S.P. Goyal, J. - The parties were married at Chandigarh on May 9, 1974 and after staying there for about 10/12 days, they left for Hydrabad where the husband was employed. The differences had started appearing between the parties even during their stay at Chandigarh and the gulf widened considerably during their stay at Hydrabad when the parents of the husband visited them and stayed there for sometime. The respondent left Hydrabad for Chandigarh on April 16, 1975 to join the marriage of her brother which was to be celebrated on May 10, 1975. The husband reached Chandigarh on May 9, 1975, soon thereafter the final break took place between them and since then they started living separately. Three/ four months thereafter, the appellant got an offer of service from Iraq and left to join in same on November 3, 1976. In the meantime, the respondent gave birth to a female child on July 17, 1976. 2. According to the case set up by the husband, he arranged for 1st Class ticket for the respondent and the child and asked her to join him in Iraq but she declined the offer. Instead, she instituted, proceedings under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code, to claim maintenance and even during those proceedings, he made an offer to her to join him in Iraq which was again turned down. He therefore, filed this petition under Section 13 of the Hindu Marriage Act on August 26, 1979 for a decree of divorce on the ground of desertion and that he had been treated with cruelty by her. Although several Acts on her part constituted the act of cruelty were alleged in the petition but at the time of arguments before me, the only one pressed into service was that the respondent deliberately and knowingly levelled false allegations of greed and denial of money against the appellant and his father in the petition filed by her under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code. The exact words relied upon in this respect and quoted in the petition are :- "The father of the applicant many a times has sent money to the respondent on demand raised by the father of the respondent. The applicant is in possession even of the numbers of the drafts sent by her father to the respondent." The respondent opposed the petition & denied the material allegations except the allegation of demand of money. In fact she reiterated the allegation and stated that soon after the marriage, the father of the appellant adopted a very stiff attitude towards the respondent because after having exhibited a show of simplicity at the time of marriage, he started putting pressure upon her to bring money from her parents. However, she made a counter allegation as well that it was the appellant who made altogether false and baseless allegation against her parents that they wanted the appellant to give monetary help on the marriage of their son. As the plea of desertion was not relied upon in support of the appeal the pleadings of the parties in this respect need not be noticed. 3. At the trial a large number of letters and documents were placed on the record but the oral evidence on behalf of the appellant consisted only of his statement and that of his father. Similarly, the respondent also relied on a number of letters, examined three witnesses and gave her own statement. The trail Court after appreciating the evidence negatived both the pleas and dismissed the petition which led to the filing of this appeal by the husband. 4. Initially, the learned counsel for the appellant relied on two other acts of the respondent, apart from the allegation of greed, namely the fabrication of documents, Exhibit A/1 and A/2 and the impounding of the passport of the appellant at the instance of the wife in support of the plea of cruelty but later on confined his arguments only to the false allegation of greed to substantiate the plea that the appellant was treated with cruelty. 5. There is no dispute on facts constituting the said plea. Not only the respondent in the written-statement reiterated her allegations made in the petition filed under Section 125, Criminal Procedure Code but also owned it even in her statement made in the Court. It was also not disputed by the learned counsel for the respondent that she failed to substantiate the said allegation. The dispute between the parties centers round the question as to whether the levelling of this allegation would amount to treating the appellant with cruelty, and if so, whether the appellant would be entitled to a decree of divorce on its basis when it was he who had first leveled the allegation against the respondent and her parents that they wanted him to give monetary help at the time of the marriage of her brother. 6. Mr. H.L. Sibal, the learned counsel for the appellant, contended that the levelling of any false allegation which harms or injures the health, reputation, the working career or the like would amount to treating the aggrieved spouse with cruelty. He further contended that the question whether the conduct complained of constituted cruelty and the like for divorce purposes is to be determined primarily by its effect upon a particular person complaining of the acts. He further argued that the question is not whether the conduct would be cruel to a reasonable person or to a person of average or normal sensibilities but is whether it would have that effect on the aggrieved spouse. In support of his first contention he relied on a number of decisions, the foremost being the celebrated judgment of the Supreme Court in Dr. Dr N.G Dastane v. Mrs S. Dastane., AIR 1975 SC 1534. In this case, under consideration was sub-section (1)(b) of Section 10 of the Hindu Marriage Act, 1955 which provided a ground for judicial separation and reads thus :- "has treated the petitioner with such cruelty as to cause a reasonable apprehension in the mind of the petitioner that it will be harmful or injurious for the petitioner to live with the other party". While striking a note of caution on the risk of relying on English decisions in this field and disapproving the application of the notice of cruelty under the English law, Chanrachud, J. as he then was, interpreted and defined the scope of the said clause thus : " The enquiry, therefore, has to be whether the conduct charged as cruelty is of such a character as to cause in the mind of the petitioner a reasonable apprehension that it will be harmful or injurious for him to live with the respondent. It is not necessary, as under the English law, that the cruelty must be of such a character as to cause `danger' to life, limb or health or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. Clearly, danger to life limb or health or a reasonable apprehension of it is a higher requirement then a reasonable apprehension that it is harmful or injurious for one spouse to live with the other." The proposition of law put forward by the learned counsel would have certainly prevailed but for the amendment which has since been brought about in the provisions of the statute. When the said judgment was rendered, cruelty was not a ground for divorce and it was by the Marriage Laws Amendment Act, 1976 that in sub-section (1) of Section 13 which provides the various grounds on which the dissolution of marriage could be claimed, the following new clause (i-a) was added :- "xx xx xx that the other party : (i-a) has after the solemnlisation of the marriage treated the petitioner with cruelty". It is, therefore, apparent that the Legislature while making cruelty a ground for divorce, omitted the qualifying words of said clause (b) and instead introduced the words which were in existence in the English statute and in the Special Marriage Act, 1954. The consideration which prevailed in Dr. N.G. Dastane's case (supra) are no more there and the above noted observations as such are no more relevant to determine the extent of the gravity of the conduct which would amount to treating the aggrieved spouse with cruelty within the meaning of the said clause. 7. Looking in to the history of the law and the various stages through which it has passed usually, if not invariably, is quite helpful in finding out the true intention of the Legislature and scope of a particular provision of the statute. The first authoritative pronouncement of the nature of the conduct which could amount to cruelty as a ground of divorce was made in England in Russell v. Russell, 1897 AC 395 and the principle enunciated was that the term `legal cruelty' meant conduct of such a character as to have caused danger to life, limb or health-bodily or mental - or to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. This decision has stood the test of times and has since been followed invariably. 8. In India, barring certain rural section of the society who were governed by their family or tribal customs, amongst Hindus (Smritikars) who observed the Hindu Law as expounded by Manu, a marriage once solemnised could not be dissolved on any ground whatsoever. It was only under the Special Marriage Act, 1954 that some relief was provided to them and if the marriage was got registered under that Act they could avail of its provision regarding judicial separation and divorce. Clause (c) of Section 27 which contained the ground on which divorce could be sought is exactly in the same terms as the one under consideration and has been lifted from there and inserted in Section 13 of the Act. However, cases under this Act have been very few and in both the reported case in T.K. Sarmvanaberumal v. Shishikana Paruma, ILR (1969)1 Madras 845, and Jyotish Chandra Guha v. Smt. Meera Guha, AIR 1970 Cal. 266, the view taken by the English decisions on legal cruelty and as explained in the book "to do on divorce" was accepted and it was held that the legal concept of cruelty involves conduct of such a character as to have caused danger to life, limb or health as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger. 9. In the year 1955 was enacted the Hindu Marriage Act but cruelty was not made as one of the grounds on which the marriage could be dissolved and instead it enabled only the seeking of judicial separation. The remedy of judicial separation and its consequences being far less serious than that of divorce, the concept of cruelty prevailing was not adopted and instead the cruelty of lesser degree as characterised in clause (b) of Section 10 was adopted as a ground for judicial separation. It was by the Marriage Laws (Amendment) Act, 1976 that cruelty was adopted as the ground of divorce. Instead of repeating the words of clause 10(i)(b), the words of clause (d) of Section 27 of the Special Marriage Act were inserted as clause 1(i)(a) in Section 13 of the Act. It may also be mentioned that clause (i)(b) was related from Section 10 and instead it was provided that judicial separation may be sought on any of the grounds mentioned in Section 13 of the Act. The intention of the Legislature in doing so is quite apparent and there is no scope for any doubt that it intended to adopt the English concept of legal cruelty which was accepted by the Court in India while interpreting similar provisions in the Special Marriage Act. I do not want to dilate on this matter any further because I propose to adopt the reasons given for this view in Madanlal Sharma v. Smt. Santosh Sharma, 1980 HLR 441, where the matter was dealt with an admirable clarity by R.A. Jahagirdar, J., in the following terms : "While considering the effect of the amendment, one must bear in mind that a change in the phraseology brought about by an amendment creates the presumption that the Legislature intended a change of meaning. It has been mentioned by Crawford in his `Statutory Construction' (at page 618) that the mere fact that the Legislature enacts an amendment is of itself an indication, as intention, as a general rule, to alter the pre-existing law. It is needles to say that he pre-existing law includes the law as interpreted by the Courts. The intention of the Parliament to the instant case has to be gathered also from the fact that the Parliament after deleting the previously existing phraseology brought on the statute book an expression which is identical to the one used in the Special Marriage Act. Both the Special Marriage Act, and the Hindu Marriage Act are Pari Materia and while interpreting an expression which is found in one Act, it is permissible, may it is even necessary, to bear in mind the decision given by the Court in relation to the same expression under the other law. Maxwell on the Interpretation of statutes infers to general presumption that the same expression is presumed to be used in the same sense throughout an Act or a series of cognate Act. There is also a presumption that change of wording denotes a change in meaning (See page 282, 12th Edition). Considering these rules of interpretation, it is clear in my opinion, that the Parliament intended to bring the provision relating to cruelty under the Hindu Marriage Act at par with the concept of cruelty as it found under the Special Marriage Act. By this amendment, the Parliament nullified the effect of the decision of the Supreme Court in Dastane v. Dastane (supra). This in fact has an effect of restoring the law as it understood prior to Dastane v. Dastane (supra) under the Hindu Marriage Act. Since the expression relating to the ground of cruelty in these two Acts, which are pari materia, is the same and since under the Special Marriage Act the ground of cruelty has always been understood to mean cruelty as it is understood under the English law, it must now be held that the concept of cruelty under Section 13(1)(i-a) of the Hindu Marriage Act must involve the same meaning as it is understood under the English law. In other words cruelty as a ground for divorce must mean cruelty of such a character as to cause danger to life, limb or health or as to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger. As has been mentioned by the Supreme Court in Dastane v. Dastane, (supra) this concept involves a higher requirement than the reasonable apprehension mentioned in Section 10(1)(b) of the Hindu Marriage Act before its amendment". I am unable to agree with Mr. H.L. Sibal that any false allegation which harms the health, reputation, working career or the like would amount to treating the aggrieved spouse with cruelty and be sufficient to support the claim of divorce. Instead the alleged false accusation has to be of such a grave character as to cause danger to life, limb, health or to give rise to a reasonable apprehension of such danger. When judged in the light of this concept of legal cruelty, accusation made can hardly be said of such a grave nature as to entail the said consequences. That apart, no evidence has been led by the appellant to show that the alleged accusation has caused danger to body or mental health or has given rise to a reasonable apprehension of such a danger. All that he deposed in the witness-box was that he had to spend many sleepless nights because of the said false accusation. This would be far from saying that his bodily or mental health has been endangered or there was reasonable apprehension of such a danger because of the false accusation. 10. There is yet another very weighty consideration which would go a long way to negative the plea of cruelty. As argued by the learned counsel for the respondent, it was the appellant who first leveled the false allegation against the respondent that her parents wanted the appellant to give monetary help on the marriage of their son. It is not disputed that there was no basis for this accusation. How a person who can make such an accusation against the parents of the wife can make a grouse of similar counter-accusation made by the wife against his father and urge that from the accusation of the latter his bodily or mental health has been endangered. 11. Much stress was laid by the learned counsel for the appellant on the fact that his father was a man of principle and refused to accept any dowry at the time of his marriage. It was, therefore, argued that the false accusation has very badly injured his feelings. The act of the father was of course laudable and the accusation must have injured his feelings but that would hardly be a consideration while determining whether by that accusation, the respondent has treated the appellant with cruelty. To determine that, the effect of the accusation has to be seen on the appellant and not on his father. Similarly, two decisions of this Court in Smt. Nirmal v. Brij Mohan, 1980 Marriage Law Journal 333, and Yudhister Raj v. Smt. Sarla Kumari, 1981 Marriage Law Jornal 343, relied upon by the learned counsel have no bearing on the present case as they were rendered on the peculiar facts of those cases. Moreover, it appears that no argument was raised as to the degree of cruelty resulting from the accusation or its effect on the aggrieved spouse. In Smt. Nirmala's case (supra), the learned Judge proceeded on the basis that any conduct on the part of a spouse which causes mental torture to the other party can be considered as evidence of cruelty. Whereas in Yudhister Raj's case (supra), the premises on which the decision proceeded were that the act which caused reasonable apprehension in the mind that it would be harmful or injurious for the aggrieved spouse to live with the other spouse would be mental cruelty. With utmost respect to the learned Judges, I am unable to subscribe to the view expressed in these cases. But as the facts in the present case are entirely different and distinguishable, I do not feel the necessity of referring the mater to a larger Bench. The last authority relied upon by the learned counsel was of the Rajasthan High Court in Om Pakash v. Smt. Shakuntla, 1981 HLR 92, but the accusations made against the husband there, were of very grave nature inasmuch as he was accused of illicit relations with his brother's wife and the plea of cruelty was thus rightly upheld. In the result, this appeal fails and the same is hereby dismissed but without any order as to costs. Appeal dismissed.