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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 138 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT 1881
  • Clause (3) of section 25 of the Indian Contract Act
  • section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,
  • section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,
  • section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act
  • section 25(3) of the Contract Act,
  • Indian Limitation Act, 1963,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • SECTION 138 NEGOTIABLE INSTRUMENTS ACT 1881
  • Clause (3) of section 25 of the Indian Contract Act
  • section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,
  • section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872,
  • section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act
  • section 25(3) of the Contract Act,
  • Indian Limitation Act, 1963,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner, an accused, was convicted and sentenced under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881 by the learned J.M.F.C, Mapusa, by an order dated 29.7.2005. This conviction was confirmed on appeal by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Mapusa. The dispute in this revision pertains to the explanation under section 138 of the Act concerning the definition of "debt or other liability" as a legally enforceable debt or liability.

The complainant is a Society engaged in advancing loans for construction purposes to its members, of which the accused is one. The accused and his wife took a loan of Rs. 3,55,000 on 5.11.1996 with a condition to repay it with interest at 18% or higher plus charges. The accused and his wife acknowledged the outstanding balance of Rs. 12,95,565 as of 30.12.2003 through an affidavit/undertaking and issued three cheques dated 30.10.2003, 30.11.2003, and 30.12.2003 towards repayment. These cheques were dishonoured due to insufficient funds. The complainant demanded payment by notice dated 3.3.2004, which was not complied with, leading to the complaint under section 138.

It was noted that the loan was taken in 1996, but the cheques were issued beyond a period of three years, raising the question whether the debt was legally enforceable under the Act given the limitation period.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a cheque issued in discharge of a time-barred debt can attract liability under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.
  2. The legal effect of a written acknowledgment or promise (affidavit/undertaking) given by the accused after the limitation period on the enforceability of the debt.
  3. The applicability of section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, regarding promises to pay debts barred by limitation, in determining the liability under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The cheques were issued beyond the limitation period, and no written acknowledgment of debt was given before the expiry of the limitation period.
  • The affidavit/undertaking at best gives a right to file a civil suit but does not support prosecution under section 138 of the Act.
  • The judgment of the Kerala High Court in K.K Ramakrishnan v. Dr. K.K Parthasaradhy is inapplicable as it did not consider section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act.

Respondent’s Arguments

  • The undertaking or promise given by the accused is legally enforceable under section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act.
  • Therefore, the debt is still enforceable by the complainant despite the limitation period.
  • Relied on the Division Bench judgment of the Kerala High Court in K.K Ramakrishnan v. Dr. K.K Parthasaradhy, which holds that a written promise to pay a barred debt becomes an enforceable contract.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Girdhari Lal Rathi v. P.T.V Ramanujachan, 1997 (2) Crimes 658 Section 138 applies only if cheque is issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt; cheques issued for time-barred debts do not attract liability. Followed by the Court as a foundational precedent establishing that time-barred debts do not attract section 138 liability unless revived.
Smt. Ashwini Satish Bhat v. Shrijeevan Divakar Lolienkar, 2000 (5) Bom. C.R (P.B) 9 Reaffirmed that issuance of cheque after limitation period without prior written acknowledgment does not attract section 138. Held binding by this Court as a co-ordinate bench judgment; the Court upheld this principle over conflicting views.
Joseph v. Devassia, 2003 K.L.T (3) 533 Supports the view that only legally enforceable debts can attract section 138 liability. Considered authoritative and supported by Apex Court’s dismissal of Special Leave Petition, thus binding.
Dr. K.K Ramakrishnan v. Dr. K.K Parthasaradhy, 2005 (1) D.C.R 165 (Kerala High Court) A written promise to pay a barred debt creates an enforceable contract under section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act. The Court found this judgment not applicable to the facts here as it did not consider section 25(3) specifically, and it conflicts with binding precedents.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court examined the nature of the debt and the effect of the undertaking/affidavit executed by the accused after the limitation period had expired. It noted that section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act applies only to legally enforceable debts or liabilities. A debt barred by limitation is not legally enforceable unless revived by a written acknowledgment or promise as per section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872.

The Court analyzed section 25(3), which provides that a written and signed promise to pay a barred debt constitutes a valid contract, thereby reviving the remedy to enforce payment by suit. The affidavit/undertaking executed by the accused was considered such a promise, which made the debt legally enforceable again.

The Court rejected the petitioner’s reliance on the Kerala High Court judgment in K.K Ramakrishnan, holding that it did not deal with section 25(3) and conflicted with binding precedents from coordinate benches and the Apex Court. The Court emphasized that mere issuance of cheques after the limitation period without prior written acknowledgment does not revive the debt.

However, since the accused had given a written promise before the expiry of limitation (through the affidavit/undertaking), the debt was revived and became legally enforceable. Therefore, dishonour of cheques issued in discharge of such revived debt attracts liability under section 138.

Holding and Implications

The Court dismissed the revision, thereby upholding the conviction under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act.

The direct effect is that a written and signed promise to pay a debt barred by limitation revives the debt for the purpose of prosecution under section 138. Mere issuance of cheques after limitation without such acknowledgment does not attract liability. This ruling aligns with existing precedents and clarifies the interplay between the Negotiable Instruments Act and the Indian Contract Act regarding time-barred debts.

    Narendra V. Kanekar v. Bardez Taluka Co-Op. Housing Mortgage Society Ltd. & Anr.

    Britto N.A, J.:— The petitioner herein, is an accused who has been convicted and sentenced under section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act, 1881, (‘Act’, for short), by the learned J.M.F.C, Mapusa, by Order dated 29.7.2005 and which Order in appeal has been confirmed by the learned Assistant Sessions Judge, Mapusa. The controversy in this revision is in relation to the explanation below section 138 of the Act, which reads as follows:

    Explanation: For the purposes of this section, “debt or other liability” means a legally enforceable debt or other liability.

    2. Some facts are required to be stated to dispose of this revision.

    3. The complainant (respondent herein), is a Society having its business of advancing loans for the purpose of construction to its members, and, the accused is a member of the said Society.

    4. The accused and his wife had availed a loan of Rs. 3,55,000/ on 5.11.1996 with a condition to repay the same with interest at the rate of 18% or higher rate of interest plus 0.6% along with charges which might have been incurred by the said Complainant. The Complainant had called upon the wife of the accused for repayment of overdue installments and on or about 30.9.2003, the accused and his wife executed an affidavit/undertaking admitting the said loan amount and confirming the outstanding balance of Rs. 12,95,565/ including interest as on 30.12.2003 and along with the said affidavit/undertaking, the accused issued three cheques dated 30.10.2003 for Rs. 5,00,000/-, 30.11.2003 for Rs. 4,00,000/ and 30.12.2003, for Rs. 3,95,565/, drawn on Syndicate Bank, Mapusa, which the Complainant stated were drawn in his favour in discharge of legally recoverable debt towards the repayment of the said loan including interest and, as per the letters of the accused dated 29.11.2003 and 27.12.2003, the cheques were deposited on 31.1.2004 only to be returned dishonoured on 16.2.2004 with endorsement that the funds were insufficient, whereupon the Complainant through his Advocate by notice dated 3.3.2004, demanded payment of the said sum of Rs. 12,95,565/, but the accused failed to comply with the same within a period of 15 days as stipulated therein, and hence the complaint.

    5. Admittedly, the loan was taken on 5.11.1996, payable with interest, as aforesaid and the cheques came to be issued on 30.9.2003, 30.10.2003, 30.11.2003 and 30.12.2003, which were issued much beyond a period of three years. There appears to be preponderance of judicial opinion in support of the view that only if the cheque is issued in discharge of a legally enforceable debt or other liability that section 138 of the Act is attracted but if a cheque is issued for the discharge of a time barred debt and it is dishonoured, the accused cannot be convicted under section 138 of the Act. This view was first taken in (Girdhari Lal Rathi v. P.T.V Ramanujachan)1, 1997 (2) Crimes 658, then by this Court in the case of (Smt. Ashwini Satish Bhat v. Shrijeevan Divakar Lolienkar)2, 2000 (5) Bom. C.R (P.B) 9 : 1999 (1) G.L.T 408 and (Joseph v. Devassia)3, 2003 K.L.T (3) 533 and it appears that the last judgment also has the imprimatur of the Apex Court in Special Leave to Appeal (Cri.) No. 1785/2001, which was dismissed by Order dated 10.9.2001 and, therefore, needs to be followed by this Court. However, the question is as to what is the legal effect of the said declaration/affidavit given by the accused prior to giving of the said three cheques?

    6. That takes us to section 25 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, which provides that an agreement without consideration is void, unless it is in writing and registered, or is a promise to compensate for something done, or is a promise to pay a debt barred by limitation of law. It further provides that an agreement made without consideration is void, unless-

    (3) It is a promise, made in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith, or by his agent generally or specially authorised in that behalf, to pay wholly or in part a debt of which the creditor might have enforced payment but for the law for the limitation of suits.

    In any of these cases, such an agreement is a contract.

    Explanation 1: Nothing in this section shall affect the validity, as between the donor and donee, of any gift actually made.

    Explanation 2: An agreement to which the consent of the promisor is freely given is not void merely because the consideration is inadequate; but the inadequacy of the consideration may be taken into account by the Court in determining the question whether the consent to the promisor was freely given.

    7. Reference to illustrations (e) would not be out of context. It reads as follows:

    (e) A owes B Rs. 1000/, but the debt is barred by the Limitation Act. A signs a written promise to pay B Rs. 500/ on account of the debt. This is a contract.

    8. Shri Padiyar, the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner/accused has submitted that the cheques in question were issued beyond the period of limitation and there was otherwise no acknowledgment of debt in writing given prior to the expiry of the period of limitation. Shri Padiyar has submitted that the said undertaking at the most may give a right to file a suit and recover the payment due on the said cheques but not for the purposes of prosecution under section 138 of the Act. On the other hand, Shri Samant, the learned Counsel on behalf of the respondent/complainant has submitted that the undertaking or promise given by the accused is legally enforceable under section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act and, therefore, the debt is still enforceable by the complainant. In support of his submission, Shri Samant has placed reliance on the Division Bench judgment of Kerala High Court in the case of (Dr. K.K Ramakrishnan v. Dr. K.K Parthasaradhy)4 2005 (1) D.C.R 165), and has submitted that even a case where a claim for recovery in Civil Suit has become barred by limitation, a promise made in writing and signed by the executant to pay, becomes an agreement supported by consideration and such an agreement is enforceable under law. Shri Padiyar, the learned Counsel on behalf of the petitioner, on the other hand, has submitted that the said Judgment of the Division Bench in fact did not consider any case of any agreement or undertaking given under section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, and therefore, would be inapplicable to the facts of the present case in the light of the judgment of this Court in the case of Ashwini Satish Bhat v. Shrijeevan Divakar Lolienkar (supra), which this Court is required to follow.

    9. The learned Division Bench of Kerala High Court has in terms not followed the said three decisions noted hereinabove, including the judgment of this Court in the case of Ashwini Satish Bhat v. Shrijeevan Divakar Lolienkar (supra). As far as mere issue of cheque is concerned, issued after the expiry of period of limitation, then there is no dispute that this Court would be bound to follow the Judgment in the case of Ashwini Satish Bhat v. Shrijeevan Divakar Lolienkar [supra], being a Judgment of a co-ordinate bench and, to that extent, the ultimate finding in the case of Dr. K.K Ramakrishnan v. Dr. K.K Parthasaradhy (supra), with respect, does not appear to be correct and therefore need not be followed.

    10. Mere giving a cheque, without anything more, will not revive a barred debt, because cheque has to be given, as contemplated by the explanatory in discharge of a legally enforceable debt. There is no doubt that in terms of the Indian Limitation Act, 1963, a signed acknowledgment of liability made in writing before the expiration of the period of limitation, is enough to start a fresh period of limitation. Likewise, when a debt has become barred by limitation, there is also section 25(3) of the Contract Act, by which, a written promise to pay, furnishes a fresh cause of action. In other words, what Clause (3) of section 25 of the Indian Contract Act in substance does is not to revive a dead right, for the right is never dead at any time, but to resuscitate the remedy to enforce payment by suit, and if the payment could be enforced by a suit, it means that it still has the character of legally enforceable debt as contemplated by the explanation below section 138 of the Act. As far as this aspect of the case is concerned, the learned Division Bench observed that to determine as to whether or not a liability is legally enforceable, the provisions of the contract act cannot be said to be irrelevant. This can provide a cause for a legal liability. Although the primary question answered by the Division Bench was that a cheque becomes a promise to pay under section 25(3) of the Contract Act, this view need not be followed by this Court in the light of the Judgment of this Court in the case of Ashwini Satish Bhat v. Shrijeevan Divakar Lolienkar (supra) and the other two judgments referred to hereinabove. Nevertheless, the Division Bench Judgment is relevant to the extent that it holds that a promise to pay in writing as per section 25(3) of the Indian Contract Act, 1872, matures into an enforceable contract, which can be enforced by filing a Civil Suit. If a suit could be filed pursuant to a promise made in writing and signed by the person to be charged therewith, as contemplated by clause (3) of section 25 of the law of Contract, then, in my view, the debt becomes legally enforceable and if a cheque is given in payment of such debt is dishonoured and subsequently, the statutory notice is not complied with, then the person making the promise in writing and issuing the cheque, would still be liable to be punished under section 138 of the Act.

    11. In view of the above, I find there is no merit in this revision and, consequently the same is hereby dismissed.

    12. Revision dismissed.

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    Comments

    Narendra V. Kanekar v. Bardez Taluka Co-Op. Housing Mortgage Society Ltd. & Anr.
    (Apr 20, 2006)