, as His Lordship then was, spoke for the Division Bench makes almost an exhaustice discussion of the relevant English and Indian law available on the point and we express our respectfull agreement with the exposition of law as made therein. W note with approval the following proposition of law laid down therein: (AIR pp.332 & 334, paras 14 & 19); (i) In India, the law does not prohibit a perpetual lease; clear and unambiguous language would be required to infer such a lease. If the language is ambiguous the Court would opt for an interpretation negating the plea of the perpetual lease; (ii) To find an answer to the question whether a covenant for renewal contained in the lease deed construed properly and in its real cotext entitles the tenant to cotinew as long as he chooses by exercising the option of renewal at the end of each successive period of 5 years subject to the same terms and conditions depends on the deed of lease being read as a whole and an effort made to ascertain the intention of the pairties while entering into the contract. No single clause or term should be read in isolation so as to defeat other clauses. The interpretation must be reasonable, harmonious and be deduced from the language of the document; (iii) The Court always leans against a perpetual renewal and hence where there is a clause for renewal subject to the same terms and conditions it would be construed as giving a right to renewal for the same period as the period of the original lease, but not a right to second or third renewal and so on unless, of course, the language is clear and unambiguous. Para-16: Another illuminating decision on the point is by Sir Ashutosh Mookerjee, J., speaking for the Division Bench of the Calcutta High Court in Secy. of State for India in Council v. A.H. Forbes. The Division Bench on a review of several English decisions held: “(1) A lease, which creates a stenancy for a term of years, may yet confer on the lessee an option of renewal. (2) If the lease does not state by whom the option is exercisable, it is exercisable (as between the lessor and lessee) by the lessee only, that is to say, a covenant for renewal, if informally expressed, is enforced only in favour of the lessee. (3) The option is exercisable not merely by the lessee personally but also by his representative-in-interest. (4) If the option does not state the terms of renewal, the new lease will be for the same period and on the same terms as the original lease, in respect of all the essential conditions thereof, except as to the covenant for renewal itself. (5) There is no sort of legal presumption against a right of perpetual renewal. The burden of strict proof is imposed upon a person claiming such a right. It should be inferred from any equivocal expressions which may fairly be capable of being otherwise interpreted. The intention in that behalf should be clearly shown; otherwise, the agreement is satisfied and exhausted by a single renewal. (6) A covenant for renewal runs with the land. (7) The position of a lessee, who has been always ready and willing to accept a renewal on proper terms, is the same in equity as if a proper lease had been granted. Where the covenant for renewal was still specifically enforceable at the commencement of a suit for ejectment against the lessee, the position of the lessee in equity is the same as if it had been specifically enforced.” Para 18: We find ourselves in full agreement with the view of the law taken in the decisions cited hereinabove. It is pertinent to note that the respondent is not claiming a lease in perpetuity or right to successive renewals under the covenant for renewal contained in the 1887 lease. The term of 50 years under the 1887 lease came to an end in the year 1937 and the option for renewal was exercised by the respondent as assignee of the original lessee which exercise was honoured by the lessor State executing a fresh deed of lease belatedly on 20.2.1945. This lease deed does not set out any fresh covenants, mutually agreed upon between the parties for the purpose of renewal. Rather it incorporates, without any reservation, all the covenants, provisos and stipulations as contained in the principal lease as if they had been herein repeated in full. Not only was a fresh deed of lease executed but the conduct of the parties also shows that at the end of the term appointed by the 1945 lease i.e. in or around the year 1987, the lessor did not exercise its right of re-entry. On the other hand, the respondent exercised his option for renewal. The officials of the appellant State i.e. the Collector and the Board of Revenue, all recommended renewal and advised the State Government to expedite the renewal. The State Government was generally renewing such like leases by issuing general orders/instructions to its officers. At no point of time prior to the filing of the counter-affidavit, on the present litigation having been initiated, the State or any of its officers took a stand that the right of renewal, as contained in the principal deed of lease, having been exhausted by exercise of one option for renewal, was not available to be exercised again. Para 20: The other two pleas raised on behalf of the appellant State merit a short and summary burial. The appellant’s plea that the land having been acquired there could be no renewal of lease has been termed by the High Court as “ridiculous” and we find no reason to take a different view. Suffice it to refer to a recent decision of this Court in Sharda Devi v. State of Bihar, wherein it has been held that the Land Acquisition Act, 1894 cannot be invoked by the Government to acquire its own property. It would be an absurdity to comprehend the provisions of the Land Acquisition Act being applicable to such land wherein the ownership or the entirety of rights already vests in the State. The Notification and declaration under Section 4 and 6 of the Land Acquisition Act for acquisition of the land i.e. the site below the bungalow are meaningless. It would have been different if the State would have proposed the acquisition of the leasehold rights and/or the superstructure standing thereon, as the case may be. But that has not been done. The renewal of lease cannot be denied in the garb of so-called acquisition notification and declaration which have to be just ignored. Para 21: Lastly, it was submitted that the respondent is in breach of the terms of the lease and hence not entitled to renewal. Firstly, the High Court has held the plea taken by the appellant State not substantiated. Secondly, the exercise of option for renewal cannot be stalled on the ground that the lessor proposes to exercise the right of re-entry on account of alleged breach when no steps were taken for exercising the right of re-entry till the option for renewal was exercised by the lessee. If the lessee is in breach and the lease entitles the lessor to re-enter, that right is available to be exercised without regard to the renewal of the lease.” 65. This Court also in the case of Hindoo Pat and another v. District Judge, Hamirpur and others, reported in 1985 All LJ 438, held that where the question of title is involved a person can not be evicted in a summary proceeding. For convenience relevant portion from the case of Hindoo Pat (supra) is reproduced as under; “Para 5: In Govt. of Andhra Pradesh v. Bandi Venkatarama, AIR 1982 SC 1081, it was held that even if a person is alleged to be in unauthorized occupation of Government land, he cannot be evicted in this summary proceeding where the question of title has been raised. The Supreme Court was dealing with a case under the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act. In that Act some remedy for eviction is provided under Section 6. It was held that when a question of title of the land in dispute arose, it could not appropriately be decided in a summary proceeding as contemplated under Sections 6 and 7 of the Act and the long possession of the respondents and their predecessors in title on those plots raises a genuine dispute between them and the Government on the question of title. The facts in the present case are also akin, as the petitioners raised the question of title that the said land was sold by one Kesar Singh as far back as in the year 1958 and they are in possession since thereafter. The long possession and payment of revenue by the petitioners are not even disputed by the respondents, on the contrary, they have been admitted. In view of these facts also even this case applies with full force. In fact, under the aforesaid 1960 Act a clear provision for eviction of such a person who is said to be in possession of surplus land is provided in Section 14(8) of the Unamended Act and Section 14(1) after its amendment.” 66. In a case reported in 1995 Supp. (2) SCC 290, State of Rajasthan v. Padmavati Devi (Smt) (Dead) by LRs and others, the Apex Court again ruled that where there is bonafide dispute about right to remain in possession of a land which involved question relating to the applicability and interpretation of various laws and documents as well as investigation into disputed question of facts requiring recording of evidence then such matter can not be adjudicated in a summary proceeding like under Section 91 of the Rajasthan Land Revenue Act. For convenience relevant portion from the judgment of State of Rajasthan (supra) is reproduced as under: “As noticed earlier Section 91 of the Act prescribes a summary procedure for eviction of a person who is found to be in unauthorized occupation of Government of India. The said provisions cannot be invoked in a case where the person in occupation raises bona fide dispute about his right to remain in occupation over the land. Dealing with similar provisions contained in Section 6 of the Andhra Pradesh Land Encroachment Act, 1945, this Court in Govt. of A.P. v. Thummala Krishna Rao has laid down that the summary remedy for eviction provided by Section 6 of the said Act could be resorted to by the Government only against persons who are in unauthorized occupation of any land which is the property of the Government and if the person in occupation as a bona fide claim to litigate he could not be ejected save by the due process of law and that the summary remedy prescribed by Section 6 was not the kind of legal process which is suited to an adjudication of complicated question of title.” 67. On the question relating to issue of composite notice petitioner’s counsel Shri N.K. Seth as well as learned counsel for the intervener Shri B.K. Saxena submitted that in view of provision contained in Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure readwith Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act a composite notice could have been given by the competent authority under Section 4, 5 and 7 of the Act. Shri B.K. Saxena had relied upon two judgments reported in; 1983 (2) ARC 124, State of U.P. v. D.C. Gupta and 1999(1) ARC 13, Triloki Nath Pandey v. IIIrd Additional District and Sessions Judge, Bareilly and others. The Case of State of U.P. v. D.C. Gupta relates to dispute between landlord and tenant. It was not a case where Nazul had leased out its land to a lessee as claimed by private respondents. In a case where relationship between landlord and tenant is in dispute giving of composite notice in pursuance to provision contained in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act readwith Section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure has been found to be correct. However, the said principle does not seems to be applicable in a proceeding where a controversy is exclusively covered under the Act in question. Moreover careful reading of case of D.C. Gupta (supra) reveals that the provision contained in Section 4 and 5 of the Act should be followed separately i.e. by serving a separate notice that is why this Court in a case of D.C. Gupta (supra) had proceeded to observe as under: “Section 4 of the U.P. Act 22 of 1972 provides that if the Prescribed Authority either of its own motion or on an application of report received on behalf of the State Government or the corporate authority, is of opinion that any persons are in unauthorized occupation of any public premises and that they should be evicted, the prescribed Authority shall issue in the manner hereinafter provided a notice in writing calling upon all persons concerned to show cause why an order of eviction should not be made. Section 5 provides that if, after considering the cause, if any, shown by any person in pursuance of a notice issued under Section 4 and any evidence he may produce in support of the same and after giving him a reasonable opportunity or being heard, the Prescribed Authority is satisfied that the public premises are in unauthorized occupation, the Prescribed Authority may make an order of eviction.” In view of case law cited by petitioners’ counsel as well as counsel for the intervenor also referred hereinabove it is evident that a notice under Section 5 may be issued only after considering the response submitted by unauthorized occupants in response through notice issued under Section 4. 68. The case of Triloki Nath Pandey (supra) also relates to a dispute adjudicated by this Court between landlord and tenant decided in pursuance to controversy under the Act No.13 of 1972. This Court had upheld the service of composite notice in pursuance to provision contained in Section 106 of the Transfer of Property Act Section 80 of Code of Civil Procedure as the dispute was between landlord and tenant. 69. The U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act 1971 is a special Act as discussed hereinabove. The provision contained therein contains a specific procedure to evict the unauthorized occupant. The provision contained in Section 4, 5 and 7 of the Act are statutory in nature. It is settled law that when in case statute wants to do certain thing in certain way then that must be done in a same way or not at all vide; Nazir Ahmad v. King Emperor, AIR 1936 PC 253: Deep Chand v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1961 SC 1527: Patna Improvement Trust v. Smt. Lakshmi Devi and others, AIR 1963 SC 1077: State of U.P. v. Singhara Singh and other, AIR 1964 SC 358: AIR 1967 SC 295 (para 34 A) Barium Chemicals Ltd. v. Company Law Board (para 34 A): Chandra Kishore Jha v. Mahavir Prasad and others, 1999 (8) SCC 266: Delhi Administration v. Gurdip Singh Uban and others, 2000(7) SCC 296: Dhanajay Reddy v. State of Karnataka, AIR 2001 SC 1512: Commissioner of Income Tax, Mumbai v. Anjum M.H. Ghaswala and others, 2002 (1) SCC 633: Prabha Shankar Dubey v. State Of M.P., AIR 2004 SC 486 and Ramphal Kundu v. Kamal Sharma, AIR 2004 SC 1657. 70. In view of above that the Act in question being special law it shall always be incumbent upon the authorities to follow the provision contained therein while taking action to evict an unauthorized occupant. 71. So far as the argument advanced by Shri B.K. Saxena, learned counsel for the intervenor M/S Gomti Construction is concerned, admittedly a portion of land is transferred during the pendency of proceeding. The intervenor being a transferee pendente lite without leave of the Court shall be bound by a final outcome of the present writ petition. As settled by Hon’ble Supreme Court in a case reported in (2004) 1 SCC 191, Bibi Zubaida Khatoon v. Nabi Hassan Saheb and another, the petitioner who was the respondent in appeal should not have transferred a portion of property during the pendency of present proceeding. The alienation of property shall be hit by doctrine of lis pendens by operation of Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act. Hon’ble Supreme Court in the case of Bibi Zubaida Khatoon (supra) had relied upon the earlier judgment of Apex Court and proceeded to held as under: “In the case of Dhurandhar Prasad Singh observations relevant for the purpose of these appeals read thus: (SCC pp.541-42, para 7) Where a party does not ask for leave, he takes the obvious risk that the suit may not be properly conducted by the plaintiff on record, yet he will be bound by the result of the litigation even though he is not represented at the hearing unless it is shown that the litigation was not properly conducted by the original party or he colluded with the adversary.” FINDING 1. The provision contained in Section 4, 5 and 7 of the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Act 1971 readwith Rule 3, 5 and 8 of the U.P. Public Premises (Eviction of Unauthorised Occupants) Rule 1971 are mandatory in nature. 2. The provisions contained in Section 4, 5 and 7 of the Act deals with the different situations and circumstances, hence, issuance of composite notice in pursuance to provision contained in Section 4, 5 and 7 of the Act readwith Rules discussed hereinabove is not permissible. 3. While issuing notice under Section 4, 5 and 7 of the Act it shall be incumbent upon the authorities to disclose the ground in brief so that the alleged unauthorized occupants may be able to submit categorical reply to the allegations or charges contained in the notices. 4. While deciding a controversy under the Act it shall always be incumbent upon the prescribed authority to deal with the dispute within the parameter and provisions contained in the Act and finding should be based on objective assessment of the material on record. 5. While issuing a notice under Section 4 it shall be incumbent upon the competent authority to indicate the specific date and actual period of unauthorized occupation. In the present case since initially Guru Prasad was in possession of premises in question from the year 1917 and thereafter Smt. Parvati Devi had acquired the possession on the basis of registered sale deed of the year 1943 and from the Parvati Devi the private respondents had acquired the possession, the allegation of unauthorized occupation from 1st April, 1979 as given in the notice is incorrect and bases on unfounded facts. Hence the consequential action taken on the basis of the disclosure of incorrect fact and period of alleged unauthorized occupation in the notice vitiates and shall be void. 6. The material on record indicates that at various stages the Lucknow Development Authority/Nagar Nigam had accepted that the private respondents is lessee of the premises in question. The material on record further discloses the continuous possession of premises in question by Shri Guru Prasad then Smt. Parvati Devi w/o Sri Justice Bisheshwar Nath and then her heir i.e private respondents right from 1917. 7. Though admittedly Nazul is the owner of property in question but since it has been claimed that Guru Prasad had acquired the property through lesse from Nazul department in the year 1917 it shall always be permissible for the private respondents to lead evidence to install their claim by producing primary or secondary evidence in respect to execution of original lease deed of the year 1917. For extension of lease it is not necessary that fresh lease may be executed by Nazul department. Accordingly the disputed question of fact co-relate with the title of property in question on the basis of alleged lease deed of the year 1917 which can not be adjudicated in the present summary proceeding in view of law discussed hereinabove. It requires recording of evidence cross examination of witness and production of primary or secondary evidence which can be done only in a regular suit. Question of title includes to proof the execution of lease deed. 8. So far as the argument advanced by the petitioner’s counsel relating to the compliance of provision contained in Nazul Manual, the burden of proof, plea of waiver, applicability of various provisions of Transfer of Property Act or the Registration Act are concerned they co-relate to the question of title vis a vis grant of lease to late Shri Guru Prasad in the year 1917 which can be adjudicated by the competent civil Court after recording of evidence and providing opportunity of hearing to the parties. In the absence of specific pleading in writ petition or before the prescribed authority, the argument advanced by the petitioner’s counsel are left open for the adjudication by the competent civil Court. 72. Since the portion of land was transferred to Gomti Construction during the pendency of present proceeding, the right of M/s Gomit Construction shall also be covered by present finding applying the principle of law laid down by the Apex Court in Zubeda Khatun’s case (supra). 73. In view of finding recorded hereinabove and provision of law discussed in the preceeding paras, the present writ petition does not survive and is devoid of merit. The impugned order of the appellate Court does not suffer from any impropriety or illegality and call for no interference. Subject to discussion hereinabove the writ petition is devoid of merit hence dismissed. No order as to costs. (Petition dismissed) _____________