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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 22(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Re-development) Act, 1971,
  • provisions of Order 8, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 9, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 8, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 9, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • ORDER 8 RULE 5 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 9, Rule 7 of Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Code, the provision of Order 8, Rule 5
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order
  • provisions of Order 9, Rule 6
  • Order 8, Rule 5
  • Sub-rule (3)
  • sub-rule (1)
  • sub-rule (2),
  • Sub-rule (4)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • section 22(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Re-development) Act, 1971,
  • provisions of Order 8, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 9, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 8, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 9, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • ORDER 8 RULE 5 CIVIL PROCEDURE CODE
  • section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure
  • Order 9, Rule 7 of Code of Civil Procedure.
  • Code, the provision of Order 8, Rule 5
  • sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order
  • provisions of Order 9, Rule 6
  • Order 8, Rule 5
  • Sub-rule (3)
  • sub-rule (1)
  • sub-rule (2),
  • Sub-rule (4)
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff (applicant) filed a suit on 20-6-1980 for possession of premises at Plot No. 72, Ward No. 31, Nagpur. The defendant was in possession as a lessee. Summons were issued and the defendant, with counsel, appeared on 12-9-1980 and sought time to file a written statement; time was granted. Subsequent adjournments and further applications for time were granted on repeated occasions (next dates: 13-10-1980, 11-11-1980, and 26-11-1980). Without filing a written statement, the defendant raised a plea under section 22(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Re-development) Act, 1971, seeking dismissal of the suit.

On 13-4-1981 the defendant again applied for time to file a written statement; the plaintiff opposed and asked that the application be dismissed and the suit be decreed under Order 8, Rule 5, CPC for non-filing of the written statement. The trial Court rejected the defendant's application and made an order on the plaint recording that no written statement had been filed and directing the plaintiff to prove his case by affidavits. Thereafter (on 20-4-1981) the defendant moved under Order 9, Rule 7, CPC to set aside what he contended was an ex parte order; the learned Judge found the 13-4-1981 order to be ex parte, set it aside, and permitted the defendant to file a written statement which was admitted on record. The plaintiff filed the present revision application challenging that order.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the order dated 13-4-1981 was an ex parte order within the meaning of Order 9, Rule 6, Code of Civil Procedure.
  2. Whether the trial Court, having proceeded under Order 8, Rule 5, CPC (including Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5), could have its order treated as an ex parte order and thereby be set aside under Order 9, Rule 7, CPC.
  3. Whether the inherent powers of the Court (section 151 CPC) could be invoked to set aside an order passed under Order 8, Rule 5 and thereby allow the defendant to file a written statement, effectively nullifying the operation of Order 8, Rule 5.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments (Applicant / Plaintiff — Shri R.D. Chaudhary)

  • The order passed on 13-4-1981 was not an ex parte order.
  • The Court had proceeded under Order 8, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure to pronounce judgment because no written statement had been filed.
  • The defendant's application invoking the inherent powers of the Court (section 151 CPC) to undo the effect of the 13-4-1981 order was not maintainable.
  • Once the Court proceeds under Order 8, Rule 5 because a written statement was not filed, it cannot allow the defendant subsequently to file a written statement on the ground that the earlier order was ex parte; the endorsement and the substance of the order cannot be construed as ex parte.

Respondent's Arguments (Non-applicant / Defendant — Shri Shareef)

  • The order dated 13-4-1981 was an ex parte order and could be set aside on sufficient cause being shown under Order 9, Rule 7, CPC.
  • The absence of the literal phrase "ex-parte order" in the endorsement is not decisive; substance over form should be considered.
  • The learned Judge rightly set aside the ex parte order after considering the circumstances and the application under Order 9, Rule 7, CPC, and therefore this Court should not interfere.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by examining the precise scope and content of Order 8, Rule 5, CPC. It summarized the rule: every allegation of fact in the plaint not specifically denied is taken to be admitted (except as against persons under disability); the Court may require admitted facts to be otherwise proved. Sub-rule (2) permits the Court to pronounce judgment where the defendant has not filed a pleading; Sub-rule (3) requires the Court, when exercising its discretion, to have due regard to whether the defendant could have or has engaged a pleader; Sub-rule (4) requires that a decree pronounced under this rule bear the date of the judgment.

The Court observed that Order 8, Rule 5 is intended to allow judgment on admitted facts to avoid delay, but that the Court's discretion is circumscribed by Sub-rule (3) when legal assistance or complications may be relevant.

The crucial factual inquiry was whether the trial Court had proceeded under Order 8, Rule 5 or whether it had passed an ex parte order under Order 9, Rule 6. The Court reviewed the record: the defendant had been served with summons, had appeared repeatedly on the dates fixed, and had repeatedly applied for further time to file a written statement. On 13-4-1981 the defendant again appeared and sought an adjournment; the plaintiff opposed and asked the Court to proceed under Order 8, Rule 5. The trial Court rejected the defendant's application and directed the plaintiff to prove his case by affidavits on the basis that no written statement had been filed.

From these circumstances and the endorsement and order on the plaint, the Court concluded that the trial Court had acted under Order 8, Rule 5: it required the plaintiff to file affidavits and thereby exercised the discretion under that Rule to have admitted facts proved otherwise than by admission. Because the defendant had in fact appeared and participated (seeking time) on the hearing dates, the Court held that the 13-4-1981 order could not be regarded as an ex parte order in the sense contemplated by Order 9, Rule 6, which arises where the defendant, after service of summons, fails to appear when the suit is called for hearing.

The opinion then addressed whether the learned Judge was entitled to set aside what he had found to be an ex parte order by invoking inherent powers under section 151 CPC (or under Order 9, Rule 7). The Court emphasized the settled principle that inherent powers are to be used to meet ends of justice only where there is no provision in the Code to remedy the apparent injustice; such powers cannot be invoked to nullify or set at naught express provisions of the Code. If inherent powers were used to undo an Order 8, Rule 5 pronouncement, Order 8, Rule 5 would be rendered nugatory because the Court could change its mind and allow filing of a written statement despite the statutory provision enabling judgment where no pleading is filed.

Applying these principles, the Court held that the learned Judge was wrong to set aside the order of 13-4-1981 (as reflected in the order dated 18-7-1981) and to permit filing of the written statement. The order of 18-7-1981 was therefore set aside and the matter remanded to the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nagpur for disposal according to law.

Holding and Implications

Core Ruling: The revision application is allowed; the order dated 18-7-1981 (which set aside the earlier order and permitted the defendant to file a written statement) is set aside and the case is remanded to the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nagpur for disposal according to law.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: the trial Court's order allowing the defendant to file a written statement (order dated 18-7-1981) is quashed; the case returns to the trial Court for continuation in accordance with the Court's earlier direction under Order 8, Rule 5, CPC.
  • Costs: there will be no order as to costs.
  • Precedential impact: the opinion applies and reiterates the established limitation on inherent powers (i.e., they cannot be used to nullify express statutory provisions). The opinion does not purport to set any broader or new precedent beyond the legal conclusions applied to these facts.

Administrative direction: Record of the case is to be sent immediately to the Court below.

Revision application allowed.

    Menomal Kushaldas Sindhi v. Gangadhar Pannalal Rai

    1. The applicant-plaintiff filed a suit on 20-6-1980 for possession of certain premises situated at Plot No. 72 in Ward No. 31 at Nagpur. The defendant was in possession of these premises as a lessee of the open plot. Summons was issued to the defendant and he along with his counsel appeared before the trial Court on 12-9-1980 which was the next date fixed for hearing. On that day, the defendant applied for time to file written-statement and the same was granted. The case was then adjourned to 13-10-1980. On that date again another application for grant of time for filing written-statement was made and the same was also granted. Case was then adjourned to 11-11-1980. Yet a third application for time to file written-statement was moved before the trial Court and it was also granted. Then the case was fixed on 26-11-1980. In the meanwhile it appears that without filing a written-statement, the defendant raised a plea under section 22(1)(a) of the Maharashtra Slum Areas (Improvement, Clearance and Re-development) Act, 1971, praying for dismissal of the suit. The case thereafter went on and on 13-3-1981, the defendant filed a purshis that he did not want to press his application for dismissal of the suit. Case was then adjourned to 13-4-1981. On that date again the defendant came up with an application for time to file written-statement. This application was resisted by the plaintiff and the plaintiff prayed that the application for grant of time be dismissed and the suit be decreed under Order 8, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure as no written-statement was filed. The Court rejected the defendant's application for grant of time and passed an order on the plaint that the defendant did not file written-statement and the plaintiff was required to prove his case by affidavits. The case was adjourned to 30-4-1981. It appears that in the meanwhile on 20th April, 1981 the defendant filed an application under Order 9, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure for setting aside the ex-parte order. That application was opposed by the plaintiff. However, the learned Judge found that the order passed on 13-4-1981 was an ex-parte order and since sufficient cause was shown, the said order was set aside and the defendant was allowed to file his written statement and the same was admitted on record. Against that order, the present revision application has been filed.

    2. Shri R.D Chaudhary, the learned counsel for the applicant, contended that the order passed on 13-4-1981 was not an ex-parte order.

    3. In fact, the Court had proceeded under Order 8, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure for pronouncement of judgment as no written statement was filed by the defendant. According to him, the application filed by the defendant under section 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure invoking the inherent powers of the Court was not maintainable and the Court could not undo what it has done on 13-4-1981. In other words, Shri Chaudhari contended that once the Court proceeds under Order 8, Rule 5 to pronounce judgment as the defendant did not file his written-statement, it cannot allow the defendant to file a written-statement on the ground that the order passed earlier was an ex-parte order. He submitted with reference to the endorsement that the order in question can never be construed as an ex-parte order and the learned Judge was wrong in treating it as one.

    4. On behalf of the non-applicant, Shri Shareef, the learned counsel, submitted that the order, which was passed by the learned Judge on 13-4-1981, was an ex-parte order and the same could be set aside on a sufficient cause being shown, under Order 9, Rule 7 of the Code of Civil Procedure. He submitted that merely because the expression “ex-parte order” does not appear anywhere, it is not decisive of the matter and the substance has to be seen. He then relied upon the circumstances and contended that the learned Judge was right in setting aside the ex parte order. He further contended that the Court had ample powers to set aside the order which was passed on 13-4-1981 for the reasons set out in the application under Order 9, Rule 7 of Code of Civil Procedure. He, therefore, submitted that this Court may not interfere with the said order.

    5. In order to appreciate the controversy, it is necessary to find out what is the exact scope of Order 8, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It deals with a specific denial of the statements or allegations made in the plaint and says that every allegation of fact in the plaint, if not denied specifically or by necessary implication, or stated to be not admitted in the pleading of the defendant, shall be taken to be admitted except as against a person under disability. It further provides that the Court may in its discretion require any fact so admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission. Sub-rule (2) lays down that where the defendant has not filed a pleading, it shall be lawful for the Court to pronounce judgment on the basis of the facts contained in the plaint, except as against a person under a disability, but the Court may, in its discretion, require any such fact to be proved. Sub-rule (3) then lays down that in exercising its discretion under the proviso to sub-rule (1) or under Sub-rule (2), the Court shall have due regard to the fact whether the defendant could have, or has, engaged a pleader. Sub-rule (4) then says that whenever a judgment is pronounced under this rule, a decree shall be drawn up in accordance with such judgment and such decree shall bear the date on which the judgment was pronounced. It is, therefore, clear that so far as the allegations of fact in the plaint are concerned, they have to be denied specifically or by necessary implications. If the defendant does not admit in his pleading any fact, then naturally the question as regards the dispute will arise. Otherwise, in the absence of any specific denial or denial by necessary implication, or a denial of fact, the allegations of fact, made in the plaint have to be taken as admitted by the defendant. However, this is not the case of a person under disability, such as an insane. The Court is clothed with the discretion that in spite of the fact, which is taken to be admitted to be proved otherwise than by such admission and in such a case it is open to the Court to require the plaintiff to prove the fact as is otherwise done. In the present case, we are concerned with Sub-rule (2) of Rule 5 of Order 8. It deals with a case where the defendant has not filed a pleading at all. In such a case it is lawful for the Court to pronounce judgment on the basis of the facts contained in the plaint. Of course, the exception being a person under disability. In such a case also, the Court may require any fact to be proved. The underlying concept appears to be that if certain allegations of fact in the plaint are admitted, the Court should be able to pronounce its judgment on the basis of those facts which are admitted or taken to be admitted. This is in order to avoid any delay in the disposal of suits. But the discretion of the Court is circumscribed by Sub-rule (3) where, while proceeding to pronounce the judgment in the absence of any written-statement or on the admission of facts, the Court must have due regard to the fact whether the defendant is assisted by counsel or not and whether he has engaged any pleader or not. This is in order to enable the defendant to get assistance on the legal questions which may arise even on admitted facts and if the facts, which are admitted, raised certain complicated questions of law, the Court may not exercise its discretion and proceed to pronounce the judgment.

    6. In the present case, the question that arises is whether the Court has proceeded under Order 8, Rule 5 or has proceeded under Order 9, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure in proceeding ex-parte. For that purpose, it will be necessary to find out the circumstances and particularly the context in which the order came to be passed. The record discloses that earlier on three occasions the Court had granted time to the defendant to file written-statement. When the defendant applied for the fourth time on 13-4-1981, it appears that the same was opposed by the plaintiff. The plaintiff, while opposing the application after setting out the facts that on earlier occasions time was granted, further stated that not only the application be dismissed with costs but the Court should proceed to decree the claim under Order 8, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure for not filing the written-statement. After this endorsement, it appears that the Court rejected the application. Not only that, but the Court further passed an order on the plaint that the defendant had not filed the written-statement and the plaintiff was required to prove his case by affidavits. In my opinion, these circumstances read in the context of the endorsement and the order of the Court, clearly show that the Court proceeded under Order 8, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure. When the Court required the plaintiff to file affidavits, it was acting under Order 8, Rule 5 and in its discretion required the plaintiff to prove the facts otherwise by such admissions, and called upon the plaintiff to prove the facts by affidavits.

    7. The next question that arises is having proceeded under Order 8, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure, could the Court treat its earlier order as an exparte order. Such an order proceeding exparte against a party to the suit is contemplated by Order 9, Rule 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure. It is important to note that an exparte order contemplates that after service of summons, if the defendant fails to appear when the suit is called on for hearing in such a case the Court may make an order that the suit be heard exparte. It is the failure of the party to appear before the Court after it is served with a summons to appear on a particular date that gives rise to an ex-parte order. In the facts of the present case, not only the defendant was duly served but he appeared whenever the case was called on for hearing and applied for time to file written-statement. On three occasions the same was granted. On the fourth occasion also the defendant appeared before the Court and applied for an adjournment in order to enable him to file written-statement. If these are the facts, then, in my view, the order, which was passed by the Court, could not be called as an ex-parte order because in pursuance of the summons the defendant did appear and had taken part in the proceedings and requested the Court to grant him time. It was, no doubt, open to the Court even under these circumstances to proceed ex-parte, treating that mere appearance of the defendant without any assistance is no appearance. But that would be a different matter. The Court not only rejected the application, but also ordered the plaintiff to file affidavits on a specific understanding that no written-statement has been filed by the defendant. In such circumstances, the order passed on 13-4-1981 cannot be called an ex-parte order. Obviously, this order not being an ex-parte order, the provisions of Order 9, Rule 6 were not attracted.

    8. A further question arises as to whether the Court has a power to allow the defendant to file a written-statement in spite of the fact that the Court has proceeded under Order 8, Rule 5 of the Civil Procedure Code and whether for setting aside such order, the inherent powers of the Court could be invoked. It is well settled principle that the inherent powers of the Court can be invoked to meet the ends of justice. It obviously means that there is apparent injustice done to a party, but there is no provision in the Code of Civil Procedure to remedy that injustice. It is only under these circumstances that the inherent powers can be invoked. Certainly such powers cannot be invoked to set at naught the express provisions of the Code. Here is a provision which enables the Court to pronounce a judgment when the defendant has not filed a written-statement. The Court proceeds under Order 8, Rule 5 and requires the plaintiff to file affidavits and if the Court were allowed to exercise its inherent powers, it would certainly set at naught the provisions of Order 8, Rule 5 of the Code of Civil Procedure because the Court will be free to change its mind and allow the defendant to file a written-statement and proceed. If such a course of conduct is permitted by the Code, the provision of Order 8, Rule 5 will be rendered nugatory. The Courts must, therefore, act in order to comply with the provisions of the law rather than to find out a way to get out of it. Certainly inherent powers are not meant for extricating out of the complications created by the Court itself. In this view of the matter, in my opinion, the learned Judge was wrong in setting aside the order dated 13-4-1981. The order has, therefore, to be set aside. I, therefore, set aside the order dated 18-7-1981 passed by the learned Judge and remand the case to the Civil Judge (Senior Division), Nagpur for disposal of the suit according to law. The revision application is allowed, but there will be no order as to costs.

    9. Record of this case be sent immediately to the Court below.

    Revision application allowed.
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    Menomal Kushaldas Sindhi v. Gangadhar Pannalal Rai
    (Nov 23, 1981)