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AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • Mookerjee
  • Cuming, JJ.
Acts
  • Section 37 read with Section 35 of the Public Demands Recovery Act
  • Section 4 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913,
  • Section 104-J of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913,
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Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Judges
  • Mookerjee
  • Cuming, JJ.
Acts
  • Section 37 read with Section 35 of the Public Demands Recovery Act
  • Section 4 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913,
  • Section 104-J of the Bengal Tenancy Act
  • Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913,
See more information ...
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Mookerjee, J.)

Factual and Procedural Background

The plaintiff was a tenant holding under the Secretary of State for India within a temporarily settled area. The land was surveyed and rent settled under Part II of Chapter X of the Bengal Tenancy Act. The Record of Rights was finally published on 31 May 1910 and recorded the rent as Rs. 25-7-0 per annum. Rent was collected at that rate for the year following publication.

On 31 May 1915 a certificate under Section 4 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, was issued for Rs. 54-15-3, showing arrears calculated at Rs. 25-7-0 per annum for Bengali years 1320–1322. On 4 December 1915 a second (supplementary) certificate was issued for Rs. 220-6-3, purporting to show arrears calculated at Rs. 85 per annum for years 1319–1322 after deducting the amount covered by the first certificate.

Revenue authorities proceeded to execute the second certificate by attempting sale of the tenure; the plaintiff deposited the amount claimed to avert sale. The plaintiff filed suit on 23 February 1918 seeking declaration that the certificate was ultra vires, refund and a permanent injunction restraining the Secretary of State from issuing similar certificates.

Procedural history: the trial Court (Court of first instance) decreed the suit. On appeal the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit. On second appeal to the Court (before Mr. Justice Huda) the dismissal was affirmed. The present opinion (by Mookerjee, J.) is on a further appeal under Clause 15 of the Letters Patent, which restored the decree of the trial Court.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the Secretary of State (revenue authorities) could challenge the accuracy of the entry in the Record of Rights once that Record had been finally published and the period for correction or appeal had expired—specifically, whether Section 104-J of the Bengal Tenancy Act creates an irrebuttable presumption in favour of the entry in the Record of Rights.
  2. If the correctness of the Record-of-Rights entry could be reopened, whether revenue authorities were competent to issue a supplemental certificate under Section 4 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, covering the period already covered by an earlier certificate (i.e., whether more than one certificate could be issued in respect of a single demand).
  3. Whether Sections 35 and 37 of the Public Demands Recovery Act bar the civil suit (i.e., whether the Civil Court's jurisdiction to grant declarations or injunctions is ousted where the statute provides procedures for cancellation or modification of certificates).

Arguments of the Parties

Plaintiff's Arguments

  • Section 104-J of the Bengal Tenancy Act creates an irrebuttable presumption that rents settled and entered in a Record-of-Rights finally published under Section 103-A are correctly settled and fair and equitable; consequently no evidence is admissible to show a different rent rate from that entry.
  • The time for instituting proceedings to alter the Record-of-Rights (under Section 104-H(2) or by appeal under Section 104-G) had expired, so the Record was conclusive and could not be reopened by the revenue authorities.
  • Even if the Record's correctness could now be questioned, Section 4 of the Public Demands Recovery Act contemplates a single certificate covering the entire demand; issuing a supplemental certificate for a period covered by a prior certificate was impermissible and would create multiplicity of proceedings.
  • Where the revenue authorities acted without lawful authority and as a colourable exercise of power, the Civil Court retained jurisdiction to grant declarations and injunctions despite statutory provisions for cancellation/modification.

Secretary of State's (Defendant's) Arguments

  • The entries in the Record-of-Rights were erroneous: rent had been settled at Rs. 85 per annum in a dispute case decided on 27 March 1909, and this was overlooked when the Record-of-Rights was finally prepared and published.
  • As a procedural/ statutory matter, the remedy for cancellation or modification of the certificate lay under Sections 35 and 37 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, and those provisions were argued to bar the present suit in the Civil Court.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Ambika Charan v. Joy. Chandra Support for the view that entries in the Record-of-Rights under the relevant provisions are conclusive (irrebuttable presumption) when final publication and prescribed periods have elapsed. The court relied on this case among others to hold that Section 104-J creates a conclusive effect for the Record-of-Rights entries and that evidence to the contrary is inadmissible after the prescribed period.
Prasanna v. Rachimuddin Same line of authority supporting the conclusiveness of the Record-of-Rights entry under Section 104-J. Used to reinforce the conclusion that the Record-of-Rights entry is binding and cannot be reopened outside the statutory remedies and time limits.
Baikuntha Nath v. Prasanna Kumar Support for the irrebuttable/conclusive character of final rent settlements entered in the Record-of-Rights. Adopted as consistent authority for treating the final Record-of-Rights as conclusive between landlord (Secretary of State) and tenant.
Prafulla v. Pealku Authority aligning with the view that a final Record-of-Rights is conclusive and not open to collateral attack after prescribed periods. Cited in support of the court's position that the time for challenging the Record had expired and the entry must be deemed conclusive.
Madhab Prokas v. Murli Monohar Applied to show the rule against multiplicity of proceedings applies to revenue recovery proceedings for arrears of rent. The court relied on this authority to hold that issuing supplemental certificates breaking a single demand into fragments violated the rule against multiplicity and was unauthorised.
Adhirani Narayan Kumari v. Raghu Mohapatra Support for applying the principle requiring entire claim to be included (to avoid multiplicity) to revenue recovery proceedings. Used to reinforce the conclusion that Section 4 of the Public Demands Recovery Act should not be interpreted to permit multiple certificates for the same demand.
Buzlur Rahim v. Shamsunnessa Doctrine that the rule against multiplicity applies not only to deliberate relinquishment but also to accidental or involuntary omission. Cited to indicate that even accidental omission cannot justify separate proceedings or fragmentation of claims by issuing supplemental certificates.
Reajuddin v. Shahamtulla Support for the proposition that where statutory powers are exercised colourably or as a flagrant abuse, the Civil Court's jurisdiction to grant declarations and injunctions is not ousted by statutory provisions. Applied to reject the contention that Sections 35 and 37 of the Public Demands Recovery Act barred the suit; the court held civil jurisdiction remained where the revenue action was colourable.
Dhiraj Chandra v. Haridas Similar support for civil jurisdiction to grant relief in cases of colourable or abusive statutory action. Relied upon with Reajuddin to conclude that S. 37 does not preclude Civil Court relief when the revenue action is unauthorized or abusive.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court identified two principal legal questions: (1) whether the Secretary of State could re-open or impeach the Record-of-Rights entry after final publication and prescribed periods had expired; and (2) whether a supplemental certificate could be issued covering a period already covered by a prior certificate.

On the first question the Court analysed Section 104-J of the Bengal Tenancy Act and concluded that it creates a conclusive effect (an irrebuttable presumption) in favour of the entry in the Record-of-Rights when the rent has been settled under Part II of Chapter X and finally published under Section 103-A. The Court reasoned that the statutory language "shall be deemed to have been correctly settled" would be meaningless if it produced only a rebuttable presumption. The Court noted the specific statutory time-limits for suits under Section 104-H(2), appeals under Section 104-G, and possible revision by the Board of Revenue, and observed that those times had expired in the present case (dates and expiry periods are stated in the opinion). Because the revenue authorities had not used the normal statutory procedures and time-limits to amend the Record, they could not reopen the matter belatedly by way of defence to the tenant's civil action. The Court remarked that a revenue officer had merely corrected the copy of the Record in his custody in 1915 (after the first certificate) and used that to justify a supplemental certificate, but that procedure was manifestly unauthorised and the original Record could no longer be lawfully amended.

On the second question the Court examined Section 4 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, which empowers the certificate-office to sign and file a certificate when satisfied that any public demand due to the Collector is due. The Court read this provision as intending a single certificate to cover the entire demand due at the time. It held that interpreting Section 4 to allow issuing more than one certificate in fragments would contravene the fundamental rule against multiplicity of proceedings. The Court invoked Order 2, Rule 2 of the Civil Procedure Code (1903), which requires that every suit include the whole of the claim that a plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of a cause of action, drawing the corollary that a party who omits or relinquishes a portion of his claim cannot later pursue it separately. The Court applied authorities (Madhab Prokas; Adhirani Narayan Kumari; Buzlur Rahim) to show that the doctrine applies to revenue recovery proceedings and extends to accidental omissions as well as deliberate ones. On that basis the issuance of the supplemental certificate was found entirely unauthorised.

Finally, the Court addressed the defence based on Sections 35 and 37 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, which provide grounds for cancellation or modification of a certificate by the Civil Court. The Court rejected the contention that these provisions barred the present suit because the revenue authorities' action was wholly unauthorised and amounted to a colourable exercise and an abuse of statutory power. In such circumstances, Section 37 does not oust the Civil Court's jurisdiction to grant declaratory or injunctive relief. The Court relied on precedents (Reajuddin; Dhiraj Chandra) to support this proposition.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court allowed the appeal. The judgment of Mr. Justice Huda (which had affirmed the Subordinate Judge's dismissal) was set aside and the decree of the primary (trial) Court, which had decreed the suit, was restored with costs throughout. In short, the Court's operative ruling was APPEAL ALLOWED; trial Court decree restored.

Implications: The direct effect is that the supplemental certificate issued in 1915 was held unauthorised and the plaintiff's decree (declaration, refund and injunction) is restored. The Court treated the Record-of-Rights entry as conclusive after the prescribed periods for challenge had expired and held that revenue authorities cannot reopen the settled record or issue fragmented certificates for the same demand. The opinion also confirms that where a revenue authority acts colourably or abusively, statutory remedy provisions (Sections 35 and 37) do not necessarily oust the Civil Court's jurisdiction to grant relief. The opinion does not purport to create a broader novel precedent beyond applying and following existing authorities cited in the text.

Show full summary ...

    Pratap Chandra Jana v. Secretary Of State

    Mookerjee, J.:— This is an appeal under Cl. 15 of the Letters Patent from the judgment of Mr. Justice Huda in a suit for a declaration that a certificate issued under the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, was ultra vires, for refund of the amount recovered thereunder and for a permanent injunction to restrain the Secretary of State for India from the issue of similar certificates in future. The Court of first instance decreed the suit. On appeal the Subordinate Judge dismissed the suit.

    2. On second appeal to this Court Mr. Justice Huda confirmed this decision. We are now invited to hold that the suit had been rightly decreed by the trial Court as the proceedings of the revenue authorities were without jurisdiction. The facts material for the determination of the question in controversy may be briefly outlined. The plaintiff holds a tenancy under the Secretary of State for India within a temporarily settled area. The land was surveyed and the rent was settled under Part II of Chapter X of the Bengal Tenancy Act, and the Record of Rights, which - was finally published on the 31st May, 1910, contained an entry to the effect that the rent payable by the defendant was Rs. 25 annas 7 a year. Rent appears to have been realised at this rate for the year following the publication of the record. On the 31st May, 1915, a certificate was made under Section 4 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913, for a sum of Rs. 54-15-3. The certificate set out the details which showed that calculated at the rate of Rs. 25-7-0 per annum, the amount in arrears for the Bengali years 1320, 1321 and 1322 amounted to Rs. 54-15-3. Subsequently, on the 4th December, 1915, another certificate was made for Rs. 220-6-3. This certificate also set out details which showed that calculated at the rate of Rs. 85 a year a sum of Rs. 220-6-3 was due in respect of the years 1319, 1320, 1321 and 1322, after deduction of the amount covered by the previous certificate and amicably paid.

    3. The revenue authorities proceeded to sell the tenure in execution of the second certificate, with the result that the plaintiff was compelled to deposit the amount claimed and thereby to avert the sale. On the 23rd February, 1918, the plaintiff commenced this litigation on the allegation that the issue of the supplementary certificate and the institution of proceedings for enforcement thereof were without jurisdiction. On behalf of the Secretary of State, the suit was defended on the ground that the entries in the Record-of-rights were erroneous, that rent had been settled at Rs. 85 a year in a dispute case on the 27th March, 1909, and that this was overlooked when the record was finally prepared and published.

    4. Two questions thereupon emerged for consideration, namely, first, whether it was competent to the Secretary of State to raise the question of the accuracy of the entry in the Record-of-rights, and secondly, if the question of correctness of the entry was open for consideration, whether it was competent to the revenue authorities to make a supplemental certificate for the period covered by the first certificate. The Courts below have expressed divergent Gpinions upon these points.

    5. As regards the first question, the plaintiff maintains that Section 104-J of the Bengal Tenancy Act raises an irrebuttable presumption in favour of the entry in the Record of Rights. This section provides that subject to the provision of S. 104-H, all rents settled under Ss. 104 to 104-F and-entered in a Record-of-rights finally published under S. 103-A or settled under S. 104-G, shall be deemed to have been correctly settled and to be fair and equitable rents within the meaning of the Bengal Tenancy Act.

    6. The effect of this provision is that when a settlement of rent has been made under part II of Chapter X, no evidence is admissible to prove that rent is payable at a rate different from that entered in the rent roll. S. 103-B, which finds a place in-part I does not operate to modify the effect of S. 104-J, which finds a place in Part II. The substance of the matter is that the entry in the Record-of-rights is-conclusive, unless altered by means of a suit instituted under S. 104-H, Sub-S. 2 within six months from the date of the certificate of final publication of the Record-of-rights, or, if an appeal has been presented to a revenue authority under S. 104-G, then within six months from the date of the disposal of such appeals. The expression 11 deemed to have been correctly settled would be meaningless, if the entry raised only a rebuttable presumption.

    7. The view we take is in accord with that adopted in Ambika Charan v. Joy. Chandra(1), Prasanna v. Rachimuddin(2), Baikuntha Nath v. Prasanna Kumar(3). Prafulla v. Pealku(4). In the case before us the time for the institution of a suit under S. 104-H, sub. S. (2) expired on the 30th November, 1910. On the other hand, the time for an appeal to the Superior Revenue authority expired on the 31st July, 1910, and the period prescribed for possible revision by the Board of Revenue terminated on the 31st May 1912.

    8. The Revenue authorities have not availed themselves of the normal procedure they cannot now be permitted to re-open the matter and re-agitate the question in a different form by way of defence to an action which the tenant has been obliged to institute by reason of the seizure of his properties by summary process. The Record-of-Rights finally published on the 31st May, 1910, has never been amended, and the time prescribed for amendment has elapsed. It appears that in 1915, after the issue of the first certificate, some revenue officer discovered the inconsistency between the decision of the Settlement Officer in the dispute case dated the 27th March, 1909, and the entry in the Record-of-rights finally published on the 31st May, 1910. He then proceeded to correct the copy of the Record-of-rights which was in his custody, and this was made the basis for the issue of the supplemental certificate. The procedure was manifestly unauthorised.

    9. The original record has never been and can no longer be amended in accordance with law. There was thus no foundation for the issue of the supplemental certificate and the entry in the Record-of-rights must be deemed conclusive between the Secretary of State and the tenant.

    10. As regards the second question, the plaintiff maintains that even if it be assumed that the revenue authorities are at liberty to establish now the inaccuracy of the entry in the Record of rights, it is not open to them to issue a supplemental certificate for the period covered by the certificate previously issued. We are of opinion that this contention is of considerable force. Section 4 of the Public Demands Recovery Act, 1913 provides that when the certificate-office is satisfied that any public demand payable to the Collector is due, he may sign a certificate, in the prescribed form and stating that the demand is due, and shall cause the certificate to be filed in his office. It is plain that the certificate so filed is intended to cover the entire demand due at the time.

    11. The “public demand,” mentioned in S. 4 and defined in S. 3, Cl. 6 read with Cl. 7, of Sch. I, includes a demand payable to the Collector by a person holding any interest in land, when such demand is a condition of the use and enjoyment of the land. We are of opinion that S. 4 should not be so interpreted as to authorize the issue of more than one certificate in the prescribed form (Appendix form 1) with regard to a single demand broken up Into fragments. Such an interpretation would violate the cardinal rule for the avoidance of multiplicity of proceedings.

    12. That rule is recognised by the Legislature in O. 2, R. 2 of the CPC, 1903, which requires that every suit shall include the whole of the claim which a plaintiff is entitled to make in respect of the cause of action, with the necessary corollary that, where the plaintiff omits to sue in respect of or intentionally relinquishes any portion of his claim, he cannot afterwards sue in respect of the portion so omitted or relinquished.

    13. This principle has been held applicable to proceedings in revenue Courts for recovery of arrears of rent; see Madhab Prokas v. Murli Monohar(5), Adhirani Narayan Kumafi v. Raghu Mohapatra, (6). As pointed out by the Judicial Committee in Buzlur Rahim v. Shamsunnessa(7) the doctrine applies to cases not merely of deliberate relinquishment but also of accidental or involuntary omission. From this standpoint, the issue of the supplemental certificate was entirely unauthorised.

    14. As a last resort, it has been urged that Section 37 read with Section 35 of the Public Demands Recovery Act which specifies the grounds for cancellation or modification of a certificate by the Civil Court bars the present suit. There is plainly no foundation for this contention. The action of the revenue authorities was wholly unauthorised, constituting a colourable exercise and consequently a flagrant abuse of the provision of the Statute. In such circumstances, S. 37 does not oust the jurisdiction of the Civil Court to make a declaration, to issue an injunction, or otherwise to grant adequate relief; Reajuddin v. Shahamtulla, (8) Dhiraj Chandra v. Haridas(9).

    15. The result is that this appeal is allowed, the judgment of Mr. Justice Huda in affirmance of that of the Subordinate Judge is set aside, and the decree of the primary Court is restored with costs throughout.

    16. Appeal allowed.

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    Comments

    Pratap Chandra Jana v. Secretary Of State
    (Mar 1, 1922)