Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges

    Abdul Rahim v. Maidhar Gazi

    The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—

    Mukerji, J.:— The Plaintiffs are the Appellants in this appeal. They instituted the suit which has given rise to this appeal for recovery of possession on declaration of their right of preemption in respect of a 4 annas share in a tank with its banks. The entire tank with its banks at one time belonged to the Plaintiffs who in Sravan 1825 sold a 6 annas share of the same to the Defendant No. 1. There was a condition in the sale deed, which, transmitted literally, runs thus: “Be it mentioned that if any necessity arises for you (i.e, the vendees) to sell the tank and its banks, you shall not be entitled to sell the same anywhere else: on receipt of proper price you will give the same to us (i.e, the vendors); also if any necessity arises for us to sell them instead of selling them elsewhere we shall sell them to you on receiving proper price.” The Plaintiffs' case was that in violation of this stipulation the Defendant No. 1 sold a 4 annas out of the share purchased by him to the Defendants Nos. 2 to 6, and coming to know of it, they made the necessary demands, namely, the talab-i-mowasibat and the talab-i-istish-had, and then instituted the suit.

    Defendants Nos. 3, 4 and 5 contested the suit. Their allegations were that the Defendant No. 6 was a minor and was not properly represented, that there was no contract for re-sale such as was alleged on behalf of the Plaintiff, that the Defendants were bonâ fide purchasers and that the formalities requisite for the demands for pre-emption were not observed.

    The minority of the Defendant No. 6 was proved and he not being properly represented, the Munsif, holding that the requisite demands had been made by the Plaintiffs, gave them a decree for 5/6th share in the property, namely, the 4 annas share of the tank and its banks. He dismissed the suit as against the Defendants No. 6. The Subordinate Judge on appeal has dismissed the entire suit.

    The Plaintiffs' first contention relates to the sufficiency of the demands. The position so far as this matter is concerned is this: The Subordinate Judge found the talab-i-ishtish-had was invalid inasmuch as it was not proved that when this demand was made, there was a reference to the talab-i-mowasibat, and that under the law an express reference to the same is necessary. As regards the talab-i-mowasibat he was of opinion that of the three witnesses Nos. 2, 3 and 4 who were called on behalf of the Plaintiff on this point, the first did not really prove it and the last one could not be relied on; and that the second witness proved that one of the Plaintiffs only offered Rs. 100 and did nothing else. An examination of the evidence of this witness, however, reveals a good deal more than what the Subordinate Judge has referred to in this way. He seems to have missed the point which is apparent on the face of the evidence of this witness, that the demand was made on the banks of the tank and immediately as the Plaintiffs came to know of the fact that the Defendant No. 1 had sold to the other Defendants. On this point the argument that has been advanced on behalf of the Appellants is that in the circumstances disclosed there was no necessity for a second demand, and reliance was placed on their behalf in this respect on the following passage in Mr. Ameer Ali's Mahommedan Law, Fourth Edition, Vol. II, page 727: “But the talab-i-ishtish-had may be combined with the talab-i-mowasibat, e.g, if at the time of the talab-i-mowasibat the pre-emptor had the opportunity of invoking witnesses in the presence of the seller or the purchaser or on the premises to attest the immediate demand, it would suffice for both demands, and there would be no necessity for the second.” This proposition has received judicial recognition in the case of Nundo Pershad Thakur v. Gopal Thakur in which Garth, C.J Beverley, J., concurring, quoted in support of it Futawa Alamgiri, (v. 268) and said: “The talab-i-ishtish-had is only necessary if at the time of making the todab-i-mowa-sibat or immediate demand, there was no opportunity of invoking witnesses; as for instance—when the pre-emptor at the time of the hearing of the sale was absent from the seller, the purchaser, and the premises. But if he heard it in the presence of any of these and had called on witnesses to attest the immediate demand, it would suffice for both demands, and there would be no necessity for the other.” This decision was overruled but on a different point by a Full Bench of this Court in the case of Rujjubali Chopedar v. Chundi Churn Bhadra (2). In that case the question referred to the Full Bench was “when the person claiming a right of pre-emption has performed the talab-i-mowasibat in the presence of witnesses but not in the presence either of the seller or of the purchaser or on the premises, is it necessary when performing the talab-i-ishtish-had that he should declare that he has made the talab-i-mowasibat and at the same time should invoke witnesses to attest it?” This question was answered in the affirmative, but the correctness of the proposition referred to above does not appear to have been in “any way shaken. Amongst the formalities necessary for the talab-i-ishtish-had, however, is that of invocation of witnesses. If this has been done in the first demand, no second demand, according to the proposition above-mentioned would be necessary. The right is strictissimi juris and failure to perform the demands in accordance with the requirements of the Mahommedan law would defeat the Plaintiffs' claim. This invoking of witnesses, as far as may be gathered from the authorities, is no mere matter of form; it imparts to the demand a solemnity clothed in which the demand becomes not a casual one but on the other hand assumes the nature of a serious transaction. No particular form of words is necessary for the invocation of witnesses, but the claimant in the presence of witnesses must say to the following effect: “Such a person bought such a property (sufficiently indicating the same) of which I am the shafi; I have already claimed my right of shufa and now again claim it, be therefore witness thereof.” (Ameer Ali on Mahommedan Law, fourth edition, Vol. II, page 725). The last words or words to that effect must be said even where the two demands are combined into one. The importance of this invocation as an essential part of the ceremony has been impliedly recognised in several cases amongst which reference may be made to Jadu Singh v. Raj Kumar (3) and Ramdulal Missir v. Jhumack Lal (4). This part of the ceremony being admittedly absent even in respect of the demand that has been proved in Plaintiffs' favour by their witness No. 3, the Plaintiff cannot possibly succeed under the Mahommedan law on which they rely.

    The second contention urged on behalf of the Appellants is that they are entitled to succeed on the basis of the contract embodied in the sale deed, to which reference has already been made. There was an issue framed by the trial Court which was to the effect as to whether there was such a contract with the Defendant No. 1 to re-sell and whether the Defendants Nos. 2 to 5 were aware of it. This issue was decided in Plaintiffs' favour by the trial Court, but there has been no reference to it in the judgment of the lower Appellate Court. It would have been necessary for us to send the case back to the lower Appellate Court for the determination of the facts in connection with that issue and also to express our opinion as regards the validity of this contract. This has been rendered unnecessary by reason of the failure of the Plaintiffs to have the Defendant No. 6 properly represented in the suit. I am not pressed by the Appellants' arguments which have been directed to re-open the decree of the Munsif dismissing the suit as against the said Defendant. The result is that even if the Plaintiffs succeed on the footing of the contract, they cannot in any event get a decree for the 1/6th share which belongs to that Defendant. Now in a suit for specific performance on a contract of this kind the principle on which the Court will proceed is that a contract for the sale of property in one lot will generally be considered indivisible, and the Court will not, as a general rule, compel specific performance of a contract, unless it can execute the whole contract. Or, as Lord Romilly, M.R, expressed it, “this Court cannot specifically perform the contract piece-meal, but it must be performed in its entirety if performed at all” [Merchants' Trading Company v. Banner ]. It is true that there are exceptions to this rule which may be justly made in view of the circumstances of any particular case. Even in cases where the contract is plain and certain in its terms and obligatory on both parties—which cannot readily be said of the contract in the present case—the right to specific execution is not absolute and its enforcement must rest on the sound discretion of the Court, a judicial discretion, to be exercised according to the established principles of equity. In the present case the Plaintiffs by their conduct have made it impossible for the Court to give effect to the contract in its entirety. The practical result of it is that the Defendant No. 6, a stranger will have his title to an 1/6th share and that both cannot be interfered with. He certainly, and the other Defendants through or under him possibly, will always be able to defeat the very object which the law of pre-emption aims at. What reason is there then to give preference to the Plaintiffs over the Defendants in the matter of the share in suit? I am accordingly of opinion after giving my best consideration to the case that the second contention of the Appellant should not be entertained.

    The result in my opinion is that this appeal should be dismissed with costs.

    Cuming, J.:— I agree. The appeal is dismissed with costs.

    C.C
    Appeal dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Abdul Rahim v. Maidhar Gazi
    (Jan 25, 1928)