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  • Rule 8 of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (in short the Rules)
  • provisions of U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Leiting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (in short the Act).
  • Section 111(3) of the Companies Act, 1956
  • Eviction Officer.5. Rule 8 of the Rules
  • Rule 8(2) of the Rules.
  • Rule 5 of the Rules
  • Uttar Pradesh Act
  • Rent Control Act
  • sub-rule (2)
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
Acts
  • Rule 8 of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (in short the Rules)
  • provisions of U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Leiting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (in short the Act).
  • Section 111(3) of the Companies Act, 1956
  • Eviction Officer.5. Rule 8 of the Rules
  • Rule 8(2) of the Rules.
  • Rule 5 of the Rules
  • Uttar Pradesh Act
  • Rent Control Act
  • sub-rule (2)
Smart Summary

Case Summary — Sudhir Narain, J.

Factual and Procedural Background

The appellant applied for allotment of the disputed accommodation under Section 16 of the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 ("the Act"). The Rent Control and Eviction Officer (RCEO) called for a report from the Rent Control Inspector, who reported that the appellant was occupying the accommodation and recommended summoning the parties. Another person, Kanhaiyalal Kesari, also applied for allotment. The appellant then filed an application seeking regularisation of his possession under Section 14, claiming possession since 1968. The landlord opposed, alleging the appellant's possession was unauthorised.

The RCEO held that the appellant's possession was unauthorised and declared the premises vacant on 11-3-1987. Thereafter, on the landlord's application, the premises were released to the landlord and the allotment applications of the appellant and Kanhaiyalal were rejected. The appellant filed a writ petition against the RCEO's order, which was dismissed by the High Court on October 28, 1992. The present Special Appeal was instituted against that dismissal. The central procedural question raised was whether a special appeal is maintainable when the impugned order is that of a "Tribunal" under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the High Court Rules.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Rent Control and Eviction Officer functions as a "Tribunal" when determining the question of vacancy of a building under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972.
  2. If the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is a Tribunal, whether a Special Appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the High Court Rules is maintainable against his order.

Arguments of the Parties

Appellant's Arguments

  • Learned counsel for the appellant contended that the power to allot or release a building under Section 16 of the Act is an administrative or executive action of the District Magistrate (and thus not a judicial function). Consequently, the procedure prescribed under the Act does not indicate the RCEO acts as a Tribunal.

Respondent's Arguments

  • Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the decision in Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Laxmi Chand (AIR 1963 SC 677) and related authorities to support the contention that the RCEO exercises judicial functions and should be treated as a tribunal for the purposes of appeal under the High Court Rules.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Yogendra Tiwari v. The District Judge, Gorakhpur Rule 8 of the U.P. Rules is mandatory; failure to follow the procedure vitiates declaration of vacancy proceedings. The court relied on this authority to show Rule 8's mandatory nature and that non-compliance can invalidate vacancy proceedings, supporting the view that the RCEO must follow a judicial procedure.
Smt. Kanti Gupta v. VIIIth, Additional District Judge, Meerut Rule 8 mandatory; procedure for ascertaining vacancy must be followed. Used alongside other authorities to underline that prescribed procedure (inspection, notice, hearing, evidence) is essential before declaring vacancy.
Roman Catholic Diocese of Agra v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Agra Rule 8 and procedural requirements are substantive and mandatory when declaring vacancy. Invoked to reinforce that the scheme contemplates adjudicatory steps and that failure to observe them vitiates proceedings.
Hari Nagar Shyam Sunder Mills v. Shyam Sunder Where an authority requires pleadings, evidence and decides disputes according to law it acts as a Tribunal (order by Central Government under Section 111(3) Companies Act treated as Tribunal). The court cited the passage that characterizes a body as a tribunal when it investigates disputes with pleadings and evidence, applying that reasoning to the RCEO's functions.
Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Laxmi Chand (AIR 1963 SC 677) Criteria for deeming a decision or act judicial: (1) application of objective standards to facts and legal rules; (2) declaration of rights or imposition of obligations; (3) procedural attributes such as opportunity to present case and ascertainment of facts by evidence. The court applied these three criteria to the RCEO's functions (pleadings, evidence, reasoned orders) to conclude the RCEO acts judicially and is therefore a Tribunal.
Bhai Lal v. Additional Deputy Commissioner Rent Controller exercises judicial functions and is a legal Tribunal, not just an executive officer (hears parties, admits evidence, grants costs, exercises court-like powers and affects rights). Cited to show historical and judicial recognition that rent-control authorities perform tribunal-like functions; used to support the conclusion that the RCEO is a Tribunal.
Prabhakar Atma Ram v. Bharat (Bombay High Court) The Rent Controller, while deciding landlord-tenant relationship questions, acts as a Tribunal. Applied to demonstrate that high courts have treated rent-control authorities as tribunals in analogous contexts.
Diwali Rai v. Jai Kumar Gopal Das Jain (A.I.R. 1989 Bom. 393) Rent Control authorities are quasi-judicial authorities adjudicating upon civil rights of parties; declaration of vacancy requires adjudication. Relied upon to show that declaration of vacancy entails adjudication of tenant's rights and thus judicial character.
Ganpat Rai v. Additional District Magistrate (1985 II ALR 423 SC) Under the scheme of the Act, an objector has a right to be heard before declaration of vacancy; Rule 8 requires objections be considered before notification of vacancy. Cited to emphasize that the proper stage for objection is under Rule 8 (before notification) and that objections must be heard and decided on evidence, supporting the court's conclusion about the RCEO's judicial function.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court analyzed the statutory scheme and procedural rules governing declaration of vacancy and allotment/release under the Act and the Rules. The analysis proceeded in these principal steps:

  1. Statutory and rule-based framework:
    • Section 12 contains deeming provisions for vacancy; Section 25(2) treats subletting without landlord's consent as vacancy in certain circumstances.
    • Rule 8 of the U.P. Rules prescribes a detailed, mandatory procedure for ascertainment of vacancy: inspection in presence of parties, eliciting facts from respectable local persons, posting the inspection report, waiting at least three days before allotment, and deciding objections after considering evidence (Rule 8(1)–(3)).
    • Section 34 empowers the District Magistrate with powers akin to those of a Civil Court for holding enquiries and receiving evidence (summoning, examining on oath, receiving affidavits, issuing commissions).
  2. Functional attributes of the proceedings:
    • The procedure for declaration of vacancy involves inspection, notice to parties, invitation of objections, hearing affected parties, and decision after taking evidence. The RCEO must post a reasoned conclusion and pass a reasoned order.
    • The court distilled five requirements emerging from the scheme: (1) there is a lis between parties; (2) the District Magistrate must adjudicate judicially and give a reasoned order; (3) parties must be given opportunity of hearing; (4) orders must be based on evidence; (5) the District Magistrate may adopt procedures in consonance with Section 14 of the Act and principles of natural justice.
  3. Application of legal tests for 'tribunal' status:
    • The court explained the settled concept of "tribunal" as an authority invested with judicial power to adjudicate rights of parties in a judicial manner.
    • Relying on precedents (Hari Nagar and Jaswant Sugar Mills), the court applied established criteria: the necessity of pleadings and evidence, the declaration of rights or imposition of obligations, and procedural attributes (opportunity to present case, ascertain facts by evidence, reasoned decision).
    • The court compared these criteria with the statutory scheme and found correspondence: the RCEO's proceedings contemplate pleadings and evidence, the RCEO is empowered with Civil Court-like powers under Section 34, must determine objections under Rule 8(2) after considering evidence, and must pass reasoned orders.
  4. Use of supporting authority:
    • Decisions (e.g., Bhai Lal; Prabhakar Atma Ram; Diwali Rai; Ganpat Rai) were invoked to show that rent-control authorities exercising adjudicatory functions have been treated as tribunals by courts in analogous contexts.
    • Decisions holding Rule 8 mandatory (Yogendra Tiwari, Kanti Gupta, Roman Catholic Diocese of Agra) reinforced the view that the process is judicial in nature and non-compliance vitiates proceedings.
  5. Conclusion of analysis:
    • Given the statutory powers, the mandatory and adjudicatory nature of the procedure, the need for evidence and reasoned adjudication, and binding precedent applying judicial-character tests, the court concluded that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer acts as a Tribunal when determining vacancy under the Act.
    • Because Rule 5 of Chapter VIII of the High Court Rules bars special appeal against the order of a Tribunal, the present special appeal is not maintainable.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The court held that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer acts as a Tribunal for the purposes of determining vacancy under the U.P. Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972, and therefore a Special Appeal under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the High Court Rules is not maintainable. The Special Appeal was dismissed and the parties were directed to bear their own costs.

Implications:

  • Direct effect on the parties: The Special Appeal was dismissed; the earlier order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer (treated as an order of a Tribunal) stands and the parties were ordered to bear their own costs.
  • Broader implications: The court applied established criteria and precedent to classify the RCEO's vacancy-determination function as judicial/tribunal in character. The opinion relies on earlier decisions and the statutory scheme to reach this conclusion. The opinion itself does not purport to announce a novel legal principle beyond applying existing tests and authorities.

End of summary. All information in this summary is drawn exclusively from the provided opinion and no outside facts or inferences have been introduced.

    Sudarshan Singh Bedi v. Addl. District Magistrate R.C.E.O., Varanasi

    Sudhir Narain, J.:— The maintainability of this Special Appeal depends upon the answer to the question as to whether the Rent Contral and Eviction Officer acts as a Tribunal while he determines the question regarding vacancy of a building under the provisions of U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Leiting, Rent and Eviction) Act, 1972 (in short the ‘Act’). A special appeal is maintainable under Chapter VIII, Rule 5 of the Rules of the High Court. It bars special appeal against the order of a Tribunal Rule 5 is reproduced below:

    “5. Special Appeal.—An appeal shall lie to the court from a judgment (not being a judgment passed in the exercise of appellate jurisdiction in respect of a decree or order made by a Court subject to the superintendence of the Court and not being an order made in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction or in the exercise of its power of Superintendence or in the exercise or criminal jurisdiction) (or in the exercise of jurisdiction conferred by Article 226 or Article 227 of the Constitution in respect of any judgment, order or award (a) of a tribunal Court or statutory arbitration made purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of jurisdiction under any Uttar Pradesh Act or under any Central Act, with respect to any of the matter enumerated in the State List or the concurrent List in the seventh Schedule to the Constitution, or (b) of the Government or any officer or authority, made or purported to be made in the exercise or purported exercise of appellate or revisional jurisdiction under any such Act) of one Judge.)”

    2. The brief facts and the circumstance under which this special appeal has been filed are that the appellant filed an application for allotment of the accommodation in dispute in his favour under Section 16 of the Act. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer called for a report from the Rent Control Inspector. The Rent Control Inspector submitted a report stating therein that the accommodation in question could not be treated as vacant as the appellant was himself occupying the said accommodation. He recommended that the parties may be summoned. One Kanhaiyalal Kesari also filed an application for allotment Subsequently, the appellant filed an application that he was in possession of the accommodation since the year 1968 and his possession may be regularised under Section 14 of the Act. The landlord filed an objection stating that the possession of the appellant was unauthorised and he was not in occupation with his consent and he is not entitled to any regularisation of his possession under Section 14 of the Act. The Rent Control and Eviction Order held that the possession of the appellant was unauthorised and declared the premises in question as vacant on 11-3-1987. After the passing of this order the landlord moved an application seeking release of the premises in dispute. The application of the landlord for release was allowed and the applications of the applicant and that of Kanhaiyalal for allotment were rejected. The appellant filed writ petition against the order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer which was dismissed by the learned Judge of this Court by order dated October 28, 1992. This special appeal has been filed against the said order. The Rent Control Officer exercises the delegated power of the District Magistrate under the Act. There is no dispute that the Rent Control and Eviction Officer has power to release an accommodation in favour of the landlord under Section 16 of the Act or allot such accommodation to one of the applicants. This power can be exercised only where there is vacancy. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer has jurisdiction to pass an order only when there is vacancy of such building. The vacancy may be actual or it may be deemed vacancy as contemplated under Section 11 of the Act. It is a deeming provision. By fiction of law certain accommodation is treated as vacant. The relevant provision of Section 12 may be extracted as under:

    “12. Deemed vacancy of building in certain cases (1) and landlord or tenant or a building shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building or a part thereof if—

    (a) he has substantially removed his effects therefrom, or

    (b) he has allowed it to be occupied by any person who is not a member of his family, or

    (c) in the case of residential building, he as well as members of his family have taken up residence, not being temporary residence, elsewhere.

    (2) In the case of non-residential building, where a tenant carrying on business in the building admits a person who is not a member of his family as a partner or a new partner, as the case may be, the tenant shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building.

    (3) In the case of residential building, if the tenant or any member of his family builds or otherwise acquires in a vacant state or gets vacated a residential building in the same city, municipality, notified area or town area in which the building under tenancy is situate, he shall be deemed to have ceased to occupy the building under his tenancy.

    3. Apart from it, a building may have been vacated by the tenant and he might not have intimated the vacancy to the landlord or to the Rent Control and Eviction Officer and might have given its possession to some other person. He might have sub-let without consent of the landlord and even in that situation it shall be treated as vacant under sub-section (2) of Section 25 of the Act. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer has to ascertain the fact of vacancy of the building in dispute Rule 8 of the U.P Urban Buildings (Regulation of Letting, Rent and Eviction) Rules, 1972 (in short the ‘Rules’) provides procedure for ascertainment of vacancy. Rule 1 may be reproduced as follows:—

    “8. Ascertainment of vacancy (Sections 12, 16 and 34(8)(1) The District Magistrate, shall before making any order of allotment or release in respect of any building which is alleged to be vacant under Section 12 or to be otherwise vacant or to be likely to fall vacant, get the same inspected.

    (2) The inspection of the building, so far possible, shall be made in the presence of the landlord and the tenant or any other occupant. The facts mentioned in the report should wherever practicable, be elicited from at least two respectable persons in the locality and the conclusion of the inspection report shall be posted on the notice board of the office of the District Magistrate for the information of the general public, and an order of allotment may be passed not before the expiration of three days from the date of such posting, and if in the mean time any objection is received, not before the disposal of such objection.

    (3) Any objection under sub-rule (2) shall be decided after consideration of any evidence that the objector or any other person concerned may adduce.”

    4. The procedure for declaration of vacancy involves inspection of building, notice to the landlord, tenant and the occupier of the building, inviting objections from them hearing the affected parties, applicant and objector in the said proceedings and, after taking evidence, determination of vacancy and after such vacancy is declared, the same has to be published by posting the notice of vacancy on the Notice Board in the office of the Rant Control and Eviction Officer.

    5. Rule 8 of the Rules has been held mandatory and failure to follow the procedure prescribed in it vitiates the entire proceedings of declaration of vacancy vide Yogendra Tiwari v. The District Judge, Gorakhpur;1 Smt. Kanti Gupta v. VIIIth, Additional District Judge, Meerut,2 Roman Catholic Diocese of Agra v. Rent Control and Eviction Officer, Agra.3

    6. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer is entitled to receive evidence of the parties. Section 34 of the Act empowers the District Magistrate for the purpose of holding any enquiry or hearing, such powers which are vested in the Civil Court under the Cods of Civil Procedure when trying a suit in respect of summoning and enforcing the attendance of any person and examining him on oath, receive evidence on affidavits in respect of a building or its locality, or issuing commission for examination of witnesses or documents.

    7. If there is no dispute as to the fact of vacancy, the District Magistrate can proceed either to release or allot the accommodation but if there is dispute as to the existence of vacancy, he has to ascertain the same. The dispute may be between the tenant and the landlord or occupant or a person claiming right of allotment that there is vacancy and in that case again the dispute may be between the tenant and such applicant. The tenant may claim that there is no vacancy either in fact or under the deeming provision.

    8. In the light of these provisions the following position emerges:—

    (1) There is a lis between the parties.

    (2) The District Magistrate has to adjudicate the dispute judicially and has to determine it by a reasoned order.

    (3) The order has to be passed after giving an opportunity of hearing to the parties concerned.

    (4) The order must be based on evidence.

    (5) The District Magistrate is empowered to adopt a procedure which is prescribed under Section 14 of the Act and in consonance with the principles of natural justice.

    9. Learned counsel for the applicant contended that the power to allot or release a building under Section 16 of the Act was only an administrative or executive action of the District Magistrate. The procedure prescribed under the Act does not support this contention.

    10. The word “Tribunal” has not been defined under this Act, but now it is settled principle of law that a tribunal is a body or an authority which is invested with the judicial power to adjudicate on questions of law or fact affecting the right of parties in a judicial manner.

    11. In Hari Nagar Shyam Sunder Mills v. Shyam Sunder,4 the Supreme Court held that an order passed by the Central Government in appeal under Section 111(3) of the Companies Act, 1956 shall be treated as an order of a Tribunal. The reason for holding it is Tribunal is quoted below.

    “Pleadings have to be filed, evidence in support of the case of each party has to be furnished and the disputes have to be decided according to law after considering the representations made by the parties. If it be granted that the Central Government exercises judicial power of the State to adjudicate upon rights of the parties in civil matters when there is a lie between the contesting parties, the conclusion is inevitable that it acts as a tribunal and not as an executive body.”

    12. Learned counsel for the respondent relied upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Jaswant Sugar Mills v. Laxmi Chand . AIR 1963 SC 677.. The Supreme Court laid down the following criteria to make a decision as judicial.

    “To make a decision or an act judicial, the following criteria must be satisfied;

    (1) It is in substance a determination upon investigation of a question by the application of objective standards to facts found in the light of preexisting legal rules;

    (2) it declares rights or imposes upon parties obligations affecting their civil rights; and

    (3) that the investigation is subject to certain procedural attributes contemplating an opportunity of presenting its case to a party, ascertainment of facts by means of evidence if a dispute be on question of law on the presentation of legal argument, and decision resulting in the disposal of the matter on findings based upon these questions of law and fact.”

    13. On the facts of the case, it was held that the Conciliation Officer is not a Tribunal as he is not required to sit in public; no formed pleadings are contemplated to be tendered, he is not empowered to compel attendance of witnesses nor he is restricted in making an enquiry:

    “He is not required to sit in public; no formal pleadings are contemplated to be tendered; he is not empowered to compel attendance of witnesses, nor he is restricted in making an enquiry, to evidence which the parties may bring before him. The Conciliation Officer is again not capable of delivering a determinative judgment or award affecting the rights and obligations of parties. He is not invested with powers similar to those of the Civil Court under the Code of Civil Procedure for enforcing attendance of any person and examining him on oath compelling production of documents, issuing commissions for the examination of witnesses and other matters.”

    14. The declaration of vacancy by Rent Control and Eviction Officer contemplates pleadings and evidence and the Rent Control and Eviction Officer is invested with the power of a Civil Court in regulating the procedure for taking evidence etc. He is also to determine the dispute after taking into account the objections raised by the parties and has to pass a reasoned order.

    15. In Bhai Lal v. Additional Deputy Commissioner,6 Hidyatullah, J. as he then was, held that the Rent Controller and the Deputy Commissioner acting under C.P, Berar Letting of Houses and Rent Control Order, 1949 exercises judicial functions as Rent Controller is a legal Tribunal and not merely an Executive Officer. The reasons for holding as Tribunal may be quoted below:

    “The Controller hears parties, admits evidence, grants costs and generally exercises all the powers which Courts possess. His orders have legal effect and in deciding the cases before him, he not only ascertains questions of fact as well as questions of law. By this order he imposes labilities and affects the rights of others.”

    16. This decision was quoted with approval by the Bombay High Court in Prabhakar Atma Ram v. Bharat.7 The Court held that the Rent Controller while deciding the question as to the existence of relationship of landlord and tenant between the parties before him acts as a Tribunal.

    17. In Diwali Rai v. Jai Kumar Gopal Das Jain . A.I.R 1989 Bom. 393 the Court held that the Rent Control authorities act as Tribunal. The authorities under the Rent Control Act are quasi judicial authority adjudicating upon civil rights of parties. The declaration of vacancy requires adjudication of the rights of a tenant or a person occupying the accommodation and claiming himself as a tenant. In Ganpat Rai v. Additional District Magistrate . 1985 II ALR 423 SC. considering the scheme of the Act for declaration of vacancy the Court held that before declaration of vacancy an objector has a right to be heard. The relevant paragraph of the case is quoted below:

    “It equally does not appear to be correct to hold that an order notifying the vacancy did no injury and caused no prejudice to the interest of any party because any order notifying the vacancy could be objected to and if any objections were filed they would have to be decided after considering the evidence that the objector or any other person concerned might adduce and that after an order of allotment or release was passed following upon the notification of vacancy, the aggrieved person could file a review application or an appeal under Section 18. In so holding the Court appears to have overlooked that the stage for objecting to a vacancy being notified was not after it was notified but, as provided by Rule 8 before it was notified and that under the said Rule 8 the notification of vacancy could only be after the objections were heard and disposed of. This Court itself pointed out in that case that the Act did not provide for a hearing at the stage when the District Magistrate passed an order of allotment of lease.”

    18. The Rent Control and Eviction Officer has to determine the objections as provided under Rule 8(2) of the Rules. The provisions of determination costs duty upon the Rent Control and Eviction Officer to act judicially after considering the pleadings of the parties and after affording them opportunity to lead evidence and further to pass a reasoned order. From the scheme of the Act and the functions and duties cast upon the Rent Control and Eviction Officer leaves no doubt that he acts as a Tribunal. The order of the Rent Control and Eviction Officer shall be treated as an order of Tribunal.

    19. The Special Appeal is not maintainable and, therefore, is dismissed. The parties shall bear their own costs.

    20. Appeal dismissed.

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    Comments

    Sudarshan Singh Bedi v. Addl. District Magistrate R.C.E.O., Varanasi
    (Dec 17, 1992)