/damages for use and occupation”.

    (b) That the existing para 12 of the plaint be deleted and substituted with the following paragraph:

    “That the present letting value of the premises is at the rate of Rs. 3,50,000.00/- per month. The defendant is liable to pay to the plaintiffs damages for use and occupation/mesne profits of the premises at the said rate and at such higher rate as may be prevailing from time to time, till vacation of the premises. The defendant is also liable to pay interest at the rate of 24% per annum on the arrears of mesne profits/damages from the date of accrual mesne profits/damages from the date of accrual thereof i.e from the month for which the same are due, till the date of payment.

    (c) That the following be added to the existing para 14 of the plaint:

    “The plaintiffs undertake to pay appropriate Court-fees on the mesne profits/damages for use and occupation found due to the plaintiffs.”

    (d) That the following paragraph be added after Sub-para (a) of para 16 of the plaint:

    “(a-1) Pass a decree in favour of the plaintiffss and against the defendant for mesne profits/damages for use and occupation at the rate of Rs. 3,50,000.00 per month or at such higher rate as may be prevailing from time to time from the date of institution of the suit till the date of vacation of the premises by he defendant, with interest @ 24% per annum on arrears thereof.”

    21. This amendment was allowed by the learned trial Judge after reply by the defendant and hearing arguments on 25th September, 1996.

    22. The amended plaint was on record and the appellant-defendant filed its written statement dated 16th November, 1996. To facilitate appreciation of the pleas taken by the appellant-defendant in the amended written statement the relevant paras of the plaint and the reply thereto by the defendant in this statement are set out hereunder:

    “12. Para 12 of the plaint is misconceived, imaginary wrong and denied. It is denied that the letting value of the suit premises is Rs. 3,50,000/- per month, which or any higher amount the defendant is liable to pay, as alleged. It is further wrong and denied that the defendant is liable to pay interest @ 24% per annum as alleged. It is submitted that the defendant continues to be the lawful tenant in the premises and is not liable to pay any damages/mesne profits. The claim of plaintiffs is wrong, false, misconceived, frivolous and unsustainable, which is liable to be rejected by this Hon'ble Court.

    14. Contents of para 14 are wrong and denied. The suit has not been correctly valued for purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction. Even otherwise this Hon'ble Court has no pecuniary jurisdiction to try the suit because as per the amendment in law the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Hon'ble Court is Rs. 5 lakhs and not Rs. 1.15 lakhs, the value fixed by the plaintiffs. Thus suit has been wrongly filed and instituted. The value of the suit for purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction has been wrongly and illegally fixed at Rs. 1,15,200/-. The criterion for fixing the value of suit for purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction is absolutely arbitrary wrong, misconceived and illegal. The relief claimed cannot be granted to plaintiffs. The relief sought can only be adjudicated upon only on the ground(s) enacted in the relevant section of the Delhi Rent Control Act. Even otherwise the plaintiffs has not paid the correct Court-fee on the plaint. The Court-fee paid is absolutely deficient. In these premises the suit is liable to be dismissed in this ground.

    16. xxxxxx

    In the interest of justice it is, therefore most respectfully prayed that this Hon'ble Court may graciously be pleased to dismiss the suit with costs.”

    23. It is noteworthy that there was no additional objections taken by the defendant anywhere else in the plaint either with regards to the valuation fix by the respondents/plaintiffs or the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court at any point of time before the learned Judge.

    24. After the framing of the issues, the matter proceeded to evidence. The plaintiffs examined three witnesses in support of its case. Sh. R.K Saraswat, a clerk of Vijaya Bank, Chandni Chowk, Delhi was examined on 14th February, 1995 as PW 1 who produced the photocopy of a lease deed executed by the Vijaya Bank on record. Thereafter Sh. Navin Khanna, one of the owners of the suit property, was produced in the witness box as PW 2 and his statement was recorded on 7th March, 1995. Sh. Kuldip Chander Sharma an officer of the Oriental Bank of Commerce, Chandni Chowk, New Delhi was examined as PW 3. It is noteworthy that PW 2 proved the ownership of the property as well as the site plan Ex. PW 2/8, lease deed Ex. PW 2/5 the certified copy of the plaintiffs application to the Competent Authority under the aforestated Slums Act was proved as Ex. PW 2/10 and the defendant's reply thereto as Ex. PW 2/11. The order of the Court was exhibited as Ex. PW 2/12. The legal notice was exhibited as Ex. PW 2/4, postal receipts as Ex. PW 2/15 and Ex. PW 2/16 and the A.D cards as Ex. PW 2/21 and Ex. PW 2/23 while the defendant's reply as Ex. PW 2/22. This witness stated in his deposition that the present letting value of the suit premises is Rs. 3 lakhs per month and had stated that he was aware of the letting in the year 1992 to the Vijaya Bank vide the lease deed which was marked as mark 1. The statement of the witness with regard to the letting value being minimum Rs. 3 lakhs per month was repeated in his cross-examination.

    25. There was no suggestion even put to this witness to the effect that the letting value was not Rs. 3 lakhs minimum.

    26. PW 3 Sh. Kuldip Chander Sharma proved on record a lease deed dated 15th June, 1995 as Ex. PW 3/1 with regard to their Chandni Chowk Branch. This witness stated that payments of the rent were made through cheques and that the branch was situated at the Fateh Puri Chowk, Khari Baoli on the main Chandni Chowk road. The witness in his cross-examination stated that the premises were taken on rent towards the end of 1991 or early 1992 and that the rent being paid to the landlord was inclusive of fittings, fixtures, fans, furnitures, booster pump, show case and show window etc. and that the rent included rent for fittings and fixtures as well.

    27. It is important to note that the answer to the suggestions put to these witnesses was as follows:

    “It is incorrect to suggest that the bank is not paying the rent of Rs. 1,55,250/- per month for this premises. It is incorrect to suggest that the bank is paying a rent of Rs. 55,000/- only for this premises. It is correct that property tax and other taxes of the property are to be paid by the landlord of this premises and not by the bank.”

    28. The parties therefore clearly proceeded with the trial on the assumption that there was a prayer made in the suit for mesne profits and evidence was recorded on the issue No. 5 which was to this effect as well.

    29. The appellant/defendant accepted the jurisdiction of the Court and raised no objections thereto.

    30. In support of its case, the appellant-defendant examined DW 1 Sh. D.K Parwani who is Chief Manager who stated that he was posted as Chief Manager in the Chandni Chowk Branch of the appellant from November, 1985 to middle of April, 1987. According to him, the premises were taken on rent in 1975 at Rs. 4,000/- per month and that when he was a manager, Rs. 10,000/- per month was being paid as rent. According to this witness, on a number of occasions, negotiations took place between the appellant bank and the landlord for execution of the lease and that stamp papers were also purchased for the purpose but lease deed was not executed. The witness deposed that the premises was in a bad shape and that the landlord had not provided any fittings, fixtures and portions.

    31. In its cross-examination, DW 1 admitted that he was not present in 1975 when the premises were taken on rent that the letting was pursuant to a written lease deed. This lease deed between the parties was exhibited on record as Ex. PW 2.D3 and Ex. PW 2.D1. Separate site plans being Ex. PW 2.D2 and Ex. PW 2.D4 were annexed to the lease deed. It is stated that two separate lease deeds were executed because there were two separate properties. The witness also admitted that other than these two registered lease deeds, after expiry, no further lease deed was executed between the parties. The reason for the same was stated to be higher demand of the landlord.

    32. Appearing as DW 2 Sh. J.P Arora, a Senior Manager of the UCO Bank branch gave his deposition on the 22nd October, 1997. This witness was posted as Senior Manager in the Chandni Chowk Branch of the appellant from September, 1988 to August, 1991. He admitted that the bank had received a legal notice from the landlord which was replied through the bank's Counsel. It was also stated that cheques for payment of rent were, regularly sent to the landlord and that sometimes they were returned and sometimes accepted.

    33. In the cross-examination, this witness stated that he was not in a position to dispute receipt of the second notice from the appellant and that he stood released from the Chandni Chowk branch of the bank before 29th August, 1991. The witness also could not make any denial with regard to the fact that the defendant/respondents have returned the cheque after July, 1991.

    34. The matter proceeded to judgment thereafter and vide a judgment and decree dated 23rd December, 1997 the suit of the defendant for possession was decreed by the learned Trial Court with regard to the property Nos. 364, 384 to 390 Chandni Chowk, Delhi. The learned trial Judge also passed a judgment and decree in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs for mesne profits/damages for use and occupation against the defendant @ Rs. 50 per square feet from the date of filing the said suit till the date of actual handing over of possession of the aforestated premises. The learned trial Judge awarded 9% simple interest on the amount of mesne profits. Direction was made to the respondents to pay additional Court-fee on the amount of mesne profits in accordance with law.

    35. This judgment passed by the learned trial Judge has been impugned before this Court by way of the present appeal. We have heard arguments at length and have also been taken through the record of the Trial Court.

    36. The propositions urged by the appellant before us can be crystallized as follows:

    (i) The respondents had made no claim for mesne profits in the original plaint and the same was incorporated pursuant to an application under Order 6 Rule 17, CPC being allowed on the 25th September, 1996 whereby the respondents was permitted to claim Rs. 3,50,000/- per month. The pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned trial Judge on that date was only Rs. 5 lakhs and the relief decreed in favour of the plaintiffs of Rs. 50 per sq. feet for 10338 sq. feet amounts to mesne profits of Rs. 5,60,900/- per month. Since these have been awarded from the date of filing of the suit on 1st April, 1992 till 23rd December, 1997, the date of passing of the decree, the total amount of mesne profits awarded was Rs. 3,56,66,100/- which was beyond the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned trial Judge.

    (ii) The evidence of the witnesses on behalf of the petitioner was over on the 19th April, 1995. The application whereby amendment for incorporating the prayer for mesne profits was filed on 12th September, 1995 and was allowed on 25th September, 1996. No evidence was led by the respondents/plaintiffs thereafter and as such there was no evidence in support of the prayer for mesne profits. For this reason, it is contended that the decree was passed on no evidence.

    (iii) The plaintiffs/respondents in its notice dated 30th April, 1998 raised a demand of Rs. 15 per sq. ft. per month as mesne profits. In its letter dated 23rd February, 1999, the plaintiffs/respondents made a demand for Rs. 17 per sq. ft. bringing the total monthly mesne profit claimed to Rs. 1,75,000/- per month. By virtue of the amendment allowed on 25th September, 1996, the plaintiffs sought mesne profits at the rate of Rs. 29 per sq. feet per month bringing the total to Rs. 3,50,000/- per month. It is therefore urged that the judgment and decree awarding mesne profits @ Rs. 50 per sq. feet per month was beyond the suit prayer and could not have been awarded in law.

    37. Inasmuch as the issue relating to the jurisdiction of the Court is concerned, as the same goes to the root of the matter, we may consider the same.

    38. Mesne profits are awarded for continuation of occupation by a tenant whose tenancy has been terminated in accordance with law. Whereas the liability to pay rent arises in the right based on an agreement between the parties, the liability to pay mesne profits arises on account of wrongful continuation of occupation after termination of the tenancy.

    39. It is settled law that an award of mesne profits is based on for charges/rent as a property may fetch in the market at the time of its computation.

    40. The statutory provision for awarding judgment and decree for mesne profits is contained in Order 20 Rule 12 of the Code of Civil Procedure which provides as under:

    “12. The decree for possession and mesne profits—(i) Where a suit is for the recovery of possession of immovable property and for rent or mesne profits, the Court may pass a decree.

    (a) for the possession of the property;

    (b) for the rents which have accrued on the property during the period prior to the institution of the suit or directing an inquiry as to such rent;

    (ba) for the mesne profits or directing an inquiry as to such mesne profits;

    (c) directing an inquiry as to rent or mesne profits from the institution of the suit until—

    (i) the delivery of possession to the decree-holder,

    (ii) the relinquishment of possession by the judgment-debtor with notice to the decree-holder through the Court, or

    (iii) the expiry of three years from the date of the decree, whichever even first occurs.

    (2) Where an inquiry is directed under Clause (b) or Clause (c), a final decree in respect of the rent or mesne profits shall be passed in accordance with the result of such inquiry.”

    41. The suit filed by the plaintiffs initially sought a prayer only for possession. By virtue of the application under Order 6 Rule 17, the plaintiffs/respondents sought to incorporate a prayer for damages/mesne profits for use and occupation @ Rs. 3,500/- per month or at such higher rate as may be prevailing from time to time from the date of institution of the suit till its vacation with interest @ 24% per annum. In para 14 of the amended plaint, the plaintiffs gave an undertaking to pay appropriate Court-fee on such mesne profits/damages which are found due and payable by the appellant-defendant to the plaintiffs.

    42. It is to be noticed that on 6th March, 1998, the appellant gave an undertaking before this Court to vacate the premises on or before the 31st March, 1999. Vide orders made on the same day, the appellant was required to pay the entire arrears of mesne profits on the area of 11,300 sq. feet shown in the site plan which was proved before the learned trial Judge at the rate of Rs. 15 per sq. feet per month with effect from 1st April, 1992 till 28th February, 1998 and at the rate of Rs. 20 per sq. feet per month with effect from 1st March, 1998 till 31st March, 1999 subject to the final outcome of the present appeal. It is stated that the appellant has paid mesne profits only on the area of 10,33 8 sq. feet and not for the area of 11,339 sq. feet as was specified in the orders passed by this Court on 6th March, 1998.

    43. The aforestated prayer was so incorporated in the plaint bearing in mind the provision of Order 20 Rule 12 whereby a Court was required to direct an inquiry as to rent or mesne profits from the institution of the suit till its eviction.

    44. The respondents/plaintiffs was conscious of the fact that the mesne profits would be admissible at such prevalent market rate of rent and would vary subject to market variations. The prayer made by the respondents/appellant also took into its purview the factum that the rate at which mesne profits would be awarded may be higher or lower than the amount claimed depending on the evidences which the plaintiffs/respondents could produce in support of its claim.

    45. There is no dispute that a prayer in such terms is legally permissible.

    46. It is noteworthy that an issue on mesne profits was framed by the Court as issue No. 5 at the time of framing of issues on the 29th November, 1994 on the premise that the suit was a composite suit for possession and mesne profits. Upon the amendment being granted on the 25th September, 1996 and the plaintiffs being permitted to amend the plaint to incorporate the relief of mesne profit, such amendment would relate back to the date of filing of the suit. The suit having been filed on or around the 24th March, 1992, the plaintiffs would be entitled to mesne profits/damages from such date.

    47. At the same time, the learned Trial Court had framed issue No. 4 which was to the following effect:

    “4. Whether the suit has been valued correctly for the purpose of Court-fee and jurisdiction?OPP”

    48. We find that the learned trial Judge has dealt with this issue in para 27 of its judgment. It was observed that this issue has not been pressed on behalf of the defendant and as such the Court held that the suit has been valued correctly for the purposes of Court-fee and jurisdiction.

    49. Perusal of the grounds of appeal in the instant case also show that the judgment of the learned trial Judge has not been challenged on any grounds in relation to valuation of the suit or the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned trial Judge.

    50. We may also appropriately advert to Sections 11 and 12 of the Court Fees Act, 1870 which are to the following effect:

    “11. Procedure in suits for mesne profits or account when amount decreed exceeds amount claimed.—In suits for mesne profits or for immovable property and mesne profits, or for an account, if the profits or amount decreed are or is in excess of the profits claimed or the amount at which the plaintiffs valued the relief sought, the decree shall not be executed until the difference between the fee actually paid and the fee which would have been payable had the suit comprised the whole of the profits or amount so decreed shall have been paid to the proper officer.

    Where the amount of mesne profits is left to be ascertained in the course of the execution of the decree, if “the profits so ascertained exceed the profits claimed, the further execution of the decree shall be stayed until the difference between the fee actually paid and the fee which would have been payable had the suit comprised the whole of the profits so ascertained is paid. If the additional fee is not paid within such time as the Court shall fix, the suit shall be dismissed.

    12. Decision of questions as to valuation—(i) Every question relating to valuation for the purpose of determining the amount of any fee chargeable under this Chapter on a plaint or memorandum of appeal, shall be decided by the Court in which such plaint or memorandum, as the case may be, is filed, and such decision shall be final as between the parties to the suit.

    (ii) But whenever any such suit comes before a Court of Appeal, reference or revision, if such Court considers that the said question has been wrongly decided, to the detriment of the revenue, it shall require the party by whom such fee has been paid to pay so much additional fee as would have been payable had the question been rightly decided and the provisions of section 10, paragraph (ii) shall apply.”

    51. The Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 has also provided the manner and the objections as to territorial jurisdiction and pecuniary jurisdiction of Trial Court have to be taken by a defendant. The provisions of Section 21 of the Code reads as under:

    “21. Objections to jurisdictions—(1) xxxxxxx

    [(2) No objection as to the competences of a Court with references to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction shall be allowed by any Appellate or Revisional Court unless such objection was taken in the Court of first instance at the earliest possible opportunity, and, in all cases where issues are settled, at or before such settlement, and unless there has been a consequent failure of justice.

    xxxxxx”

    52. We have considered the pleadings of the defendant and the objections taken by it with regard to the legal bars to the suit of the plaintiffs. There is no objection taken to the valuation of the claim for mesne profit or to pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court in the written statement or the amended written statement. Even though an issue as to valuation was framed, however, the same not pressed by the appellant-defendant and as such the Court held the same in favour of the respondents/plaintiffs. The appellant-defendant participated in the entire trial without raising any objections on account of want of pecuniary jurisdiction by the Trial Court.

    53. We may refer to the pronouncement of the Apex Court wherein while considering the provisions of Sections 20 and 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure, the Apex Court held that it is open to the defendants to waive this objection, and if they do so, they cannot subsequently raise such objections. Such objections cannot be raised for the first time in Appellate or Divisional Jurisdiction if the defendant allows the Trial Court to proceed to judgment without raising any objection as to jurisdiction and takes the chance of a verdict in his favour. In such circumstances, the defendant waives the objection and will not be specifically permitted to raise it. Long and continued participation by the defendant in the proceedings without any protest made, in an appropriate case would amount to a waiver of the objections. It was so held in the pronouncement of the Apex Court AIR 1966 SC 634, Bahrein Petroleum Company Ltd. v. P.J Pappu. In (1998) 1 SCC 732 entitled Martin and Harris Ltd. v. VIth Additional Distt. Judge, the Supreme Court held where the defendant failed to raise a ground to the effect that the suit suffered from a formal defect, and on the contrary joined issues on merits of the case and failed to take such ground in the memo of appeal it was held that apart from waiver of such objection, the appellant was estopped from taking up such a contention.

    54. It is necessary to notice also the statutory provisions governing the procedure to be followed in suits for mesne profits when the amount decreed exceeds the amount claimed. Such contingency has been provided for under Section 11 of the Court Fees Act, 1870.

    55. In the instant case, no objection has been taken in its pleadings by the appellant/defendant. There was no objection taken by filing any kind of application. The issue raised on valuation was not pressed. An issue relating to liability to pay mesne profits and their extent was permitted to be framed without objection even in the absence of prayer in the plaint. The evidence was recorded wherein the plaintiffs/respondents produced evidence with regard to the mesne profits which was not objected to by the appellant/defendant. There is not even aground of appeal with regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Trial Court or valuation of the suit before this Court.

    56. It is also to be noticed that Section 21(ii) relating to the objection as to competence of the Court in reference to the pecuniary limits of its jurisdiction was incorporated in the statute by virtue of the amendment effected to the Code of Civil Procedure by Act 104 of 1976 with effect from 1st February, 1977. We have no hesitation in holding that the defendant/appellant did not take such objection in the Court at first instance at the earliest possible opportunity and also did not press the issue relating to valuation and thereby waived his objections to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Court.

    57. In this behalf, we may also refer to the pronouncement AIR 1985 Patna 67, Asia Saran Singh v. Smt. Jamuna Devi, and AIR 1987 Patna 1. Adverting to the object of the Legislature in indicating Section 21 of the Code and Section 11 of the Suit Valuation Act, 1987 it was observed that the object of the Legislature was to ensure that the time and labour spent by a Court in deciding a case should not be wasted. If the party concerned had joined issues and gone to trial upon merits without objecting to the pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction of the Court at the earliest opportunity, such party cannot be allowed to dispute that jurisdiction afterwards.

    58. In the present case, the defendant did not take any objection to the jurisdiction in the written statement, went to trial on merits and now that the judgment of the Court has gone against him, he seeks to press the plea of want of pecuniary jurisdiction on such late stage without even raising the same as a ground of appeal in his memorandum.

    59. It is to be noticed that the suit was filed on original side of this Court as per the then applicable pecuniary jurisdiction. There was no dispute so far as the jurisdiction of this Court to try the Suit No. 1247/1002 on its original side was concerned. Upon amendment of the Delhi High Court Act has noticed hereinabove, the suit stood transferred for trial to the Court of the learned Additional District Judge. There was also no dispute by appellant to the pecuniary jurisdiction of the transferred Court to adjudicate upon the matter either in the written statement as filed or in the amended written statement which was filed by the appellant-defendant on 16th November, 1996 pursuant to the order dated 25th September, 1996.

    60. As a general principle, the question of jurisdiction goes to the root of the case and ought to be permitted to be raised at any stage. The Legislature in its wisdom has incorporated in Section 21 of the Code of Civil Procedure the boundaries within which a party can raise such objection. It is therefore not necessary that a judgment by a Trial Court has to be reversed or set aside on the ground of want of pecuniary or territorial jurisdiction alone. This will depend on the facts and circumstances of the case as discussed herein.

    61. We further find that the statute has recognized the fact that mesne profits to be awarded do not necessarily have to be at a rate claimed by a party. The same may be higher or lower than the claimed rate depending on the evidence produced before a Court during the course of the inquiry conducted in terms of Rule 12 of Order 20.

    62. In such legal position, the objection of the appellant-defendant in the instant case to the effect that the Court awarded an amount higher than the suit claimed is misconceived. In this behalf, we may usefully refer to a pronouncement of the Division Bench of this Court 1999 RLR 114, S. Kumar… v. G.R Kathpalia & Anr.…. In this case the plaintiffs had raised a claim of damages @ Rs. 10,000/- per month. The trial Judge after considering the matter had awarded damages/mesne profits @ Rs. 50,000/- per month. After considering the matter, including the location of the premises etc., the Division Bench was of the view that Rs. 50,000/- per month would be just and fair by way of damages/mesne profits from the date of institution of suit till possession of premises to this extent only.

    63. The prayer made by the plaintiffs/respondents in the instant case also is worded to incorporate a claim of higher damages/mesne profits when it sought a decree against the appellant-defendant for use and occupation at the rate Rs. 3,50,000/- per month or at such higher rate as may be prevailing from time to time from the date of institution of the suit till the date of vacation. We therefore find the objection of the defendant totally devoid of any merit.

    64. The issue raised by the defendant with regard to the objection of pecuniary jurisdiction can be examined from yet another angle. In the instant case, according to the respondents in terms of the decree passed, the total amount awarded in the decree on account of mesne profits from 1st April, 1992 to 3rd December, 1997 comes to an amount of Rs. 356 lakhs. If the said objection of the appellant was to be upheld, the suit would thereupon fall within the pecuniary jurisdiction of a Single Judge on the original side of this Court.

    65. We find that the suit was originally filed before this Court and that on account of amendment of the provisions with regard to the pecuniary jurisdiction of this Court, the suit was transferred to the District Courts and was marked to the Court of the learned Additional District Judge. During the evidence with regard to the issue which was framed with regard to the mesne profits when the parties led the evidence, evidence was led on the issue of mesne profits before the Court of the learned Additional District Judge.

    66. The appellant has not raised any dispute that the claim of the plaintiffs for mesne profits of Rs. 3,50,600/- was not within the pecuniary jurisdiction of the learned Additional District Judge who was vested with the power to adjudicate on suits up to Rs. 5 lakhs.

    67. Subsequently, by virtue of the central act no. 35 of 2002 which came into force on 16th July, 2003, the pecuniary jurisdiction of the Civil Judge has been increased in trying cases up to Rs. 3 lakhs while the pecuniary jurisdiction of the District Judge/Additional District Judge has been increased to Rs. 20 lakhs. Therefore, according to the appellant/defendant, if the objection as to pecuniary jurisdiction was allowed, the suit would have required to be filed on the original side of this Court for adjudication at a stage subsequent to the amendment being allowed on 25th September, 1996.

    68. After this date, from perusal of the record of the lower Court, we find that only the pleadings to the amended plaint were brought on record and the evidence of the two witnesses of the appellant-defendant was recorded on the 22nd October, 1997. The appellant-defendant filed certain applications before the Trial Judge before the matter proceeded to judgment culminating in the judgment and decree dated 23rd December, 1997.

    69. Perusal of the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure shows that an appeal against a judgment of the District Judge/Additional District Judge of the value of the claim lies only to a Division Bench of this Court. Similarly the Appellate Forum for appeals against judgment and decrees made by a learned Single Judge in exercise of original civil jurisdiction of this Court also lies to a Division Bench of this Court under Section 10 of the Delhi High Court Act. Therefore, we find that no prejudice by way of deprivation of a Forum of Appeal or otherwise as resulted to the appellant in the instant case even if the objections of the appellant were sustained. For this reason as well, we find that there has been no failure of justice on account of the trial being held and the judgment being passed by the learned Additional District Judge.

    70. We also find that the appellant-defendant has not been able to point out any error of law which would indicate that the appellant-defendant suffered any prejudice on merits or failure of justice on any count. No prejudice of any kind has been urged before us.

    71. Adverting to the objections raised by the defendant to the effect that the findings of the learned trial Judge are based on no evidence, we find that the plaintiffs has proved on record lease deed of properties in the vicinity of the suit property. Witnesses from other banks were examined to prove the prevalent rental rate at different times. We find that PW 2 Navin Khanna, a co-owner of the property, stated in his evidence that the letting value of the suit premises was Rs. 3 lakhs per month as on 7th March, 1995. He caused to be produced a lease deed entered into by M/s. Vijaya Bank on the 14th February, 1992 whereby the Vijaya Bank had entered into a lease for further period of 10 years with effect from 18th November, 1991 on a monthly rent of Rs. 60,500/- for a carpet area of 4840 sq.ft approximately situated at 1488-1489, Chandni Chowk, Delhi-6.

    72. The plaintiffs also produced and proved on record the registered lease deed dated 15th June, 1995 executed by the Oriental Bank of Commerce in receipt of the premises bearing No. 208 situated in Ward No. 11, Fateh Puri, Chandni Chowk, Delhi whereby the Oriental Bank of Commerce agreed to take on lease the ground floor and first floor admeasuring approximately 26 sq. feet covered or at a monthly rent of Rs. 1,55,250/-. This lease deed contains a clause for renewal for three years each with 15% increase in the rent each time. This lease deed was proved through the evidence of PW 3 Kuldip Chander Sharma, an officer of the Oriental Bank of Commerce. It is to be noted that though the lease is of 1995 however the same was effective from 1992. The area of the premises which was let out to the Vijaya Bank and the Oriental Bank of Commerce was less than half the area which was let out to the appellant-defendant. Therefore, in any case it could not be contended that the mesne profits/damages of the suit were less than Rs. 3 lakhs per month. The respondents/plaintiffs had not sought the claim with effect from the date of termination but from the date of filing of the suit.

    73. The testimony of this witness was, however, could not be shaken in cross-examination inasmuch as there was a documentary evidence by way of the registered lease deed in favour of the landlord.

    74. In the instant case, the rental being paid by the appellant was at a paltry rate of Rs. 0.80 per month per sq. foot.

    75. We may also notice the facts set out in an application being CM No. 14663/2004 filed by the respondents/plaintiffs.

    76. It has been pointed out that during the pendency of the present case, efforts to amicably resolve the matter were made when in a meeting held on 4th November, 2003, it was agreed that the appellant would pay mesne profits/damages for use and occupation to the respondents at the rate of Rs. 32.50 per sq. feet per month for an area of 10338 sq. feet and would pay interest on the arrears at the rate of 6% per annum. In these circumstances, this Court on 24th November, 2003 had recorded that learned Counsel for the parties submitted that they have amicably settle the matter and a short adjournment was prayed to enable the parties to place an application of the Code of Civil Procedure. On 4th March, 2004, it was stated that the matter has been settled between the parties and that the same has to be rectified by a Board of the appellant bank. A copy of the draft compromise application setting out the terms and conditions agreed to between the parties was sent to the appellant bank by the respondents vide a letter dated 17th May, 2004. In the application filed in this Court, it has been prayed on behalf of the respondents that the compromise/settlement arrived at between the parties and reiterated to this Court on 24th November, 2003 and 4th March, 2004 be implemented. Thereafter, the matter was adjourned from time to time. When the matter was taken up on the 6th December, 2004, it was stated by the Counsel who was then appearing for the appellant, that the appellant was not agreeable to the terms and conditions of the settlement recorded in the application filed by the respondents. It was further stated that Counsel had received instruction not to agree to the terms of settlement as stated in the application. Accordingly, the matter was proceeded with on merits and arguments of the parties heard on the issue raised.

    77. It is to be noticed that the lease deed relating to the Vijaya Bank is a lease deed of renewal and is an unstamped agreement which has only been produced on record and marked without the same being proved in accordance with law. So far as the lease of the Oriental Bank of Commerce is concerned, we find that as per the terms and conditions of this document, the rate at which the premises have been taken on rent comes to Rs. 52/- per sq. feet per month in 1992; Rs. 56/- per sq. feet per month in 1995 and Rs. 70/- per sq. feet per month in the year 1998.

    78. In the instant case, the Trial Court has passed a judgment and decree awarding mesne profits to the respondents only at a rate of Rs. 50/- per sq. feet per month from the date of filing of the suit till the date of its actual handing over to the plaintiffs. We find no reason to vary the rate at which the mesne profits have been awarded against the appellant.

    79. Our attention has been drawn to several orders passed by the Apex Court and by this Court wherein the occupant of the premises was required to pay interest on the award of mesne profits. We find that vide a judgment dated 27th August, 1996 rendered by a learned Single Judge of this Court in RSA No. 81/1996 entitled. The New India Assurance Co. Ltd. v. Renu Vohra, it was held that owner of the premises is entitled to award of interest upon its claim of mesne profits in view of Section 2(12) of the Code of Civil Procedure. It was noticed that Section 26 of the Delhi Rent Control Act after the amendment effected in 1988 provided that the tenant will be desirable to pay interest @ 15% per annum if the rent is not paid according to the agreement and, in the absence of agreement, by the 15th day of the month succeeding to the month for which the rent has become payable.

    80. Other statutes have also fixed rates of interest at different rates which are to be found in Section 31(7)(b) of the Arbitration and Conciliation Act wherein a rate of 18% per annum has been statutorily provided on awarded amounts and Section 23 of the Land Acquisition Act, 1996 which provides that interest rate of 12% shall be payable. Section 34 of this statute stipulates interest rate of 9% or 15% on the awarded amount in certain eventualities.

    81. Against the aforestated judgment in RSA 31/1996 entitled New India Assurance Company Ltd. v. Renu Vohra, SLP (C) No. 22770/1996 vide its order dated 2nd December, 1996 was filed and the Apex Court directed that interest @ 15% would be payable by the tenant New India Assurance Co. Ltd. from the date of filing the suit till payment of the amount.

    82. In the instant case, the Trial Court has awarded a simple interest @ 9% per annum on the amount of mesne profits. We see no reason to vary the same.

    83. We find no merit in the appeal which is hereby dismissed. The respondents shall be entitled to the costs of the present appeal which are quantified at Rs. 10,000/-.

    Appeal dismissed.
    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Uco Bank v. Kalicharan & Sons & Ors.
    (Jul 15, 2005)