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Judgment Summary — RSA Nos. 789 of 1981 & 2483 of 2002 (Rajive Bhalla, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

Two appeals concerning the same property were considered together: RSA No. 789 of 1981 and RSA No. 2483 of 2002. The outcome of RSA No. 789 of 1981 would determine RSA No. 2483 of 2002.

In RSA No. 789 of 1981 the plaintiffs-appellants challenged the judgment and decree dated 28.2.1981 of the District and Sessions Judge, Sangrur, which had accepted the respondents' appeal, reversed the trial Court's judgment and decree and dismissed the appellants' suit for ejectment.

The plaintiffs (appellants) had sued for ejectment asserting ownership of the suit land as preferential heirs to the estate of Jiwa Singh (referencing Mutation No. 256 dated 29.2.1964). The respondents pleaded that after Jiwa Singh's death the parties effected a family partition dated 12.7.1957, by which the respondents became owners in possession; alternatively, respondents pleaded ownership by adverse possession since 1957.

The trial Court framed issues (including whether there was a family partition, whether defendants had become owners by adverse possession, and estoppel) and, after evidence and arguments, decreed the suit for the plaintiffs. The trial Court held that although a family partition had been executed, it would not bind the appellants (preferential heirs) as it was executed in ignorance of the law, and found respondents had not proved adverse possession.

The first appellate Court accepted the respondents' appeal, reversed the trial Court, held the appellants were estopped from challenging the admitted family settlement (Ex. D-2), and upheld respondents' claim of ownership by adverse possession, thereby dismissing the plaintiffs' suit.

Separately, respondent No. 4 (Surjan Singh) had filed a suit for perpetual injunction restraining the appellants from alienating 9 bighas 7 biswas. The trial Court decreed that suit, but the Additional District Judge, Sangrur (on appeal) accepted the appeal and dismissed the injunction because a title dispute was pending adjudication before the High Court.

Counsel agreed that if RSA No. 789 of 1981 were dismissed (i.e., the family settlement upheld and appellants bound), then RSA No. 2483 of 2002 would have to be allowed.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a point not pleaded or raised before the courts below and not mentioned in the grounds of appeal can be urged for the first time during argument in a second appeal?
  2. Whether an admission made by a party in ignorance of rights conferred by law binds the person who made the admission?
  3. Whether a person who enters possession under colour of title can claim ownership by adverse possession?

Arguments of the Parties

Appellants' Arguments

  • Ex. D-2 dated 12.7.1957 reflects a partition and not a family settlement; because it vests/divests proprietary interest in immovable property exceeding Rs.100/-, it was compulsorily registrable and could not be read into evidence without registration.
  • Jiwa Singh died on 8.6.1957 after the Hindu Succession Act, 1956 had come into force; appellants are his legal heirs under that Act and thus the settlement Ex. D-2 was executed in ignorance of their statutory rights and cannot bind them. As statutory rights cannot be disavowed, the first appellate Court erred in upholding Ex. D-2.
  • Respondents entered possession pursuant to Ex. D-2 (colour of title) and therefore cannot at a later stage assert ownership by adverse possession. If an attempt to dispossess occurred in 1964, adverse possession could have commenced only from 1964, and by the suit filed in 1972 the 12-year period for adverse possession had not expired.

Respondents' Arguments

  • Ex. D-2 was voluntarily executed by the parties without fraud, coercion or misrepresentation; appellants cannot now plead ignorance of their rights under the Hindu Succession Act to disavow the settlement.
  • Even if Ex. D-2 were a partition only co-sharers could effect a partition. The respondents are not co-sharers; whatever the tenor of the document it is a family settlement and not compulsorily registrable.
  • The objection about non-registration was not raised in the trial Court or first appellate Court and was not mentioned in the grounds of appeal; registration is a mixed question of law and fact and cannot be urged for the first time in second appeal arguments.
  • The impugned judgment and decree of the first appellate Court does not suffer from any error raising a substantial question of law, and the appeal should be dismissed.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, (1976) 3 SCC 119 : AIR 1976 SC 807 The principle that a family settlement may be upheld where parties having some antecedent title, claim or possible claim settle their disputes; such a settlement can operate as an estoppel preventing parties who have taken advantage under it from resiling, and that adherence to statutory succession rights does not automatically negate a voluntary family settlement. The Court relied on Kale to hold that Ex. D-2 is a binding family settlement; ignorance of rights under the Hindu Succession Act cannot be a ground to set aside the settlement and the settlement operates as an estoppel on the appellants.
Ramji Dass v. Dhanti Ram, 1979 PLR 41 Support for the principle that close relations who enter into a family arrangement cannot back out of it; family arrangements operating as binding settlements. Cited to bolster the conclusion that once close relations have entered into a family arrangement, it is not open to parties to resile; used to affirm that Ex. D-2 binds the parties.
Kanhia Lal v. Brij Lal, AIR 1918 PC 70 Application of the principle of estoppel in the context of family arrangements (Privy Council authority). Referred to as judicial authority supporting the application of estoppel to family arrangements; used as part of jurisprudential foundation for upholding Ex. D-2.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court proceeded in stages, addressing procedural admissibility, adverse possession, and the binding effect of an admission or settlement executed in ignorance of statutory rights.

1. On the procedural contention that Ex. D-2 was not registered and therefore could not be read into evidence, the Court observed:

  • Ex. D-2 had been led into evidence without objection at trial or on first appeal; both parties admitted its voluntary execution.
  • Failure to raise non-registration earlier and its absence from grounds of appeal meant the issue was being raised for the first time in second appeal.
  • Non-registration is a mixed question of fact and law (requires inquiry into nature of document, inter se status of parties, antecedent rights, intention, whether it records a prior oral settlement, etc.). Such mixed questions must be pleaded and supported by specific material evidence; therefore the objection could not be allowed to be raised for the first time on second appeal.
  • Conclusion: argument based on non-registration (a mixed question of fact and law) cannot be raised for the first time in second appeal; Ex. D-2 could not be excluded on that ground.

2. On adverse possession, the Court analysed the character of respondents' possession:

  • Respondents had come into possession pursuant to Ex. D-2, which conferred proprietary rights on them; hence they were in possession under colour of title.
  • Possession under colour of title implies belief that possession is legal and valid; a person in such possession cannot consistently assert that their possession is adverse to the true owner's possessory/proprietary rights — that would be a contradiction in terms.
  • The Court held that from 1957 to 1964 respondents' possession was at best permissive; only after an attempt to dispossess them in 1964 could possession be hostile. The suit was filed in 1972, before any alleged hostile possession had ripened into ownership by adverse possession.
  • Therefore the first appellate Court's finding that respondents had become owners by adverse possession involved a misreading of material evidence and an error of law and was liable to be reversed in that respect.

3. The central surviving question was whether an admission (or settlement) made in ignorance of statutory succession rights binds the party who made it:

  • The Court examined the nature of Ex. D-2 and reiterated the legal characteristics of a family settlement — a voluntary arrangement by which family members apportion property among themselves irrespective of actual or perceived statutory rights.
  • The Court emphasized that the Hindu Succession Act does not prohibit parties from settling their disputes by altering shares; if every family settlement could be set aside on the ground that statutory succession rights existed, the concept of family settlements would be negated.
  • Relying on Kale and other authorities, the Court held that where parties voluntarily enter a family settlement and take advantage of it, that settlement operates as an estoppel and prevents parties from resiling merely by asserting ignorance of statutory rights.
  • Applying that principle to the facts (both sides admitted voluntary execution; appellants admitted that but for the settlement they would have succeeded to Jiwa Singh's estate), the Court concluded Ex. D-2 is a binding family settlement and appellants could not set it aside on the ground of ignorance of rights under the Hindu Succession Act.

Holding and Implications

Holding:

RSA No. 789 of 1981 — DISMISSED. The Court affirmed that Ex. D-2 is a binding family settlement and that an admission or settlement executed in ignorance of rights under the Hindu Succession Act does not, per se, render the settlement unenforceable.

Consequent disposition in the companion appeal:

RSA No. 2483 of 2002 — ALLOWED. Because RSA No. 789 of 1981 was dismissed (i.e., the family settlement Ex. D-2 was upheld), the Court set aside the judgment and decree dated 2.3.2002 passed by the Additional District Judge, Sangrur and restored the judgment and decree dated 28.7.2001 of the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Malerkotla. No order as to costs was made in both matters.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: Ex. D-2 (12.7.1957) is enforced as a family settlement binding the parties; appellants are estopped from claiming the share they now seek to assert contrary to that settlement; respondents' rights as reflected by the settlement stand.
  • The Court applied established authorities (including Kale) to reaffirm that voluntary family settlements can operate as an estoppel even where statutory succession rights exist and where a party claims to have executed the settlement in ignorance of those rights.
  • The opinion did not purport to create a new legal doctrine; it applied existing case law to the facts and resolved the appeals accordingly.

Order: RSA No. 789 of 1981 dismissed with no order as to costs; RSA No. 2483 of 2002 allowed, the impugned appellate judgment set aside and the trial Court's decree restored; no order as to costs.

    Chanan Singh And Others v. Surjit Singh And Others

    Rajive Bhalla, J.:— This order shall dispose of RSA Nos. 789 of 1981 and 2483 of 2002, as they relate to the same property and as adjudication of RSA No. 789 of 1981 would determine the outcome of RSA No. 483 of 2002.

    2. The plaintiffs-appellants, in RSA No. 789 of 1981 challenge the judgment and decree dated 28.2.1981, passed by the District and Sessions Judge, Sangrur accepting the appeal filed by the respondents, reversing the judgement and decree, passed by the trial Court and as a result dismissing their suit. Respondent No. 4 Surjan Singh has filed RSA No. 2483 of 2002, challenging the judgment and decree dated 2.3.2002 passed by the Additional District Judge, Sangrur accepting the appeal, setting aside the judgement and decree passed by the Civil Judge (Junior Division), Malerkotla dated 28.7.2001 and as a result dismissing his suit.

    3. The appellants filed a suit for ejectment by alleging that they are owners of the suit land as they have a preferential right to succeed to the estate of Jiwa Singh-deceased, as reflected in Mutation No. 256 dated 29.2.1964 The respondents filed a written statement claiming that after the demise of Jiwa Singh, parties to the suit effected a family partition dated 12.7.1957 As a result of this settlement, they have become owners in possession of the suit land. In the alternative, they pleaded that they have become owners by adverse possession as they are in possession since 1957. On the basis of these pleadings, the learned trial Court framed the following issues:—

    “1. Whether there has been family partition whereunder the land measuring 9 bighas 7 biswas bearing khasra Nos. 412/1-10, 444min/2-1, 443/3-11, 442/2-5, fell to the share of defendant No. 1 as alleged in the written statement? If so its effect? OPD.

    2. Whether defendants have become owners of land measuring 18 bighas 14 biswas bearing khasra Nos. 412 min/1-10, 444 min/2-0, 443 min/3-11, 442 min/2-5, 412 min/1-10, 444/2-1, 443 min/3-11, 442 min/2-5, by way of adverse possession? OPD.

    3. Whether the plaintiffs are estopped from instituting the suit by their act and conduct? OPD.

    4. Relief.”

    4. After considering the pleadings, the evidence adduced and the arguments addressed, the trial Court decreed the suit. The trial Court affirmed the execution of the family partition but held that as concededly, the appellants are preferential heirs, the family settlement executed in ignorance of the law, would not bind their rights. The trial Court also held that the respondents have failed to prove that they have become owners by adverse possession.

    5. Aggrieved by the aforementioned judgement and decree, the respondents filed an appeal. The first appellate Court, accepted the appeal, reversed the judgement and decree passed by the trial Court and dismissed the suit by holding that the appellants are estopped from challenging the admitted family settlement. The first appellate Court also upheld the respondents claim that they had become owners by adverse possession.

    6. Surjan Singh, respondent No. 4 filed a suit for a permanent injunction to restrain the appellants herein, from alienating land measuring 9 Bighas 7 Biswas. The trial Court decreed the suit but the Additional District Judge, Sangrur accepted the appeal, reversed the judgment and decree passed by the trial Court and dismissed the suit by holding that as the dispute with respect to title is pending adjudication before the High Court, the appellants could not be restrained from alienating the suit land by grant of an injunction.

    7. Counsel for the parties are ad-idem that if RSA No. 789 of 1981 is dismissed and it is held that parties are bound by the family settlement, RSA No. 2483 of 2002 would have to be allowed.

    8. Counsel for the appellants submits that the document Ex. D-2, dated 12.7.1957 reflects a partition and not a family settlement. The tenor of the document clearly suggests that parties thereto effected a partition, thereby vesting and divesting proprietary interest in immovable property exceeding Rs. 100/- The document Ex. D-2, is compulsorily registrable and could not have been led into evidence without registration.

    9. Another argument pressed into service by counsel for the appellants is that as Jiwa Singh passed away, on 8.6.1957, after coming into force of the Hindu Succession Act, 1956, the appellants, who are his legal heirs under the aforementioned enactment executed Ex. D-2 in ignorance of their statutory rights. The respondents admit that the appellants are preferential heirs to the estate of Jiwa Singh. As statutory rights cannot be disavowed, the first appellate Court committed an error in upholding the settlement Ex. D-2. The trial Court, therefore, rightly held that as there can be no estoppel against statute, the partition/settlement Ex. D-2 would not estop the appellants from filing the suit. It is further submitted that as Ex. D-2 was executed in ignorance of law, it does not bind the appellants.

    10. The final argument advanced by counsel for the appellants is that the first appellate Court, has erred while accepting the respondents assertion that they have become owners by adverse possession. The respondents, admittedly, came into possession as owners pursuant to Ex. D-2. Whatever be the circumstances thereafter they can not assert or allege ownership by way of adverse possession. Even ii it is accepted that the appellants made an attempt to dispossess the respondents in 1964, their adverse possession commenced, at best, from 1964 and, therefore, the period of 12 years had not expired before the suit was filed in 1972. The first appellate Court, therefore, could not have held that the respondents had perfected their ownership by adverse possession.

    11. Counsel for the respondents, on the other hand, submits that the appellants admit the execution of the settlement Ex. D-2. Their plea that they executed Ex. D-2 in ignorance of their rights under the Hindu Succession Act, was rightly negatived by the first appellate Court. It is submitted that as Ex. D-2 was executed voluntarily, without any fraud, coercion or misrepresentation, the appellants cannot be allowed to plead ignorance of their rights, as such a defence is impermissible in law. Parties are close relatives who sat across the table to resolve their differences and decided to apportion Jiwa Singh's estate. The settlement was subsequently reduced into writing reflected by Ex. D-2. The appellants, therefore, cannot disavow the family settlement. As regards the plea that Ex. D-2 is compulsorily registrable, as it reflects a partition and not a family settlement, it is submitted that a partition can only take place between co-sharers. Admittedly, the respondents are not co-sharers and, therefore, whatever the tenor of the document or the words used therein, Ex. D-2 is a family settlement and, therefore, not compulsorily registrable. It is further argued that this argument was not raised, whether before the trial Court or the first appellate Court and even the grounds accompanying the memo of appeal are silent as to any such argument. It is further submitted that registration of a document, is a mixed question of law and fact, with facts preceding law and, therefore, cannot be urged for the first time during arguments. As the impugned judgement and decree does not suffer from any error or infraction of law as would raise a substantial question of law, the appeal be dismissed.

    12. I have heard learned counsel for the parties and perused the impugned judgements and decrees.

    13. Counsel for the appellants framed substantial questions of law, but during arguments, the following substantial questions of law have arisen for adjudication:—

    “1. Whether a point that has not been pleaded or raised before the Courts below and does not find mention in the grounds of appeal can be urged for the first time during argument in second appeal?”

    2. Whether an admission made by a party in ignorance of rights conferred by law binds the person who has made the admission?”

    3. Whether a person, who enters possession under colour of title can claim ownership by adverse possession?”

    14. Counsel for the appellants, as noticed in his submissions, asserts that as the document Ex. D-2, vests in parties or divests them of proprietary rights, in immovable property exceeding Rs. 100/-, it could not be read into evidence, without registration. Counsel for the appellants fairly concedes that such a submission was neither pleaded nor urged before the Courts below and that such an objection has not been raised, in the grounds of appeal filed before this Court. Furthermore, it is not denied that Ex. D-2 was led into evidence, without objection as to admissibility, relevance or mode of proof and both parties admit that Fx.D-2 was executed by them. As a general rule of legal prudence, facts not pleaded can not be raised during arguments. Courts have on occasion, relaxed this strict rule, in appropriate cases, where the argument is either discernible from the pleadings or raises a pure questions of law that does not require pleadings, evidence or finding on facts. The appellant seeks to urge that Ex. D-2 should be ruled out of consideration for want of registration. The argument, though attractive must fail. Both parties admit to the voluntary execution of Ex. D-2. The only plea raised against Ex. D-2, before the trial Court, the first appellate Court and before this Court, in the grounds of appeal, is that the document does not bind the appellants as it was executed in ignorance of rights under the Hindu Succession Act. Ex. D-2 was led into evidence without objection. No objection was raised at any stage of the proceedings that this document could not be lead or read into evidence for want of registration. The grounds of appeal accompanying the memorandum are silent as to any such, assertion. Failure to register a document and its consequences are mixed questions of fact and law : facts being the nature of the document, the inter se status of the parties, their antecedent rights, their intention, whether the document records a prior oral family settlement or the document confers and divests proprietary rights in immovable property exceeding Rs. 100/-. A plea based upon non-registration of a document is, therefore, a mixed question of fact and law, that must be pleaded and based upon specific and material evidence. In the absence of any pleadings much less specific, and any evidence much less material evidence, the question of non-registration of the settlement Ex. D-2 cannot be urged for the first time during arguments in second appeal. As a result, the first question of law is answered by holding, that an argument that raises mixed questions of fact and law cannot be raised for the first time while addressing arguments, in second appeal. The document Ex. D-2, therefore, cannot be ruled out of consideration.

    15. The next question that merits adjudication is whether the first appellate Court was right in holding that the respondents have become owners by adverse possession. Admittedly, the respondents came into possession, of the suit property pursuant to the settlement Ex. D-2. The settlement Ex. D-2 records the conferment of proprietary rights upon the respondents. The respondents, therefore, came into possession of the suit property, under colour of title. A person, who enters possession, under colour of title possessory or proprietary, whether perceived or assumed shall not thereafter be heard to urge that his possession is adverse to the possessory and proprietary rights of the true owner. Possession, under colour of title, inheres in the trespasser, a belief that his possession is legal and valid. An assertion of adverse possessory title would, therefore, be a contradiction in terms. The first appellate Court did not consider this principle and also disregarded the fact that the respondents came into possession in the year 1957 under colour of title, drawn from the document Ex. D-2. Their possession from 1957-1964 was at best permissive. It was only after an attempt was made to dispossess them in 1964 could they assert that their possession had become open, hostile and in opposition to the possessory and proprietary rights of the appellants.. The suit was filed in 1972 before their alleged hostile possession had ripened into ownership. The first appellate Court disregarded this principle and these facts, while holding that the respondents had become owners by adverse possession. The finding that the respondents have become owners by adverse possession suffers from a misreading of material evidence and an error of law that renders it illegal and, therefore liable to be reversed.

    16. The question that survives adjudication and would necessarily determine the outcome of this appeal is, whether an admission made in ignorance of legal rights binds the party making such an admission. Before proceeding to answer this question, it would be appropriate to examine the nature of the document Ex. D-2. The first appellate Court has held that Ex. D-2 is a family settlement that binds parties, whereas the trial Court held that, though a family settlement it does not bind the parties. Both the appellants and the respondents admit that Ex. D-2 was executed voluntarily. The respondents admit that but for the family settlement, the appellants would succeed to the estate of Jiwa Singh, deceased, to their exclusion. A family settlement is a voluntary arrangement that sets at rest proprietary disputes. During a family settlement, members of the family assemble and after resolving their differences decide to apportion property amongst its members, irrespective of rights or shares actual or perceived flowing from the Hindu Succession Act. A settlement may confer rights upon members of the family, who have a possible or perceived claim to property, which would, then be deemed to have been acknowledged by parties to the settlement. The Hindu Succession Act does not place an embargo on parties disavowing rights flowing therefrom and parties are, therefore, free to settle their property disputes by diminishing or enhancing their shares. If adherence to rights, as set out under the Hindu Succession Act, were to be held to be inviolable or sufficient to disavow a family settlement, it would negate the very concept of a family settlement. A reference in this regard would necessarily have to be made to a judgement of the Hon'ble Supreme Court reported as Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, (1976) 3 SCC 119 : AIR 1976 SC 807. A relevant extract of this judgement reads as follows:

    “The members who may be parties to the family arrangement must have some antecedent title, claim or interest even a possible claim in the property which is acknowledged by the parties to the settlement. Even if one of the parties to the settlement has no title but under the arrangement the other party relinquishes all its claim or titles in favour of such a person and acknowledges him to be the sole owner, then the antecedent title must be assumed and the family arrangement will be upheld and the Courts will find no difficulty in giving assent to the same.”

    17. It cannot be disputed that the defendants and the plaintiffs were members of the family. Under the Hindu Succession Act, the defendants did not have a right of succession but they had entered into possession in the estate of Jiwa Singh alongwith the plaintiffs and their rights of succession had been admitted by the plaintiffs and all the rights by the other co-sharers had been given up in their favour with respect to ⅓rd share and this had been voluntarily entered into by the parties. There is no force in the contention raised by the learned counsel for the plaintiffs that it was a provisional arrangement and the plaintiffs were misguided to accept the claim of the defendants. I thus hold the view that Ex. D-2 was a family settlement and is enforceable as such and all the claims between the parties in respect to the land left by Jiwa Singh had been settled. In Ramji Dass v. Dhanti Ram, 1979 PLR 41, their Lordships held that once the close relations had entered into a family arrangement it is not open to either of the parties to back out of it and their Lordships made the following observations:

    “It is thus apparent that the close relations had entered into a family arrangement and once they had done so it is not open to either of the parties to back out of it. The position of law has been made abundantly clear by a comparatively recent judgment of their Lordships of the Supreme Court in Kale v. Deputy Director of Consolidation, in which it was observed as under:

    “….The principal that there is no estoppel against the statute does not apply to the present case. Assuming, however, that the said document was compulsorily registrable the Courts have generally held that a family arrangement being binding on the parties to it would operate as an estoppel by preventing the parties after having taken advantage under the arrangement to resile from the same or try to revoke it. This principle has been established by several decisions of this Court as also of the Privy Council. In Kanhia Lal v. Brij Lal, AIR 1918 PC 70, the Privy Council applied the principle of estoppel to the facts of the case and observed as follows.”

    18. Applying the principle enunciated in the afore-’ mentioned judgement to the facts of the present case, it would have to be held that even if the respondents had no right, title or interest in the property, the appellants effected a settlement thus assuming antecedent title in the respondents. Their plea that they committed an error, as they were unaware of the provisions of the Hindu Succession Act cannot, therefore, be accepted. Ignorance of rights flowing from the Hindu Succession Act cannot be a ground to set aside a family settlement and as held in Kale (supra), the family settlement would operate as an estoppel preventing parties thereto from disavowing its contents. The findings returned by the first appellate Court affirming the document Ex. D-2 as a family settlement that binds the rights of the parties is, therefore, affirmed and the second question of law is, answered accordingly.

    19. In view of what has been stated herein above, as there is no merit in this appeal, it is dismissed with no order as to costs.

    RSA No. 2483 of 2002

    20. In view of the fact that RSA No. 789 of 1981 has been dismissed, the present appeal would have to be allowed. The judgement and decree passed by the first appellate Court would have to be set aside and that of the trial Court restored as the appellants herein have no right, title or interest in the suit property that has fallen to the share of the respondents. The appeal is-allowed, the judgement and decree dated 2.3.2002, passed by the Additional District. Judge, Sangrur is set aside and that of Civil Judge (Junior Division) Malerkotla dated 28.7.2001 is restored.

    21. No order as to costs.

    Order accordingly.

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    Chanan Singh And Others v. Surjit Singh And Others
    (Dec 9, 2008)