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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Illustration (a) to Section 50 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
  • Section 54-A(2) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913
  • Article 126 of the articles of association of the Company
  • Section 91-B(1) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913
  • Standard articles
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 277(1) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Disposition
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • Illustration (a) to Section 50 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872
  • Section 54-A(2) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913
  • Article 126 of the articles of association of the Company
  • Section 91-B(1) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913
  • Standard articles
  • Section 5, Subsection 2 of the 1983 Income Tax Act
  • Section 277(1) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The Bank of Poona Ltd. (“the Company”), incorporated in 1945 with an authorised capital of Rs 50 lakhs, was required by Section 277(1) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 to have at least half of its authorised capital subscribed before commencing business. By April 1946 only 4,860 shares had been taken up. To meet the statutory minimum, Director Narayandas Shriram Somani arranged for 2,000 shares to be allotted in the names of his mother (Jivanbai), wife (Goverjabai) and sister-in-law (Kamalabai).

On 25 May 1946 the Board (three directors present: M.C. Loya, D.R. Nayak and Narayandas) allotted 500 shares each to Goverjabai and Kamalabai and 1,000 shares to Jivanbai. Contemporaneously, the Company advanced substantial loans and overdrafts to Narayandas’s brother Ramnath, which were later consolidated. Further financial transactions on 27 December 1951 shifted Ramnath’s liability of Rs 1,00,000 to Narayandas through book entries supported by a new promissory note from Narayandas.

When the loans remained unpaid, the Company sued:

  • Special Suit 39/1954 against Ramnath and the proprietary concern “Ramakisan Ramratan Somani” for Rs 22,964-13-0. The trial court dismissed the suit (23 April 1955); the Bombay High Court reversed and decreed it; Civil Appeal 801/1962 is the further appeal.
  • Special Suit 78/1954 against Narayandas for Rs 1,09,099-14-0 on his Loan Account 6/184 and promissory note dated 27 December 1951. The trial court dismissed the suit; the High Court decreed it; Civil Appeal 802/1962 is the further appeal.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the 2,000-share allotment of 25 May 1946 was void for want of quorum because an interested director (Narayandas) voted, thereby offending Section 91-B(1) of the Companies Act, 1913.
  2. Whether, in consequence, there was a total failure of consideration justifying non-repayment of the loans that allegedly financed the share subscription.
  3. Whether the book-entry transaction of 27 December 1951 constituted a valid loan of Rs 1,00,000 to Narayandas.
  4. Whether the impugned loans were unlawful “financial assistance” for the purchase of the Company’s own shares under Section 54-A(2) of the Companies Act, 1913.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants’ Arguments (Narayandas, Ramnath and their concern)

  • The share allotment and related loans were sham transactions; the Company had assured the Somani brothers that they would never be required to pay.
  • Because Narayandas voted on the allotment, his presence could not count towards quorum under Section 91-B(1); hence the allotment was void, consideration failed, and the loans are irrecoverable.
  • No cash was actually advanced to Narayandas on 27 December 1951; therefore the suit as framed (for recovery of a loan) was not maintainable.
  • The loans amounted to prohibited financial assistance for acquisition of the Company’s own shares, violating Section 54-A(2).
  • (Earlier) Kamalabai was a minor, rendering her share allotment invalid (later abandoned).

Respondent’s Arguments (Bank of Poona Ltd.)

  • The allotment and loans were genuine; the Company never promised to waive repayment.
  • Even if Narayandas’s vote is excluded, the irregularity makes the allotment merely voidable at the Company’s instance; the Company has affirmed it.
  • The 27 December 1951 book entries constituted a lawful loan and simultaneous repayment on Ramnath’s behalf; physical cash transfer is unnecessary under Section 50 of the Contract Act.
  • The Section 54-A(2) contention was never properly pleaded or argued below; it should not be entertained on appeal. In any event, as a banking company the loans were in the ordinary course of business, and the provision targets “purchase,” not subscription, of shares.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
In re Yuill v. Greymouth Point Elizabeth Railway & Coal Co. Ltd. (1904 1 Ch 32) A quorum must consist of disinterested directors; an interested director’s presence cannot count. Cited to show that after excluding Narayandas’s vote there was no quorum, rendering the allotment merely voidable, not void.
Transvaal Lands Co. v. New Belgium (Transvaal) Land & Development Co. (1914 2 Ch 488) Contracts approved with votes of interested directors are voidable at the company’s option. Used to characterise the 25 May 1946 allotment as voidable and capable of affirmation by the Company.
Pratt (Bombay) Ltd. v. M.T. Ltd.; Sassoon & Co. Ltd. v. Pratt (Bombay) Ltd. (ILR 1938 Bom 421) Section 91-B is a statutory expression of the equitable rule against conflicted director votes. Relied on to affirm that Section 91-B’s effect is to render such resolutions voidable, not automatically void.
York Tramways Co. v. Willows (1882) 8 QBD 685 Doctrine of estoppel against a director who participated in and benefited from an irregular transaction. Applied to prevent Narayandas from challenging the validity of the allotment he procured and acted upon.
Re V.G.M. Holdings Ltd. (1942) 1 All ER 234 Distinction between “purchase” and “subscription” of a company’s own shares for purposes of financial assistance prohibitions. Cited (by respondent’s counsel) to argue that Section 54-A(2) does not apply to loans connected with share subscription; court noted but declined to entertain the point for procedural reasons.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

Genuineness of Transactions: The Court found ample evidence—hundis honoured, share certificates issued, transfers executed, repayments made from personal funds, security created, and interest charged—that both the share allotment and ensuing loans were intended to be operative. Assurances by individual promoters (Loya and Parulekar) did not bind the Company.

Effect of Director’s Interest and Quorum: Relying on Section 91-B and the equitable rule, the Court agreed that Narayandas’s vote should have been excluded, leaving no quorum. However, such an irregularity renders the allotment voidable, not void. The Company elected to affirm the allotment; hence it is valid and consideration did not fail. Further, Narayandas, having promoted and acted on the allotment, is estopped from challenging its validity.

Validity of the Rs 1,00,000 Loan (27 Dec 1951): Though no cash physically changed hands, reciprocal entries debiting Narayandas and crediting Ramnath constituted payment under Section 50 of the Contract Act. The accompanying promissory note and written acknowledgment proved the loan.

Section 54-A(2) Argument: The alleged illegality of “financial assistance” was not properly raised below or in the statement of case. The Court refused to entertain the argument. It therefore did not decide whether Section 54-A(2) applied.

Minority of Kamalabai: The argument that Kamalabai was a minor was abandoned.

Holding and Implications

DISMISSED – Both Civil Appeals 801/1962 and 802/1962 are dismissed with costs (one hearing fee).

Consequences: The Bombay High Court’s decrees in favour of the Company stand affirmed, rendering the appellants liable for the outstanding loan amounts. The decision turns on established principles of company law (director conflicts, voidable contracts, estoppel) and does not purport to create new precedent; its impact is confined to the parties and reinforces orthodox doctrine that companies may affirm irregular but voidable transactions.

    Narayandas Shreeram Somani v. Sangli Bank Ltd.

    Bachawat, J. — The Bank of Poona Ltd., (hereinafter referred to as the Company) now amalgamated with Sangli Bank, Ltd. was incorporated in 1945. The Company was promoted by N.G Parulekar and Murlidhar Chaturbhuj Loya. The authorised capital of the Company was rupees fifty lakhs divided into 50,000 ordinary shares of Rs 100 each. By the end of April 1946, the Company was able to find subscribers for 4860 shares only. In view of Section 277(1) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, the Company was unable to carry on business unless the subscribed capital was not less than half the authorised capital. In order to comply with the requirements of Section 277(1), the Directors of the Company decided that they or their nominees would subscribe for a large number of shares. Narayandas Shriram Somani was one of the Directors of the Company. Ramnath Shriram Somani is his brother. They carried on business in the name of Ramkisan Ramratan Somani. Jivanbai is the mother of Narayandas and Ramnath, Goverjabai is the wife of Narayandas, and Kamalabai is the wife of Ramnath. Narayandas decided to subscribe for 2000 shares in the names of the three ladies. At a meeting held on May 25, 1946, the Board of Directors of the Company allotted 500 shares to Goverjabai, 500 shares to Kamalabai and 1000 shares to Jivanbai against three separate applications for shares signed by them. The applications were accompanied by three separate hundis dated May 25, 1946 for Rs 25,000, Rs 12,500 and Rs 12,500 drawn by Narayandas in favour of the Company. The meeting of May 25, 1946 was attended by three Directors, Murlidhar Loya, D.R Nayak and Narayandas. At that meeting, the Directors also sanctioned a loan of Rs 60,000 to Ramnath. On May 28, 1946, Ramnath obtained from the Company the loan of Rs 60,000 against his promissory note, and a separate Loan Account No. 1/18 was opened in his name in the books of the Company. The three hundis were honoured on May 29, 1946. The Directors of the Company at a meeting held on June 8, 1946 resolved to give an overdraft of Rs 40,000 to Ramnath. A separate overdraft account LA/C No. 71 in the name of Ramnath was opened in the books of the Company, and Ramnath obtained the sanctioned overdraft by a cheque dated June 27, 1946 for Rs 15,00 and another cheque dated June 29, 1946 for Rs 25,000. The balance of the application and allotment moneys amounting to Rs 12,500, Rs 12,500 and Rs 25,000 in respect of the shares of Goverjabai, Kamalabai and Jivanbai were paid to the Company on June 22, June 28 and June 29 respectively. There is reason to believe that the subscription of the 2000 shares was financed by the advances to Ramnath.

    2. On December 28, 1948, Ramnath was indebted to the Company in his loan account for Rs 65,743-6-6 and in his overdraft account for Rs 41,909-10-0. On that date, both accounts were closed and a new Loan Account No. 9 with a debit of Rs 1,09,500 was opened in the name of Ramnath, who executed a promissory note. The Reserve Bank of India was pressing the Company to take steps in respect of the advances to Ramnath. In this circumstances, Ramnath repaid to the Company Rs 18,500 on December 29, 1950 and Rs 1500 on January 2, 1951. At the same time, on January 6, 1951, the Company gave a new loan of Rs 20,000 to Ramkisan Ramratan Somani and Ramnath, and the borrowers executed a joint and several promissory note in favour of the Company for the sum of Rs 20,000 . In respect of this loan, a separate loan account was opened in the books of the Company. In his Loan Account No. 9, Ramnath repaid Rs 1,00,000 on December 27, 1951 and Rs 4198-8-0 on December 29, 1951, and as a result of the last payment, the account was closed. The above sum of Rs 1,00,000 was paid on behalf of Ramanth by Narayandas, who on the same date obtained a loan of Rs 1,00,000 from the Company. On the same date, Narayandas executed a promissory note for the sum of Rs 1,00,000, a letter of pledge and trust receipt in respect of cloth, saris etc. valued at Rs 1,50,000, and a separate Loan Account No. 6/184 in his name was opened in the books of the Company.

    3. In spite of demands, the Company was unable to realise its dues in respect of the outstanding loans. On March 18, 1954, the Company instituted Special Suit No. 39 of 1954 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division of Poona, against Ramkisan Ramratan Somani and Ramnath for the recovery of Rs 22,964-13-0 due from them in respect of their loan account and the promissory note, dated January 6, 1951. The suit was dismissed by the trial court on April 23, 1955, but in First Appeal No. 819 of 1955 preferred by the Company, the High Court decreed the suit. Civil Appeal No. 801 of 1962 arises out of this claim. On April 24, 1954, the Company instituted Special Suit No. 78 of 1954 in the Court of the Civil Judge, Senior Division, Poona against Narayandas for the recovery of Rs 1,09,099-14-0 due from him in respect of the Loan Account No. 6/184 and the promissory note dated December 27, 1951. On April 23, 1955, the trial court dismissed the suit, but in First Appeal No. 820 of 1955 preferred by the Company, the High Court decreed the suit. Civil Appeal No. 802 of 1962 arises out of this claim.

    4. On behalf of the appellants, Mr Purushottam Tricamdas contended that the allotment of the 2000 shares and the several loans in the names of Ramnath and Narayandas were not genuine transactions, and that the parties did not intend that the allottees would be the holders of the shares or that Narayandas and Ramnath would be liable to repay the loans. It is to be noticed that the plea that the allotment of the 2000 shares was not intended to be operative, was not sufficiently raised in the pleadings. Narayandas pleaded in his written statement that at the time of the purchase of the shares, Loya and Parulekar gave him and Ramnath the assurance that the sum of Rs 1,00,000 required for the purchase of the shares would be paid by the Company on interest at 41/2 per cent per annum and Loya and Parulekar would not demand and recover the amount but they would sell the shares and credit the amount of the sale proceeds towards the principal and interest in the loan account and would not allow Narayandas and Ramnath to suffer loss with regard thereto. Narayandas swore that it was agreed between him, Parulekar and Loya that he would normally take the 2000 shares which would be finally sold to others and he would be out of liability and he and Ramnath would not repay the loans nor take any benefit thereunder. He also suggested that he or Ramnath did not repay any moneys out of their own pocket, and all repayments in the accounts were made out of the moneys received by him from the Company. At the trial the Company did not examine either Loya or Parulekar. It may be that Loya and Parulekar gave some understanding to Narayandas with regard to the disposal of the shares, and in view of this understanding, they subsequently executed in favour of Narayandas two letters dated December 27, 1951, whereby Parulekar agreed to buy from him 500 shares and Loya agreed to buy from him 800 shares. But these assurances if any were given to Narayandas by Parulekar and Loya in their individual capacity and not as Directors of the Company. There is no record of any assurance given on behalf of the Company to Narayandas in the minutes of the board meetings. Narayandas and his nominees, Goverjabai, Kamalabai and Jivanbai dealt with the shares on the footing that they were the owners of the shares. Some of the shares were transferred to third parties under transfer deeds executed by Jivanbai, and the sale proceeds were credited to the loan account of Narayandas. Jivanbai received from the Company all the 1000 shares allotted to her and executed a receipt, dated February 25, 1953. Narayandas obtained from Loya and Parulekar written undertakings dated December 27, 1951, for the purchase of 800 and 500 shares respectively. By letter, dated June 28, 1954, Narayandas called upon Parulekar to fulfil his undertaking for the purchase of 500 shares. All these circumstances prove that the allotment of the 2000 shares was intended to be operative and the allottees were intended to be the holders of the shares. Ramnath out of his own funds paid several sums of money towards discharge of his indebtedness in the loan accounts. He paid Rs 750-4-0 in the overdraft account towards interest on December 12, 1946 and Rs 1484-7-0 in the Loan Account No. 1/18 on April 21, 1947, and we are not satisfied that these sums were paid out of commission earned by Narayandas from the Company. Similarly, on December 29, 1951, he paid Rs 4198-8-0 in the Loan Account No. 9 and on January 4, 1954, Rs 100 was paid by Ramkisan Ramratan and Ramnath in their loan account. The loan accounts were secured by promissory notes. Moreover, the loan account of Narayandas was secured by a trust receipt and a letter of pledge. Even on March 3, 1953, Narayandas executed a letter in favour of the Company declaring that he held as security a stock of sarees valued at Rs 1,50,000. In respect of other loan transactions, the Company charged the appellants interest at the rate of 6 per cent and those loans were repaid quickly. But the loan transactions in suit were intended to be of a more permanent nature, and in order to accommodate Narayandas and Ramnath, the Company agreed to charge interest at 41/2 per cent We are satisfied that the allotment of the 2000 shares was intended to be operative and the allottees became the owners of the shares. We are also satisfied that the loans to Ramnath and Narayandas were intended to be operative, and the Company did not give any assurance to them that they would not be called upon to repay the loans.

    5. The next contention of Mr Purushottam Tricamdas arises in this way: Article 126 of the articles of association of the Company provides that the Directors may determine the quorum necessary for the transaction of business, and unless and until otherwise determined, three Directors shall be the quorum. The Directors did not make any other determination with regard to quorum, and at all material times, a quorum of three was required for a Directors' meeting. The board meeting of May 25, 1946 was attended by three Directors only, namely, M.C Loya, D.R Nayak and Narayandas. At this meeting, the Directors resolved to allot 2000 shares to the nominees of Narayandas. Narayandas was clearly interested in the allotment of the shares. Section 91-B(1) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913 provided that “No director shall, as a director, vote on any contract or arrangement in which he is either directly or indirectly concerned or interested nor shall his presence count for the purpose of forming a quorum at the time of any such vote; and if he does so vote, the vote shall not be counted”. The Poona Bank, Ltd. was a public company, and Section 91-B(1) applied to its Directors. Narayandas, therefore, ought not to have voted at the meeting of May 25, 1946. If his vote is excluded, there was no quorum for the meeting. Mr Purushottam Tricamdas, therefore, contended that the allotment of 2000 shares to the nominees of Narayandas at this meeting was invalid and no title passed to the allottees in respect of the shares, and in the circumstances, there was a total failure of the consideration paid for the shares, and as the consideration was paid out of the loans, the appellants are not liable to repay the same.

    6. Now, a director of a company stands in a fiduciary position towards the company and is bound to protect its interest. For long, it has been an established rule of equity that he must not place himself in a position in which his personal interest conflicts with his duty, and unless authorised by the company's articles, he must not vote as a director on any contract or arrangement in which he is directly or indirectly interested. Standard articles give effect to this rule of equity. See Palmer's Company Precedents, 17th Edn., Part I, p. 553. If he votes in such a case, his vote would not be counted, and his presence would not count towards the quorum, that is to say, the minimum number fixed for the transaction of business by a board meeting, for a quorum must be a disinterested quorum, and must be comprised of Directors who are entitled to vote on the particular matter before the meeting. See In re Yuill v. Greymouth Point Elizabeth Railway and Coal Company Limited 1904 1 Ch 32. If an interested director votes and without his vote being counted there is no quorum, the meeting is irregular, and the contract sanctioned at the meeting is voidable by the company against the director any other contracting party who has notice of the irregularity, see Transvaal Lands Company v. New Belgium (Transvaal) Land and Development Company 1914 2 Ch 488; but the company may waive the irregularity and affirm the transaction. The matter is put succinctly by Gore-Browne in Handbook on Joint Stock Companies, 41st Edn.p 363 thus:

    “According to the well established rule that an agent cannot act on behalf of his principal in a matter in which the agent has a conflicting interest or duty, Directors are precluded from taking part in any resolution under which they take a benefit or which adopts a contract that concerns them unless the articles authorise their doing so. It must be here noted that if interested Directors take part in any transaction there is an irregularity which renders the transaction voidable by the company as against the Directors and any persons who have knowledge of the facts.”

    7. Section 91-B embodied the existing rule of equity in the form of a statutory provision. In Pratt (Bombay) Ltd. v. M.T Ltd. and Sassoon and Co. Ltd. v. Pratt (Bombay) Ltd. ILR 1938 Bom 421, Sir George Rankin observed that the section is a concise statement of the general rule of equity explained in the Transvaal Lands Company case 1914 2 Ch 488 and he pointed out that the impugned transactions on which the interested Directors had voted, were voidable by the official liquidator of the Company. The voting by the interested director, of itself, does not invalidate the contract. The effect of Section 91-B is that the vote of the interested director must be excluded, and if as a result of such exclusion there is no quorum, the resolution sanctioning the contract is irregular and the contract is liable to be avoided by the company against the Directors and any other contracting party having notice of the irregularity. Section 91-B is meant for the protection of the company, and the company may, if it chooses, waive the irregularity and affirm the contract.

    8. We think that the allotment of the 2000 shares to the nominees of Narayandas in the meeting of the Directors of the Company held on May 25, 1946 was not void. In view of the fact that Narayandas was not entitled to vote on the allotment and after exclusion of his vote there was no quorum, the allotment was irregular, and the Company was entitled to avoid the allotment. Instead of avoiding the allotment, the Company has chosen to affirm it. The allotment is, therefore, valid and binding on the allottees.

    9. Moreover, Narayandas cannot be heard to say that there was no valid allotment of the shares. For the purpose of satisfying the requirement of Section 277(i) it was necessary to allot the shares, and he allowed the Company to commence business on the footing that the shares had been subscribed. He was a director of the Company and a party to the resolution allotting the shares. He dealt with the shares on the footing that the allottees were the holders of the shares with a clear knowledge of the circumstances on which he might have founded his present objection. He cannot now be heard to say that he was interested in the allotment and could not vote. Like the director in York Tramways Company v. Willows (1882) 8 QBD 685 he is now estopped from contending that the allotment is invalid. For all these reasons, we hold that the allotment is valid, and there is no failure of consideration.

    10. In the plaint in Suit No. 78 of 1954, the Company pleaded that on December 27, 1951, Narayandas took from it on loan a sum of Rs 1,00,000 and executed an on-demand promissory note for the amount. Mr Purushottam Tricamdas contended that, as a matter of fact, no cash amount was paid and no loan was advanced by the Company to Narayandas on December 27, 1951, and consequently, the suit as framed is not maintainable. Now, at the relevant time, Ramnath was indebted to the Company for Rs 1,04,198 in respect of Loan Account No. 9. On December 27, 1951, at the request of Narayandas, the Company credited Ramnath with Rs 1,00,000 in this loan account and debited Narayandas with Rs 1,00,000 in a new loan account opened in his name. On the same date, Narayandas acknowledged in writing the receipt of Rs 1,00,000 and executed a promissory note for the amount in favour of the Company. Ramnath took full advantage of the credit of Rs 1,00,000 and on payment of the balance of Rs 4198-8-0 closed his Loan Account No. 9. Though no actual money passed, the two entries in the books of account amounted to payment of Rs 1,00,000 by the Company to Narayandas by way of a loan and repayment of the same amount by Narayandas to the Company towards discharge of the indebtedness of Ramnath in the latter's loan account with the Company. The result was as if the Company had paid a sum of Rs 1,00,000 in cash to Narayandas and then Narayandas had returned the amount to the Company with instructions to credit it to Ramnath. To support a plea of payment, it is not necessary to show that cash passed. Illustration (a) to Section 50 of the Indian Contract Act, 1872 shows that payment may be made by means of transfer entries in books of account. The Company has sufficiently established a payment of Rs 1,00,000 by it to Narayandas by way of loan on December 27, 1951.

    11. Mr Purushottam Tricamdas contended that the loans to Narayandas and Ramnath were financial assistance by the Company for the purpose of or in connection with the purchase of its shares by Narayandas or his nominees, and the loans being in contravention of Section 54-A(2) of the Indian Companies Act, 1913, were illegal and could not be recovered. Mr K.N Bhabha contended (1) that the appellants ought not to be allowed to take this new point in this appeal; (2) the lending of the money was a part of the ordinary business of a banking company and the loans to Ramnath and Narayandas were made by the Company in the course of its business; and (3) having regard to the decision in Re V.G.M Holdings Ltd (1942) 1 All ER 234 the word “purchase” in Section 54-A(2) did not include the acquisition of shares by subscription or allotment, and in this case, the loans were given in connection with the acquisition by Narayandas or his nominees of shares by subscription or allotment and not in connection with acquisition of shares by purchase, and consequently, Section 54-A(2) had no application. Now, it appears that in para 15 of his written statement Narayandas pleaded that the advance of loans to him in connection with the purchase of shares was illegal, but no issue was raised on the question whether the loans were financial assistance in connection with the purchase of the shares and were in contravention of Section 54-A(2). There is passing reference to this contention in para 15 of the judgment of the trial court, but there is no reference to it in the judgment of the High Court. We find also that this contention finds no place in the statement of the case filed on behalf of the appellants. Mr Purushottam Tricamdas relied on ground No. 12 of the appellants' statement of case, but we think that this ground is wholly insufficient to raise this contention. In these circumstances, we think that it is not open to the appellants to urge this contention, and we indicated this to Mr Purushottam Tricamdas in the course of the argument.

    12. In the courts below, the appellants contended that Kamalabai was a minor, and, therefore, the allotment of 1000 shares to her was invalid. This contention is no longer pressed, and does not survive.

    13. No other contentions were advanced before us.

    14. In the result, the appeals are dismissed with costs, one hearing fee.

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    Narayandas Shreeram Somani v. Sangli Bank Ltd.
    (Apr 15, 1965)