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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Special Marriage Act, 1954
  • Section 482 CrPC, Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005
  • Section 23 of the above Act
  • the main body of Section 2(q) of the aforesaid Act
  • Sections 12, 18, 19, 20 and 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
  • Section 2(q) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Special Marriage Act, 1954
  • Section 482 CrPC, Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005
  • Section 23 of the above Act
  • the main body of Section 2(q) of the aforesaid Act
  • Sections 12, 18, 19, 20 and 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005
  • Section 2(q) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant married Respondent 1 on 20 January 2005 under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 and began residing with him, her widowed mother-in-law (Respondent 2) and sister-in-law (Respondent 3) at Khorej Colony, Amravati. Alleging domestic violence—including an assault on 16 June 2007 that prompted registration of an FIR under Section 498-A IPC—the appellant initiated Misc. Criminal Application No. 203 of 2007 under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20 and 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (“DV Act”).

On 16 August 2007 the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Amravati granted interim maintenance of Rs 1500 per month and restrained all respondents from dispossessing the appellant from the matrimonial home. Respondent 1’s appeal to the Sessions Court was dismissed on 2 May 2008, and his challenge under Section 482 CrPC was rejected by the High Court on 4 September 2009.

Meanwhile, Respondent 2 sought modification of the injunction order; the Magistrate dismissed that application on 14 July 2008. Respondents 2 and 3 then filed Criminal Appeal No. 159 of 2008 before the Sessions Judge, asserting that (i) women cannot be made respondents under the DV Act and (ii) the house belonged exclusively to Respondent 2. On 15 July 2009 the Sessions Judge deleted the injunction, removed Respondents 2 and 3 from the proceedings, and directed Respondent 1 to arrange alternate accommodation or pay Rs 1000 per month in lieu thereof.

The appellant challenged that decision via Criminal Writ Petition No. 588 of 2009. On 5 March 2010 the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court upheld deletion of Respondents 2 and 3 and ordered the appellant to vacate the house. The present Supreme Court appeal is against that High Court judgment.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether female relatives of a husband or male partner can be arrayed as “respondents” under the proviso to Section 2(q) of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005.
  2. Consequently, whether the Sessions Judge and High Court were justified in deleting Respondents 2 and 3 from the domestic violence proceedings and directing the appellant to vacate her matrimonial home.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • The proviso to Section 2(q) permits an aggrieved wife to file a complaint against “the relative of the husband or male partner”; the statute does not limit “relative” to males.
  • Therefore, Sessions Judge and High Court erred in excluding female relatives and deleting Respondents 2 and 3.

Respondents' Arguments

  • The term “respondent” in Section 2(q) expressly refers to an “adult male person”; by implication, only male relatives fall within its scope.
  • Legislative intent to omit the word “female” indicates exclusion of female relatives from proceedings under the DV Act.

Table of Precedents Cited

No precedents were cited in the provided opinion.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Supreme Court scrutinised Section 2(q) of the DV Act and its proviso. While the main clause defines “respondent” as an adult male person in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person, the proviso authorises an aggrieved wife or female partner to file a complaint “against the relative of the husband or male partner.” The Court observed:

  • The proviso enlarges—not restricts—the definition, allowing complaints against relatives without gender qualification.
  • If the legislature intended to exclude female relatives, it would have expressly done so; conversely, the absence of a definition limiting “relative” to males shows no such intent.
  • Both the Sessions Judge and High Court were influenced solely by the main clause of Section 2(q) and ignored the widening effect of its proviso.

Accordingly, the Court held that female relatives of a husband or male partner are not exempt from being respondents under the DV Act.

Holding and Implications

Appeal Allowed; High Court and Sessions Court orders set aside.

Consequences:

  • The matter is remitted to the trial court, which must proceed against Respondents 2 and 3 on the appellant’s domestic violence complaint.
  • The direction forcing the appellant to vacate her matrimonial home is nullified.
  • The judgment clarifies that female relatives fall within the ambit of “relative” in the proviso to Section 2(q), reinforcing the DV Act’s protective scope. No new precedent beyond statutory interpretation was set, but the ruling resolves conflicting lower-court views on this point.

    Sandhya Manoj Wankhade v. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade And Others

    Altamas Kabir, J.— Leave granted. This appeal is directed against the judgment and order dated 5-3-2010, passed by the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court in Crl. WP No. 588 of 2009, inter alia, directing the appellant to vacate her matrimonial house and confirming the order of the Sessions Judge deleting the names of the other respondents from the proceedings.

    2. The appellant herein was married to Respondent 1 on 20-1-2005, and the marriage was registered under the provisions of the Special Marriage Act, 1954. After her marriage, the appellant began to reside with Respondent 1 at Khorej Colony, Amravati, where her widowed mother-in-law and sister-in-law, Respondents 2 and 3 respectively, were residing. According to the appellant, the marriage began to turn sour after about one year of the marriage and she was even assaulted by her husband and by the other respondents. It is her specific case that on 16-6-2007, she was mercilessly beaten by Respondent 1, which incident was reported to the police and a case under Section 498-A IPC came to be registered against him.

    3. In addition to the above, the appellant appears to have filed a complaint, being Misc. Crl. Application No. 203 of 2007, on 16-7-2007, against all the respondents under Sections 12, 18, 19, 20 and 22 of the Protection of Women from Domestic Violence Act, 2005 (hereinafter referred to as “the Domestic Violence Act, 2005”). An application filed by the appellant before the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Amravati, under Section 23 of the above Act was allowed by the learned Magistrate, who by his order dated 16-8-2007, directed Respondent 1 husband to pay interim maintenance to the appellant at the rate of Rs. 1500 per month from the date of the application till the final disposal of the main application and also restrained all the respondents from dispossessing the appellant from her matrimonial home at Khorej Colony, Amravati, till the final disposal of the main application.

    4. It further appears that the said order of the learned Magistrate dated 16-8-2007, was challenged by Respondent 1 in Crl. Appeal No. 115 of 2007 before the learned Sessions Judge, Amravati, who by his order dated 2-5-2008, dismissed the said appeal. Aggrieved by the orders passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Respondent 1 filed Criminal Application No. 3034 of 2008 in the High Court under Section 482 CrPC challenging the order dated 16-8-2007 of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Amravati and the order dated 2-5-2008 of the Sessions Judge, Amravati. The said application was dismissed by the High Court on 4-9-2009.

    5. In the meanwhile, Respondent 2 filed an application in Misc. Crl. Application No. 203 of 2007 in the Court of the Judicial Magistrate, First Class, Amravati, praying for modification of its order dated 16-8-2007 and a direction to the appellant to leave the house of Respondent 2. The said application for modification was dismissed by the learned Magistrate on 14-7-2008 holding that it was not maintainable.

    6. Thereupon, Respondents 2 and 3 filed Crl. Appeal No. 159 of 2008 on 11-8-2008, under Section 29 of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, questioning the orders passed by the learned Magistrate on 16-8-2007 and 14-7-2008, on the ground that being women they could not be made respondents in the proceedings filed by the appellant under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, and that the matrimonial house of the appellant at Khorej Colony, Amravati, belonged exclusively to Ramabai, Respondent 2 and mother-in-law of the appellant and did not, therefore, come within the definition of “shared household”. The said Criminal Appeal No. 159 of 2008 was allowed by the learned Sessions Judge vide his judgment dated 15-7-2009.

    7. The learned Sessions Judge allowed Criminal Appeal No. 159 of 2008 and set aside the judgment and order dated 14-7-2008 and also modified the order dated 16-8-2007, to the extent of setting aside the injunction restraining the respondents from dispossessing or evicting the appellant from her matrimonial house at Khorej Colony, Amravati. Respondent 1 husband was directed to provide separate accommodation for the residence of the appellant or to pay a sum of Rs. 1000 per month to the appellant from the date of filing of the application till its final decision, in lieu of providing accommodation.

    8. In Criminal Writ Petition No. 588 of 2009, the appellant herein challenged the judgment and order dated 15-7-2009, passed by the learned Sessions Judge, Amravati, in Crl. Appeal No. 159 of 2008, claiming that she had a right to stay in her matrimonial house. Although, the question as to whether a female member of the husband's family could be made a party to the proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, had been raised in Crl. Appeal No. 159 of 2008, the learned Sessions Judge in his order dated 15-7-2009 did not decide the said question and did not absolve Respondents 2 and 3 herein in his order, but only observed that female members cannot be made parties in proceedings under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, as “females” are not included in the definition of “respondent” in Section 2(q) of the said Act.

    9. The learned Single Judge of the High Court disposed of the writ petition by his judgment and order dated 5-3-2010, with a direction to the appellant to vacate her matrimonial house, which was in the name of Respondent 2, with a further direction to the trial court to expedite the hearing of Misc. Crl. Application No. 203 of 2007 filed by the appellant herein and to decide the same within a period of six months. A further direction was given confirming the order relating to deletion of the names of the “other members”.

    10. Questioning the said judgment and order of the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court, Mr Garvesh Kabra, learned advocate appearing for the appellant, submitted that the High Court had erred in confirming the order of the learned Sessions Judge in regard to deletion of names of Respondents 2 and 3 from the proceedings, upon confirmation of the finding of the Sessions Judge that no female could be made a party to a petition under the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, since the expression “female” had not been included in the definition of “respondent” in the said Act.

    11. Mr Kabra submitted that it would be evident from a plain reading of the proviso to Section 2(q) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, that a wife or a female living in a relationship in the nature of marriage can, not only file a complaint against her husband or male partner but also against relatives of the husband or male partner. The term “relative” not having been defined in the Act, it could not be said that it excluded females from its operation.

    12. Mr Satyajit A. Desai, learned advocate appearing for the respondents, on the other hand, defended the orders passed by the Sessions Judge and the High Court and urged that the term “relative” must be deemed to include within its ambit only male members of the husband's family or the family of the male partner. The learned counsel submitted that when the expression “female” had not been specifically included within the definition of “respondent” in Section 2(q) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, it has to be held that it was the intention of the legislature to exclude female members from the ambit thereof.

    13. Having carefully considered the submissions made on behalf of the respective parties, we are unable to sustain the decisions, both of the learned Sessions Judge as also the High Court, in relation to the interpretation of the expression “respondent” in Section 2(q) of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005. For the sake of reference, Section 2(q) of the abovesaid Act is extracted hereinbelow:

    “2. (q) ‘respondent’ means any adult male person who is, or has been, in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person and against whom the aggrieved person has sought any relief under this Act:
    Provided that an aggrieved wife or female living in a relationship in the nature of marriage may also file a complaint against the relative of the husband or the male partner;”

    14. From the above definition it would be apparent that although Section 2(q) defines a respondent to mean any adult male person, who is or has been in a domestic relationship with the aggrieved person, the proviso widens the scope of the said definition by including a relative of the husband or male partner within the scope of a complaint, which may be filed by an aggrieved wife or a female living in a relationship in the nature of a marriage.

    15. It is true that the expression “female” has not been used in the proviso to Section 2(q) also, but, on the other hand, if the legislature intended to exclude females from the ambit of the complaint, which can be filed by an aggrieved wife, females would have been specifically excluded, instead of it being provided in the proviso that a complaint could also be filed against a relative of the husband or the male partner.

    16. No restrictive meaning has been given to the expression “relative”, nor has the said expression been specifically defined in the Domestic Violence Act, 2005, to make it specific to males only. In such circumstances, it is clear that the legislature never intended to exclude female relatives of the husband or male partner from the ambit of a complaint that can be made under the provisions of the Domestic Violence Act, 2005.

    17. In our view, both the Sessions Judge and the High Court went wrong in holding otherwise, possibly being influenced by the definition of the expression “respondent” in the main body of Section 2(q) of the aforesaid Act.

    18. The appeal, therefore, succeeds. The judgments and orders, both of the learned Sessions Judge, Amravati, dated 15-7-2009 and the Nagpur Bench of the Bombay High Court dated 5-3-2010, in Crl. Writ Petition No. 588 of 2009 are set aside. Consequently, the trial court shall also proceed against the said Respondents 2 and 3 on the complaint filed by the appellant.

    19. The appeal is allowed accordingly.

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    Sandhya Manoj Wankhade v. Manoj Bhimrao Wankhade And Others
    (Jan 31, 2011)