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Case Number

C.R.P No. 5042/80

Advocates

For the Appellant: G.S. Dvarakesvara Rao, K. Pratap Reddy, Advocates.

Judges

Seetharam Reddy, J.

Acts

sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the A.P Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960
favour.7. Section 24 of the A.P Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960
Section 2(ix) of A.P Buildings (Lease Rent & Eviction) Control Act,
Section 2(ix) of the Rent Control Act.
Sec. 24 of the Rent Control Act.5.

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Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petition arises from a revision by a tenant challenging an appellate court decision that reversed a Rent Controller's order. The petitioner sought permission under sub‑section (5) of Section 8 of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 to deposit monthly rents for the premises known as Mulgi Municipal No. 4-1-392, Abid Road, Hyderabad, covering November 1974 to January 1976 and future monthly rents.

The original lease was in the name of "Papanna & Co." (lease commenced 1936). Papanna (the original lessee) and Janakiram (the petitioner's father) allegedly carried on a hair cutting saloon jointly. Papanna died in 1956; Janakiram continued the business and paid rent (including a rent enhancement in 1965). After Janakiram's death, the petitioner continued the business and paid rent, but respondents issued rent receipts in the name of Papanna & Co. and, from November 1974, purported to issue a notice in the name of Papanna directing vacation. Respondents refused to accept rents sent by the petitioner from November 1974 onwards.

The petitioner sent legal notices seeking an account/bank details to deposit rent and ultimately filed a petition under Section 8 of the Act when respondents refused to accept rent. The Rent Controller allowed the petition, finding that the parties had carried on business jointly, that rent had been paid and received, and that a landlord‑tenant relationship existed as between the petitioner (and his predecessors) and the respondents.

The appellate court reversed the Rent Controller, holding that receipts in the name of Papanna & Co. did not prove the petitioner was a tenant, that the petitioner did not fall within the heirs described in Section 2(ix) of the Act, and that the respondents were therefore justified in refusing rent. The petitioner filed this Civil Revision Petition challenging the appellate court's reversal.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the petitioner is a "tenant" within the meaning of Section 2(ix) of the A.P. Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960, given the payments of rent, receipts issued in the name of Papanna & Co., and the facts of continuous occupation and business.
Whether the right of tenancy is heritable or passes to the petitioner's legal representative (i.e., whether the petitioner, as legal representative of his deceased father, can claim tenancy rights under Section 24 and by virtue of the heritability incident recognized for statutory/contractual tenants).
Whether tenancy interest could be acquired by prescription/adverse possession by Janakiram's continuous possession (18 years) after the death of Papanna, thereby entitling the petitioner to continue tenancy.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The petitioner has been paying rents and the landlords have received rents from him (evidence: Exs. P-1 and P-2), so he must be deemed a tenant under Section 2(ix) of the Act.
The right of tenancy is heritable for contractual tenancy; since the petitioner's father was a joint tenant with Papanna and continued paying rent after Papanna's death, the petitioner as heir is entitled to continue the tenancy.
Janakiram's continuous possession from 1956 to 1974 (over 18 years) gives rise to tenancy rights by prescription under Section 24 / principles of adverse possession, and the petitioner, as legal representative, continues that tenancy.

Respondents' Counterarguments

Succession applies in contractual tenancy but not in statutory tenancy; the petitioner is not among the heirs contemplated under Section 2(ix), so he is not entitled to tenancy rights.
The petitioner is not one of the heirs as defined in Section 2(ix) and therefore cannot claim tenancy.
Because the premises are non-residential, Section 2(ix) benefits cannot be attracted (respondents contended this point).
The respondents also contended that Papanna and Janakiram were not jointly carrying on the business and that the petitioner deliberately suppressed dates of death; they maintained there was no landlord-tenant relationship with the petitioner.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Damodilal v. Parashram, (1976) 4 SCC 855; AIR 1976 SC 2229	Statutory tenant (continuing in possession after determination) has incidents of tenancy similar to contractual tenant; such statutory tenancy is heritable — statutory tenant retains an interest in the premises.	The court relied on this authority to support the proposition that a tenancy continuing after the death of an original tenant can be heritable and that the petitioner could claim tenancy rights akin to a contractual tenant.
R. Ramanujam v. D. Venkatrao, 1982 (i) APLJ 146	Where a tenant dies, his legal heir is entitled to claim tenancy rights by operation of law even if not specifically enumerated under Section 2(ix); statutory tenant's right of heritability operates like contractual tenant's.	Used to support the view that the petitioner, as legal representative of Janakiram, may continue proceedings and claim tenancy rights by operation of law under Sec. 24 and by virtue of heritability.
Gopal Lal v. Feshru Md. Shah, AIR 1946 Calcutta 477	If a landlord takes no steps to recover possession and allows a transferor to remain in occupation for 12 years or more, the occupier may acquire a limited tenant's interest by adverse possession, barring the landlord's right to recover possession by limitation.	Cited to support the argument that Janakiram's continuous possession (1956–1974) could give rise to a prescriptive tenancy interest.
Bastacolla Colliery Co. v. Bandhu Beldar, AIR 1960 Patna 344	If a lessee's possession would otherwise be wrongful, the acceptance of rent by the lessor can convert that possession into a landlord‑tenant relationship (possession ceases to be adverse if rent is accepted).	Applied to show that payment and acceptance of rent by respondents could establish a landlord‑tenant relationship rather than adverse possession.
Mani Charan v. State, AIR 1969 Orissa 184	A person in continuous possession for the prescriptive period can acquire the status of an occupancy tenant by prescription; prescriptive tenancy interest recognised where possession continued for requisite period.	Relied upon to reinforce the proposition that possession by Janakiram for more than the prescriptive period could create a tenancy interest by prescription.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court proceeded sequentially from statutory definitions and the evidence before it. It first examined Section 2(ix) of the Act, noting the definition is inclusive and contains three limbs:

Any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable;
The surviving spouse or any son or daughter of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant as a family member up to the tenant's death; and
A person continuing in possession after termination of the tenancy in his favour.

The court focused on the first limb ("person by whom or on whose account rent is payable") and asked whether the petitioner paid rent for his own occupation or on behalf of Papanna & Co. The Rent Controller had found (and no effective contrary evidence was led) that:

Papanna & Janakiram carried on the business jointly and receipts were issued in the name of Papanna & Co.;
After Papanna's death (1956), Janakiram continued the business for 18 years till 1974, and rent was enhanced in 1965, indicating Janakiram was negotiating and acting as tenant;
The petitioner continued the business after his father's death and paid rents which respondents accepted (receipts Exs. P-1, P-2), although receipts bore the name Papanna & Sons.

On this factual matrix the court concluded that Papanna & Co. necessarily represented the joint business of Papanna and Janakiram; there was no evidence of termination of tenancy upon Papanna's death; the continued business under the same name and the acceptance of rent and the enhancement transaction in 1965 established implied consent by landlords to continuation of tenancy with Janakiram. Consequently, the petitioner, who continued the business and paid rents, fell within the first limb of Section 2(ix) and also the second limb (as a surviving son/legal representative continuing in occupation).

The court relied on Damodilal v. Parashram to show that statutory tenants continuing in possession have incidents of tenancy similar to contractual tenants, including a heritable interest. It also referred to R. Ramanujam v. D. Venkatrao for the proposition that a legal heir can claim tenancy rights by operation of law and to Section 24 of the Act (and the CPC definition of "legal representative") to justify continuation of proceedings and rights by the petitioner's legal representative status.

The prescription/adverse possession argument was considered: the court cited Gopal Lal, Bastacolla, and Mani Charan to show there are authorities recognising that prolonged acceptance of occupation and rent may lead to a limited tenant's interest by prescription and that acceptance of rent can convert otherwise adverse possession into a landlord‑tenant relationship. Given Janakiram's continuous possession (1956–1974) to the knowledge of respondents without steps to terminate tenancy, the court held that a prescriptive tenancy interest could have arisen in his favour and thereby inure to the petitioner as his legal representative.

Based on these statutory readings, evidentiary findings (receipts, conduct, rent enhancement), and cited authorities, the court found the appellate court's conclusion—that receipts did not prove tenancy and that the petitioner did not fall within Section 2(ix)—to be improper, irregular and illegal.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court set aside the appellate order and allowed the Civil Revision Petition. The court specifically held that the order under revision "suffers from impropriety, irregularity and illegality and hence the same is set aside."

Core Ruling: REVISION PETITION ALLOWED; ORDER UNDER REVISION SET ASIDE.

Implications:

Direct effect on the parties: The appellate reversal is set aside, restoring the Rent Controller's determination that the petitioner has a tenancy right in respect of the suit mulgi and was entitled to deposit rents as sought under Section 8 (the Rent Controller had allowed the petition to permit deposit of rents).
The court held that the petitioner qualified as a tenant under Section 2(ix) (by reason of payment/receipt of rent and continuation of business) and, additionally, could claim tenancy rights as legal representative under Section 24 and by the heritability incident recognized in the cited authorities.
On prescription/adverse possession grounds, the court accepted that prolonged possession and acceptance of rent could give rise to a tenancy interest, reinforcing the petitioner's entitlement.
No costs were awarded: "In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs."
The opinion does not announce any novel legal principle beyond applying and reconciling existing statutory provisions and precedents to the facts; its effect is to vindicate the petitioner's tenancy rights on the facts found and legal authorities cited.

This summary is confined to information contained in the provided opinion and does not add facts or propositions beyond that text.

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M. Vijaya Ram v. Kamaran & Another

1. This revision Petition by the tenant against the reversing judgment by the appellate court, arises under the following circumstances: The petitioner herein filed a petition under sub-section (5) of Section 8 of the A.P Buildings (Lease, Rent and Eviction) Control Act, 1960 to permit the petitioner to deposit the monthly rents of the Mulgi bearing Municipal No. 4-1-392 situated at Abid Road, Hyderabad from November, 1974 onwards to the end of January, 1976 and also future monthly rents.

2. The petitioner is the tenant of the respondents in the suit Mulgi on a monthly rent of Rs. 85/-. Originally the suit premises was taken on lease by one Papanna the grand-father of the petitioner. The said Papanna and the father of the Petitioner late M. Janakiram were running a hair cutting saloon in the premises during their lifetime. After the death of Papanna in the year 1956, the father of the petitioner was running the said business along with his son the petitioner herein and after his death, the petitioner is continuing the said business under the same name and style of “Royal Hair Cutting & Dressing Saloon” as legal representative of the deceased. The said business is being carried on for more than 45 years. After the death of the said Papanna, Janakiram went on paying the rents, though the receipts were issued in the name of late Papanna and after the death of the petitioner's father the petitioner is continuing as tenant to the knowledge of the respondents though they are issuing rent receipts in the name of Pappanna & Co. after collecting rent from the petitioner. The respondents have stopped Collection of rents from November 1974 after issuing rent receipts in the name of Papanna & Co. after collecting rent from the petitioner. The respondents have stopped collection of rents from November, 1974 after issuing a legal notice d/30-11-1974 in the name of Papanna and Sons by directing the deceased Papanna to vacate the suit premises. The petitioner as a legal representative of Papanna replied to the said notice on 27.1.1975 In fact, earlier, the respondents demanded enhancement of rent from Rs. 85/- to Rs. 200/- to which the petitioner did not agree. Subsequently from the month of November, 1974, the petitioner started sending monthly rents by money order till the end of November, 1975. But the respondents refused to accept the same. As the respondents refused to receive the rent, the petitioner got a legal notice issued on 29-12-1975 calling upon the respondents to furnish the name of the Bank in order to deposit the rent in their credit account. After the expiration of the notice period, the petitioner has sent complete rents from November, 1974 to the end of January, 1976. Since the rent amount was refused a petition under Sec. 8 of the Act was filed on the file of the Rent Controller. In the Counter, the respondents stated that the late Papanna and Janakiram were not carrying on business of hair cutting saloon jointly. The petitioner deliberately suppressed the dates of death of Papanna and Janakiram. There is no relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties and therefore, they were justified in refusing to receive rents from the petitioner. The respondents bonafide require the premises for their business. The Rent Controller on the basis of the averments and the evidence let in held that the said Papanna died in the year 1956 and the respondents did not lead any evidence to disprove that the petitioner was not the successor to the business of Janakiram or the original tenant Papanna, Ex. P-32 receipt dated 25-2-73 showed that a sum of Rs. 100/- was received from the respondents through Janakiram towards part payment of professional fee to Sri Gulam Yazdani Advocate in connection with municipal appeal of the suit Mulgi, Ex. P-33 is the office copy of the letter date 14-3-75 addressing the Assistant Commissioner Municipal Corporation of Hyderabad, Circle No. 6 for assessing the municipal tax on the actual rent basis. In view of the same, the respondent's contention that the petitioner did not bring to the notice of the respondents the fact of the death of the Original tenant Papanna or that they were not aware of the petitioner's father carrying on the business in the suit mulgi, is not tenable. It is further held that the respondents having passed the receipts Exs. P-1 and P-2 dated 10-9-1974 & 10-11-74 cannot set up a plea that the petitioner is not their tenant in the eye of law. Further the receipts were issued in the name of Papanna & Company originally and not in the individual name of Papanna which proved that late Papanna and the petitioner's father Janakiram, jointly carried on business in the suit mulgi and therefore, it establishes contractual relationship of landlord and tenant between the petitioner and the respondent. So holding, the Rent controller allowed the petition.

3. On Appeal, the appellate court however, reversed the decision of the Rent controller holding that the rent receipts issued in favour of Papanna & Company are not in the name of the respondents. So they do not prove that the petitioner paid the rent or that the landlords received the rent from the petitioner recognising him as their tenant. Since the tanant Papanna died and as the petitioner is not one of the heirs as mentioned under Sec. 2(ix) of the Act, he does not come within the definition of tenant. Therefore, the petitioner is not a tenant and so the landlords are justified in refusing rent from him. Hence this Revision.

4. The contention of the learned counsel for the petitioner is three-fold.

(1) Since the petitioner has been paying the rents the landlords-respondents are receiving rents from him at any rate from the year 1974, under Exs. P-1 and P-2, the petitioner must be deemed to be a tenant within the meaning of the provisions enacted under Sec. 2(ix) of the Act.

(2) The right of tenancy is heritable if it is contractual tenancy and since the petitioner's father was joint tenant alongwith Papanna, and after Papanna's death, since his father was paying the rent, and after his death, he is entitled by virtue of his heir to continue the tenancy.

(3) After the death of Papanna in the year 1956 right upto 1974 the premises was in possession of his father which is for more than 18 years and therefore, he has acquired the tenancy right by prescription and so the petitioner continues the tenancy as the legal representative of his deceased father under Sec. 24 of the Rent Control Act.

5. The counter contentions are, in case of contractual tenancy there is a succession but not in case of statutory tenancy. The petitioner is not one of the heirs as contemplated under Sec. 2(ix) of the Act and therefore, he is not entitled to continue as a tenant; the premises being non-residential one, the benefit of Sec. 2(ix) of the Act cannot be attracted for.

6. Before adverting to analyse the arguments and counter-arguments the relevant statutory provisions may be read. Section 2(ix) of A.P Buildings (Lease Rent & Eviction) Control Act, reads thus:—

“‘tenant’ means any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building and includes the surviving spouse, or any son or daughter, of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the building as a member of the tenant's family upto the death of the tenant and a person continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour.”

7. Section 24 of the A.P Buildings (Lease, Rent & Eviction) Control Act, 1960 reads thus:—

“Sec. 24. Proceedings by or against legal representatives: (1) Any application made, appeal preferred, a proceeding taken under this Act by or against any person may in the event of his death be continued by or against his legal representatives. (2) Where any application appeal or other proceedings could have been made, preferred or taken under this Act by or against any person such application, appeal or other proceeding may, in the event of this death be made, preferred, or taken by or against his legal representatives”.

8. To marshall the relevant facts originally the lease was in favour of Papanna & Co., Rent receipts also were issued in the name of Papanna & Co. The lease commenced in the year 1936. During the continuance of the lease the premises was sold to the present respondents in the year 1954. It is categorically stated in the petition that the said Papanna and the father of the petitioner late Janakiram were carrying on hair cutting saloon in the said mulgi during their lifetime. After the death of Papanna in the year 1956 as is found by both the courts below, late Janakiram who is the father of the petitioner herein, continued to carry on business in the mulgi for a period of 18 years upto 1974. In the said business the petitioner also joined his father. Then certain disputes arose with regard to the payment of municipal taxes, the money was advanced by the said Janakiram to the Advocate concerned appearing for and on behalf of the mulgi in question. A letter also was addressed by the petitioner to the Assistant Commissioner of Municipal taxes. A copy of the same is filed in the Court. After the death of late Janakiram the petitioner continued to carry on the business of hair dressing in the said premises and payment of rent also was made by him, which is not in dispute, and the receipts though were issued in the name of Papanna & Sons and for the first time at the end of 1974 a legal notice is issued purporting it to be in the name of late Papanna for vacating the premises.

9. It is on this format of the case the legal position vis-a-vis the said premises and also the person who is also in occupation of the premises have to be examined. Section 2(ix) of the Act defines the tenant. It is an inclusive definition. Under the first limb a person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building, becomes a tenant. The said person includes the surviving spouse, or son or daughter of a deceased tenant who had been living with the tenant in the building as a member of the tenant's family upto the death of the tenant. This is the second limb. There is a third limb of the said definition which covers a person “continuing in possession after the termination of the tenancy in his favour”. It is quite clear from the first limb that any person by whom or on whose account rent is payable for a building is a tenant. Now in the case before us it is in the evidence of the respondents that the rent was paid by the petitioner twice under Exs. P-1 and P-2 though the receipts were issued in the name of Papanna & Sons. Therefore, the question is whether the rent was paid by the petitioner for his own use and occupation or for Papanna & Sons. The origin of the tenancy is that the lease is granted in favour of Papanna & Company and it is averred in the petition that Papanna and Janakiram, the father of the petitioner herein carried on the business jointly and there was no contra evidence to disprove this. If that be so, Papanna & Co., necessarily represented Papanna and Janakiram which business continued jointly till Papanna died. There is no evidence to the contra again to show that there was any contravention or termination of the tenancy on the death of the said Papanna. The business was carried on never-the-less under the same name and style as “Royal Hair Cutting and Dressing Saloon” even thereafter, for that matter right upto this day; and from the date of death of Papanna, Janakiram continued the business for a period of 18 years, and it is in the evidence that in the year 1965 rent was enhanced by Rs. 20/- from Rs. 65 to Rs. 85/-. Surely the enhancement of rent could not have been negotiated with the dead person Papanna and therefore, it was at the instance of the said Janakiram. If that be so, the tenancy was continued with the implied consent of the landlords and once that tenancy is held established after his death, his son who continued the business in the same name and style coupled with the vital fact that the rents were also paid by the petitioner and received by the respondents, after the death of the petitioner's father establishes beyond doubt that the petitioner has a right of tenancy not only under the first limb of the definition under Sec. 2(ix) of the Act but also under the second limb of the said definition. It has been held in Damodilal v. Parashram (1) (1976) 4 SCC 855 : AIR 1976 S.C 2229.

“the definition of tenant in Section 2(i) makes a person continuing in possession after the determination of his tenancy a tenant unless a decree or order for eviction has been made against him, thus putting him on par with a person whose contractual tenancy still subsists. The incidents of such tenancy and a contractual tenancy must therefore be the same unless any provision of the Act conveyed a contrary intention. Under the M.P Act such a tenant retains an interest in the premises and not merely a personal right of occupation. Section 14 read with Sec. 2(i) makes it clear that the so-called statutory tenant has the right to sub-let in common with a contractual tenant and this is because he also has an interest in the premises occupied by him. Thus, the statutory tenant under Sec. 2(i) has a heritable interest in the premises.”

10. If that be so, after the death of Papanna by implication there is a contractual tenancy between late Janakiram and the landlords which right contracted upto his death and even after his death by virtue of the right of heritability the right of tenancy is continued by the petitioner. There is yet another aspect. Apart from Sec. 2(ix) of the Act whether the petitioner herein can claim to have a right of tenancy in the said premises by virtue of his being a legal representative of the deceased Janakiram, a Bench of this court held in the case reported in R. Ramanujam v. D. Venkatrao (2) 1982 (i) APLJ. 146 that “Where a tenant dies, his legal heir is entitled to claim tenancy rights by operation of law in respect of the premises for which the deceased was the tenant eventhough he does not come under any of the categories of persons enumerated in Section 2(ix) of the Rent Control Act. This right is conferred on a statutory tenant by virtue of the incident of heritability just as it is available in the case of a contractual tenant”.

11. Under Sec. 24 of the Act any application made or any proceeding taken under this Act by or against any person may in the event of his death be continued by or against his legal representatives. Nowhere in this Act ‘Legal representatives’ has been defined. If that be so, the definition as laid down in the Civil Procedure Code has to be adopted which is now well settled. Sec. 2(11) C.P.C defines ‘legal representative’ which means a person who in law represents the estate of a deceased person and includes any person who intermeddles with the estate of the deceased and where a party sues or is sued in a representative character the person on whom the estate devolves on the death of the party so suing or sued.

12. As held earlier, Janakiram continued the tenancy after the death of Papanna. In fact his right of tenancy was impliedly admitted when the rent was received from him and also when the rent was enhanced by him after the death of Papanna in the year 1956. If that be so, the petitioner being admittedly the legal representative continues to represent the estate of the deceased Janakiram and thereby continues to exercise his right of tenancy.

13. The argument is that after the death of Papanna in the year 1956 by continuous possession of 18 years thereafter by the ‘petitioner's father, there has been acquisition of limited interest of tenancy by adverse possession. Reliance was placed on the following decisions for this proposition. In Gopal Lal v. Feshru Md. Shah (3) AIR 1946 Calcutta 477 the Calcutta High Court held that “if the landlord does not take any steps to recover possession of the property and allows the transferor to remain in occupation of it for 12 years or more, the latter would acquire a limited interest of a tenant by adverse possession and the right of the landlord to recover khas possession of the land would be barred by limitation”. In the decision in Bastacolla Colliery Co. v. Bandhu Beldar (4) AIR 1960 Patna 344 it is held as follows:—

“The possession of a lessee becomes wrongful from the time of his entry on the basis of a void or invalid lease, but if he pays rent which is accepted by the lessor, his possession ceases to be adverse to the lessor, and a relationship of landlord and tenant comes into existence.

14. There are some cases in which a lease can acquire a right of occupancy tenant by prescription. In the decision reported in Mani Charan v. State (5) AIR 1969 Orissa 184 a suit was filed by the plaintiff for declaration in respect of a land that he had acquired title of occupancy tenant by prescription alleging that he was in possession of the land for a period of 16 years. It is held by Orissa High Court that the plaintiff prescribed a tenant's interest in respect of the suit land by being in possession for more than the prescriptive period prior to the date of vesting and the conclusion was irresistible that the plaintiff was in possession of the disputed land from the beginning of the agricultural year of 1940 till the date of the vesting on 27-11-1952. Here too, right from the date of the death of Papanna i.e in 1956 till 1974 Janakiram was in continuous possession of the suit premises and to the knowledge of the respondents-landlords and yet no steps were taken during that period for terminating the tenancy. If that be so, the said Janakiram and thereby the petitioner prescribed a tenancy interest in respect of the suit mulgi by being in possession for more than the prescriptive period of 12 years. Viewed from any angle, the petitioner has a tenancy right over the suit mulgi and has therefore, a right to continue as such.

15. The order under revision suffers from impropriety, irregularity and illegality and hence the same is set aside.

16. In the result, the Civil Revision Petition is allowed. In the circumstances, there shall be no order as to costs.

M. Vijaya Ram v. Kamaran & Another

Structured Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Legal Issues Presented

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

Respondents' Counterarguments

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Holding and Implications

M. Vijaya Ram v. Kamaran & Another

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