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Equivalent Citations
citation codes
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Acts
  • Article 106 of the Limitation Act (then Article 123 of the Limitation Act).
  • provisions of Order XIV, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Article 113, Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act, 1963.25.
  • Article 113 of Schedulel of the Limitation Act.
  • Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  • Article 110 of the Limitation Act.
  • Article 106 of the Limitation Act
  • Limitation Act, Article 113
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Article 106 of the Limitation Act (then Article 123 of the Limitation Act).
  • provisions of Order XIV, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Article 113, Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act, 1963.25.
  • Article 113 of Schedulel of the Limitation Act.
  • Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963.
  • Article 110 of the Limitation Act.
  • Article 106 of the Limitation Act
  • Limitation Act, Article 113
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

(Narrative strictly from the provided opinion)

The parties are brother (plaintiff) and sister (defendant). They seek relief concerning movable properties said to form part of the estate of their deceased mother, Jerbai Rustomji Noble, who died intestate on 23 May 1978. The plaintiff's suit, filed on 11 July 1994, prays for accounts and administration of the deceased's movable estate, a declaration that the plaintiff and defendant are each entitled to one-half of the estate, directions for division in equal shares, and ancillary reliefs (including inquiries and consequential orders). The defendant contests that the items in the plaint constitute the mother's estate and contends that the plaintiff's suit is barred by the law of limitation.

The court framed the question of limitation as a preliminary issue under Order XIV, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure and heard arguments of counsel on that issue. The pleadings were on record and issues had been framed. Relevant factual highlights recorded in the plaint and correspondence include a notice from the defendant's advocate dated 30 July 1990 asserting that the defendant had purchased certain shares and had added the plaintiff's name in the shareholdings for convenience; a reply by the plaintiff's attorneys dated 21 August 1990 denying the defendant's beneficial ownership and claiming beneficial interest and specific jewellery; and subsequent litigation between the parties (noted in the opinion as Suit No. 1661 of 1991 filed by the defendant, with dates and service referred to in the plaint).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the plaintiff's suit for accounts and administration of the deceased mother's movable estate is barred by limitation.
  2. If limitation is in issue, whether the appropriate period for the plaintiff's cause of action is three years under Article 113 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act, 1963 (for suits relating to movable property of an intestate), or twelve years under Article 106 (for a legacy or distributive share), or some other article such as Articles 110/113 in specific circumstances relied on by the parties.
  3. When the cause of action for the plaintiff accrued: at the date of the mother's death (23 May 1978), at the time of the defendant's claim (notice dated 30 July 1990), upon service of the sister's suit, or upon later events alleged (for example, alleged appropriation/conversion after the plaintiff noticed the defendant wearing jewellery in 1992)?

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's (brother's) arguments

  • The plaintiff contends the suit need not be measured from the mother's death in 1978 but from when the defendant raised a dispute and made a claim (i.e., from the time the dispute arose, argued to be July/August 1990), so the suit filed in 1994 is within three years of the dispute.
  • The plaintiff's counsel additionally contended (not as pleaded but argued) that the suit could be brought within twelve years under Article 106 of the Limitation Act (i.e., counsel sought to invoke a 12‑year limitation period applicable to legacies or distributive shares becoming payable).
  • The plaintiff also relied on the contention that he became aware of the defendant's claim for the first time upon service of the writ of summons in the defendant's suit, and therefore his suit within three years of that service was timely (the plaint asserts that the plaintiff "realised 'for the first time' about the claim" upon service).
  • The plaint further pleads a tort of appropriation/conversion arising on noticing the defendant wearing the jewellery and Gara in March/April 1992 and relies on that event to support filing within limitation.

Defendant's (sister's) arguments

  • The defendant contended that the plaintiff's suit is barred by limitation and that the appropriate period for the plaintiff to sue for his half share in the movable estate is three years under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, running from the date of the mother's death (23 May 1978).
  • The defendant relied on the fact that she made a claim to the shares by notice dated 30 July 1990 and that the plaintiff's own correspondence of 21 August 1990 shows the dispute was then live; thus the plaintiff's subsequent suit (filed in July 1994) is also outside three years from that notice.
  • Counsel for the defendant drew attention to case law distinguishing the applicability of Articles 110, 113 and 106 and argued Article 106 (12 years) does not apply where the suit is not against an executor, administrator or person legally charged with distribution of the estate.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Sadbuddhi Brahmesh Wagh v. Sheila Mahabaleshwar Wagh, 2003 (5) Mh. L.J 293 : 2003 (6) Bom. C.R 787 Held that an heir excluded from joint family property could sue within 12 years from exclusion under Article 110 of the Limitation Act (case relied on by plaintiff's counsel). The court noted the decision but held it inapplicable because the present plaintiff does not claim to be excluded from joint family property and cannot frame his claim as enforcing a right to a share in joint family property under Article 110.
Parmeshwari Devi Ruia v. Krishnakumar Nathmal Murarka & Ors., 2007 (6) Bom. C.R 180 Distinction between Articles 110, 113 and 106; holding that limitation for administration suits depends on who the plaintiff is and the nature of relief; for an heir suing a person in possession where no grant of representation exists, Article 113 (three years for movables) applies. The court relied on the principles explained in this judgment to conclude Article 113 governs suits by an heir for movable estate administration; Article 106 does not apply where suit is not against an executor/administrator.
Smt. Suhashini Dasi v. Ahi Bhusan De, AIR 1963 Calcutta 520 Held that mere possession of the estate by a person does not attract Article 106 (then Article 123); Article 106 applies where possession is that of a person charged with the duty to distribute the legacy (executor/administrator). The court relied on this authority to underscore that Article 106 is inapplicable where the suit is not against an executor/administrator and the person in possession is simply an heir claiming the estate.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court followed a stepwise analysis, confined to the facts and arguments in the pleadings and the correspondence between the parties:

  1. Preliminary issue and framing: The court framed limitation as a preliminary issue under Order XIV, Rule 2 CPC and heard counsel on that issue.
  2. Nature of relief and accrual: The suit seeks accounts and administration of only movable estate left by the intestate mother and a declaration of equal half shares. The court observed that the plaintiff's entitlement as an heir to a half share accrued on the mother's death (23 May 1978) and his right to sue for movable estate therefore arose on that date.
  3. Relevant Limitation provision: For suits concerning movable property of an intestate where no representation (probate/letters of administration) has been granted and the suit is by an heir against a person in possession, Article 113 of Schedule I to the Limitation Act (three years) applies. The court held Article 113 governs the present suit because the estate is movable and administration is sought by an heir in respect of movables.
  4. Applicability of Article 106 and other articles: The court analysed Article 106 (twelve years) and concluded it did not apply because that article governs suits against executors/administrators or suits to recover legacies or distributive shares against such persons. Here, there was no executor/administrator and no will; the defendant is an heir and not a person legally charged with distribution. The court therefore rejected the plaintiff's counsel's contention that Article 106 supplied a 12‑year limitation.
  5. Effect of correspondence and earlier suit: The court reviewed the timeline in the plaint and exhibits — the defendant's advocate notice dated 30 July 1990 asserting beneficial ownership, the plaintiff's reply dated 21 August 1990 denying that assertion and claiming jewellery and beneficial interest, and the subsequent suit filed by the defendant identified as Suit No. 1661 of 1991 (the opinion records dates and service as pleaded). The court found the defendant's claim was first made by notice on 30 July 1990 and that the plaintiff's own letter of 21 August 1990 shows he then asserted claims to jewellery and other items.
  6. Counterblast or service of earlier suit does not create new accrual: The court rejected the plaintiff's argument that the filing or service of the defendant's suit created an accrual of cause of action enabling a fresh three-year period for the plaintiff. The court described such a reactive filing as a "counterblast" and emphasised that one party suing does not, by itself, create a new cause of action for the other; the right to sue accrues upon the relevant event (here, the mother's death) or upon denial of the claim — not upon being sued by the other party.
  7. Tort/appropriation argument and later events: The court examined the plaintiff's attempt to rely on later events (for example noticing the defendant wearing the jewellery in 1992 and alleging appropriation/conversion). It held that the plaintiff's claim to the movables still depended on the mother's death and that noticing the defendant wearing jewellery did not create a new cause of action unrelated to the original accrual; the underlying right remained rooted in the 1978 death.
  8. Conclusion on limitation: Because the plaintiff's cause of action for movables accrued on the mother's death in 1978 and the suit was not filed within three years from that date, the court found the suit barred by limitation. The court answered the preliminary issue of limitation in the affirmative (i.e., that limitation bars the suit) and proceeded to dismiss the suit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: Suit dismissed.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The plaintiff's suit for accounts, administration and declaratory relief in respect of the movable estate of the deceased mother was held to be time‑barred under the Limitation Act and was dismissed. The court's dismissal resolves the dispute in this suit by denying the plaintiff the reliefs sought on limitation grounds.
  • Limitation principle applied: The court applied Article 113 (three years) to a suit by an heir for movable estate where there is no executor/administrator and the estate is not admitted; it rejected application of Article 106 (twelve years) in those circumstances. The court also rejected the proposition that filing or service of a prior suit by the other party creates a fresh accrual for the defendant to sue.
  • Broader precedent: The opinion applies established distinctions between Articles 106, 110 and 113 as noted in cited authorities. The judgment, as recorded in the opinion, does not purport to lay down a novel general rule beyond applying those distinctions to the facts at hand; the decision's effect is the dismissal of the plaintiff's suit on limitation grounds.
Order: The preliminary issue on limitation is answered in the affirmative and the suit is dismissed.
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    Kobad Rustomji Noble v. Nelly Rustomji Noble

    1. Parties are brother and sister. They have filed their pleadings. Issues have been framed. It is the contention of the defendant-sister that the plaintiffs suit is barred by the Law of Limitation as seen from the plaint itself. The issue of limitation is to be decided as a preliminary issue under the provisions of Order XIV, Rule 2 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is accordingly framed. The Advocates of the parties have been heard upon the issue of limitation.

    2. The suit is filed for accounts of the movable properties and assets left by the deceased Jerbai Rustomji Noble (the mother of the parties) and for administration of the same. The suit is also for a declaration that the plaintiff and the defendant are each entitled to half of the movable properties and assets of the deceased. The suit is further for a direction for the division of the properties and assets in equal shares between the plaintiff and the defendant and for the ancillary reliefs of making inquiries and passing orders for the aforesaid purpose.

    3. It is clear that the suit is in respect only of movable properties. These properties are stated to be the ones left by the deceased/mother of the parties, forming her estate. They be administered by the Court for payment of an equal share to both the parties. The mother expired on 23rd May 1978. She died intestate. Her movable estate was to be administered within three years from that date. The plaintiff and the defendant are admittedly the only heirs. They are, therefore, admittedly entitled to half share in the estate, if any, of the mother.

    4. Though the factum of the death of the mother and the heirs left by her are admitted as also the shares of the heirs, the estate of the mother is not admitted. The plaintiff-brother has shown the estate of the mother contained in the shares of Companies listed in Exhibits-A and B, the Bank Accounts listed in Exhibit-C, the jewelleries listed in Exhibit-E and the garas and sarees in Exhibit -F. The defendant has not admitted that constitutes her mother's estate. That would have to be proved by the plaintiff in the suit. Issues in that regard have been framed.

    5. The Court must first consider whether the suit is within limitation, given the factum of the death of the mother in 1978 and the filing of the suit in 1994 for the accounts and administration of only her movable estate.

    6. It is the essential claim of the plaintiff, who claims a share in the movable estate, that the shares belonged to the deceased who held them jointly with the defendant-sister and had a “desire” that after her death the plaintiffs name must be included jointly with the defendant in all shares. It is the case of the plaintiff that the mother's desire was carried out and the shares were held by the plaintiff with the defendant in joint names. It is the plaintiff's case that thereafter the defendant took away the shares and raised the false disputes when the plaintiff refused the transfer of the shares by the defendant.

    7. It is the case of the defendant that the suit for accounts and administration of the movable estate of the deceased-mother is required to be filed within 3 years of the death of the mother for claiming a half share in her estate under Article 113 of the Limitation Act, 1963. It is the case of the plaintiff that it must be filed within 3 years of the dispute having been raised by the defendant and a claim having been made by her. Upon such a case of the plaintiff, the point of time when the dispute arose and the first claim was made is to be seen.

    8. In paragraph 18 of the plaint, it is averred that in 1989-1990, the defendant-sister took away the suitcase along with the shares, documents and records. The averments in paragraph-20 of the plaint show that the defendant-sister made the first claim that she had purchased the shares out of her own monies in July 1990. The plaintiff has sought to rely upon the correspondence between the parties with regard to that claim. The correspondence is not annexed to this plaint. It is annexed to the suit filed by the defendant-sister being Suit No. 1661 of 1991 for a declaration that she is the owner having full and exclusive beneficial, right, title and interest in the shares, debentures and bonds and other ancillary reliefs. The list of documents relied upon by the plaintiff and annexed to this plaint shows, inter alia, at Item No. 6, the correspondence between the parties prior to High Court Suit No. 1661 of 1991. That is the correspondence entered into in July/August 1990, annexed at Exhibits-B and D to the plaint in Suit No. 1661 of 1991 filed by the defendant-sister.

    9. It would be worthwhile to refer to that correspondence since the first claim is made therein. The notice sent by the Advocate of the defendant-sister dated 30-7-1990 to the plaintiff-brother herein specifically states that the sister had purchased out of her earnings as Medical Practitioner certain shares in Public Limited Companies. After her mother's death she added the name of her brother to the shareholdings out of convenience only. The brother had no beneficial interest thereto. He signed the share transfer forms as and when required by the sister. Sometimes prior to July 1990, he refused to sign as before and hence, the legal notice.

    10. The reply of the Attorneys of the plaintiff-brother dated 21st August 1990, Exhibit-D in Suit No. 1661 of 1991, calls for inspection of the share certificates as well as various other related documents of the defendant-sister. It makes out a specific case that the defendant-sister hardly earned anything from her medical practice and, therefore, the brother and the sister entered into the arrangement that the brother would maintain the sister and pay for her food, rent, electricity bills and other maintenance expenses and as a part of the arrangement, the sister “from her small earnings as also from the dividends/interest received from the shares/debentures” appropriated by her, would purchase shares in the joint names of the brother arid the sister and would also look after the portfolio. The beneficial interest of the sister was denied. The fact that she regularly purchased the shares from her own earnings was denied. The plaintiff-brother claimed the beneficial interest in all the shares wherein his name appeared and contended that he had a discretion not to sign the transfer forms.

    11. Under the same letter/reply to the notice, the plaintiff-brother made a claim to several items of jewellery in paragraph 6 thereof. The jewellery came to be vaguely described and enumerated thereunder. It was claimed in that notice that the jewellery was kept in a Bank Locker, the key of which remained with the sister only who paid the rent of the locker. Repeated oral requests for the jewellery did not yield any response from the sister. The plaintiff-brother claimed half share in the jewellery owned by his mother at the time of her death which, it was contended, was always denied by the defendant-sister. The plaintiff-brother made a further claim that he owns certain shares and debentures in which the sister's name was added for the sake of convenience, for which she had refused to sign the share transfer forms and called upon her to do so and threatened to claim damages.

    12. By further letter dated 17-9-1990, Exhibit-E to the Plaint in Suit No. 1661 of 1991, the defendant-sister rejoined. The contents of that letter need not be reiterated.

    13. It is clear that the claim was made by the sister on 30th July 1990. The claim was refuted by the brother on 21st August 1990. The brother made a separate claim for jewellery on 21st August 1990. This was about 12 years after the death of their mother.

    14. The claim of the sister arose upon the refusal of the brother to sign the shares which were in the joint names of the sister and the brother. The claim of the brother was in his reply to the sister's claim. The jewellery always remained with the sister as is mentioned in the Attorneys' letter dated 21st August 1990. That claim arose upon the death of the mother if the brother claimed half share in her estate, of which those jewelleries formed a part. The claim of the plaintiff-brother to the shares and debentures standing in his name in which he claimed that his sister's name was added for the sake of convenience was upon the sister's refusal to sign the share transfer forms.

    15. After such correspondence showing the initial claim of the defendant-sister, the brother's denial thereto, as well as the brother's' claim to the jewellery arising upon the death of his mother, the defendant-sister filed her suit being Suit No. 1661 of 1991 in respect only of the shares, debentures and bonds standing in the joint names of the brother and the sister in which she claimed the entire beneficial interest upon the fact that the entire consideration was paid by her out of her own separate earnings from her medical practice and her brother's name was joined therein only for the sake of convenience.

    16. The plaintiff-brother herein has averred about filing of the suit in paragraphs 19 and 21 of the plaint. He claims that the disputes were raised by the defendant-sister wrongfully only in the said suit filed on 30th May 1991. That averment is seen to be distinctly incorrect in view of the averments in paragraphs 18 and 20 of the plaint recited hereinabove.

    17. It is seen that the first claim was made by the defendant-sister with regard to the shares and bonds under her Notice dated 30th July 1990. In any event, even if the defendant-sister had not raised that claim, the plaintiff-brother having contended that was a part of the estate of his late mother, should have sued for accounts and administration of such estate of the movable properties upon the death of the mother and not after his sister claimed the full beneficial interest thereto.

    18. No claim has been made by the sister in respect of any Bank Accounts of the mother, the jewellery of the mother or the sarees of the mother. The half share which the plaintiff-brother claimed in such estate and properties as having been left by his mother is, therefore, not dependent upon any claim made by the sister in her suit or otherwise. It is dependent solely upon the mother's death. He has to claim half share in the mother's estate upon her death. The estate is only movable. Hence, his claim to the movables is required to be made within three years from the death of the mother. He has not shown any claim made by the sister with regard thereto in her suit or otherwise. It is seen that his claim to the shares, debentures and bonds shown in Exhibit-A to the suit is also upon the mother's death since he has claimed the half share therein. It matters not that the sister has filed the suit. She may not have sued the brother. The brother's claim cannot be dependent upon the sister's claim in a prior suit.

    19. This suit is not filed within three years of the claim having been made on 30th July 1990 also. This suit is filed on 11th July 1994, about four years after the claim having been made by the defendant-sister. Even upon such a contention, the claim is distinctly barred by the Law of Limitation. The plaintiff-brother has sought to save the bar of limitation by filing of the suit of his sister and its service. It may be mentioned that this suit is not filed within three years of the filing of the sister's suit also. The sister's Suit No. 1661 of 1991 has been filed on 30th May 1994. It is averred in paragraph 21 of the plaint that the writ of summons in the suit was served on 24th July 1991. The plaintiff realized “for the first time” about the claim of the sister in the shares, debentures and bonds listed in Exhibit-A to the plaint. Upon such service having been effected, he sued the sister within three years thereafter on 11th July 1994.

    20. Filing of such a suit is popularly called a “counterblast” to the earlier suit. It is not an accrual of a cause of action. No suit by one party is an accrual of the cause of action even if the claim is made and made known to the defendant for the first time. The defendant merely has a right to defend that suit. The right of defendant to sue accrues only upon the happening of an event or denial of his claim. The happening of the event, in this case, was the mother's death. There has been no denial of his claim because the defendant never made a claim to half the estate of the mother between 1978 and 1990. He made a claim to a part of her estate as shown by himself initially under his Attorneys' letter dated 21st August 1990.

    21. In paragraph 22 of the plaint, the plaintiff has referred to the said Attorneys' letter dated 21st August 1990 in which the claim with regard to the jewellery was made for the first time. It is averred that the defendant failed to comply with the plaintiff's demand with regard to the jewellery. It is, therefore, seen that though the claim is made by the plaintiff with regard to the jewellery of his mother in August 1990, no suit has been filed by him until the present suit filed on 11th July 1994. Even in the suit aside from showing three Bank Accounts of the mother in the list Exhibit-C, and the sarees and Gara in Exhibit-F, there is no averment to show how the plaintiff claims half share therein.

    22. To save the bar of limitation, another averment is made in paragraph 22 of the plaint that the plaintiff-brother noticed the defendant-sister “wearing” the jewellery as well as the Gara of the mother in March/April 1992. He, therefore, apprehended that the defendant removed the jewellery kept in the locker. The averments show that the defendant has not handed over to the plaintiff his half share in the jewellery as well as in the Gara forming a part of the estate of the mother. The suit is, therefore, filed upon the tort of appropriation/conversion as averred in paragraph 23 of the plaint. It may be mentioned the fact that the share was not handed over is also dependent upon the mother's death and not upon the plaintiff noticing the defendant having worn the jewellery or the Gara. Such noticing of the defendant does not give a cause of action to the plaintiff to file a suit as is claimed in paragraph 26 of the plaint.

    23. A reading of the plaint shows that the claim of the plaintiff-brother to movable properties and estate of his mother and for its administration to give his half share arose upon the death of the mother on 23rd May 1978. The claim of the defendant-sister to the full beneficial interest in the shares, debentures and bonds was made by her on 30th July 1990. It was made known to the plaintiff upon the receipt of that claim under her Advocate's notice. It was denied by the plaintiff on 21st August 1990 under his Attorneys' letter of that date. It is, therefore, false to state that the plaintiff knew for the first time the claim of his sister when he was served the writ of summons in the suit filed by her. He knew of it much earlier than the filing of that suit in the correspondence that ensued between the parties' Advocates and Attorneys prior to that suit and which is a part of the list of documents relied upon by the plaintiff in this suit.

    24. For suing upon such a claim to the movable estate of his mother, the plaintiff must file a suit within three years from the date of the death of his mother under Article 113, Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act, 1963.

    25. Though it is not the case of the plaintiff in the plaint, his Counsel has contended that the suit is to be filed within 12 years of the legacy or share being payable to him under Article 106 of the said Schedule.

    26. The entire plaint proceeds upon a claim under Article 113 of the said Schedule, albeit from the date of the knowledge of the claim. Hence, the averments in the plaint show the saving of the bar of limitation for a period of 3 years and not 12 years from any date. Nevertheless, since this is a contention of law, it must be considered.

    27. It would be pertinent to set out Article 106 itself. It runs thus:—

    Description of suit Period of limitation Time from which period begins to run 106. For a legacy or for a share of a residue bequeathed by a testator or for a distributive share of the property of an intestate against an executor or an administrator or some other person legally charged with the duty of distributing the estate. Twelve years When the legacy or share becomes payable or deliverable.

    28. This Article applies in the case of suits relating to:

    (a) a legacy

    (b) share of a residue bequeathed by a testator

    (c) distributive share of the property of an intestate or administrator or some such person having the duty to distribute the estate.

    29. Since the deceased did not leave a Will, there is no legacy. Hence, the first clause does not apply. The share mentioned in Article 106 is a share of residue bequeathed by a testator since there is no Will left by the deceased. Even that part of the Article does not apply. The distributive share of the property of an intestate is against an executor, administrator or the like. In this case, the suit is not filed against any executor or administrator or the like. The estate is in the hands of a party claiming the estate i.e the plaintiff's sister. The plaintiff claims estate which is in the hands of the defendant. The defendant is not like an executor or administrator of the estate of the deceased-mother. A reading of the article, therefore, shows that no part of it applies to the facts of the present case.

    30. In any case, a share which became payable or deliverable to the plaintiff was upon the death of his mother and not upon his sister making a claim thereto or he noticing her wearing is a part of his mother's estate!

    31. The deceased died intestate. The estate has not been administered. The estate is not even admitted by the defendant-sister. What constitutes the mother's estate is not known. It is not understood how Article 106 would apply to this case and even if it did, the suit is yet barred by the Law of Limitation since it is not filed within 12 years of the legacy or share becoming payable (i.e the date of the death of the mother).

    32. Mr. Balsara on behalf of the plaintiff relied upon the judgment in the case of Sadbuddhi Brahmesh Wagh v. Sheila Mahabaleshwar Wagh reported in 2003 (5) Mh. L.J 293 : 2003 (6) Bom. C.R 787. It is held in that case that the suit filed by an heir excluded from the joint family property to enforce his share therein can be filed within 12 years from the exclusion becoming known to the plaintiff under Article 110 of the Limitation Act. I do not see how the plaintiff, in the present case, claims to be excluded from a joint family property or can claim to be enforcing a right to a share in a joint family property.

    33. It is observed in paragraph 7 of that judgment that Article 106 of the Limitation Act would be applicable only if the defendant was an executor or administrator or a person legally charged with the duty of distributing the estate. If an heir is excluded from the joint family property, he could file a suit within 12 years of such exclusion. The observations in that judgment will not apply to the facts of this case.

    34. Mr. Ahmed on behalf of the defendant drew my attention to the judgment of this Court in the case of Parmeshwari Devi Ruia…Plaintiff; v. Krishnakumar Nathmal Murarka & Ors.…Defendants. reported in 2007 (6) Bom. C.R 180 in which a distinction for applicability of Articles 110, 113 and 106 has been drawn. The suit in that case was filed for administration of the estate of the deceased as also for declaration and possession. It has been held that in the suit for administration the limitation period would depend upon who the plaintiff is and what his specific cause of action is. It is held that if the suit is filed by an heir against the person in possession for distribution of the estate where no Probate, Letters of Administration or Representation has been granted, the period would be 12 years for immovable property under Article 65 and three years for movable property under Article 113 of Schedulel of the Limitation Act. It is observed that Article 106 would apply only in a suit to recover a legacy and in a suit by a coheir for claiming entitlement to the part of his interest as a coheir, Article 106 would not apply.

    35. Mr. Ahmed further drew my attention to the judgment of the Calcutta High Court in the case of Smt. Suhashini Dasi v. Ahi Bhusan De reported in AIR 1963 Calcutta 520 which was a suit for partition and division of the suit property by metes and bounds. It was held that mere possession of the estate would not attract Article 106 of the Limitation Act (then Article 123 of the Limitation Act). It is held in that judgment that possession in such a case where Article 106 would apply is the possession of the person charged with duty to distribute the legacy. That lies ordinarily on an executor or administrator or somebody on whom the duty is cast either by the terms of the Will as executor or by an order of the Court as administrator. Therefore, if the suit is not against any of these but merely against the person in possession of the estate, Article 106 would not apply.

    36. The Limitation Act makes no separate provision for limitation with regard to “administration suits” as they are dependent upon the special reliefs claimed as is observed in paragraph 37 of the judgment in the case of Parmeshwari Devi Ruia (supra). The plaintiff herein claims his half share in the movable estate of his mother. He claims accounts as well as administration. His half share accrued to him upon the death of his mother. It is entirely in movable estate. He has to claim that share within the period of limitation. Since there is no provision for such a suit in Schedule 1 to the Limitation Act, Article 113 applies. He has to sue within three years when the right to sue accrues. The right to sue accrues upon the death of his mother. He should have filed his suit, whether or not his sister, the defendant made any claim thereto. He should have, therefore, sued within three years from 23rd May 1978. He having not sued within the period of limitation, his suit is now barred by the Law of Limitation. The preliminary issue raised in the suit with regard to the bar by limitation is answered in the affirmative. Hence, the following order:—

    37. The suit is dismissed.

    Suit dismissed.
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    Kobad Rustomji Noble v. Nelly Rustomji Noble
    (Jun 2, 2008)