Summary of Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

The petitioner filed a writ petition seeking a writ of certiorari to quash the order dated 17.12.2011 passed by the District Compassionate Appointment Committee, Nalanda at Biharsharif, which had rejected the petitioner’s application for appointment under the dying-in-harness rules. The ground recorded for rejection was that at the time of the death of the petitioner’s father (who died in harness) another son of the deceased was in service in the Department of Railways. The deceased had been a State of Bihar employee, serving as head clerk in the office of the Executive Engineer, Waterways Division, Nalanda, Biharsharif.

Legal Issues Presented

1. Whether the presence at the time of death of a son who is employed bars another dependent son (not in service) from claiming appointment under the dying-in-harness rules.
2. How the Government order governing compassionate appointments (issued under Article 162 of the Constitution of India) and its definition of "family" apply to the question of entitlement under the dying-in-harness rules; and whether any rule under Article 309 proviso-2 limiting the benefit to only one dependent was placed before the court.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Position

• The petitioner sought quashing of the District Compassionate Appointment Committee's order rejecting his application and relief in the form of consideration for appointment under the dying-in-harness rules.

Respondent / State's Arguments

• Learned State Counsel Mr. Dhurandhar Kumar, A.C to S.C. 16, submitted that a Division Bench in an L.P.A. had held that if one son is employed, the claim does not go to another son.

Table of Precedents Cited

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court reasoned that appointment under the dying-in-harness rules is governed by a Government order issued by the State of Bihar under Article 162 of the Constitution. The court noted that no rule under Article 309 proviso-2 had been placed before it which specifically provides that the benefit of compassionate appointment is available to only one dependent of the deceased.

The court examined the Government order's definition of "family," which includes the wife of the deceased, son, unmarried daughter and widow of the son. It observed that the definition of "family" must be read in the context of dependency and not as an absolute bar. On that basis the court held that the fact that one son was in employment at the time of the father's death is not a valid ground for rejecting the application of another dependent son who was not employed and who falls within the Government order's definition of a dependent family member.

The court addressed the State's reliance on a Division Bench judgment in an L.P.A., stating that upon perusal that judgment "the rules as explained above have not been taken into account in the said judgment." For these reasons the court concluded that the rejection by the District Compassionate Appointment Committee was contrary to the Government order.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition is allowed and the order rejecting the petitioner's application is set aside.

Consequences: The District Compassionate Appointment Committee, Nalanda at Biharsharif, is directed to reconsider the petitioner's application for appointment under the dying-in-harness rules. The opinion does not discuss broader legal implications; its immediate effect is to require reconsideration of the petitioner's application. No new precedent is articulated beyond this decision's effect on the parties.