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Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This Civil Revision challenges the order dated 23-9-1983 passed by the Sub-Judge 1st Class in execution proceedings arising out of Suit No. 1002/74. The petitioner objected to the issuance of warrants of actual possession of premises No. 202.A-1A, Gurdwara Committee Building, Sadar Bazar, Delhi, claiming lawful tenancy rights as a tenant inducted by the defendant Gurdwara Committee.

The original suit was filed by Charan Singh against the Gurdwara Committee and its General Secretaries seeking mandatory and perpetual injunctions to restrain the letting out of the shop premises to others and for a direction to consider his application for allotment of the shop. The suit, filed on 25-8-1972, was based on an agreement dated 11-4-1955, under which the plaintiff claimed entitlement to the shop after surrendering possession of one quarter and shifting to another within the same building. The plaintiff alleged the shop in question had become vacant and should be let out to him. The defendants denied the agreement's continuing validity and claimed the plaintiff had not shown interest in the vacant shops. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 19-7-1978 and the plaintiff’s appeal proceeded ex parte as the defendants did not contest it. The appellate court ultimately decreed the suit.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a collusive decree between the plaintiff and defendant can extinguish the legal rights of a third party petitioner claiming lawful tenancy.
  2. Whether the trial court and appellate court were correct in ordering the issuance of warrants of actual possession in execution of a decree for mandatory injunction.
  3. Whether the petitioner, as a third party, has locus standi to raise objections and file revision against the execution order under Order 21 Rules 97 and 101 of the Civil Procedure Code.
  4. Whether execution of a decree for mandatory injunction can include warrants for actual possession under the relevant procedural provisions.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The decree obtained by the plaintiff and defendant was collusive and cannot affect the petitioner’s legal rights as a lawful tenant.
  • The trial court erred in issuing warrants of actual possession since the plaintiff was entitled only to symbolic possession under the law.
  • Execution of a decree for mandatory injunction does not permit issuance of warrants of possession, relying on the Full Bench decision in Sarup Singh v. Daryodhan Singh, AIR 1972 Delhi 142.
  • The petitioner’s tenancy rights are protected under the Delhi Rent Control Act, which requires eviction through a separate decree, as supported by Sunder Dass v. Mulkh Raj, AIR 1981 Delhi 85.
  • The first appellate court failed to consider these binding decisions despite their citation.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • The petitioner lacks locus standi to raise objections or file revision under Order 21 Rules 97 and 101 CPC as a third party in execution proceedings.
  • The allegation of collusion between plaintiff and defendant is denied; instead, collusion is alleged between petitioner and defendant.
  • The shop was let to the petitioner in violation of the agreement and after suit filing.
  • On merits, the petitioner is not a tenant of the defendants.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sarup Singh v. Daryodhan Singh, AIR 1972 Delhi 142 (Full Bench) Execution of decrees for mandatory injunction does not authorize warrants of actual possession; coercive measures under O.21 R.32(1) such as detention or attachment are appropriate. The Court upheld that warrants of actual possession cannot be issued in execution of a decree for mandatory injunction, declaring the execution order illegal and non-executable.
Sunder Dass v. Mulkh Raj, AIR 1981 Delhi 85 Tenancy rights under Delhi Rent Control Act require eviction through a formal decree; tenants cannot be dispossessed without such decree. The Court noted that the petitioner’s tenancy rights are protected under this Act and that eviction cannot be effected by execution of injunction decree.
Soni Vrajlal Jethalal v. Soni Jadavji Govindji, AIR 1972 Guj 148 High Court’s power under Section 151 CPC to prevent miscarriage of justice and set right illegalities in execution proceedings. The Court approved the use of inherent powers to correct illegal execution orders causing injustice to third parties, applying this principle to set aside the warrants of possession.
Rodger v. Comtoir D'Escompte De Peris, (1871) 3 PC 465 Support for exercising inherent powers to do substantial justice in execution matters. The Court relied on this precedent to justify its exercise of inherent jurisdiction under Section 151 CPC to prevent miscarriage of justice.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the nature of the decree obtained by the plaintiff, which was for mandatory injunction rather than possession. It relied on the Full Bench decision in Sarup Singh v. Daryodhan Singh to establish that execution of such a decree does not permit issuance of warrants for actual possession. The Court found a patent illegality in the execution court’s order to issue such warrants.

The Court further considered the petitioner’s position as a lawful tenant under the Delhi Rent Control Act, which protects tenants from dispossession without a formal eviction decree. The respondent’s failure to file a suit for possession and reliance solely on a mandatory injunction decree was held to be improper, and the petitioner should not be deprived of possession without due process.

The Court acknowledged the potential hardship to a third party caused by the illegal execution order and emphasized that procedural rules (Order XXI Rules 97 and 101) must be interpreted to avoid multiplicity of proceedings and miscarriage of justice. The Court invoked its inherent powers under Section 151 of the CPC to prevent injustice and set aside the illegal warrants of possession.

Consequently, the Court concluded that the execution order was illegal and non-executable, and the petitioner’s possession must not be disturbed.

Holding and Implications

The petition is allowed.

The Court set aside the order of the Execution Court issuing warrants of actual possession of the suit property, declaring it illegal. The petitioner shall not be disturbed in possession of the premises on the basis of the said warrants.

This decision directly protects the petitioner’s possession rights and clarifies that execution of mandatory injunction decrees cannot include warrants for actual possession. No new precedent beyond the application of existing principles was established, but the ruling prevents miscarriage of justice arising from improper execution procedures.

    Kuldip Singh v. Charan Singh And Others

    This Civil Revision is directed against the order of the Sub-Judge 1st Class dt. 23-9-83 in execution No. 82/81 in Suit No. 1002/74. The petitioner in the Civil Revision had raised objections in the said execution proceedings for the issue of the warrants of actual possession of premises No. 202.A-1A, Gurdwara Committee Building, Sadar Bazar, Delhi. He claimed the possession of the said premises as a lawful tenant inducted by the defendant Gurdwara Committee.

    2. Plaintiff, Charan Singh had filed the said suit against the defendant, Gurdwara Committee and the General Secretaries of the said Committee. The suit was for mandatory injunction and perpetual injunction for restraining the letting out or giving the said shop to anybody else and for a mandatory direction to consider the plaintiff's application for letting out the shop to him. The said suit was filed on 25-8-72. The plaintiff alleged that by virtue of an agreement dt. 11-4-55 between himself and defendant No. 1 he was entitled to the said premises. It was alleged by the plaintiff that he was in possession of Quarter No. 11 in the said building and it was agreed that he would surrender the possession of the said Quarter and shift to Quarter No. 9. It was further alleged that under the said agreement he was also promised that he would be entitled to get a shop in the said building and in the line of shops occupied by Dasonda Singh to Ram Lal Mochi. It was then alleged that no time limit was fixed for the allotment of a plot. The shop 202/1, which was occupied by Ram Lal Mochi, had fallen vacant. The plaintiff, therefore, claimed that the said shop be let out to him and not to anybody else. The defendants in their written statement claimed that the alleged agreement dt. 11-4-55 had exhausted itself and was not operative. The reason was that instead of Quarter No. 9 the plaintiff later on preferred Quarter No. 1/436 which was much bigger in area and abutted on a 16′ wide street as against a 5′ wide street abutting Quarter No. 9. Two premises had fallen vacant in the said shop line from time to time but the plaintiff never showed any desire nor made any request for the allotment of said shops. The suit was filed on 25-8-72 but before that on 6-8-72, the said premises were let out to the objector and some others. But after filing of the said written statement the defendants did not show any interest in the suit and allowed the matter to be proceeded ex parte. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on 19-7-78. The plaintiff preferred an appeal. The defendants did not contest the appeal and allowed it to proceed ex parte. The petitioner herein claims that after letting out the shop in question to him the defendant committee in collusion with the plaintiff allowed the suit to be decreed by not contesting the same. The appellate court decreed the suit.

    3. Two contentions are raised by the petitioner in this revision. The first contention is that the collusive decree between the plaintiff and the defendant cannot put to an end a legal right in favour of the petitioner/third party. It is also contended that the trial court was wrong in ordering issuing warrants of actual possession against the petitioner. The plaintiff was only entitled to symbolic possession in law and not the actual possession. The counsel for petitioner has relied upon Sarup Singh… v. Daryodhan Singh… AIR 1972 Delhi 142 (FB) in support of the proposition that no warrant of possession can be issued in execution of decree for mandatory injunction. The counsel further argued that his right to lawful tenancy is governed by Delhi Rent Control Act and the tenant cannot be dispossessed except by decree of eviction passed under the Delhi Rent Control Act. He has relied upon the decision of this Court reported in Sunder Dass v. Mulkh Raj, AIR 1981 Delhi 85. The Counsel then submitted that neither of the decisions of this Court were considered by the first appellate court although they were cited before the said court.

    4. The respondent, however, objected to the maintainability of this revision application. He has submitted that the petitioner had no locus standi and he was not entitled to raise any objection under O. 21 R. 97 CPC or O. 21 R. 101 CPC. Since the third party, to an execution proceeding, cannot raise any objections, he cannot also file any revision. The counsel further denied the allegation of collusion between the plaintiff and the defendant and urged that in fact there was a collusion between the petitioner herein and the defendant. According to the learned counsel this is clear from the fact that the shop in question was let out to the petitioner in violation of the agreement and after the filing of the suit. On merits it was contended that the petitioner was not a tenant of the defendants.

    5. The contention of the petitioner that the first appellate court was not competent to order warrants of actual possession in view of the decision of the Full Bench of this court in Sarup Singh… v. Daryodhan Singh… Civil Revision No. 151 of 1970 : (Reported in AIR 1972 Delhi 142) is to be upheld. The Full Bench of this Court held that a decree for injunction is normally to be executed by detaining the judgment-debtor in Civil prison or by attachment of his property or both under O. 21 R. 32(1). Ordinarily, these two coercive measures would constitute an effective remedy to compel the judgment-debtor to obey the decree or order of the Court. If the judgment-debtor fails to vacate the premises in spite of having suffered detention in prison there is no impediment to further exercise of punitive powers under R. 32(1) and (3) according to law. It was further held that since the decree-holder sought a decree for injunction instead of decree for possession, he has to face its legal consequences, and he can have the decree executed only in accordance with the provisions of law governing execution of decrees, for injunction. He cannot employ the arguments of frustration of his object existing behind his suit to obtain a relief from the court which was not envisaged by the suit and not granted by the Court. Issue of a warrant for delivery of possession in execution of a decree for injunction passed in a suit for mandatory injunction is not justified either by O. 21, R. 35 or S. 51(e). There is a patent illegality apparent on the face of the record committed by the lower court in directing warrants of actual possession. The decree, therefore, is not executable.

    6. If the decree is not executable in law by issue of warrants of actual possession, is the third party who stands to suffer by such a decree without any remedy? Should he be subjected to suffer loss of possession and his legal rights and be told to file a separate suit to get back his possession? The immediate consequences of the illegal decree of possession is instant dispossession. The initiation of the suit and its prosecution which unfortunately has become a delayed and long winding affairs would completely frustrate a third party. Order XXI, R. 97 and R. 101 must be interpretated in this background. Is it the intention of law particularly after the amendments to the Civil Procedure Code by the amending Act of 1976 that there should be multiplicity of proceedings and miscarriage of justice in relation to a third party?.

    7. The respondent decree-holder had an option to file the suit for possession but he did not do so and preferred only to file the suit for permanent/mandatory injunction. But he is a beneficiary of the wrong order of warrants of possession in his favour. While on the other hand the petitioner who is a lawful tenant of the suit premises is to be told that he has no remedy under O. XXI and that he should file a suit for vindicating his claim. This to my mind is total miscarriage of justice. The Court can in such circumstances exercise its powers under S. 151, if any technical difficulty comes in the way of exercise of its powers under S. 115 of the C.P.C But I do not find that the court is powerless to set right the patent illegalities and miscarriage of justice under S. 115 of C.P.C itself. In case of the mandatory injunctions the execution court has no jurisdiction to pass an order for warrants of actual possession. No act of court in the course of its proceedings should be permitted to cause injury to a suitor in the court. Such course of action to set right the illegalities was followed in Soni Vrajlal Jethalal v. Soni Jadavji Govindji, AIR 1972 Guj 148. In the said decision relying upon Rodger v. Comtoir D'Escompte De Peris, (1871) 3 PC 465 at page 475, D.A Desai, J. as a Judge of Gujarat High Court, in similar circumstances, exercised the power of the High Court under S. 151, C.P.C for doing substantial justice in the matter and I am in respectful agreernent with the said approach. An additional fact which has adversely affected the petitioner is that the landlord after stating in the written statement that the petitioner was inducted as a tenant and the landlord was receiving rent from him, did not prosecute the suit or the appeal and allowed the ex parte orders to be passed.

    8. The order of the Execution Court, issuing warrants of actual possession of the suit property, is thus illegal and set aside. The petitioner shall not be disturbed in his possession of the premises on the basis of the said warrants of possession.

    Petition allowed.
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    Comments

    Kuldip Singh v. Charan Singh And Others
    (Mar 28, 1985)