ORDER

A. Muhamed Mustaque, J.

These revision petitions are filed by the tenants. The landlord is the respondent in all these revision petitions. The landlord approached the Rent Control Court seeking eviction of the tenants. One of the common grounds on which eviction was sought is under Section 11(3) of the Kerala Buildings (Lease and Rent Control) Act, 1965 (for short, the “Act”). Though eviction was sought under other grounds as well against some of the tenants, that question does not arise for consideration in these revision petitions, as these revision petitions arise only from the order passed by the Appellate Authority reversing the finding rendered under Section 11(3) of the Act by the Rent Control Court.

2. The Rent Control Court dismissed the rent control petitions under Section 11(3) of the Act on finding that the need put forward by the landlord is for residence after reconstruction of the tenanted premises and since there are no pleadings in the rent control petitions regarding reconstruction, the landlord is not entitled for eviction. The Appellate Authority reversed the said finding and found that the claim under Section 11(3) of the Act is maintainable, even if the landlord wants to use the tenanted premises for residential purpose after reconstruction.

3. Challenging the order of eviction under Section 11(3) of the Act, Shri K. Ramachandran appearing for the revision petitioners-tenants submits that the need put forward by the landlord in the present rent control petitions was for the purpose of residence of the landlord along with his family members and, the landlord had raised the same need in the earlier rent control petitions, which was dismissed by Rent Control Court, the Appellate Court, and this Court in revision. Therefore, the eviction sought for the same relief, which was canvassed by the landlord in the earlier rent control petitions, is hit by Section 15 of the Act. It is also submitted that based on mere observation made by this Court while disposing the earlier civil revision petitions, namely, C.R.P Nos. 1474, 1516, 1527 and 1564 of 1998, that the dismissal of the civil revision petitions would be without prejudice to the right of the landlord for filing fresh petition for eviction; the landlord cannot file an eviction petition on the same relief sought under Section 11(3) of the Act. It is also submitted that subsequent events relied on by the landlord was part of the cause of action for filing earlier rent control petitions on bona fide need. Therefore, the present rent control petitions, based on the cause of action available with him while filing the earlier rent control petitions, will not dilute the rigour of Section 15 of the Act. Learned counsel Shri K. Ramachandran also tried to make out a distinction between need, desire and luxury and submitted that, if at all petitions are maintainable for eviction under section 11(3) of the Act, the claim projected is nothing but luxury or desire. On the other hand, the learned counsel, Shri Rajit. R appearing for the landlord (respondent) would submit that circumstances necessitated by the present rent control petitions are due to the retirement of the wife of the petitioner, and the earlier petitions were filed by the landlord while she was in service. The courts below in the earlier round of litigation found that there was no bona fide need for the landlord to stay along with his family in the tenanted premises as his wife and their only son were employed at a distant place. It is also submitted by the learned counsel for the landlord that due to retirement and old age they prefer to reside in the petition schedule tenanted premises, which is very near to the Guruvayoor Temple. According to the learned counsel Shri Rajit. R, changed circumstances give fresh cause of action to the landlord for seeking eviction.

4. The subject matter of these revisions is four buildings lying as a line room under a common roof. Admittedly, the landlord had filed R.C.P Nos. 50, 51, 52 and 53 of 1993 on the file of the Rent Control Court, Chavakkad. The present rent control petitions are also in respect of same rooms, which were the subject matter of the earlier rent control petitions. The claim of the landlord in the earlier rent control petitions was that after the partition in the year 1993 in which the petition schedule building was alloted to him, he developed an intention to reside with his family in a separate residence. It was found on evidence that petitioner's family consists of his wife and their only son and, the son was employed at Delhi and his wife was working as a school Teacher at Peringode. Since his wife and son were residing elsewhere, it was found by the courts below that the need put forward by the landlord was not genuine. The findings rendered by the Rent Control Court attained finality in the revision filed by the landlord as C.R.P Nos. 1474, 1516, 1527 and 1564 of 1998. While the matter was pending in revision, on behalf of the landlord, a new plea was raised based on the retirement of his wife, to bolster the claim of bona fide need under Section 11(3) of the Act. This Court was of the view that subsequent events need not be considered to upset the findings rendered by the Rent Control Court and the Appellate Authority regarding bona fide need. This Court further observed that “if the petitioner's wife had retired and now he has bona fide need or tenants subleased the buildings, this order will not prevent him filing a fresh petition”. The courts below concurrently found that rent control petitions are not hit by Section 15 of the Act, in view of the observation made by this Court in the civil revision petitions.

5. This Court in Ayanikkattu Unniraja & Ors. v. K.P. Gurudas & Anr. [2014 (1) KHC 473 (DB)] held that the liberty to institute fresh suit while dismissing the appeal, will not save the fresh suit from the operation of res judicata unless it is shown that there is change in circumstances by the landlord and the burden is on the landlord to prove the changed circumstances. Therefore, we are of the view that the observation made by this Court, while disposing the civil revision petitions, will not enable the landlord to file fresh petition under Section 11(3) of the Act unless the landlord establishes that the issue previously agitated is different from the second petition for eviction.

6. It is a Universal doctrine that an issue which attained finality by a judicial decision cannot be reagitated. This principle has found place in the administration of justice through the legislation and also by the judicial practice based on the public policy. These principles are often modified by the statute in its purport and application. Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure contains comprehensive principles relating to finality of litigation and it lays down principles of res judicata, which literally means “a matter judged”. Res judicata lays down the principle that a matter may not generally be relitigated once it has been judged on the merits of the matter. In law, there are differences between res judicata, issue estoppel and cause of estoppel etc., even though, these different principles form part of the Universal law based on public policy in administration of justice with varying applications in a context. The principle of issue estoppel would arise in subsequent litigation when ‘fact in issue’ is decided in previous litigation.

7. In Thoday v. Thoday (1964 1 All E.R 341) the House of Lords succinctly laid down difference between “res judicata” and “issue estoppel” as follows:

“Res judicata debars a Court from exercising its jurisdiction to determine the lis if it has attained finality between the parties whereas the doctrine issue estoppel is invoked against the party, if such an issue is decided against him, he would be estopped from raising the same in the latter proceedings.”

8. The distinction between res judicata and issue estoppel was also explained by Mahmood, J. in Sita Ram v. Amir Begam [I.L.R, 8 All.324] thus:

“Perhaps the shortest way to describe the difference between the plea of res judicata and an estoppel, is to say that whilst the former prohibits the Court from entering into an inquiry at all as to a matter already adjudicated upon, the latter prohibits a party, after the inquiry has already been entered upon, from proving anything which would contradict his own previous declaration or acts to the prejudice of another party, who, relying upon those declarations or acts, altered his position. In other words, res judicata prohibits an inquiry in limine, whilst an estoppel is only a piece of evidence. Further, the theory of res judicata is to presume by a conclusive presumption that the former adjudication declared the truth, whilst “an estoppel”, to use the words of Lord Coke, “is where a man is concluded by his own act or acceptance to say the truth”, which means, he is not allowed, in contradiction of his former self, to prove what he now choses to call the truth.”

9. Issue of estoppel is specie of principles of res judicata. Res judicata is often considered as principles of procedure. Issue estoppel is considered as a principle of evidence. In our Evidence Act in Section 115, estoppel has been recognised as a principle of evidence. Estoppel is only a rule of evidence capable of having gravest effect on the substantive rights of the parties [see Pullock on Contract, 6th edition, page 505].

10. Rent Control Court is a court of limited jurisdiction. The scope of enquiry for ordering eviction is based on the enumerated grounds. The grounds of eviction are decided based on the determination of ‘fact in issue’. The grounds envisaged for eviction are capable of determining substantiative rights of the parties vis-a-vis determination of landlord-tenant relationship. What is referred in Section 15 of the Act is only on reagitating issues. Therefore, what is contemplated under Section 15 of the Act is reagitating issues in grounds of eviction between parties which are substantially decided in the previous litigation. On the other hand, res judicata is a part of principles of procedure which determines rights and liabilities itself and it bars reagitating the matter between the same parties. On the other hand, “issue estoppel” being rule of evidence, it allows parties to reagitate rights and liabilities on grounds other than on issues which are not previously litigated. One of the difference between Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure and Section 15 of Act is, former refers to “matter directly and substantially in issue” and in the latter, the word “matter” is conspicuously absent, and it denotes only “facts in issue”. This is obvious because grounds of eviction in the Rent Control Act are based on personal action relatable to the landlord or tenant, which by very nature is recurring. The “matter substantially in issue” referred in Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, is words of wider import to relate a cause of action available at the time of action relating to the “matter”. The expression “substantially” used in Section 15 of the Act would only indicate that issue must have been decided on merits. Section 15 of the Act only denotes reagitating a “fact in issue”, which is not same as res judicata as understood under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure. Thus we are of the view, the principles contained in Section 15 of the Rent Control Act are only “issue estoppel” and not of “res judicata

11. As has been noted what is embodied under Section 15 of the Act is “facts in issue” and not the “matter in issue” and, thus, subsequent petition is maintainable on new facts. A landlord may have causes of action to file eviction petition under Section 11(3) based on present need or future need. If the claim of the landlord based on present need is rejected, that does not bar him to file fresh eviction petition under Section 11(3) of the Act, that was available to him as a future need, at the time of seeking eviction previously. In this case, though it would have been possible to the landlord to claim eviction, based on the future need as well, however, that was not projected in the earlier rent control petitions. But that does not bar the landlord from filing a second petition based on the subsequent events that arose after the earlier rent control petitions, as we have noted, the principles of res judicata, as comprehended under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure, would not apply.

12. This Court in P.N Govindan… v. Abdul Kari Subaida Beevi…. [1997 (1) KLT 910] held that neither the principles of ‘res judicata’ nor ‘constructive res judicata’ under Section 11 of the Code of Civil Procedure as such will have application to the proceedings under the Act. It is also held by this Court in Radha Lekshmy G. v. Indian Saree House [2014 (2) KHC 567 (DB)], wherein one of us was a party (K.T Sankaran, J.), that principles of res judicata or provisions contained in Rule 2 of Order II of the Code of Civil Procedure would not apply to subsequent proceedings under the Rent Control Act. Therefore, the need projected, in the second petition, under Section 11(3) on different facts is perfectly maintainable and is not hit by Section 15 of the Act.

13. Onto the next point raised by the learned counsel Shri K. Ramachandran that requirement is only a desire or luxury, we are of the view requirement projected is a need as envisaged under Section 11(3) of the Act. Each person may set his own priorities according to his age, experience in life, religious beliefs, cultural and social values he cherishes and some may give more priority to inner harmony than to any other temporal affairs, especially when they are getting old. Decision to settle in the tenanted premises after the retirement of the wife of the landlord with intention to reside near Guruvayur Temple cannot be brushed aside as a luxury or a desire. There are no common yardsticks to adjudge the requirement of a person to differentiate it from luxury or desire. All that makes a need is, how one vouchsafes with intensity to look upon to occupy that tenanted premises after the eviction. Luxury of a person may be a need of another. An atheist may view religious avidity as a redundant human requirement while devout human feel it as inspiring awe to gratify one's soul. The duty of the court is only to look at the claim projected under Section 11(3) of the Act to scan and find element of practical or realistic and pragmatic sense in the requirement projected rather than bordering judicial mind to have a finer craft in dissecting the requirements among need, luxury or desire. Thus, the landlord's priority to have an abode near to the temple cannot be termed as a mere luxury. There is nothing on record to suggest about the obscurity of the claim made. Therefore, we are of the view, the requirement projected by the landlord is only need and the landlord has established the same.

14. In view of the discussions as above, we dismiss the rent control revisions. However, considering the fact that the tenanted premises are residential buildings, we grant time up to 28/02/2015, to the tenants to vacate the tenanted premises on following terms:

i. The tenants in each case shall file an affidavit before the Rent Control Court or the execution court, as the case may be, within four weeks from today, undertaking to vacate the tenanted premises within the time granted by this Court.

ii. The arrears of rent, if any, will be paid to the landlord within two months from today.

iii. The tenants will continue to pay the same monthly rent till the vacant possession is handed over.

If any of these conditions are violated, the petitioners will not be entitled for the benefit of this order. No costs.