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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Advocates
Judges
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  • Order XXXVII Rule 3(7) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred
  • provisions of Sub-rule (4) Rule (3), Order XXXVII, CPC.
  • Sub-rule (7) of Rule (3), Order XXXVII, CPC.
  • Sub-rule(4) of Rule (3) Order XXXVII, CPC
  • Order XXXVII, Rule (3)7, CPC
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Cites
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Order XXXVII Rule 3(7) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred
  • provisions of Sub-rule (4) Rule (3), Order XXXVII, CPC.
  • Sub-rule (7) of Rule (3), Order XXXVII, CPC.
  • Sub-rule(4) of Rule (3) Order XXXVII, CPC
  • Order XXXVII, Rule (3)7, CPC
Smart Summary

Case Summary — Order on IA 931/96 (Order XXXVII, CPC)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff, Nirayu Private Limited, by its constituted attorney Shri Kamal Kumar, filed Suit No. 2815/94 under Order XXXVII, Code of Civil Procedure (CPC), seeking recovery of Rs. 14,63,438.58. After initial proceedings and service of summons under Form No. 4 (Appendix-B), the plaintiff filed IA 9761/95 for issuance of summons for judgment. On 17.10.1995 the court directed that summons for judgment be served on the defendants, and an office note dated 20.10.1995 records that one set of summons for judgment for 9.1.1996 was added to the counsel for the defendants, Mr. Mukul Talwar.

Defendants 1, 2, 3 & 5 filed IA 931/96 under Order XXXVII Rule 3(7), CPC, seeking condonation of delay in filing an application for leave to defend (IA 930/96). The applicants alleged improper service of the summons for judgment—specifically that the summons were not accompanied by the statutory affidavit verifying the cause of action and amount claimed—and raised subsidiary factual grounds about partnership disputes, unavailable accounts held by their chartered accountants, and ongoing settlement talks. The plaintiff filed a detailed reply contending the summons were properly served, alleging the defendants' contentions were mala fide, and sought dismissal with costs.

The learned judge heard counsel, examined the material on record, analysed the statutory provisions (Order XXXVII, Rule (3)(7) and Sub-rule (4) of Rule (3), Order XXXVII), and delivered the order summarized below.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the defendants have shown "sufficient cause" within the meaning of Order XXXVII, Rule 3(7), CPC, to justify condonation of delay in filing an application for leave to defend.
  2. Whether summons for judgment in Form No. 4-A (Appendix-B) were served on the defendants in compliance with Sub‑rule (4) of Rule (3), Order XXXVII, CPC — i.e., whether the summons were accompanied by the required affidavit verifying the cause of action and amount claimed and stating that in the plaintiff's belief there was no defence.
  3. Whether, if service is taken to have been proper, the application for leave to defend (IA 930/96) is barred by limitation.

Arguments of the Parties

Applicants' (Defendants 1, 2, 3 & 5) Arguments

  • The summons for judgment were not served in accordance with Order XXXVII because no affidavit verifying the cause of action and the amount claimed was served along with the summons; therefore there was no proper service and no occasion to apply for leave to defend within time.
  • On merits: there were disputes in the partnership firm (M/s. Mohan Lal & Company — defendant No. 1) involving defendants 2–5 as partners, accounts were not finalised, relevant documents and books were with M/s. P.N. Khanna & Co., Chartered Accountants, and so the applicants lacked access to information necessary to apply for leave to defend.
  • There were ongoing settlement/compromise talks between the parties.

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • The application for condonation of delay is not maintainable and should be dismissed with costs.
  • Summons for judgment were served in accordance with law; defendants' plea about defective service is false and made mala fide to prolong proceedings.
  • No application for leave to defend was filed within limitation, so the plaintiff is entitled to a decree as prayed.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's analysis proceeded in distinct steps, grounded in the statutory language and the record entries:

  1. Interpretation of "sufficient cause": The judge explained that the phrase in Order XXXVII, Rule 3(7) refers to a cause beyond the control of the party which prevents timely approach to the court. It is judged by a reasonable-person standard and requires that the cause could not have been avoided by due care and attention. The extent of delay is independent of sufficiency of cause.
  2. Application to the applicants' case: The court accepted that the applicants raised several grounds but found the subsidiary grounds (partnership disputes, accounts with accountants, settlement talks) unpersuasive. The court concentrated on the core contention that summons for judgment were not properly served because the mandatory supporting affidavit was not supplied.
  3. Statutory requirement for service: The court quoted and relied on Sub‑rule (4) of Rule (3), Order XXXVII, which requires that summons for judgment (Form No. 4‑A) be supported by an affidavit verifying the cause of action and the amount claimed and stating belief that there is no defence. The court stated that without that affidavit the defendant cannot be taken to have been properly served.
  4. Evaluation of the record concerning service: The court examined the file. The plaintiff's application for issuance of summons for judgment was ordered on 17.10.1995, and an office note dated 20.10.1995 records that one set of summons for judgment for 9.1.1996 was "added" to counsel for the defendants, Mr. Mukul Talwar. The court observed that the office did not record any defect in the process, which suggested the office considered the process in order.
  5. Receipt by the defendants' advocate: The summons were received on behalf of the defendants by their advocate, Mr. Mukul Talwar, who acknowledged receipt and recorded a note on the copy of the summons in token of receipt. The court reasoned that if the summons had been defective (i.e., without the statutory affidavit), the advocate—being conversant with statutory requirements—would have pointed this out in his receipt note. No such note was recorded.
  6. Absence of evidentiary support from the applicants: The court noted that the applicants did not file any affidavit by Mr. Mukul Talwar to explain or support their contention that the statutory affidavit was not served or to explain why such an affidavit was not filed; no explanation for the absence of such supporting evidence was offered.
  7. Conclusion on sufficiency and bona fides: Given the office record, the advocate's acknowledgement without protest, and the absence of supporting affidavit or explanation from the applicants, the court found the applicants' contention to be an afterthought lacking force and bona fides.
  8. Consequence for delay and limitation: Because the court rejected the applicants' primary ground for excusing delay (defective service), it held that the application for condonation was liable to be dismissed. Consequently the application for leave to defend (IA 930/96) by those defendants was dismissed as barred by limitation.

Holding and Implications

The application for condonation of delay (IA 931/96) is dismissed; the application for leave to defend (IA 930/96) filed by defendants 1, 2, 3 & 5 is dismissed as barred by limitation; and the plaintiff's suit is decreed.

Direct consequences imposed by the order:

  • The plaintiff's suit (Suit No. 2815/94) is decreed in favour of Nirayu Private Limited and against the defendants for Rs. 14,63,438.58.
  • Costs and pendente lite and future interest are awarded at 18% per annum.
  • The liability of the defendants is declared joint and several.
  • Decree-sheet to be drawn up and the file consigned to record room.

The opinion does not state any broader precedent-setting implications; the decision operates to dispose of the applications and to grant the plaintiff final relief in the suit.

    Nirayu Pvt. Ltd v. Mohan Lal.

    Lokeshwar Prasad, J.— This order shall govern the disposal of an application (IA 931/96), filed on behalf of the defendants 1, 2, 3 & 5 under Order XXXVII Rule 3(7) of the Code of Civil Procedure, 1908 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the CPC’) seeking condonation of delay in filing the application for leave to defend the suit.

    2. The facts relevant for the disposal of the above mentioned application lie in a narrow compass. The plaintiff Nirayu Private Limited, through its constituted attorney Shri Kamal Kumar has filed a suit (Suit No. 2815/94) for the recovery of Rs. 14,63,438.58 against the defendants under Order XXXVII, CPC. After the service of the summons of the suit in Form No. 4, Appendix-B, CPC, the plaintiff filed an application (IA 9761/95) for issue of summons for judgment on the defendants. The above said application came up for hearing before the learned Predecessor of this Court on 17.10.95 and the learned Predecessor of this Court vide order dated 17.10.95 directed that summons for judgment be served on the defendants on plaintiff's filing the process fee, for 9.1.1996

    3. Defendants 1, 2, 3, & 5 (hereinafter referred to as ‘the applicants’) have filed the present application (IA 931/96) under Order XXXVII, Rule (3)7, CPC with the prayer that delay in filing the application, seeking leave to defend the suit be condoned for reasons stated in the application. The main reason advanced by the applicants in the above said application for condoning the delay is that the summons for judgment have not been served on the applicants in accordance with the mandate of Order XXXVII, CPC as no affidavit verifying the cause of action and the amount claimed has been served alongwith the summons for judgment on the applicants. It is stated that in the absence of the above said statutory affidavits there is no service of summons for judgment on the applicants. In the application, besides the above ground, the applicants, on merits have taken other grounds also to the effect that there were certain disputes in the partnership firm of M/s. Mohan Lal & Company (defendant No. 1) of which defendants 2 to 5 are partners and that the accounts of the defendant firm had not been finalised and all the relevant documents/books were lying with M/s. P.N Khanna and Company, Charted Accountants as a result of which the applicants did not have any access or information regarding the accounts and were unable to file the application seeking leave to defend the suit. It is also stated that there were also talks for settlement/compromise going on between the parties. It is prayed by the applicants in the above said application that delay in filing the application (IA 930/96), seeking leave to defend the suit be condoned.

    4. Notice of the above application was given to the plaintiff who has filed a detailed reply. In the reply, filed on behalf of the plaintiff, it is stated that the present application, filed on behalf of the applicants is not maintainable in the eyes of law and is liable to be dismissed with costs. It is stated that summons for judgment were served on the defendants in accordance with law and the defendants/applicants have taken the false plea which is malafide and the applicants are not entitled to any indulgence by this Court. It is stated in the reply that the applicants are only prolonging and delaying the proceedings by making the false averments. It is stated that the application being frivolous be dismissed with costs and the suit filed by the plaintiff be decreed as prayed for as there is no application for leave to defend in the eyes of law on behalf of the defendants within limitation.

    5. I have heard the learned Counsel for the parties at length and have also carefully gone through the documents/material on record. Order XXXVII, Rule (3)(7), CPC which is relevant for deciding the above said application reads as under:

    “The Court or Judge may, for sufficient cause shown by the defendant, excuse the delay of the defendant in entering an appearance or in applying for leave to defend the suit.”

    The words ‘sufficient cause’ occurring in the above said sub-rule are of utmost significance. Though the expression ‘sufficient cause’ has not been defined but it must mean a cause which is beyond the control of the party invoking the aid of the same. In other words any cause, which prevents a person approaching the Court within time, is sufficient. In doing so it is a test of reasonable man in normal circumstances which has to be applied. The test whether or not a ‘cause’ is ‘sufficient’ is to see whether it could have been avoided by the party by the exercise of due care and attention. In other words whether it is a bona fide cause, inasmuch as nothing shall be deemed to be done bona fide or in good faith which is not done with due care and attention. The quantum or extent of delay has no direct nexus in law with the sufficiency of cause to condone the delay and these two are diverse and independent factors. In a given case if sufficient cause to the satisfaction of Court is not made out, even a relatively small delay cannot be condoned whereas if the Court is satisfied of the sufficiency of cause it may condoned even a long delay.

    6. In the light of the above settled legal position it is to be seen as to whether the applicants have shown ‘sufficient cause’ within the meaning of Sub-rule (7) of Rule (3), Order XXXVII, CPC. As already stated, the applicants in the above said application have stated that they have not been served with the summons for judgment in accordance with the mandate of Order XXXVII, CPC as no affidavit verifying the cause of action has been served upon them alongwith the summons for judgment. Besides the above ground they have taken other grounds also. As regards the other grounds, other than the one stated above, the same have failed to impress this Court and, therefore, I proceed to deal with the contention raised that in case the service of summons in Form No. 4-A Appendix-B, CPC is taken to have been proper, the application (1A 930/96) seeking leave to defend the suit would be barred by limitation.

    7. In so far as the above aspect is concerned, as already stated, the grievance of the applicants is that since they had not been properly served with the summons for judgment there was no occasion for them for applying for leave to defend the suit.

    8. As regards service of summons in Form No. 4-A Appendix-B, CPC, the dispute principally revolves around Sub-rule(4) of Rule (3) Order XXXVII, CPC which runs as under:

    “If the defendant enters an appearance, the plaintiff shall thereafter serve on the defendant a summons for judgment in Form No. 4-A in Appendix-B or such other Form as may be prescribed from time to time, returnable not less than ten days from the date of service, supported by an affidavit verifying the cause of action and the amount claimed and slating that in his belief there is no defence to the suit.”

    On a bare reading of the above provisions of Sub-rule (4) Rule (3), Order XXXVII, CPC it is apparent that the same provides not only for the service of summons for judgment by the plaintiff in Form No. 4-A Appendix-B, CPC but also of summons being “supported by an affidavit verifying the cause of action and the amount claimed and stating that in his belief there is no defence to the suit.” Thus the language of Sub-rule(4) itself makes it apparently clear that summons for judgment in Form No. 4-A must necessarily be accompanied by an affidavit as referred to in the said Sub-section and if that be so, the defendant would not be taken to have been properly served unless and until the said affidavit is also served upon him.

    9. In view of the position explained above, for deciding the above question it is necessary to examine as to whether the summons in Form No. 4-A Appendix-B, CPC were served on the applicants in accordance with the statutory provisions of Sub-rule (4) Rule (3), Order XXXVII, CPC. As already stated, the application filed on behalf of the plaintiff for the issue of summons for judgment (IA 9761/95) came up for hearing before the learned Predecessor of this Court on 17.10.95 and the learned Predecessor of this Court vide order of even date directed that summons for judgment be served on the defendants. The office note dated the 20th October 1995 (in Part II of the file) recorded while complying with the above said orders of the Court, is of significance which reads as under:

    “Reference order dated 17.10.95 One set summons for judgment for 9.1.96 to the Counsel for the defendants Mr. Mukul Talwar, Advocate is added. May issue.”

    10. From the above office notice which was the first step in the directions of service of summons for the judgment on the applicants it is clear that the office did not notice any defect in the process (summonses for judgment) which was to be issued in compliance with the orders of the Court. Had there been any defect/short-coming in the process as pleaded by the applicants/defendants, the office decidedly would have pointed out the same. Moreover, the process (summons for judgment) issued for service on the defendants/applicants in the present case were not received by a layman, but by a duly authorised Advocate, namely, Sh. Mukul Talwar. Sh. Mukul Talwar, Advocate, while acknowledging the receipt of the summonses for judgment on behalf of the defendants/applicants had taken all precautions, which fact is evident from his note recorded by him under his signatures on the copy of- the summonses for judgment in token of his having received the same on behalf of the defendants/applicants. Had the process (summonses for judgment) been defective, as is being contended by the applicants/defendants, in that event, decidedly Sh. Mukul Talwar, who is an Advocate and is supposed to be well conversant with the above statutory provisions, would have decidedly mentioned the above fact in his above mentioned note, recorded by him under his signatures on the copy of the summonses for judgment in token of his having received the same on behalf of the defendants. No such note, pointing out any such defect, has been recorded by said Sh. Mukul Talwar while acknowledging the receipt of the process on behalf of the defendants/applicants.

    11. The summonses decidedly were not received by the applicants themselves and the same on their behalf were received by their Advocate Sh. Mukul Talwar. Thus the best person to say whether the same were with the statutory affidavit or were without the same, would have been Sh. Mukul Talwar, Advocate. No affidavit of said Sh. Mukul Talwar, Advocate has been filed by the applicants in support of their contention and no explanation whatsoever has been offered by the applicants for not filing the same.

    12. In view of the position explained above, in my opinion, there appears to be no force in the plea of the applicants/defendants which appears to be an after thought and deserves to be rejected.

    13. In view of the above discussion, the above mentioned application, filed by the applicants, seeking condonation of delay in filing the application for leave to defend is liable to be rejected and accordingly the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.

    14. In view of my decision on application (IA 931/96) the above mentioned application seeking leave to defend the suit filed on behalf of defendants 1, 2, 3 & 5 is liable to dismissed being barred by limitation. Accordingly, the same is dismissed with no order as to costs.

    Suit No. 2815194

    15. All the defendants, including defendant No. 4 stand duly served with summonses for judgment. No application seeking leave to defend the suit has been filed by any of the defendants within the prescribed time limit. The application (IA 930/96) filed by defendants 1, 2, 3 & 5, seeking leave to defend the suit stands dismissed being barred by time and, therefore, the plaintiff is entitled to judgment forthwith. Accordingly, the present suit filed by the plaintiff is decreed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants and a decree in the sum of Rs. 14,63,438.58- (Rupees fourteen lacs sixty three thousand four hundred thirty eight and paise fifty eight only) is passed in favour of the plaintiff and against the defendants together with costs and pendente lite and future interest @ 18% per annum. The liability of the defendants will be joint and several. Decree sheet be drawn up accordingly and thereafter the file be consigned to record room.

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    Comments

    Nirayu Pvt. Ltd v. Mohan Lal.
    (Apr 1, 1998)