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  • provisions of S. 115 of the Evidence Act,
  • Section 47 read with Section 151, C. P. C.
  • O. XXI, Rule 58 read with S. 151, C.P.C.,
  • provisions of O. XXI, Rule 58, C.P.C.
  • provisions of O. XXI, Rule 102
  • provisions of O. XXI, Rule 58,
  • O. I, Rule 8(4), C.P.C.
  • O. XXI, Rule 58
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Acts
  • provisions of S. 115 of the Evidence Act,
  • Section 47 read with Section 151, C. P. C.
  • O. XXI, Rule 58 read with S. 151, C.P.C.,
  • provisions of O. XXI, Rule 58, C.P.C.
  • provisions of O. XXI, Rule 102
  • provisions of O. XXI, Rule 58,
  • O. I, Rule 8(4), C.P.C.
  • O. XXI, Rule 58
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

The revision petition challenges the order dated 12-2-2009 of the Additional Civil Judge (S.D.) No. 3, Udaipur, which rejected an objection petition filed under Section 47 read with Section 151, C.P.C. in Execution Case No. 7/04 opposing execution of a decree.

Brief chronology based on the opinion:

  • A suit for cancellation of a sale deed dated 19-12-1967 was filed by Shri Vishnu Shanker and others, alleging the property belonged to Mandir Thakurji Charbhuja Ki Bari and that the seller, Shri Kundan Lal, had no right to sell. The suit was decreed on 7-3-1990.
  • Two appeals were filed against the decree: one by Ganesh Lal & Amba Lal and another by the legal representative of Kundan Lal (Shri Shiv Shanker).
  • During the pendency of one appeal, Ganesh Lal & Amba Lal claimed to have effected a compromise with the plaintiffs by paying Rs. 28,000; the appellate court required notice publication under O. I, Rule 8(4), C.P.C. The required notice was not published and the appellate court recorded that the compromise could not be acted upon and should be filed.
  • One appeal was dismissed for non-prosecution on 5-7-1994; the other appeal by L.Rs. of Kundan Lal was dismissed on merits, and a second appeal by Shiv Shanker remained pending before this Court.
  • The decree-holders (Vishnu Shanker and others) filed execution proceedings. The petitioner had purchased the property from Ganesh Lal during the pendency of appeal and filed an objection petition under O. XXI, Rule 58 read with S. 151, C.P.C. The trial court allowed that objection on 8-5-1997 holding the applicants were not the original decree-holders.
  • On revision, this Court set aside the trial court's order on 18-11-2003, holding O. XXI, Rule 58 C.P.C. not attracted to the facts and directing the executing court to proceed after being satisfied as to the bona fides of the person filing the execution application. A Special Leave Petition by the petitioner against that order was rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court on 15-4-2008.
  • The execution file could not be located and the decree-holders filed a fresh execution application. The petitioner filed an objection under Section 47 read with Section 151, C.P.C., contending (inter alia) that the decree had been satisfied by the previously claimed compromise and therefore was not executable, disputing property identity, and challenging the status of the applicants as decree-holders. The executing court rejected the objection, and the present revision petition challenges that rejection.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a transferee pendente lite (purchaser from a judgment-debtor during the pendency of the suit) is entitled to resist execution of a decree in their own right.
  2. Whether the alleged compromise (including payment of Rs. 28,000) between parties during the pendency of appeal, which was not acted upon by the appellate Court due to non-publication of notice, rendered the decree satisfied and therefore inexecutable.
  3. Whether the objection petition filed under Section 47, C.P.C. by the petitioner (after earlier objections under O. XXI, Rule 58 were held not maintainable) is barred by principle of res judicata or otherwise precluded from being raised afresh.
  4. Whether the executing court's order rejecting the objection petition suffers from jurisdictional error, illegality or warrants interference in revision under Section 115, C.P.C.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

  • Once a compromise was entered into before the appellate Court and the decree-holders accepted Rs. 28,000 as compensation, the decree merged in that compromise and became inexecutable upon verification by the appellate Court.
  • The petitioner (purchaser from Ganesh Lal) in bona fide believed that the decree stood satisfied and had become the absolute owner of the property; dismissal of the appeal for technical non-compliance should not negate the substantive compromise.
  • The executing Court erred in not appreciating these aspects and in holding the decree executable; the execution application by decree-holders is an abuse of process and a fraud on the petitioner.
  • The principle of estoppel under Section 115 of the Evidence Act applies given the acceptance of compensation in the compromise.
  • The petitioner contended that validity and executability of the decree are distinct issues and that the executing court should have inquired whether in view of subsequent events the decree became inexecutable; accordingly, objections under Section 47 were maintainable despite earlier proceedings under O. XXI, Rule 58.
  • Relied on decisions of the Supreme Court (Kishangarh v. Chand Mal & Co. and Haji Sk. Subhan v. Madhorao) in support of contentions.

Respondents' Arguments (Decree-holders)

  • This Court had already held in earlier revision that the provisions of O. XXI, Rule 58 C.P.C. were not attracted to the fact situation and that the executing Court had no jurisdiction to dismiss execution as not maintainable on that ground; that earlier order was operative and final.
  • The petitioner, being a transferee pendente lite, is precluded from raising the same objections in a piece-meal way; the principle of res judicata applies to execution proceedings and thus the fresh objection under Section 47 is barred.
  • The alleged compromise could not be acted upon because the appellants failed to publish notice as required by O. XXIII, R. 3-B, and the appellate Court recorded that the compromise cannot be acted upon and should be filed; therefore the petitioner cannot claim rights based on a compromise which was not acted upon by the Court.
  • A transferee pendente lite has no independent right to resist execution; they cannot get their title adjudicated in execution proceedings (relying on Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram and other authorities).
  • Relied upon several precedents (including Prem Lata Agarwal v. Laxman Prasad Gupta and various High Court and this Court decisions) in support of the proposition that objections to executability must be raised together and that res judicata and other rules preclude the petitioner's case.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Municipal Board, Kishangarh v. Chand Mal & Co., (1999) 9 SCC 198 : (AIR 2000 SC 3611) Cited by the petitioner (specific principle from the case not detailed in the opinion). Noted as relied upon by petitioner; the Court concluded the decisions cited did not assist the petitioner on the facts.
Haji Sk. Subhan v. Madhorao, AIR 1962 SC 1230 Cited by the petitioner (specific principle from the case not detailed in the opinion). Noted as relied upon by petitioner; the Court found it did not help the petitioner's case in the circumstances.
Prem Lata Agarwal v. Laxman Prasad Gupta, AIR 1970 SC 1525 Cited by respondents in support of the proposition that res judicata and related principles apply to execution proceedings. Used by respondents to support the submission that the petitioner's fresh objection was barred; the Court upheld the res judicata effect.
Smt. Pushpa v. Ganpatsingh, AIR 1977 Raj 216 Principle: Judgment-debtor must raise all objections to executability at one time; cannot raise fresh objections piecemeal. The Court quoted this case and applied its principle to hold the petitioner could not raise fresh objections after earlier proceedings.
Mahaveer Uchcha Prathmik Vidhyalaya v. Babu Lal, 2000 AIHC 502 : (AIR 2000 (NOC) 15 (Raj)) Cited by respondents (specific principle not detailed in the opinion). Listed among authorities relied upon by respondents; the Court found the overall body of authorities supported refusal to entertain fresh objections by the transferee pendente lite.
Ajay Singh v. Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, 2003 (2) RLW Raj 1293 Cited by respondents (specific principle not detailed in the opinion). Noted as one of the decisions invoked by respondents to support the proposition that objections must be raised together and res judicata applies.
Ankush R. Naik v. Sujata Sanzgiry, 2009 AIHC 961 : (AIR 2009 (NOC) 330 (Bom)) Cited by respondents (specific principle not detailed in the opinion). Recorded as relied upon by respondents among Bombay High Court decisions; Court treated the collective authority as supportive of respondents' position.
Yamunabai Purushottam Deogirikar v. Mathurabai Nilkanth Choudhari, 2010 AIHC 426 : (AIR 2010 (NOC) 109 (Bom)) Cited by respondents (specific principle not detailed in the opinion). Included among the authorities the respondents relied upon; the Court considered the body of precedents but concluded they did not assist the petitioner.
Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, AIR 2008 SC 1997 (reported also as 2009 DNJ (SC) 337) Principle: A transferee pendente lite cannot be said to be resisting or obstructing execution in his own right and therefore is not entitled to get his claim adjudicated in execution proceedings; suffices for decree-holder to show claim arose after institution of suit to invoke Rule 103. The Court relied on this Supreme Court authority to hold that the petitioner, being a transferee pendente lite, could not sustain objections to execution; objections were not maintainable.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded by examining prior proceedings and the legal character of the petitioner as a transferee pendente lite. Key steps in the Court's reasoning (as expressed in the opinion) are:

  1. Review of prior orders: The Court recalled its earlier order dated 18-11-2003 in which it set aside the executing court's order of 8-5-1997 and directed the executing court to proceed with execution after being satisfied as to the bona fides of the applicant. In that earlier order the Court had held that O. XXI, Rule 58 was not attracted to the facts and that the executing court had no jurisdiction to hold the execution proceedings themselves not maintainable on the ground urged by the objector.
  2. Res judicata and finality: The Court reasoned that the issue of the right of the petitioner (a transferee pendente lite) to resist execution had already been adjudicated by this Court on 18-11-2003 and that the order had attained finality (Special Leave Petition against it was rejected). Therefore, the petitioner could not re-open the same issue by filing a fresh objection under Section 47; the principle of res judicata applies to execution proceedings and precludes such re-litigation.
  3. Transferee pendente lite status: The Court relied on settled law (including Usha Sinha) that a person who purchases property from a judgment-debtor during the pendency of suit has no independent right to resist execution; such a transferee cannot get his claim adjudicated in execution proceedings and cannot resist execution in his own right.
  4. Requirement for raise-all-objections rule: The Court applied the principle stated in Smt. Pushpa that a judgment-debtor must raise all objections to executability at the appropriate stage together; failure to raise them precludes raising fresh objections later in a piecemeal manner.
  5. Effect of alleged compromise: The Court examined the contention that the compromise (and the Rs. 28,000 payment) merged and satisfied the decree. It observed that the suit was a representative suit and that under O. XXIII, R. 3-B no compromise could be entered without recorded leave of the Court and without notice to interested persons. The appellate Court had directed publication of notice which was not carried out; as a result the appellate Court recorded that the compromise could not be acted upon and was filed. The Court held that because the compromise was not acted upon by the appellate Court (on account of non-publication of notice), the petitioner could not claim a better right than the transferor on the basis of that unacted-upon compromise.
  6. Conclusion on maintainability: Combining the above principles and findings, the Court concluded that the petitioner's objections, both as a transferee pendente lite and by reason of having earlier litigated similar points, were not maintainable and that the executing court's order rejecting the objection did not suffer from illegality or jurisdictional error requiring interference under Section 115, C.P.C.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

REVISION PETITION DISMISSED.

Implications and direct effects:

  • The impugned order of the executing court rejecting the petitioner's objection under Section 47 read with Section 151, C.P.C. is upheld.
  • The petitioner's status as a transferee pendente lite prevents her from resisting execution of the decree in her own right; her objections are not maintainable and are barred by the earlier adjudication (res judicata) on 18-11-2003 and by the failure to raise all available objections at the appropriate stage.
  • The Court found that the alleged compromise could not be acted upon because required notice publication was not effected; therefore, the decree did not stand satisfied or become inexecutable on the basis of that compromise.
  • No interference was warranted under Section 115, C.P.C., as the Court found no infirmity, illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error in the order under challenge.
  • The opinion does not state that a new legal precedent was laid down; it applies existing principles (res judicata, law on transferee pendente lite, and procedural requirements for compromises in representative suits) to the facts and dismisses the revision petition.

Disposition recorded in the opinion: "Revision dismissed."

    Yashodhara Ameta (Smt.) v. Vishnu Shanker Paliwal & Ors.

    This revision petition is directed against order dated 12-2-09 passed by the Additional Civil Judge (S. D.) No. 3, Udaipur in Civil Misc. Case No. 6/04 whereby an application preferred by the petitioner raising objections under Section 47 read with Section 151, C. P. C. in Execution Case No. 7/04 raising objections against execution of the decree, stands rejected.

    2. The relevant facts in nutshell are that Shri Vishnu Shanker and four others filed a suit for cancellation of sale deed dated 19-12-67 alleged to have been executed by one Shri Kundan Lal (since deceased) in favour of Ganesh Lal and Amba Lal. It was averred in the plaint that the disputed property belongs to Mandir Thakurji Charbhuja Ki Bari of Bada Paliwal Samaj and therefore, late Shri Kundan Lal had no right to sell it.

    3. The suit was decreed by the trial Court in favour of the plaintiffs vide judgment and decree dated 7-3-90. Aggrieved thereby two appeals were filed; one by Ganesh Lal & Amba Lal and another by legal representative of Kundan Lal, Shri Shiv Shanker.

    4. During the pendency of the appeal, the parties in the appeal preferred by Shri Ganesh Lal and Shri Amba Lal, entered into a compromise and submitted an application before the appellate Court stating that the appellants/defendants have paid an amount of Rs. 28,000/- as compensation to the respondents/plaintiffs and, therefore, the appeal may be allowed and the suit preferred by the plaintiffs may be dismissed as withdrawn. The compromise arrived at was attested by the appellate Court. However, an application was preferred inter alia by the respondent-defendant-Shiv Shanker s/o late Shri Kundan Lal and others, objecting the disposal of the appeal in terms of compromise so also withdrawal of the suit. That apart, during pendency of the appeal on 11-3-1991, the Court observed that the compromise arrived at between the parties cannot be attested without issuing notice in terms of O. I, Rule 8(4), C.P.C. and accordingly, the appellants therein were directed to get the notice published in the newspaper "Prat Kaal."

    5. Thereafter, the matter remained pending for publication of the notice. No steps were taken on behalf of the appellants therein for publication of the notice and, therefore, on 2-6-92 the Court observed that no proceedings can be taken on the compromise arrived at and, therefore, the same was ordered to be filed and the matter was posted for arguments on appeal.

    6. On 2-5-1994 the counsel appearing for the appellants pleaded no instructions stating that since the appellants have entered into compromise, they have not appeared in the matter. Noticing the statement made as aforesaid, vide order dated 5-7-1994, the appellate Court dismissed the appeal for default in appearance.

    7. The appeal preferred by L.Rs. of Kundan Lal, Shri Shiv Shanker also stands dismissed by the appellate Court on merits. However, it is stated that a second appeal preferred by Shiv Shanker being No. 112/95 is pending decision before this Court.

    8. The decree-holder Vishnu Shanker and Ors. filed an application for execution of the decree. The petitioner herein who had purchased the property from Shri Ganesh Lal during the pendency of the appeal filed objection petition under O. XXI, Rule 58 read with S. 151, C.P.C., resisting the execution of the decree inter alia on the ground that the persons who have filed the execution proceedings are not the same persons, who had filed the original suit. The application was contested by the decree-holders by filing reply thereto. The application was allowed by the trial Court vide order dated 8-5-1997 holding that the applicants being the persons other than original decree-holders, are not entitled to file the execution proceedings.

    9. Aggrieved by order dated 8-5-1997 the decree-holders preferred a revision petition being No. 234/98 before this Court. After due consideration this Court opined that the Executing Court had no jurisdiction to pass the order holding execution proceedings itself not maintainable on an application preferred by the objector Smt. Yashodhara, the petitioner herein. The Court further observed that the provisions of O. XXI, Rule 58, C.P.C. are not at all attracted to the fact situation as alleged in the objection petition, or the facts as appeared from the record. Accordingly, vide order dated 18-11-2003 while setting aside order dated 8-5-1997 passed by the Executing Court, this Court directed the Executing Court to proceed with the execution proceeding in accordance with law after being satisfied about the bona fides of the person filing the execution application.

    10. The Special Leave Petition preferred by the petitioner herein before the Hon'ble Supreme Court against order dated 18-11-2003 passed by this Court also stands rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court vide order dated 15-4-2008.

    11. The original file of the execution proceedings restored by this Court was not traceable, therefore, the decree-holders filed yet another application before the Executing Court for execution of the decree. The petitioner herein filed objection petition therein u/S. 47 read with S. 151, C.P.C. claiming that since the matter was compromised between the parties and the compromise has also been made basis of the order passed in the appeal and further, the amount of compensation having been accepted by the decree-holders, the decree is not executable and, therefore, the execution proceedings deserves to be dismissed as not maintainable. It was contended that the decree-holders having accepted the amount of Rs. 28,000/- in terms of the compromise arrived at filed before the appellate Court, they cannot be permitted to get the decree executed by committing fraud. The petitioner submitted that since, the decree stands satisfied and, therefore, it has become inexecutable. The petitioner also disputed the description and identity of the property stating that the property purchased by the objector and the property subject-matter of the execution proceeding are different and since, the decree is silent about the property of the objector, the same is not executable against her. It was contended that the persons who have filed the application for execution of the decree, are not the decree-holders.

    12. The Executing Court has rejected the objection petition preferred by the petitioner by the order impugned. Hence, this revision petition.

    13. Learned counsel for the petitioner contended that once the matter has been compromised between the parties before the Court and the decree-holders accepted the amount of compensation in terms of the compromise arrived at, the decree stands merged in the compromise and becomes inexecutable moment the compromise is verified by the appellate Court. It is submitted that in view of the compromise arrived at, the judgment-debtor Ganesh Lal in all bona fides believed that the decree stands satisfied and he has become absolute owner of the property in question. Learned counsel submitted that unfortunately the appellate Court instead of accepting the appeal and setting aside the decree against Ganesh Lal, dismissed the same for non-prosecution. Learned counsel submitted that merely because certain technicalities of the law were not complied with, it cannot be said that the compromise was not entered into between the decree-holders and the judgment-debtors notwithstanding that the same was duly verified by the appellate Court. Learned counsel submitted that the Executing Court has seriously erred in not appreciating all these aspects of the matter in correct perspective which has resulted in failure of justice. Learned counsel submitted that the dismissal of the objection petition by the Executing Court while holding the decree to be executable is ex facie without jurisdiction. Learned counsel submitted that the appellate Court has applied the principle of lis pendence but has failed to appreciate that if a transfer is made with the consent of the plaintiff then he cannot be permitted to take advantage of principle of lis pendence. Learned counsel submitted that the decree-holder having accepted the amount the compensation in terms of the compromise arrived at, the principle of estoppel in terms of the provisions of S. 115 of the Evidence Act, comes into play as the sale is effected on the basis of compromise duly verified by the appellate Court. Learned counsel submitted that on the facts and the circumstances of the case, the execution application filed on behalf of the decree-holders is nothing but abuse of process of the law and is fraud with the petitioner. Learned counsel submitted that the Executing Court has misread the proceedings of the appellate Court, subsequent to verification of the compromise on 11-12-1990. Learned counsel submitted that the decree-holders cannot be permitted to take benefit of their own wrong. Learned counsel further urged that the validity of the decree and its executability are two separate questions which are required to be gone into by the Executing Court and specific finding was required to be recorded as to whether in view of the subsequent events, the decree has become inexecutable. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has relied upon decisions of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matters of 'Municipal Board, Kishangarh v. Chand Mal & Co. (1999) 9 SCC 198 : (AIR 2000 SC 3611) and Haji Sk. Subhan v. Madhorao., AIR 1962 SC 1230.

    14. On the other hand, learned counsel for the respondents submitted that this Court while deciding the revision petition preferred by the decree-holders against the order dated 8-5-1997 passed by the Executing Court noticing the facts as mentioned in the earlier objection petition has already held that the provisions of O. XXI, Rule 58 are not at all attracted. Learned counsel submitted that in view of the finding arrived at by this Court that the petitioner, a transferee pendente lite is not entitled to resist the execution of the decree, he is precluded from raising fresh objections in a piece-meal manner at a subsequent stage even in the same execution proceedings. Learned counsel submitted that the principle of res judicata applies to the execution proceedings as well therefore, the objection petition filed by the petitioner was liable to be rejected as not maintainable being barred by principle of res judicata. In support of his contentions, learned counsel has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Prem Lata Agarwal v. Laxman Prasad Gupta, AIR 1970 SC 1525, the decisions of this Court in the matters of Smt. Pushpa v. Ganpatsingh, AIR 1977 Raj 216, Mahaveer Uchcha Prathmik Vidhyalaya v. Babu Lal, 2000 AIHC, 502 : (AIR 2000 (NOC) 15 (Raj); Ajay Singh v. Rajasthan Civil Services Appellate Tribunal, 2003 (2) RLW Raj 1293 and the decisions of the Bombay High Court in the matters of Ankush R. Naik v. Sujata Sanzgiry, 2009 AIHC 961 : (AIR 2009 (NOC) 330 (Bom)) and Yamunabai Purushottam Deogirikar v. Mathurabai Nilkanth Choudhari, 2010 AIHC 426 : (AIR 2010 (NOC) 109 (Bom)). Learned counsel submitted that the question regarding the validity of the compromise and executability of the decree stands settled by the decision of this Court, against which the S.L.P. preferred also stands rejected by the Hon'ble Supreme Court. Learned counsel submitted that on failure on the part of the appellants/judgment-debtors to get the notice published in terms of provisions of O. XXIII, R. 3-B(2), C.P.C., vide order dated 2-6-1992, the appellate Court specifically recorded that on account of non-publication of the notice by the appellate despite opportunities being granted, no proceedings can be taken upon the compromise and the same may be filed. In this view of the matter, learned counsel submitted that the question regarding the effect of the alleged compromise which has not been acted upon and no decree has been passed by the Court in terms thereof is not open to be raised by the petitioner who is only a transferee pendente lite. Learned counsel submitted that the transferee pendente lite has no independent right in property to resist, obstruct or object execution of the decree and, therefore, he is not entitled to get his claim adjudicated. In this regard, learned counsel has relied upon a decision of the Hon'ble Supreme Court in the matter of Usha Sinha v. Dina Ram, 2009 DNJ (SC) 337 : (AIR 2008 SC 1997).

    15. Replying the arguments of learned counsel for the respondents, learned counsel for the petitioner submitted that while deciding the earlier revision petition, the Court has restored the execution proceedings and directed the executing Court to proceed with the execution proceedings in accordance with law after being satisfied about bona fides of the persons filing the execution application. Learned counsel submitted that other questions raised on behalf of the petitioner-objector were not considered and decided and, therefore, it cannot be said that the fresh objection petition filed by the petitioner is barred by principle of res judicata. Learned counsel submitted that admittedly, the respondents/decree-holders have filed fresh execution application therefore, the fresh objection petition filed by the petitioner-objector under S. 47 of C.P.C. was maintainable. It is submitted by the learned counsel that the substantive right of the petitioner to get adjudicated his claim in terms of provisions of S. 47 of C.P.C. does not stand closed on account of objection petition filed under O. XXI, Rule 58 being held not maintainable.

    16. I have considered the rival submissions and perused the material available on record.

    17. Admittedly, in the first objection petition filed by the petitioner in execution case No. 24/95, the execution of the decree was resisted on two grounds; firstly, that the persons who have filed execution proceedings were not plaintiffs in the original suit and, therefore, cannot be treated to be decree-holders and secondly, that the matter was settled between the parties during the pendency of the appeal and thereafter the property has been sold by the judgment-debtors Ganesh Lal and Amba Lal in favour of the petitioner-objector. The Executing Court arrived at the finding that the persons filing the execution application are not the decree-holders and, therefore, they are not entitled to get the decree executed. However, on revision petition being filed by the decree-holders against the order passed by the Executing Court as aforesaid, this Court after due consideration arrived at the finding that on the application of the petitioner herein, a transferee during the pendency of the appeal, the Executing Court had no jurisdiction to pass the order holding the execution itself not maintainable. While dealing with the question of maintainabilty of the objection petition filed and regarding the status of the decree after the alleged compromise before the appellate Court, the Court observed :

    "All said and done, a lock at the provisions of O. 21, R. 58, C.P.C. would show that these provisions are not at all attracted to the fact situation as alleged in the objection petition, or to the facts as appeared from the record. Even, according to the objection petition, the applicant seek to contend that she is a transferee pendente lite from the defendant. It was pointed out by the learned counsel for the petitioner that an appeal was filed against the decree dated 7-3-1990 by the defendant and therein this compromise referred to by the present objector Yashodhara was pressed into service, but since the suit was representative suit, which had been decreed, the appellate Court directed notice of the compromise to be published so as to inform the representatives, but then, the defendant did not get the notice published and, therefore, in the order dated 2-6-1995, it was positively directed that since the defendant has not got the notices published, the compromise cannot be acted upon and should be simply filed without any consideration. Then thereafter, on 5-7-1994, the appeal was dismissed.

    The learned counsel for the petitioner placed before me for perusal the certified copy of the order sheets of the appellate file which establish the above facts.

    In these circumstances, to say the least, the learned trial Court (executing Court) rather had no jurisdiction to pass the impugned order holding that the execution itself is not maintainable, on the application of the objector Yashodhara."

    18. Suffice it to say that considering the objection raised by the petitioner/objector with reference to the compromise arrived at between the parties to the appeal and subsequent transfer by the judgment-debtors Ganeshlal and Ambalal in favour of the petitioner, this Court has categorically held that the objection petition filed by the petitioner herein resisting the execution of the decree was not maintainable. Thus, the question with regard to the right of the petitioner-objector, a transferee pendente lite to raise objection resisting the execution of the decree having been adjudicated by this Court vide order dated 18-11-2003 as aforesaid, in Revision Petition No. 24/95 arising from the earlier objection petition, filed by the petitioner under the provisions of O. XXI, Rule 58, merely because, now the objections have been filed by the petitioner purportedly u/S. 47 of the C.P.C., the binding effect of the order dated 18-11-2003 which has attained finality does not stand obliterated. The principle of res judicata does apply to the execution proceedings and, therefore, the question with regard to the right of the petitioner, a transferee pendente lite to resist the execution of the decree having been adjudicated by this Court, the fresh objection petition filed by the petitioner was apparently barred by the principle of res judicata.

    19. Even after revival of the execution proceedings or on filing the fresh execution application, the petitioner cannot be permitted to raise fresh objections which he had not incorporated in the earlier objection petition filed. It is settled law that person questioning the executability of the decree must raise all objections which are available to him at one and same time and thereafter, he would be precluded from raising fresh objection.

    20. In Smt. Pushpa's case (supra), this Court while considering this aspect of the matter, held :

    "From the foregoing discussion of the case law, the position of law which emerges is that the judgment-debtor if he so desires must raise all objections to the executability of the decree which are available to him at one and the same time at appropriate stage and if he does not do so he is precluded from raising fresh objection in a piece-meal manner at a subsequent stage even in the same execution proceedings."

    21. It is settled law that person purchasing the property from the judgment-debtor during the pendency of the suit has no independent right to resist, obstruct or object the execution of the decree. Further, a transferee pendente lite is not entitled to get his claim adjudicated. In this regard, the provisions of O. XXI, Rule 102 are self-explanatory. Moreover, in Usha Sinha's case (supra), the Hon'ble Supreme Court while dealing with the right of a transferee pendente lite to resist, obstruct or object execution of the decree, opined that the resistence at the instance of transferee of a judgment-debtor during the pendency of the proceedings cannot be said to be resistance or obstruction in his own right and, therefore, he is not entitled to get his claim adjudicated. The Court opined that for invoking Rule 103, it is enough for the decree-holder to show that the persons resisting the possession or offering obstruction is claiming his title to the property after the institution of the suit in which decree was passed and sought to be executed against the judgment-debtor.

    22. Thus, viewed from any angle, the objections filed by the petitioner, who is a transferee pendente lite, resisting the execution of the decree were not maintainable.

    23. The contention of the learned counsel that once the matter has been compromised between the parties before the appellate Court and the decree-holders accepted the amount of compensation in terms of the compromise arrived at, the decree stands merged in the compromise and become inexecutable moment the compromise is verified by the appellate Court, is also devoid of any merit. Indisputably, the suit wherein the decree sought to be executed was passed was a representative suit and, therefore, in view of the provisions of O. XXIII, R. 3-B, no compromise could have been entered into without leave of the Court expressly recorded in the proceedings. That apart, before granting such leave, the Court is under an obligation to give notice in such manner as it may think fit to such persons, as may appear it to be inter- ested in the suit. It is not in dispute that considering the requirement of law as aforesaid, vide order dated 11-3-1991, the Court directed for publication of the notice, however, the judgment-debtors did not care to get the notice published, consequently, vide order dated 3-9-1992, the appellate Court specifically directed that since despite opportunities being granted, the appellants did not care to get the notice published therefore, the compromise arrived at cannot be acted upon and accordingly, the same was ordered to be filed. In this view of the matter, the petitioner, a transferee pendente lite does not acquire the better right than the transferor and cannot claim any right on the basis of alleged compromise which was refused to be acted upon by the Court. Thus, the claim of the petitioner that the decree stands satisfied in terms of the compromise and, therefore, it has become inexecutable, is also absolutely baseless.

    24. In view of the discussion above, the decisions cited by the learned counsel for the petitioner in support of the contention raised, noticed above, also do not help him in any manner.

    25. For the aforementioned reasons, this Court is of the considered opinion that order impugned passed by the Court below does not suffer from any infirmity, illegality, irregularity or jurisdictional error warranting interference by this Court in exercise of its revisional jurisdiction under S. 115, C.P.C.

    26. In the result, the revision petition fails, it is hereby dismissed.

    Revision dismissed.

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