Viswanatha Sastri, J.:— These three appeals arise out of suits instituted by the plaintiff Gaddam Veerayya, the paternal uncle of Sambayya, deceased, for a declaration that certain sales of Sambayya's lands effected by his widow and mother were not Binding on his reversioner. It is not now disputed that the plaintiff is the nearest male reversioner of Sambayya. The sales impugned in these appeals are Exhibits B-5, B-14 and B-12 effected by the widow and mother of Sambayya claiming to be absolutely entitled to the properties sold under Sambayya's will Exhibit B-1 dated 19th September, 1937. The widow and the mother of Sambayya as well as the vendees from them were made defendants to the suits. The Court below held that Exibit B-1 had not been proved to be the will of Sambayya and that the widow of Sambayya had inherited his properties as his heir-at-law. The sales were not sought to be supported by the vendees on the ground of any necessity of the estate and the only issue of fact arising in these appeals is as regards the truth and genuineness of the will, Exhibit B-1. At the hearing before us, it was argued that even if Exhibit B-1 was not proved to be the last will and testament of Sambayya, the suits were not maintainable by reason of section 14 of the Hindu Succession Act (XXX of 1956) which enlarged the limited interest of a Hindu widow into an absolute estate with retrospective effect and thereby put an end to the rights of reversioner to sue for the protection of the estate of the last male owner during the lifetime of his widow.

2. Section 14(1) of the Hindu Succession Act (XXX of 1956) enacts that

“any property possessed by a female Hindu, whether acquired before or after the commencement of this Act, shall be held by her as full owner thereof and not as a limited owner”.

3. For the purposes of this section, “property” includes both movable and immovable property acquired by a female Hindu by inheritance. The section provides that, subject to certain exceptions where a limited estate has been created by a written instrument, whatever property is in the possession of a Hindu woman, whether it has been acquired before or after the commencement of the Act, shall be regarded as her absolute property. The previous law allowing only a Hindu woman's limited estate to a widow inheriting her husband's property has been abrogated. Though section 14 of the Act is retrospective in so far as it enlarges a Hindu woman's limited estate into an absolute estate even in respect of property inherited or held by her as a limited owner before the Act came into force, its operation is confined to property in the possession of the female when the Act came into force. The word “possessed” in section 14 refers to possession on the date when the Act came into force. Of course, the possession referred to in section 14 need not be actual physical possession or personal occupation of the property by the Hindu female, but may be possession in law. The possession of a licensee, stee or mortgagee from the female owner or the possession of a guardian or trustee or agent of the female owner would be her possession for the purpose of section 14. The word “possessed” is used in section 14 in a broad sense and in the context “possession” means “the state of owning or having in one's hands or power”. It includes possession by receipt of rents and profits. Even if a trespasser is in possession of land belonging to a female owner on the date when the Act came into force, the female owner might conceivably be regarded as being in possession of the land, if the trespasser had not perfected his title by adverse possession before the Act came into force. It is not however necessary for us to express an opinion on this point. Where, however, before the Act came into force, the female owner had sold away the property in which she had only a limited interest and put the vendee in possession, she should in no sense be regarded as “possessed” of the property when the Act came into force. The object of the act was to confer a benefit on Hindu females by enlarging their limited interest in property inherited or held by them into an absolute estate, with retrospective effect, if they were in possession of the property when the act came into force and therefore in a position to take advantage of its beneficent provisions. The jet was not intended to benefit alienees who, with eyes open, purchased property from female limited owners without any justifying necessity before the Act came into force and at a time where the female vendors had only the limited interest of a Hindu woman. On a transfer of property, it is only the transferor's interest that would pass to the transferee the general principle being that a person cannot, transfer to another more that what he or she is entitled to and a transferee cannot therefore have a better title than what the transferor had to the property transfereed. If the transferor held the property only under limitations, the transferee would take it subject to those limitations, except in the case of a bona fide purchaser for value without notice from a person who had himself acquired title under a voidable sale. Before the Act came into force, a Hindu widow had power to convey an absolute interest in property inherited by her from her husband only under particular circumstances. She could however have conveyed her limited interest in the property in the absence of any necessity, and a transfer by her in the absence of such necessity cannot convey anything more than her own limited interst. A Hindu female limited owner who, before the coming into force of the Act, had sold property inherited by her retains no right to or interest in the property on the date of the coming into force of the Act. Section 14 merely enlarges her limited interest into an absolute estate in the property held by her when the Act came into force and does not enlarge the rights of a purchaser of her limited interest before the Act came into force. The rule of “interest feeding the estoppel” enacted in section 43 of the Transfer of Property Act on which reliance was placed for the appellant, would not avail the vendees because the female vendor does not get an absolute estate under section 14 of the Act in property of which she was not in possession at the date when the Act came into force. For these reasons, the appellant's objection to the maintainability of the suits by reason of the enactment of section 14 of Act XXX of 1956 must be overruled.

4. A further legal objection is taken to the maintainability of the suits O.S No. 138 of 1949 and 198 of 1949 which form the subject of A.S No. 80 of 1950 and A.S No. 802 of 1951. It is argued that these suits were instituted by a remote reversioner more than six years from the dates of the sales under Exhibits B-5 and B-12 effected by the widow of the last male owner. It is urged that Article 120 and not Article 125 of the Limitation Act applies to the case. There has been a divergence of Judicial opinion on this point among the several High Courts and among the Judges of the Madras High Court. In Chiruvolu Punnamma v. Chiruvolu Perrazu 1906 16 M.L.J 307, a Full Bench of the Madras High Court was of the opinion that Article 125 was intended rather to describe the character of the suit than to strictly limit the persons who might bring such suit. In the opinion of the Full Bench, though the point did not directly arise for decision, having regard to the fact that the presumptive reversioner sues not on his own behalf alone but on behalf of all other possible reversioner as well, the language in which a suit of that nature is described in column 1 of Article 125 is wide enough to include a suit in which, in exceptional circumstances, a reversioner other than the nearest reversioner, is allowed to be the plaintiff and have the conduct of the suit. In this view Article 125 would apply to all suits by reversioner to question alienations during the widow's lifetime. In Veeramma v. Gopaladasayya a later Full Bench of the Madras High Court went much further and following Venkatanarayana v. Subbammal 1915 28 M.L.J 535, and Janki Ammal v. Narayanaswami Iyer 1916 31 M.L.J 225, held that a suit by a reversioner to set aside an alienation by a Hindu widow was a representative suit on behalf of all reversioner, then existing or thereafter to be born, and that all of them had but a single cause of action which arose on the date of the alienation. Wallis, C.J, in his order of reference and Sadasiva Aiyar and Seshagiri Aiyar, JJ., siting in the Full Bench were of the opinion that Article 125 was the only Article applicable to suits by reversioner, presumptive or remote, for setting aside alienation of the widow during her lifetime. Rajagopala v. Ramanuja 1935 44 L.W 208., Kuppuswami v. Thangavelu 1946 2 M.L.J 214., and Yagnanarayana v. Lakshminarayana 1951 1 M.L.J 502, were decisions of single Judges of the Madras High Court. In Rajagopala v. Ramanuja, and Kuppuswami v. Thangavelu, it was assumed that Article 120 of the Limitation Act would apply to a suit by a reversioner other than the presumptive reversioner for setting aside an alienation by the widow during her lifetime. In Yagnanarayana v. Lakshminarayana, to which one of us was a party, it was observed:

“Though a literal interpretation of the first column of Article 125 would make it applicable to a suit only by a presumptive reversioner, a wider interpretation has been put upon it so as to make it applicable even to a suit by a remoter reversioner in view of the fact that a suit by a reversioner to set aside an alienation by a limited owner is a representative one brought on behalf of all the reversioner and that all of them have only a single cause of action. At any rate, this is the view of Full Bench of this Court in Varamma v. Gopaladasayya 1917 I.L.R 41 Mad. 659 F.B.

5. The above considerations apply with greater force where, as in this case, the nearest reversioner is a female entitled only to a limited interest. In such a case it has been uniformly held by the Madras High Court that without proof of fraud or collusion between the widow and the female reversioner, the nearest male reversioner is competent to sue to set aside an alienation by the widow during her lifetime—see Raghupati v. Tirumalai 1892 2 M.L.J 91, Chidambara v. Nallammal 1909 I.L.R 33 Mad. 410., and Yagnanarayana v. Lakshminarayana. There is also the further fact that in the present case the widow has alienated the property jointly with the mother of the last male owner and the next reversioner who is a male and who is not a party to the alienation seeks to have it set aside during the lifetime of the widow and the mother. In such a case it has been held in Vidyavati v. Nand Lal A.I.R 1937 Lah. 760. that Article 125 of the Limitation Act would apply, even though the mother who joined with the widow in the alienation was the person who would have succeeded if the widow had died at the time of the institution of the suit. The view of the Full Bench of the Madras High Court has been doubted in Das Ram v. Thirthanath, and Janakinath v. Jyotish. In the last case it was held that Article 120 of the Limitation Act governed a suit by a remote reversioner for a declaration of the invalidity of the surrender by a Hindu widow in favour of the nearest reversioner. The Limitation Act makes no express provision for these cases in which a declaratory suit is permitted to be brought by a remote reversioner and therefore Article 120 of the Limitation Act was applied to such a suit in Jankinath v. Jyotish. The question as to when a, remote reversioner is to be allowed to sue, is merely a question as to which reversioner should have the conduct of the suit which is instituted on a cause of action common to all and the rule that a suit to set aside an alienation by a female limited owner must be brought by the presumptive reversioner is not an inflexible one but is subject to exceptions—see Sethurayar v. Karuppayammal. The weight of authority in the Madras High Court is in favour of the view that Article 125 of the Limitation Act though in terms applicable only to suits by presumptive reversioner, applies equally to suits by remote reversioner who have the conduct of the litigation for the benefit of persons entitled to the estate when the succession opens on the each of the limited owner. Following the view of the Madras High Court we overrule the contention of the appellants that the suits are barred by limitation.

6. The last question that remains for our consideration is whether the defendants have proved the will, Exibit B-1, alleged to have been executed by Sambayya on 19th September, 1937. Sambayya died on 24th September, 1937. The will was presented by his mother, the second defendant, for registration on 8th December, 1937. The genuineness of the will was contested by the plaintiff but eventually the will was registered on 21st March, 1938. The Court below which had the advantage of seeing the scribe and the attestors of the will in the witness-box has come to the conclusion that their evidence is unacceptable and that it had not been established that Exibit B-1 was executed by Sambayya.

7. According to the evidence adduced by the propounders of the will, it was the mother of Sambayya that played an active part in connection with the preparation and execution of the will by bringing the scribe and the attestors to the house of Sambayya when the will is alleged to have been executed. The mother has not given evidence in the case. Sambayya's widow examined as D.W 1, deposed that the plaintiff was on good terms with Sambayya and was living in the same house with him. Yet she admitted that the plaintiff was not aware of the execution of the will and was not even informed about the will after it was executed. The reason given is that the plaintiff went away to the fields in the morning and did not return even for taking food till the evening. The evidence is that the will was executed at about 5 p.m when the plaintiff would in all probabilitity have returned even if he had left the house in the morning for attending to his fields. Though the will is alleged to have been executed on 19th September, 1937, it was not registered during the lifetime of Sambayya. The evidence of D.W I is that those around Sambayya apprehended that he would not recover when the will was thought of. The will was not published for a considerable time after its alleged execution on 19th September, 1937, and it was only on 8th december, 1937, that Sambayya's mother presented it for registration. Though Sambayya could read and write Telugu and had signed and executed promissory notes and other documents, Exibit B-I purports to bear only his thumb impression. Unfortunately, no thumb impression of Sambayya was available, for a comparison of the thumb impression found on Exhibit B-I with his admitted thumb impressions. The case of the plaintiff is that Sambayya was suddenly struck down by a paralytic stroke and was neither able to speak or move or understand any thing. The evidence of D.W I as well as the scribe is that Sambayya's right side including his right hand had been affected by paralysis but not his mouth and that Sambayya, though he was in a position to give instructions for the preparation of the will, could not sign the will and therefore his thumb impression was taken on Exhibit B-1. According to the evidence of D.W 1, Ayurvedic doctors of Bandarpalli and Mothadaka were treating Sambayya while he was ill. It is significant that none of these doctors is called to speak to the physical and mental condition of Sambayya on 19th September, 1937 or on any day thereafter till he died, in view of the serious nature of the malady and the prostrate condition of Sambayya, it would have been natural for Sambayya and those interested in him to take the attestation of one or other of the doctors who attended upon him. This however was not done. It is said that Ankanna and Narasimham who are men of some affluence and who reside in the village took a leading part in connection with the preparation of the will and were present when it was executed. These persons have not chosen to give evidence about the execution of the will. Their omission to enter the witness box is all the more significant because they have taken a conveyance under Exhibit B-12 dated 1st April, 1943, of a substantial portion of the property of Sambayya from his widow and mother. The scribe and attestors of Exhibit B-1 are persons related to Ankanna and Narasimham, defendants 4 and 5 in O.S No. 138 of 1949 which is the subject-matter of A.S No. 80 of 1950. It is rather strange that these defendants who are stated to have been present at the time of the execution of the will and fully aware of the events that happened at the time have not gone into the box even to prove that the sale-deed Exhibit B-12 was supported by consideration and was binding on the reversioner.

8. The scribe and attestors of the will are not persons on whose evidence much reliance could be placed. The scribe D.W 2 stated by denying knowledge of the will and later on spoke to his having written it. He was arrested and brought as a witness before the Court. He had already given evidence in support of the will in the enquiry before the Sub-Registrar and therefore the defendants were in a position to treat him as hostile. But it might be that he was unwilling to swear to a false story before the Court though he was prepared to take the risk at the enquiry before the Sub-Registrar. In any case his evidence cannot be safely acted upon. He stated Sambayya was in a dangerous condition at a time when the will was executed. He would have it that Sambayya was affected by paralysis on the whole of the left side, while others would say that it was the right side that was affected and therefore thumb impression has been taken. If Sambayya was affected by paralysis on the left side he could have signed Exhibit B-1. If Sambayya's mouth also was affected by paralysis, as D.W 2 stated, he could not have given instructions for the preparation of the will D.W 3, an attestor of Exhibid B-1 is the village munsif of Paricherla. He deposed that Sambayya had paralysis on one side including the mouth and that he was talking in a distorted fashion. He stated that the will had been executed and the other attestors had attested when he went to the house of Sambayya for attesting the will. He admitted the existence of two factions in the village, to one of which he belongs. Two of the other attestors are related to this witness. He stated that he was involved in debts to the extent of Rs. 20,000 and sought relief before the Debt Conciliation Board. He appears to have been arrested in some criminal case for causing hurt to a villager. His evidence has not been relied upon by the Court below and we see no reason to differ from it. D.W 4 is a clerk of defendants 4 and 5 who are very much interested in upholding the will and yet who are avoiding the witness-box, though according to the evidence of the witnesses examined for the defendants they were present at the house of Sambayya at the time when the will is alleged to have been executed. D.W 4 is a relation of D.W 3. There are certain discrepancies between the evidence given by him before the Court and that given before the Sub-Registrar to which the learned Subordinate Judge adverted. D.W 5 is another attestor of the will. The fifth defendant in O.S No. 138 of 1949 is his father-in-law. Though he belongs to the same village of Pericherla he would pretend ignorance of the fact that a considerable portion of the property of Sambayya is in the possession of his father-in-law as a vendee from Sambayya's mother and widow. He even goes to the length of professing ignorance of the fact that his father-in-law, Narasimham, is the fifth defendant in O.S No. 138 of 1949.

9. Under the terms of the will, an extent of Ac. 1-50 of land is given to the mother-in-law of Sambayya. In the written statement of the first defendant, it was alleged that the land given to the mother-in-law was purchased by herein the name of Sambayyya and therefore he gave it back to her. This fact is not mentioned in the will and D.W 5 stated in his evidence that the testator said that he used the money of his mother-in-law without specifying how much he had taken from her. If Ac. 1-50 of land was given to the mother-in-law by way of discharging the debt which Sambayya owed to her, that fact would have been recited in the will but it was not.

10. Defendants 4 and 5 are remoter reversioner than the plaintiff and are money-lendets living in the village, having purchased a major portion of the property of Sambayya from his widow and mother. The suggestion of the plaintiff is that it was at their instance that the will was brought into existence with the help of the scribe and attestors who are all either related or obliged to them.

11. The learned advocate for the appellant places strong reliance on the circumstance that the plaintiff had not brought a suit for a declaration of the invalidity of the will and the alienations till 1949, though the will was published at the time of the registration in 1938, This criticism loses much of its force when it is remembered that the plaintiff came to know of the will only when he received notice from the Sub-Registrar at the time of enquiry before him and that as soon as he received the notice he objected to the registration on the ground that the will was not genuine. It is not the case of the propounders of the will that the plaintiff, who was living in the same house as Sambayya, was ever informed of the execution of the will or that the will was published to any person in the village other than the supposed scribe and attestors before it was presented for registration. Another circumstance relied upon by the appellants is that Koteswararao, the son of the plaintiff, had taken a sale-deed of a portion of the property of Sambayya from his widow and mother under Exhibit B-5 dated 22nd August, 1942. The evidence of the first defendant is that Koteswararao hand gone away from the family and had left his father many years before 1937. Koteswararao was the first wife's son of the plaintiff and was not on good terms with his father. He had been helping the widow and mother with funds for the conduct of the registration enquiry. The fact that he had taken a sale-deed in satisfaction of the debts due to him for advances made through another person for the conduct of the widow's litigation against the plaintiff does not in any way affect the plaintiff's case.

12. For these reasons, we are of the opinion that Exhibit B-1 has not been proved to be the true and genuine will of Sambayya. The result is that these appeals fail and are dismissed with costs of respondents 4 and 5 in A.S No. 80 of 1950 and respondents 5 and 6 in A.S No. 801 of 1951 and respondents 3 and 4 in A.S No. 802 of 1951.

T.A.B

13. Appeals dismissed.