Stodart, J.:— A field which was joint family property belonging to two coparceners was sold by one of them Muthuraman Chetty. In 1918 the other coparcener filed a suit for partition and separate possession of his half share. Muthuraman Chetty was the first defendant in that suit. He died during the trial and his sons Adaikappa and Palniappa were substituted. The suit was dismissed on 24th February 1923. The plaintiff appealed and his appeal was allowed on 28th August 1925; Some of the defendants filed a second appeal in the High Court and this was dismissed and finally on 27th February 1926 the trial Court having divided the land gave the plaintiff a decree. Up to the last, Adaikappa and Palniappa remained on the record as the representatives of the deceased vendee. They had a common defence and appeared by the same Vakils.
In 1927, the suit now under appeal was filed on behalf of the minor son of Palniappa. He alleged that Palniappa had died in January 1924, pending the hearing of the first appeal, and that this fact was fraudulently kept from the knowledge of the several. Courts in which the suit was thereafter litigated, and sued for a declaration that all proceedings subsequent to the first decree of the trial Court should be declared null and void. At the trial, the District Munsif did not decide the issue of fact whether Palniappa had died in January 1924 but, assuming that he had, held that the appeal which was then pending did not on that account abate.
This decision was affirmed on first and second appeal. Varadachariar J. (who appears to have taken it as a proved fact that Palniappa died in 1924), while accepting the general proposition that a decree obtained after the death of a defendant cannot bind his representatives unless they had been made parties to the suit, observes:
“The position in the present case was that the suit had originally been instituted against the plaintiff's grandfather. … and all that was required for the purpose of upholding the jurisdiction of the Court to deal with the matter to the end was that the estate of the grandfather should, continue to be duly represented. On the death of the grandfather his two sons were brought on record, that is, the estate was represented by two persons as legal representatives.” And he answers in the negative the question: Does the estate that was at first represented by two-persons as legal representatives and is later on represented by one of them only, cease to be represented for the purpose of that litigation?”
And the learned Judge goes on to say:
“The difference has to be kept in view between cases in which the original party to the action dies and his legal representative is not brought on the record… and cases in which only one of several representatives—brought in as such during the pendency of an action—dies, and the estate continues to be represented by the remaining legal representatives … I am of the opinion that in the second group there is no lack of representation of the estate, that the remaining representatives can as well represent the estate a the original group did…”
In that view we have no hesitation in concurring. Learned Counsel for the appellant, contends for the position that by the original decree dismissing the suit against the appellant's uncle and father these two acquired a right of their own in the property so that when the appellant's father died pending appeal and the appeal and second appeal were decided without anyone being substituted for him, the appellant's rights in the property which had descended to him from his father were not affected. The answer to this argument is twofold. By the decree while it was still under appeal Palniappa acquired no final right in the property. Secondly, the subject of the litigation was not the title of Palniappa to the property but the title of his father Muthuraman Chetty What the Courts were then deciding was whether Muthuraman had acquired a title to the property in defeasance of the suit claim. And if plaintiff had been brought on” the record it would not have been in substitution of his father Palniappa but of his grandfather Muthuraman Chetty.
Again—looking at the matter from the point of view of the plaintiff in that suit who is the first respondent here—it is clear that everything was done to make him believe that Palniappa was alive throughout the whole course of the proceedings. And at the’ final stage when the suit was remanded to the trial Court to pass a final decree Palniappa must have been represented in some way. The field could not have been divided by metes and bounds and final decree passed without notice to the parties. If Palniappa was then dead, it is difficult to see how his son's guardian could Have remained in ignorance of these proceedings. Wilfully or negligently this guardian permitted this respondent to proceed with the suit as if Palniappa were alive. And the preponderance of authority is that when a party takes proper steps to substitute on the record the representatives of an adversary who has died pendente lite, he is not to be penalised because he has not brought on the whole of the representatives. He can only act to the best of his knowledge. Learned Counsel for the appellant relies on the Privy Council decision, Wajid Ali Khan v. Puran Singh. In that case there were four respondents and one died during appeal. The appeal proceeded without his representative being substituted. It was held that the appeal abated and the decree did not affect his rights. But that was a case where each plaintiff had a separate and individual right of pre-emption. It was merely an example of the ordinary rule. Nor does Pulchraj Jeshraj v. Jamsetji Rustum(2), also relied on by learned Counsel, apply to the facts of this case. There, wrong persons were brought on in place of a deceased respondent and it was held that the decree did not affect the rightful heirs. But even in such a case it has been held recently in our own Court that in certain circumstances the substitution of a wrong person will save the suit from abatement; Chaturbujadoss Kushaldoss and Sons v. Rajamanicka Mudali(3). There, the deceased defendant left his estate by will to a nephew. The plaintiff brought on as his legal representative his widow who was disputing the will, and who was in possession of part of the estate, and whom he bond fide believed to be the proper legal representative; It was held that the widow was interested in defending the estate and sufficiently represented the estate. It is not necessary however in this case to consider these cases where a wrong person was substituted. Here, the right persons were substituted; and the only question for decision is that propounded by Varadachariar J.:
“Was the deceased sufficiently represented after the death, of one of them?”
There is ample authority for the proposition stated above that a suit does not abate merely because all the representatives of a deceased party have not been brought. On the record; see Shib Dutta Singh v. Sheikh Karim Bakhsh*. In the latter Case it is stated:,
“When an appellant applies for the substitution of such of the heirs of the deceased respondent as he bona fide believes to be in existence the appeal does not abate.”
How much stronger is the case here where all the proper heirs were brought on in the first instance and remained on the record till the end? It may be that one of them had died but the appellant (respondent here) did not know this. So far as his knowledge went, Muthuraman Chetty's heirs were all on the record and the suit was contested up to the last stage by one of them at least, who was competent to contest it and interested in contesting it. A case in the Lahore High Court, Begam Jan v. Jannat Bibi, is to the same effect.
Lastly, the learned Counsel for the appellant cites a case of the Bombay High Court, Shankerbhai Manorbhai v. Motilal Ramdas. In that case, an uncle and nephew sued as tenants in common for the possession of property. The nephew died during suit and his widow came on the record as his legal representative. The plaintiffs obtained a decree. During the appeal the widow died and appellants applied to have her husband's uncle, already on the record as first plaintiff, declared her heir. This application was disallowed and the appellants took no steps to bring on her real heir. It was held that the appeal abated against the latter. But this was merely the ordinary case of a party to a suit with a distinct and separate interest of her own dying during the suit and no steps thereafter taken to substitute her legal representatives.
In the result we dismiss the appeal with costs.
A.S.V