- This revision petition is directed against the order dated 2.12.1983 passed by the Senior Sub Judge, Narnaul. 2. Arguments in the suit for specific filed by the petitioner against Lekh Ram are stated to have been heard on 30.5.1983 whereafter, it was adjourned for pronouncement of orders. According to the petitioner, no orders were pronounced on 31.5.1983 and his counsel in the trial Court had been enquiring from the Reader of the Court about the case on 6.7.1983 he had been told by the Reader that the suit had been decreed on 31.5.1983. After obtaining certified copy of the order, which was delivered to the petitioner on 3.8.1983 when the petitioner came to know that he was required to deposit the balance amount of consideration within a period of two months from the date of the decision. Since the time granted had already expired, the petitioner moved an application before the trial Court for extending the time upto 4.8.1983 for depositing the balance amount of consideration. The application had been dismissed because the Court was of the view that it had become functus officio and could not in exercise of powers under Section 148 CPC extend the period given by him for making the payment of the balance of the consideration amount. 3. In the revision, reversal of the view taken by the Court below is being sought as this order ignores the specific provisions of Section 28(1) of the Specific Relief Act which reads as under :-
"28.1. Where in any suit a decree for specific performance of a contract for the sale or lease of immovable property has been made and the purchaser or lessee does not, within the period allowed by the decree or such further period as the Court may allow, pay the purchase money or other sum which the Court has ordered him to pay, the vendor or lessor may apply in the same suit in which the decree is made, to have the contract rescinded and on such application the Court may, by order, rescind the contract either so far as regards the party in default or altogether as the justice of the case may require."
A perusal of this section indicates that in a suit where decree for specific performance of a contract for sale or lease of immovable property has been granted, and the purchaser or lessee does not within the period allowed by the decree pay the purchase money or other sums which the Court has ordered him to pay, allow such further time for payment of the purchase money in justice in the case may require. This power would necessarily envisage the power to condone the delay in making such an application and if in such a case valid reasons are put forth to explain the delay, the Court can also allow the application for extension of time. This is the view which has been taken by the Apex Court in
Sardar Mohar Singh v. Mangilal,
1997(2) R.C.R.(Civil) 296 :
1997(9) SCC 217, and also in
Yeshoda and Another v. K. Nagarajan,
1997(1) R.C.R.(Civil) 583 : 1996(11) SCC 228. 4. In the present case, the petitioner had clearly spelt out the reasons why he was unable to comply with the orders within the stipulated period. Neither the respondents nor the Court below have indicated any circumstances to the contrary. The Court has avoided to dwell upon the merits of the explanation offered. In these circumstances, I feel that the trial Court had rejected the application under the erroneous belief that it had become functus officio as no material has been produced on the record to prove that the explanation for the delay in filing of the application for extension of time has not been suitably explained. Ends of justice require that the petitioner should be granted six weeks time for depositing the amount. 5. For the reasons recorded above, this petition is allowed, the impugned order is set aside and the petitioner is granted six weeks time from today for depositing the amount. 6. A copy of the order be given dasti on payment. Petition allowed.