Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (in short "Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982")
  • section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922 and section 505(1)(b) of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 3(2) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982 and section 505(1)(b) of the Indian Penal Code.
  • SECTION 3 POLICE INCITEMENT TO DISAFFECTION ACT 1922
  • Act 14/1982. Invoking the provision under section 12(2) of Act 14/1982,
  • section 2(f) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982,
  • section 3(2) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982.
  • Section 505(1)(b) of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 16 of the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982
  • provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982
  • Section 16 of Act 14 of 1982. 35.
  • Nadu Act 14/1982,
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (in short "Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982")
  • section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922 and section 505(1)(b) of the Indian Penal Code.
  • section 3(2) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982 and section 505(1)(b) of the Indian Penal Code.
  • SECTION 3 POLICE INCITEMENT TO DISAFFECTION ACT 1922
  • Act 14/1982. Invoking the provision under section 12(2) of Act 14/1982,
  • section 2(f) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982,
  • section 3(2) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982.
  • Section 505(1)(b) of the Indian Penal Code
  • section 16 of the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982
  • provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982
  • Section 16 of Act 14 of 1982. 35.
  • Nadu Act 14/1982,
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (W.P. No.1243 of 2003) — Delivered 27.4.2010

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, a former Indian Army serviceman who subsequently joined the Tamil Nadu Subordinate Police Services and retired as Inspector of Police on 31.10.1997, allegedly authored a news item published in the Tamil Daily Malai Murasu on 8.12.1997 in his capacity as State Convenor of the Tamil Nadu Police Officials Association. Based on a complaint dated 6.1.1998 by the fourth respondent, the third respondent registered Crime No.11/98 under section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922 and Section 505(1)(b) of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner was arrested, remanded to judicial custody, and on 9.1.1998 a detention order under the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982) was passed by the second respondent (Inspector General and Commissioner of Salem City), on the basis of a proposal submitted by the third respondent.

The petitioner made a written representation dated 19.2.1998. The Advisory Board constituted under Act 14/1982 recommended revocation of the detention order, and the Government of Tamil Nadu revoked the detention. The criminal proceedings were later dropped by the Judicial Magistrate on the final report submitted by the third respondent (June 2001). The petitioner filed the writ petition seeking compensation (Rs.10,00,000) alleging mala fide detention intended to malign his reputation; respondents denied mala fides and relied inter alia on good faith, statutory immunity and the absence of material to show habitual misconduct.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the detention of the petitioner under Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982 was motivated by mala fide intent to malign his reputation.
  2. Whether the respondents are liable to pay monetary compensation for the detention and for the registration/prosecution which was subsequently dropped.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • The detention order under Act 14/1982 was clamped against him with mala fide intention to detain and to destroy his reputation and image.
  • He and his family suffered mental agony and physical suffering due to the detention and prosecution; he sought Rs.10,00,000 as compensation and sent a lawyer's notice dated 27.6.2002.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The first respondent alleged suppression of material facts by the petitioner and contended that the detention order was passed only after obtaining legal advice.
  • The respondents asserted that the petitioner, while claiming to be Convenor, had been advocating formation of an association and had toured districts to solicit serving police personnel; this conduct was alleged to be prejudicial to public order.
  • The petitioner submitted a written undertaking (representation dated 19.2.1998) promising not to indulge in such activities in future; the Advisory Board recommended release after perusing materials including that representation.
  • Respondents 2 to 4 emphasized that they acted in good faith and in official capacity; they relied on statutory protection (Section 16 of Act 14/1982) shielding acts done in good faith under the Act.
  • The third respondent ultimately filed a final report dropping criminal proceedings owing to lack of concrete material; the respondents contended this does not establish mala fide conduct.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
VIJAY NARAIN SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR ((1984) 3 SCC 14) The meaning of the phrase "a person habitually commits" acts prejudicial to public order — continuous repetition of some offence prejudicial to public order is essential to term a person habitual. The court referred to this principle to observe that there was no concrete material to show that the petitioner habitually engaged in activities prejudicial to public order.
BHIM SINGH, MLA v. STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND OTHERS (AIR 1986 SC 494) Recognition that monetary compensation may be awarded where arrest/imprisonment is malicious and constitutional/legal rights are invaded, particularly where there is collusion or malicious intent by State actors. The court distinguished that case: in Bhim Singh there was deliberate malicious intent and collusion; in the present case the facts did not show such malice or collusion, so its principle did not lead to grant of compensation here.
UNION OF INDIA v. AMRIT LAL MANCHANDA ((2004) 3 SCC 75) Explanation of the nature and justification of preventive detention — anticipatory, preventive (not punitive), and ordinarily left to executive discretion; the detaining authority may act on material that affords a basis for a sufficiently strong suspicion. The court applied this reasoning to hold that the respondents acted on suspicion arising from the press note and that preventive detention may be justified as an anticipatory measure; this supported the conclusion that respondents acted in good faith.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded through the following analytical steps, based solely on the material before it:

  1. Establishment of the factual matrix: the press note of 8.12.1997 (addressed to the Chief Minister and urging permission for a police association), complaint of 6.1.1998, registration of Crime No.11/98, arrest and remand, and the detention order of 9.1.1998 under section 3(2) of Act 14/1982.
  2. Recognition that the petitioner had publicly advocated formation of an association after retirement and had given a written undertaking (representation dated 19.2.1998) that he would not indulge in such activities in future; the court reproduced the undertaking and treated it as significant evidence of the petitioner's own admission of having contemplated such activity.
  3. Review of investigative record: the third respondent, during investigation, was unable to collect concrete material to sustain charges under section 3(2) of Act 14/1982 and Section 505(1)(b) IPC, and therefore filed a final report recommending dropping of proceedings; the Judicial Magistrate accepted that report.
  4. Consideration of the statutory and doctrinal context: the court noted definitions in Act 14/1982 (for example section 2(f) defining 'goonda') and relied on Supreme Court authority (Amrit Lal Manchanda) describing preventive detention as anticipatory, preventive in nature, and generally resting on the executive's satisfaction which may be formed on material falling short of proof required in criminal trials.
  5. Application of precedent on "habitual" misconduct (Vijay Narain Singh): the court observed that to treat someone as habitually committing acts prejudicial to public order requires evidence of continuous repetition; such concrete materials were absent in the present case.
  6. Assessment of the respondents' state of mind and conduct: the court found there existed a genuine apprehension in the minds of the respondents that the press note's call might precipitate indiscipline in the uniformed police force and potentially affect public order. The second respondent sought legal advice, acted on the registered case and reports before him, and even forwarded and acted upon the petitioner's undertaking. The first respondent approved the detention order and later, on advisory board recommendation, revoked it.
  7. Consideration of the claim for mala fide and compensation: the court distinguished Bhim Singh (where malicious intent and collusion were found) and concluded that the facts here did not demonstrate malicious or mala fide intent on the part of the respondents. The respondents had statutory immunity under section 16 of Act 14/1982 for acts done in good faith under the statute. The court therefore found the petitioner's claim that the detention was motivated by mala fide intent unproven.
  8. Conclusion: because the petitioner failed to establish mala fide intention, and because the respondents had acted on suspicion and in what the court found to be good faith preventive motives, the court rejected the claim for compensation and dismissed the writ petition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The writ petition failed and stands dismissed. There was no order as to costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect: The petitioner's claim for compensation (Rs.10,00,000) was rejected; no monetary relief was awarded.
  • The court concluded that the respondents acted in good faith on a cause of suspicion arising from the petitioner's press note and investigative material; the Advisory Board's recommendation and the final report dropping proceedings supported the factual chronology but did not establish mala fide conduct by respondents.
  • The opinion does not announce a new legal precedent; it applies existing authorities (including the Supreme Court decisions cited) to distinguish facts and to confirm that preventive detention may rest on executive satisfaction and suspicion, and that compensation is appropriate only when mala fide detention and malicious invasion of rights are established (as in Bhim Singh), which was not found here.

Delivered on 27.4.2010 by M. Jeyapaul, J. — Index: Yes. Internet: Yes.

To access the original judgment, please Sign In or Subscribe.

    N. Sengodan v. The Secretary To Government, Home (Prohibition And Excise) Department, Chennai Others

    The petitioner served in the Indian Army for a period of seven years and thereafter, joined in the Tamil Nadu Subordinate Police Services and retired as Inspector of Police, Athur Police Station, Salem District on 31.10.1997. After his retirement, he had the opportunity of realizing the difficulties encountered by each and every member of the police force in Tamil Nadu and had voiced the merits of forming an association through which the demands of the members of the police force could be legally made to set right the wrongs committed to them. In the Tamil Daily Malai Murasu dated 8.12.1997, there was a news item allegedly authored by N.Sengodan, the petitioner herein in his capacity as State Convenor, Tamil Nadu Police Officials Association. Based on the said news item, a complaint dated 6.1.1998 was lodged by the fourth respondent with the third respondent Inspector of Police, Fairlands Police Station, Salem City. The third respondent registered a case in Crime No.11/98 for offence under section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922 and for offence under Section 505(1)(b) of the Indian Penal Code. The petitioner was arrested by the third respondent and was remanded to judicial custody. While he was in judicial custody, an order of detention dated 9.1.1998 passed by the second respondent Inspector General and Commissioner of Salem City was served on him. The order of detention was passed by the second respondent based on the proposal submitted by the third respondent. The petitioner made a written representation to the Secretary to Government on 19.2.1998 through the Superintendent, Central Prison, Salem. The Advisory Board established under the provisions of the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982 recommended for revocation of the detention order. The Government of Tamil Nadu revoked the order of detention made by the Inspector General and Commissioner of Police.

    2. The petitioner would contend that the order of detention was clamped against him with a mala fide intention of detaining him under Act 14/1982. The petitioner was detained under Act 14/1982 for a period of two months. The ground case also was dropped by the learned Judicial Magistrate V, Salem based on the final report submitted by the third respondent in the month of June 2001. Respondents 2 to 4 have acted with an object of destroying the reputation and image of the petitioner. The petitioner issued lawyer's notice dated 27.6.2002 claiming damages, but, the respondents gave a reply claiming immunity to their actions. Alleging that the petitioner, alongwith his family members, underwent mental agony and physical sufferings, he sought for compensation of Rs.10,00,000/= from the respondents.

    3. The first respondent has contended in the counter that the petitioner is guilty of suppression of material facts. The petitioner, having falsely claimed to be the Convenor of the Tamil Nadu Police Employees Association, visited several Districts and insisted the members of the Disciplined Forces to join the said association so as to raise their voice against the Government. The order of detention was passed by the second respondent only after obtaining legal advice. The petitioner submitted a representation dated 19.2.1998 undertaking that he would not indulge in any such activity in future. The Advisory Board, after perusing the order of detention, report of the detaining authority, the written representation of the detenu dated 19.2.1998 and the connected records, expressed its opinion that there was no sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner. The Government revoked the order of detention passed as against the petitioner based on the advice of the Advisory Board. The final report was filed dropping the proceedings as against the petitioner only based on the fact that the detention order was revoked by the Advisory Board and the petitioner kept up his undertaking not to indulge in any activity for the next three years. The order of detention was passed by the second respondent in his official capacity. Therefore, the claim for damages made by the petitioner is totally unsustainable, it is contended.

    4. Respondents 2 to 4 would contend in their counter that the petitioner submitted a representation dated 19.2.1998 tendering apology for his conduct and gave assurance that he would not indulge in any such activity in future. The second respondent forwarded the same to the Chief Office, Chennai with his report. Only on the basis of the undertaking given by the petitioner, the Advisory Board ordered the release of the petitioner. Legal Advisor was consulted beforeever the second respondent passed the order on the report submitted by the third respondent. The second respondent passed the detention order in his official capacity exercising the power vested with him. The order of detention passed by the second respondent was confirmed by the third respondent. No animosity was alleged as against respondents 2 to 4 by the petitioner. Very vague allegation has been made that the petitioner was detained with mala fide intention. The petitioner, claiming himself to be the Convenor of the Tamil Nadu Police Employees Association, made efforts to form an association. Respondents 2 to 4 cannot be fastened with any liability to pay compensation, it is contended.

    5. A retired Inspector of Police, who was detained under the Tamil Nadu Prevention of Dangerous Activities of Bootleggers, Drug Offenders and Slum Grabbers Act, 1982 (in short "Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982") and was released thereafter from detention by the Government of Tamil Nadu as per the recommendation of the Advisory Board constituted as per the provision of the said Act, claims compensation from the respondents on the ground that respondents 2 to 4 have acted with mala fide intention in order to malign his reputation though there was no ground for booking a case as against him and passed an order of detention under the said Act.

    6. There was a news item in the Tamil Daily Malai Murasu dated 8.12.1997 alleged to have been given by the petitioner in his capacity as State Convenor, Tamil Nadu Police Employees Association. The said news item is in the form of an address to the Honourable Chief Minister of Tamil Nadu. The sum and substance of it is as follows:-

    The police officials, who are supposed to give protection to the public, have been forced to seek protection for themselves. The police officials are not in a position to articulate their demands to the Government. The attack launched on Mr.Selvaraj, Police Constable and his subsequent death that took place at Coimbatore on 30.11.1997 is a classic example. As the police officials were not in a position to properly bring to the notice of the Government, their wives had to inform the Government about the incident through their strike on the street. In order to obviate such a situation, a demand was also placed before the State to permit them to have an association for themselves. Reminding the above development, a demand has now been made to permit them to have an association in order to ventilate their grievances and also to protect themselves. Therefore, the police officials make a demand to the Honourable Chief Minister to give permission to them to form an association in the above facts and circumstances.

    7. Though this news item was published in the Tamil Daily Malai Murasu on 8.12.1997, on the basis of the complaint dated 6.1.1998 given by the fourth respondent, Inspector of Police, Sooramangalam Police Station, Salem City, the third respondent, Inspector of Police, Fairlands Police Station, Salem City registered a case in Crime No.11 of 1998 under section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922 and Section 505(1)(b) of the Indian Penal Code. The fact remains that the petitioner retired from service on 31.10.1997 itself. Therefore, this news item appeared long after his retirement. The petitioner was, thereafter, arrested on 6.1.1998 and was remanded to judicial custody on 7.1.1998.

    8. The third respondent filed an affidavit before the second respondent praying for an order of detention under section 3(2) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982. In the affidavit, he has averred to the fact that the petitioner, who has retired from the service on 31.10.1997, was known for his pro-police Association activities even while he was in Government service. He claimed to be the President of South Arcot District Police Association. The press statement given by the petitioner appeared in the Tamil Daily Malai Murasu on 8.12.1997 has the potential to incite the police personnel of Tamil Nadu to form an association to fight for their rights. He had toured various Districts of Coimbatore, Tiruchirappalli, Pudukottai and Chennai and incited the serving police personnel with an idea to form an association. Bringing to the notice of the second respondent that he was acting in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, the third respondent prayed for an order of detention under section 3(2) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982. The second respondent passed an order of detention considering the adverse activities of the petitioner which were brought to his notice. Having categorically held that the petitioner had acted in a manner prejudicial to the maintenance of public order, he passed an order under section 3(2) of the Act 14/1982.

    9. On 9.1.1998 itself, the petitioner moved an application for bail. The learned Judicial Magistrate V, Salem, having adverted to the fact that the petitioner, having formed an association, made an open invitation to all the police officials to join the association, dismissed the application.

    10. It is the admitted case of the first respondent that the first respondent also approved the order of detention passed by the second respondent. The Advisory Board, after perusing the grounds of detention, the report of the detaining authority to the Government, the written representation of the detenu dated 19.12.1998, the connected records and the oral representation of the detenu before the Advisory Board, unanimously expressed its opinion that there was no sufficient cause for the detention of the petitioner under Act 14/1982. Invoking the provision under section 12(2) of Act 14/1982, the Governor of Tamil Nadu revoked the order of detention passed on 9.1.1998 by the second respondent. As per the directions of the first respondent, the petitioner was released forthwith from detention under Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982.

    11. section 3 of the Police (Incitement to Disaffection) Act, 1922 provides for penalty for causing dissatisfaction towards the State. Section 505(1)(b) of the Indian Penal Code provides for punishment for publishing or circulating any statement with an intent to cause or likely to cause fear or alarm to the public or to any section of the public whereby any person may be induced to commit an offence against the State or against public tranquility.

    12. In para 4 of the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, the petitioner has categorically stated that after his retirement, he had the opportunity to realise the difficulties encountered by each and every member of the police force in the State of Tamil Nadu and had voiced the merits of forming an association, through which demands could be legally made to set right the wrongs committed to them. The aforesaid averment found in the affidavit of the petitioner is loud and clear that he was toying with an idea of forming an association for the police force in order to address their grievance through the association.

    13. Admittedly, the petitioner made a representation dated 19.2.1998 before the Advisory Board. In the penultimate paragraph of his representation, he has submitted as follows:-

    "I submit that I undertake not to indulge in any activities which is per se illegal and unlawful. I submit that I have not taken any part in the strike or in the connected activities. So, I request that I am innocent and I may be released at an early date. I assure you that I will not take any part in future in this connection."

    14. If the aforesaid undertaking given before the Advisory Board is read alongwith the averment in the affidavit filed in support of the writ petition, it is quite clear that the petitioner, who had an idea to form an association for the police force, assured the Advisory Board that he would not take any part in future in that connection.

    15. In fact, the very same representation was given to the second respondent who forwarded the same to the Director General of Police of Tamil Nadu bringing to his notice the assurance given by the petitioner that he would not indulge in any illegal or unlawful activities and the request made by him to revoke the detention order against him.

    16. It is found that the second respondent, without simply forwarding the representation made by the petitioner, virtually recommended for some positive action on the basis of the assurance given by the petitioner.

    17. It is not the case of the petitioner that the press note found published in Malai Murasu dated 8.12.1997 was purposely planted to implicate him in a criminal case. As per his own admission, he was toying with an idea for quite sometime to form an association to address the grievance of the police officials. The very fact that he had undertaken before the Advisory Board that he would not indulge in such activities in future would go to show that he expressed remorse for his activities which culminated in registration of the case.

    18. The third respondent had after all registered a case based on the complaint given by the fourth respondent. He had suspected that the petitioner toured various Districts for the purpose of mobilising the opinion of the police force to form an association to address their grievance. The second respondent was completely guided by the case which was already registered as against the petitioner on the file of the third respondent police and the adverse activities brought to his notice. In fact, the order of detention passed by the second respondent was approved by the first respondent.

    19. It appears that there was an apprehension in the mind of the Government of Tamil Nadu that if association activities for the Uniformed Police Force is permitted, public order would be the first casualty. That had prompted the second respondent to pass the order of detention and the first respondent to approve the said order of detention passed by the second respondent.

    20. As per section 2(f) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982, a 'goonda' means a person who habitually commits or attempts to commit offences punishable under Chapter XVI or Chapter XVII or Chapter XXII of of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.

    21. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner cites the decision of the Honourable Supreme Court in VIJAY NARAIN SINGH v. STATE OF BIHAR ((1984 3 SCC 14). The phrase "a person habitually commits" acts prejudicial to public order came up for consideration before the Honourable Supreme Court in the aforesaid decision. The Honourable Supreme Court has held that continuous repetition of some offence prejudicial to public order is essential to term a person habitually committing such acts.

    22. Though the respondents would contend that the petitioner was involved in habitual activities prejudicial to the interest of the public order by touring various Districts and soliciting the police officials to join the Association, there is no concrete material produced before the court. But, there was a suspicion in the minds of the respondents that the chain of activities indulged by the petitioner by touring various Districts and inciting the police officials to join the Association would be prejudicial to the public order.

    23. The third respondent, during the course of investigation, could not collect concrete materials to clamp the petitioner with the offence under section 3(2) of the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982 and Section 505(1)(b) of the Indian Penal Code. Therefore, he filed a final report recommending for dropping of the criminal proceedings initiated as against the petitioner. The learned Judicial Magistrate also accepted such a final report dropping the criminal proceedings initiated as against the petitioner. It is only thereafter the petitioner has filed this writ petition praying for compensation.

    24. It may be a case where the third respondent was not in a position to collect materials to show that the petitioner was involved habitually in activities inciting the Uniformed Police Force to join the Association. That does not mean that the respondents acted with malicious or mala fide intention to malign the reputation of the petitioner, who had already retired from service. There was no reason for the respondents to select a retired official to book a case and detain him under Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982, if they had not in good faith intended to prevent any violation to public order.

    25. The learned counsel appearing for the petitioner cited a decision of the Supreme Court in BHIM SINGH, MLA v. STATE OF JAMMU AND KASHMIR AND OTHERS (AIR 1986 SC 494(1)). It has been held therein as follows:-

    "When a person comes to us with the complaint that he has been arrested and imprisoned with mischievous or malicious intent and that his constitutional and legal rights were invaded, the mischief or malice and the invasion may not be washed away or wished away by his being set free. In appropriate cases we have the jurisdiction to compensate the victim by awarding suitable monetary compensation. We consider this an appropriate case. We direct the first respondent, the State of Jammu and Kashmir to pay to Shri.Bhim Singh a sum of Rs.50,000/= within two months from today. The amount will be deposited with the Registrar of this Court and paid to Shri.Bhim Singh."

    26. That was a case where an MLA was imprisoned with malicious intent and thereby his constitutional and legal rights were invaded. Not only the police officials acted deliberately with mala fide intention but the learned Judicial Magistrate and the Subordinate Judge also aided them either by colluding with them or by their casual attitude. Under such circumstances, the above referred observation was made by the Honourable Supreme Court.

    27. In the instant case, the press note published in Malai Murasu in the name of the petitioner was the source for registration of a case as against the petitioner. The respondents had to promptly act in order to avoid any upheaval in the police force on account of the call which emanated from the said press note. If any indiscipline is set in in the Uniformed Force, the State would be incapacitated to maintain the public order. Therefore, a case was registered by the third respondent based on the complaint given by the fourth respondent on the strength of the press note published in the Tamil Daily. There can be no mala fide intent on the part of the respondents to malign the reputation of the petitioner. The facts and circumstances of this case cannot be equated with the fact situation of the above case dealt with by the Supreme Court.

    28. The learned Senior Counsel appearing for respondents 2 to 4 would submit that a protection has been provided under section 16 of the Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982 for the State Government as well as for the officers concerned in connection with the acts done in good faith by them. The above section would read that no suit or prosecution or legal prosecution shall lie against the State Government or any other officers or person for anything in good faith done or intended to be done in pursuance of Act 14/1982.

    29. It is found that there is a source for registering a case as against the petitioner. As the respondents apprehended that the entire police force would wake up to the call given in the press note, they acted in good faith to prevent any such untoward incident in the police force which may culminate in an upheaval. There may be some misconception of law by the respondents while clamping a detention order on the petitioner. Mala fide intention cannot be attributed for such misconception of law.

    30. In this context, it is relevant to note that the second respondent, who, in fact, passed an order of detention as against the petitioner, thought it fit to give a positive signal to the authorities concerned to consider the request of the petitioner on the basis of the assurance given by him that he would not indulge in such activities in future. If there had been any mischievous or malicious intent to deprive the petitioner of the fundamental rights or to malign his reputation, the second respondent would not have acted in such a fair manner.

    31. Coming to the role of the third respondent, it is found that he, having found that no substantial materials could be collected to charge sheet the petitioner, recommended for dropping of proceedings as against the petitioner in the final report filed by him before the court. The court also accepted the final report and dropped the proceedings as against the petitioner. The aforesaid act of the third respondent would go to show that there was no mala fide intention on his part in registration of a case and recommending for clamping an order of detention by the second respondent. Just because the Advisory Board found that there was no sufficient cause for detaining any more the petitioner and the case booked against the petitioner was dropped, mala fide intention cannot be attributed as against the respondents.

    32. Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure. The main object of the law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. Preventive detention is resorted to when the Executive is convinced that such detention is necessary in order to prevent the person detained from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain objects which are specified by the law concerned.

    33. Justifying the enactment of law of preventive detention, the Supreme Court has held in UNION OF INDIA v. AMRIT LAL MANCHANDA ((2004) 3 SCC 75) as follows:-

    "Before dealing with rival submissions, it would be appropriate to deal with the purpose and intent of preventive detention. Preventive detention is an anticipatory measure and does not relate to an offence, while criminal proceedings are to punish a person for an offence committed by him. They are not parallel proceedings. The object of the law of preventive detention is not punitive but only preventive. It is resorted to when the executive is convinced that such detention is necessary in order to prevent the person detained from acting in a manner prejudicial to certain objects which are specified by the law concerned. The action of the executive in detaining a person being only precautionary, normally the matter has necessarily to be left to the discretion of the executive authority. It is not practicable to lay down objective rules of conduct in an exhaustive manner, the failure to conform to which should lead to detention. The satisfaction of the detaining authority, therefore, is considered to be of primary importance, with great latitude in the exercise of its discretion. The detaining authority may act on any material and on any information that it may have before it. Such material and information may merely afford basis for a sufficiently strong suspicion to take action, but may not satisfy the tests of legal proof on which alone a conviction for offence will be tenable. The compulsions of the primordial need to maintain order in society without which the enjoyment of all rights, including the right to personal liberty of citizens would lose all their meanings, provide the justification for the laws of preventive detention. Laws that provide for preventive detention posit that an individual's conduct prejudicial to the maintenance of public order or to the security of State or corroding financial base provides grounds for satisfaction for a reasonable prognostication of possible future manifestations of similar propensities on the part of the offender. This jurisdiction has at times been even called a jurisdiction of suspicion. The compulsions of the very preservation of the values of freedom of democratic society and of social order might compel a curtailment of individual liberty. "To lose our country by a scrupulous adherence to the written law' said Thomas Jefferson "would be to lose the law itself, with life, liberty and all those who are enjoying with us, thus absurdly sacrificing the end to the needs." This, no doubt, is the theoretical jurisdictional justification for the law enabling preventive detention. But the actual manner of administration of the law of preventive detention is of utmost importance. The law has to be justified by striking the right balance between individual liberty on the one hand and the needs of an orderly society on the other."

    34. The very fact that there was a call to the entire police force found in the press note has given rise to the suspicion which warranted taking immediate action as against the petitioner. They had acted in good faith that if such preventive action was not taken as against the petitioner, the situation would go out of hand and there would be anarchy. The respondents have got immunity under Section 16 of Act 14 of 1982.

    35. In the instant case, the petitioner has failed to establish that there was mala fide intention on the part of the respondents in registering a case and detaining him under Tamil Nadu Act 14/1982. The question of giving compensation just because the case booked as against the petitioner was dropped and the order of detention was revoked by the Government would not arise for consideration.

    36. In view of the above, the writ petition fails and it stands dismissed. There is no order as to costs.

    27.4.2010.

    Index: Yes.

    Internet: Yes.

    ssk.

    The Secretary to Government, Home (Prohibition and Excise) Department, Fort St. George, Chennai 600 009.

    M.JEYAPAUL, J.

    Ssk.

    P.D. ORDER IN W.P.No.1243 of 2003 Delivered on 27.4.2010.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    N. Sengodan v. The Secretary To Gov...
    (Apr 27, 2010)