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  • sub-section (6) of section 12 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910.20.
  • section 12(6) of the Electricity Act, 1910 (hereafter the old Act)
  • SECTION 43 ELECTRICITY ACT 2003
  • provisions contained in section 12 of the old Act
  • SECTION 43 ELECTRICITY ACT
  • Section 12(6) of the old Act
  • Section 43(1) of the new Act,
  • section 43 of the new Act,
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Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
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Acts
  • sub-section (6) of section 12 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910.20.
  • section 12(6) of the Electricity Act, 1910 (hereafter the old Act)
  • SECTION 43 ELECTRICITY ACT 2003
  • provisions contained in section 12 of the old Act
  • SECTION 43 ELECTRICITY ACT
  • Section 12(6) of the old Act
  • Section 43(1) of the new Act,
  • section 43 of the new Act,
Smart Summary

Factual and Procedural Background

This opinion addresses the question of whether a writ of mandamus can compel a licensee to supply electricity to a prospective consumer who is not in lawful occupation of the premises where the supply is sought. The petitioner claimed to be an occupier of the premises and sought electricity supply, substantiating his occupation with documents such as a telephone bill and voter identity card. The private respondent did not dispute occupation but contended it was unlawful. No eviction proceeding was pending against the petitioner. The Court was called upon to resolve conflicting judicial views on whether lawful occupation is a prerequisite for electricity supply under the Electricity Act, 2003.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a licensee can be directed by a writ of mandamus to supply electricity to a prospective consumer without the consumer being in lawful occupation of the premises.
  2. The interpretation of the term "occupier" under section 43 of the Electricity Act, 2003, and whether it implies lawful occupation.
  3. The extent of the licensee's duty to verify the lawfulness of occupation before supplying electricity.
  4. The applicability and relevance of prior decisions under the Electricity Act, 1910, which required lawful occupation for supply.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner’s Arguments

  • The petitioner claimed to be an occupier of the premises and sought electricity supply accordingly.
  • He substantiated his occupation with documents such as a telephone bill and voter identity card.

Private Respondent’s Arguments

  • The private respondent did not dispute that the petitioner was occupying a portion of the premises but contended that such occupation was unlawful.
  • No eviction proceeding was pending against the petitioner at the time of the order.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Associate Indian Mechanical Pvt. Ltd. v. C.E.S.C Ltd., 1989 (1) CLT (H.C) 187 Lawful occupier alone is entitled to electricity supply under section 12(6) of the Electricity Act, 1910. Referenced as part of earlier decisions requiring lawful occupation for supply under the old Act.
Surajbali Pandey & Co. v. CESC Ltd., 1995 (1) CHN 533 Lawful occupation is a precondition for electricity supply under the old Act. Used to support the principle that trespassers are not entitled to supply under the old Act.
Aloke Saha v. Rina Ghosh (DB), 1999 (1) CLJ 567 Lawful occupier requirement under section 12(6) of the old Act. Part of the consistent judicial interpretation under the old Act.
Samsul Haque Mollick v. C.E.S.C Ltd., AIR 2006 Cal 73 Trespassers are not entitled to electricity supply; ‘occupier’ means lawful occupier under section 43 of the Electricity Act, 2003. One of the recent decisions holding that supply cannot be given to trespassers.
Anjali Metia v. W.B.S.E.B (DB), 2006 (4) CHN 433 ‘Occupier’ construed as lawful occupier under the new Act. Referenced as part of conflicting decisions on the interpretation of ‘occupier’.
Amarendra Singh v. C.E.S.C Ltd., AIR 2007 Cal 108 ‘Occupier’ means lawful occupier for entitlement to electricity supply. Decision overruled later by Division Bench in AIR 2008 Cal 66.
Gyanendra Nath Shil v. Superintending Engineer, AIR 2008 Cal 19 ‘Occupier’ means lawful occupier; trespassers cannot claim supply. Used to support the interpretation of lawful occupation as a prerequisite.
Debadas Biswas v. West Bengal State Electricity Board & Ors., AIR 2008 Cal 29 Reinforces the principle that trespassers are not entitled to supply. Quoted for the proposition that a trespasser cannot claim supply by continuing trespass.
Amarendra Singh v. C.E.S.C Ltd., AIR 2008 Cal 66 (Division Bench) Occupier entitled to electricity supply regardless of legality of occupation; legality to be decided by Civil Court. Preferred by this Court as better in point of law; supply to occupier not to be withheld pending civil adjudication.
Moloy Kumar Acharya v. Chairman-cum-Managing Director, W.B State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd., AIR 2008 Cal 47 Until adjudicated otherwise, status of occupant is ‘occupier’ under section 43 of the new Act. Supports supply to occupant pending legal determination of status.
Soumitra Bannerjee v. CESC Limited, 1999 (2) CHN 573 ‘Lawful occupier’ under section 12(6) of old Act can be interpreted in a diluted manner to avoid misuse of electricity supply denial as a pressure tool in civil disputes. Supports supply to occupants with arguable claims despite pending civil disputes.
Bholanath Karmakar v. Madan Mohan Karmakar, 1987 (2) CLJ 332 Approach to conflicting decisions of coordinate benches: reconcile if possible, otherwise prefer the better legal view. Guided this Court’s approach to conflicting precedents on the issue.
Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, AIR 1959 SC 519 Principle on preferring one conflicting precedent over another based on legal merit rather than chronology. Supported the approach to choose the better legal precedent among conflicting decisions.
Industrial Suppliers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1980 SC 1858 Legal definition of ‘occupier’ as a person in actual possession. Used to interpret ‘occupier’ under section 43 of the new Act.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court began by identifying the central statutory provision, section 43(1) of the Electricity Act, 2003, which mandates supply of electricity to an owner or occupier of premises upon application. The term "occupier" is not defined in the Act; however, the Apex Court in Industrial Suppliers (P) Ltd. held that an occupier is a person in actual possession.

The Court observed that unlike the old Electricity Act, 1910, which explicitly required lawful occupation for supply, the new Act consciously omits the adjective "lawful" before "occupier." This omission is significant and cannot be supplemented by judicial interpretation unless omission leads to absurdity or unintelligibility, which the Court found it does not.

The Court noted conflicting earlier decisions where some benches construed "occupier" to mean "lawful occupier," effectively requiring proof of lawful possession before supply. However, the Court preferred the reasoning of the Division Bench in Amarendra Singh (AIR 2008 Cal 66) and other decisions like Soumitra Bannerjee and Moloy Kumar Acharya, which held that actual possession suffices for entitlement to electricity supply, and that the legality of occupation is a matter for civil courts, not the licensee.

The Court emphasized that electricity is an essential service linked to the fundamental right to life under Article 21 of the Constitution, and denying supply based on unestablished claims of trespass would unjustly deprive individuals. It also held that the licensee’s duty is to supply electricity once formalities are complied with, without adjudicating the lawfulness of occupation, which is outside its statutory mandate.

Accordingly, the Court concluded that the licensee is not obligated to verify lawful occupation before supplying electricity, and supply cannot be withheld on the basis of alleged unlawful occupation. However, this supply is without prejudice to the owner’s right to seek eviction through proper legal channels.

Holding and Implications

The writ petition is allowed. The petitioner, claiming actual possession of the premises, is entitled to electricity supply without the licensee being required to verify the lawfulness of occupation.

The licensee, CESC Ltd., is directed to supply electricity to the petitioner within two weeks of completion of formalities. If resistance is encountered, the licensee may seek police assistance to enforce compliance.

This order does not confer any additional rights on the petitioner in respect of possession; the owner retains the right to initiate eviction proceedings according to law.

No new legal precedent is set beyond the direct effect on the parties, but the Court expressly prefers certain Division Bench and Single Judge decisions over others on the interpretation of ‘occupier’ under the Electricity Act, 2003.

    Santosh Jaiswal v. Cesc Limited & Ors.

    1. Whether a licence can be directed by a Writ of Mandamus to supply electricity to a prospective consumer thereof without he being in lawful occupation of the premises at which such supply is sought, is the question which falls for determination before this Court in this proceeding.

    2. Divergent views have been expressed by Hon'ble Division Benches and learned Single Judges of this Court while answering similar questions which arose for determination before Their Lordships.

    3. That a lawful occupier is alone entitled to electricity and a trespasser has no such entitlement in terms of section 12(6) of the Electricity Act, 1910 (hereafter the old Act) has been laid down in the following decisions:

    a) 1989 (1) CLT (H.C) 187: Associate Indian Mechanical Pvt. Ltd. v. C.E.S.C Ltd.;

    b) 1995 (1) CHN 533: Surajbali Pandey & Co. v. CESC Ltd.; and

    c) 1999 (1) CLJ 567: Aloke Saha v. Rina Ghosh (DB).

    4. Recent decisions of this Court on interpretation of section 43 of the Electricity Act, 2003 (hereafter the new Act) holding that trespassers are not entitled to supply of electricity and that the word ‘occupier’ must be construed as lawful occupier of the premises at which supply is sought has been laid down in the following decisions:

    a) AIR 2006 Cal 73: Samsul Haque Mollick v. C.E.S.C Ltd.,

    b) 2006 (4) CHN 433: Anjali Metia v. W.B.S.E.B (DB);

    c) AIR 2007 Cal 108: Amarendra Singh v. C.E.S.C Ltd.;

    d) AIR 2008 Cal 19: Gyanendra Nath Shil v. Superintending Engineer; and

    e) AIR 2008 Cal 29: Debadas Biswas v. West Bengal State Electricity Board & Ors. (supra), the Hon'ble Division Bench has held in paragraph 8 as follows:

    “We are not, therefore, in a position to agree and uphold the judgment of the learned Single Judge. The learned Single Judge was bound to discuss and decide as to whether the petitioner could be in law termed to be an occupier within the meaning of section 43. A person cannot be allowed to take advantage of his own wrong. Therefore, the person who is a trespasser cannot by continuing his trespass claim the character of an occupier, and as such claim the rightful supply of electricity under section 43 of the Electricity Act. However, this auction was not even addressed by the learned Judge. As if all this is not sufficient, the learned Judge should also have noted that the title suit filed by the petitioner for declaration of his 1/5th right in the property is dismissed and the appeal against the same is not pending. It is only a condonation of delay application which seems to have been pending before the Appellate Court and for the reasons known only to the parties and the Court, that application still remain undecided in spite of elapse of four years of its filing. Therefore, at least prima facie the petitioner did not produce any material either before the Board or before the learned Judge justifying his lawful occupation of the premises.”

    6. In Gyanendra Nath Shil (supra), the learned Judge in paragraph 7 has held as follows:

    “In my mew, ‘occupier’ of any premises means must be a lawful occupier on the date seeking electric connection, for a trespasser cannot get statutory amenities or facilities. Therefore, there cannot be any difference between the expression ‘lawful occupier’ as mentioned in the earlier Act of 1910 and word ‘occupier’ in the present Act of 2003. When authority concerned earlier prescribed lawful occupier, there is no reason to think in view of change of law, trespasser is to be given lawful right.”

    7. The decision of the learned Single Judge in Amarendra Singh (supra) has been overruled by the Hon'ble Division Bench by judgment dated 10.1.08 reported in AIR 2008 Cal 66: Amarendra Singh v. C.E.S.C Ltd. It has been held therein that—

    “2. ****** In view of the provisions of section 43 of the Electricity Act, 2003, the appellant herein being the occupier is entitled to enjoy the electricity at the occupied portion of the premises in question.

    3. The legality and/or validity of the occupation of the premises in question by the appellant can be decided in the Civil Court but that will not prevent the said appellant from enjoying the benefit of electric connection”.

    8. However, the decision in Anjali Metia (supra) appears not to have been noted.

    9. The Division Bench decisions in Anjali Metia (supra) and Amarendra Singh (supra) and the decision in Samsul Hague Mollick (supra), inter alia, have been noted by a learned Single Judge of this Court in Moloy Kumar Acharya v. Chairman-cum-Managlng Director, W.B State Electricity Distribution Co. Ltd., reported in AIR 2008 Cal 47. The meaning of the word ‘occupier’ in Black's Law Dictionary and Stroud's Judicial Dictionary was traced and it was held in paragraph 19 as follows:

    ********Therefore unless and until there is an adjudication in any of the proceedings referred to above or in any of the proceedings pending inter se between the parties holding that the petitioner is an unlawful occupant or is a trespasser on the property, his status, till then, is that of an ‘Occupier’ under section 43 of the Electricity Act, 2003. *******”

    10. At this juncture the decision of a learned Single Judge of this Court reported in 1999 (2) CHN 573: Soumltra Bannerjee v. CESC Limited, deserves attention. While considering what ‘lawful occupier’ in Section 12(6) of the old Act would connote, it has been held as follows:

    “19. If orders are to be passed against the private respondents for the purpose of enabling public respondents to do their duty then a finding has to be reached whether the writ petitioners are lawful occupiers within the meaning of sub-section (6) of section 12 of the Indian Electricity Act, 1910.

    20. If that expression is construed in a strict manner and the meaning ascribed to that expression is that the occupier is lawful, by any standards and without any doubt or dispute being there, in regard to the lawful nature of occupation, then and in that event the writ petition must fail. This is simply because no fewer than two civil suits are pending as between the warring parties here.

    21. If, however, the expression lawful occupier is given a dilute meaning, in the sense that it is held as including all occupiers who are not in obviously unlawful occupation, although there might be doubts and disputes which have to be resolved later, then and in that event the writ petitioners must succeed.

    22. They are not criminals; when they came into possession in the early ‘90s there was no force applied by them; they have come in through the promoters who were inducted by the owner/landlord; the owner/landlord being in the same premises, were aware that they are coming into occupations at least as alleged by the writ petitioners they have made payments to the promoter for getting their flats, although lately complaints were being filed in the police station the disputes between the petitioners and the respondent No. 4 are purely of a civil nature which might go this way or that and the Writ Court is not the proper Court for making any pronouncement in that respect.

    23. This situation is of common occurrence. When civil disputes are pending between two parties it is often the case that one party wants electricity connection and another party, may be the seller, may be the landlord, wishes to stop giving of such connection. In these circumstances, in my opinion, it is most inappropriate to allow any party to utilize the non-giving of essential supplies to the opposite party as a means or tool of putting extraneous pressure in the matter of resolution of civil disputes. Because of this reason I would interpret the words ‘lawful occupier’ in sub-section (6) in a reasonably dilute manner. All occupiers who are peace loving, who have an arguable case which might succeed in the end are entitled to get electricity connection notwithstanding opposition by the opponents. In case they are thrown out they will be thrown out of duly electrified premises and that is not a matter which is likely to affect the substance of the civil dispute or litigation amongst the parties.”

    11. This Court has been unable to trace any decision of the Apex Court on the point. In view thereof, this Court is theoretically bound by each of the decisions taken by the different benches of this Court on the point in issue. What would be the proper course of action for a Court faced with binding but conflicting decisions of higher Courts of equal strength came up for consideration before a Special Bench of this Court in Bholanath Karmakar v. Madan Mohan Karmakar, reported in 1987 (2) CLJ 332. Hon'ble Anandamoy Bhattacharjee, J. (as His Lordship then was) speaking for the Bench ruled that in such a case the course to be adopted by the Court is, firstly, to try to reconcile and to explain those contrary decisions by assuming, as far as possible, that they applied to different sets of circumstances. But when such contrary decisions of co-ordinate benches cannot be reconciled or explained, it was held, by relying on the decision of the Apex Court in Atma Ram v. State of Punjab, reported in AIR 1959 SC 519, that the subordinate Court would have to prefer one to the other and not necessarily obliged, as a matter of course, to follow either the former or the later in point of time, but to follow that one, which according to it, is better in point of law.

    12. Having due regard to the above and in view of apparent inconsistency in the views expressed by different benches which cannot be reconciled, this Court would venture to decide the issue before it on the basis of its own interpretation and understanding of the provisions contained in the new Act which governs the issue and to follow that view of the Division Bench as well as the views taken by learned Single Judges which, according to it, is better in point of law.

    13. Provisions of the new Act which are considered relevant are quoted below:

    “Section 43(1) - Every distribution licensee, shall, on an application by the owner or occupier of any premises, give supply of electricity to such premises, within one month after receipt of the application requiring such supply:

    Provided that where such supply requires extension of distribution mains, or commissioning of new sub-stations, the distribution licensee shall supply the electricity to such premises immediately after such extension or commissioning or within such period as may be specified by the Appropriate Commission;

    Provided further……”

    “Section 2(70)—Supply, in relation to electricity, means the sale of electricity to a licensee or consumer”.

    “Section 2(15)—Consumer means any person who is supplied with electricity for his own use by a licensee or the Government or by any other person engaged in the business of supplying electricity to the public under this Act or any other law for the time being in force and includes any person whose premises are for the time being connected for the purpose of receiving electricity with the works of a licensee, the Government or such other person, as the case may be”.

    “Section 2(4)—Person shall include any company or body corporate or association or body of individuals, whether incorporated or not, or artificial juridical person”.

    14. Two broad principles/rules of interpretation are well-accepted, literal and exploring the legislative intent. Ordinarily, the plain grammatical meaning of the legislation in question is discerned and applied. When the plain grammatical meaning leads to absurdity or ambiguity or renders the legislation unintelligible or a literal meaning could not have been intended by the legislature, a departure from literal interpretation may be made and the Courts may be justified in looking for what the legislature intended. However, in the pursuit of understanding a particular legal provision, amendment of law in the garb of interpretation is impermissible. The function of the Court is to find out what is legal and not what is right. Gap in the law has to be remedied by amending the Act and not by filling the gap by a judicial verdict. There may be exceptional situations where unless the gap is filled by judicial verdict the legislation would be rendered unintelligible or absurd and it is only in those exceptional situations that the Court may fill in such gap.

    15. Keeping these well-settled principles of law in mind, this Court would proceed to examine the point in issue.

    16. The word occupier in section 43(1) of the new Act has not been defined therein. In its decision in Industrial Suppliers (P) Ltd. v. Union of India, reported in AIR 1980 SC 1858, the Apex Court has held that in the legal sense an occupier is a person in actual possession.

    17. Applying the literal rule, there appears to be no doubt that an occupier of a premises meaning thereby a person in possession thereof, in terms of section 43 of the new Act, is entitled to supply of electricity on request being made to the licensee and once electricity is supplied and he bears the charges therefor, he becomes a consumer of electricity. The duty of the licensee is to supply electricity, i.e sell electricity. However, duty and/or obligation of the licensee to ascertain whether the prospective consumer is in lawful occupation or not is not discerned in the statutory provisions.

    18. In some of the decisions referred to supra, the Courts have interpreted the word ‘occupier’ in section 43 of the new Act to mean ‘a lawful occupier’.

    19. There can be no doubt that by so interpreting the word ‘occupier’ in section 43, the Courts have assumed existence of a word therein. Section 12(6) of the old Act provided that occupier of a building or land would mean one in lawful occupation thereof for the purposes mentioned in sub-section (2) thereof. The decisions in Associate Indian (supra), Surajbali Pandey (supra) and Aloke Saha (supra) have proceeded on the basis that provisions contained in section 12 of the old Act is a bar for supplying electricity to a prospective consumer unless he proves lawful occupation of the premises at which supply is intended. Without dilating on the point of applicability of section 12 of the old Act to an application for new connection on the face of section 22 thereof, it may be noted that in repealing the old Act and introducing the new Act the legislature has consciously omitted the word ‘lawful’ while denoting the class of persons entitled to supply of electricity. What the legislature omitted, obviously consciously, could not have been read into the statute unless of course reading of the statute without such addition would render it absurd or unintelligible. section 43(1) of the new Act, read as it is, does not produce absurd or unintelligible results.

    20. That apart, one cannot lose sight of the fact that a person intending to enjoy electricity though alleged to be a trespasser by the owner of the premises cannot be evicted by the owner except by taking recourse to law. If possession of such trespasser is protected till such time his eviction is ordered according to law, it defies reason as to why an embargo should be created by judicial verdict only in respect of obtaining supply of electricity. None can dispute that electricity is an essential service without which it is difficult to survive. Right to live a meaningful life and with dignity is one of the basic postulates of Article 21 of the Constitution. The right guaranteed under Article 21 is the fundamental of all fundamental rights enshrined in Chapter III of the Constitution. One cannot be deprived of such right only on the basis of an unestablished accusation that he is a trespasser which, as held in Soumitra Banerjee (supra), is commonly used as a tool or means of putting extraneous pressure for resolving civil disputes. Supply of electricity to such alleged trespasser by a licensee would neither prejudice in any manner the owner's right to have an order of eviction passed against him nor would it make any difference so far as status of the alleged trespasser is concerned. The licensee's duty is to sell electricity provided formalities are complied with. There is no justification to hold that lawful occupation of a portion of the premises is a pre-condition for obtaining supply. If the right of an owner to object to electricity being supplied to an occupier of his premises by the licensee is to be conceded on the ground that the occupier has illegally or unauthorisedly taken possession, that would necessarily lead to clothing the licensee with the right to adjudicate the occupier's right to enjoy the property which this Court is inclined to hold is not the legislative intention. The laws of the country provide for adjudication of such issue by an appropriate forum. If there is any flaw in the statute or the phrasing is defective and the need to mend it arises, it is only the legislature that can amend it. It is the function of the Courts to expound and not to legislate is settled law. Keeping in view the scheme of the new Act, reading the word lawful before the word ‘occupier’ would amount to legislation by Court which is impermissible.

    21. Accordingly, this Court is minded to hold that the decision of the Division Bench in Amarendra Singh (supra) and the decisions of the learned Single Judges in Soumitra Bannerjee (supra) and Moloy Kumar Acharya (supra) are better in point of law and this Court would prefer the views expressed therein to the views expressed by the Hon'ble Division Bench in Anjali Metia (supra) and the decisions of the learned Single Judges in Samsul Haque Mullick (supra), Debadas Biswas (supra) and Gyanendra Nath Shil (supra). It is further held that an applicant for supply of electricity if found to be in actual possession of any portion of a premises at which supply has been prayed is entitled to such supply without any duty being cast on the licensee to ascertain whether such possession is legal or illegal; however, supply would obviously be without prejudice to the owner's right to have an order of eviction against the occupier in a duty constituted proceeding.

    22. In the present case, the petitioner has claimed to be an occupier of the premises in question and has sought to substantiate his occupation by annexing telephone bill and voter's identity card.

    23. Mr. Kundu, learned Counsel for the private respondent has not disputed occupation of a portion of the premises by the petitioner but contended that such occupation is unlawful. However, no proceeding for eviction of the petitioner at his instance is pending.

    24. In view of the foregoing discussion, this Court holds that the petitioner is entitled to supply of electricity. CESC Ltd. is directed to take effective steps for supplying electricity to the petitioner as early as possible but positively within two weeks from date of compliance of all formalities by him. In the event, any resistance is offered by the private respondent, it shall be open to CESC Ltd. to seek the assistance of the Officer-in-Charge of the local Police Station who shall be bound to provide assistance to secure compliance of this order.

    25. Supply of electricity to the petitioner in terms of this order, however, shall not create any additional right in favour of the petitioner if an action to evict him is initiated by the private respondent according to law.

    26. The writ petition stands allowed. However, parties shall bear their own costs.

    27. Urgent photostat, certified copy of this order, if applied for, be furnished to the applicant within 4 days from date of putting in requisites therefor.

    Dipankar Datta, J.:

    Writ application allowed.
    A.D

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    Comments

    Santosh Jaiswal v. Cesc Limited & Ors.
    (Jul 22, 2008)