Citation Codes

Equivalent Citations

citation codes

Case Number

Civil Revision Petition No. 262 of 1924

Advocates

A. Venkatarayalu Ayya for respondent.
V. Ramadoss for petitioner.
Government Pleader (C.V Anantakrishna Ayyar) for the Board of Revenue.

Judges

Devadoss
Waller, JJ.

Acts

Section 183 of the North West Provinces Rent Act, XII of 1881
Section 192. Part B of the Schedule of the Estates Land Act,
provisions of Section 30 of the Estates Land Act
SECTION 107 GOVERNMENT OF INDIA ACT
Act and the specific provisions of Section 199
Section 27 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act
SECTION 18 LAND ACQUISITION ACT
Section 215 of the Estates Land Act
Clauses (a) to (f) of Sub-section (3)
Rent Recovery Act (VIII of 1865)
Section 192. Under Section 202
provisions of Section 224 (2)
Land Act, I of 1908,
Section 115, C.P.C.,

See more information ...

Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Provided Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

A Revenue Officer, responsible for settlement of rents in the villages of Kalagampudi and Pedamamidipalli, Narasapur Taluk, Kistna District, prepared a Record of Rights under Chapter XI of the Estates Land Act. The proprietor of Pedamamidipalli appealed to the Board of Revenue against that Record of Rights. The Board of Revenue dismissed the proprietor's appeal. The proprietor then moved the High Court seeking revision of the Board of Revenue's order.

Legal Issues Presented

Whether the High Court has revisional jurisdiction over the orders of the Board of Revenue passed under Sections 171 and 172 of the Estates Land Act.
If the High Court does have such jurisdiction, whether it should exercise its revisional jurisdiction in the present case.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's Arguments

The opinion records that Mr. Ramadoss argued the first point for the petitioner, but it does not set out the petitioner's specific arguments in detail in the provided text.

Respondents' Arguments

The opinion records that Mr. Venkatarayaliah argued for the respondents, but it does not set out the respondents' specific arguments in detail in the provided text.

Government Pleader's Arguments

The Board of Revenue is not a Civil Court; it is an administrative or specialized tribunal established by statute to hear appeals and revise orders of the Collector and Settlement Officer under the Estates Land Act.
The High Court cannot revise the orders of the Board of Revenue under Section 115, C.P.C., or under Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915, because the Board is not a Civil Court within the meaning required for such revisional power.
The argument relied on the Full Bench decision in Abdul Sattar Sahib v. Special Deputy Collector, which held that the High Court could not interfere in revision with the order of a Land Acquisition Officer who refused to refer a case to the District Court; by analogy, the Government Pleader contended a similar bar should apply here.
Implicitly, the Government Pleader relied upon precedents that restrict High Court interference where a specialized tribunal or statutory forum has been created to determine particular questions.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent	Rule or Principle Cited For	Application by the Court
Burla Appanna v. Anala Latchayya (79 Ind. Cas. 372)	The court's earlier expressed view regarding High Court revisional jurisdiction in similar circumstances under the Estates Land Act.	The present Court states it sees no reason to change the view expressed in this case and refers to the reasons given there (the Court does not repeat them but adopts that prior conclusion).
Abdul Sattar Sahib v. Special Deputy Collector (84 Ind. Cas. 616)	Held (Full Bench) that the High Court could not interfere in revision with the order of a Land Acquisition Officer who refused to refer a case to the District Court.	The Court acknowledges it is bound by this Full Bench decision but indicates that the decision does not apply to the present case; the Court questions by analogy whether the Abdul Sattar reasoning should bar High Court direction when an officer refuses to refer, but refrains from further comment because it finds the case inapplicable.
Kokku Parthasarathy Naidu v. Chintalachervu Koteswara Rao (78 Ind. Cas. 98)	Where the Legislature erects a tribunal to determine questions under a particular enactment, the High Court cannot interfere with that tribunal's decision unless the enactment allows appeals to the High Court or makes the tribunal a Civil Court within the Letters Patent definition.	The Court holds this decision has no application to the present case and distinguishes the Board of Revenue's role under the Estates Land Act from the kind of tribunal envisaged in Kokku Parthasarathy.
Kartik Chandra Ojha v. Gora Chand Mahto (20 Ind. Cas. 420)	Proceedings under certain tenancy/enhancement provisions are judicial proceedings; the High Court has jurisdiction to interfere where Collectors exceed or fail/refuse to exercise jurisdiction vested by statute.	The Court cites this decision to support the proposition that where revenue officers determine landlord-tenant rights, the High Court has power to interfere in revision if officers exceed or fail in jurisdiction.
Ram Dayal v. Ramadhin (12 A. 198)	Held by an Allahabad Bench that the High Court had no power under a specified provision to revise a Collector's order on appeal from an Assistant Collector, with concerns about overlapping revisional jurisdictions.	The Court distinguishes this authority, rejecting its applicability because, in the present case, the Board of Revenue operates as an appellate authority rather than a revisional authority; the Court also rejects the "dilemma" argument as determinative of jurisdiction.
Ramamami Goundan v. Kali Goundan (52 Ind. Cas. 634)	Cited as a correctly decided authority relevant to revisional jurisdiction questions (as recorded in the opinion).	The Court accepts that this case was correctly decided and treats it as supportive precedent (the text pairs it with the Ramaswami/Ramaswami decisions to reinforce the position taken).
Ramaswami Goundan v. Kali Goundan (52 Ind. Cas. 634)	Authority on revisional jurisdiction issues (the opinion records it as a controlling decision on the first point for one of the concurring judges).	One of the judges (Waller, J. concurs) states the matter is concluded by this decision and that he sees no reason to dissent; the Court relies upon it when considering High Court jurisdiction.
Paramaswami Aygangar v. Alamu Nachiar Ammal (49 Ind. Cas. 11)	Referenced in connection with decisions cited about revisional jurisdiction (the opinion lists it alongside others decided by the same Judges).	The Court cites it as one of the cases decided by the same Judges who decided Ramaswami Goundan, supporting the consistency of prior authorities on revisional jurisdiction.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court considered two issues: (1) whether the High Court has revisional jurisdiction over orders of the Board of Revenue under Sections 171 and 172 of the Estates Land Act, and (2) whether the High Court should exercise such jurisdiction in the particular facts of this case.

On the first issue the Court examined the scheme and objects of the Estates Land Act. Key points in the Court's reasoning:

The Settlement Officer under Chapter XI determines the rights and liabilities of both landholder and ryot by making a Record of Rights; such proceedings are governed by the Civil Procedure Code by virtue of Section 192.
Parts A and B of the statutory Schedule show that where civil rights of landholder and ryot are determined, appeals are provided to the District Court; matters entirely within the cognizance of the Revenue Officer provide appeal to the Collector and then to the Board of Revenue (Section 190).
The Record of Rights is comparable in importance to the terms of a patta and Section 173 grants a party the liberty to sue to set aside a Settlement Officer's order in certain cases; Section 172 gives the Board of Revenue power to direct revision of any Record of Rights of its own motion.
The mere existence of an appeal to the Board of Revenue does not, by itself, negate the High Court's power under the Act to revise orders of the Collector or Settlement Officer. The Court noted the Calcutta High Court's consistent position that the High Court may interfere in revision where Collectors or Revenue Officers determine landlord-tenant rights.
Precedents that erect or treat tribunals as exclusive forums (e.g., Kokku Parthasarathy) were examined and distinguished; likewise the Full Bench decision in Abdul Sattar Sahib was acknowledged but found not applicable to these facts.
The Court rejected the proposition that concurrent revisional power by the Board of Revenue and the High Court creates a reason to deny the High Court jurisdiction: whether the High Court should exercise its jurisdiction is a separate matter from whether it has the jurisdiction.
Because the Board of Revenue in the present statutory scheme functions primarily as an appellate authority (by rule under Section 215) rather than as a final revisional tribunal that the Act makes immune from High Court superintendence, the Court concluded the High Court does have revisional jurisdiction over orders under Chapter XI.

On the second issue (whether to exercise jurisdiction in this case) the Court analyzed the way the Revenue Officer determined the rent:

The Revenue Officer considered himself bound by Section 30 of the Estates Land Act when determining what was a fair and equitable rent. The Court observed that Section 30 applies to enhancement of rent at the instance of the landholder, and its specific numeric limit (increase cannot be more than annas 2 in the rupee) is not necessarily applicable to proceedings under Chapter XI initiated by either party.
Under Chapter XI, a Revenue Officer must consider a broader set of factors when making a Record of Rights: the existing rent, rise in prices, the time when the rate was last settled, present state of irrigation facilities, and other circumstances affecting fairness and equity. The Revenue Officer may reduce rent or settle differing rates for land of differing fertility or value.
The Court found that the Revenue Officer in this case had not properly exercised the jurisdiction entrusted to him under Chapter XI because he unduly restricted himself to the rule in Section 30 rather than applying the appropriate Chapter XI considerations.
Because the statutory right of suit under Section 173 did not apply here (none of Sub-section (3) clauses (a) to (f) applied), the parties had no right of suit and relief by revision remained the available remedy; thus, the High Court was justified in exercising its revisional jurisdiction in this case.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The Court answered the first question in the affirmative: the High Court has revisional jurisdiction over the orders of the Board of Revenue passed under the relevant provisions of the Estates Land Act. On the second question, the Court exercised that revisional jurisdiction in this case.

Direct consequences of the decision:

The Court set aside the order of the Revenue Officer for the settlement of rents and directed the Revenue Officer to make a proper Record of the rent taking into account the considerations appropriate to Chapter XI (existing rate, rise in prices, time when rate was last fixed, present irrigation facilities and other circumstances).
The petitioner was awarded the costs of the application; the costs of further proceedings were ordered to abide the result.

Broader implications: The opinion reasons that the High Court's revisional jurisdiction can coexist with appellate or revisional powers conferred on the Board of Revenue under the Estates Land Act and relies on earlier authorities for that conclusion. The text does not state that a novel precedent was being created beyond the Court's adoption and application of existing authorities and reasoning set out in the opinion.

Show full summary ...

Valluri Narasimha Rao, Proprietor Of Peddamamidipalli (Petitioner), v. The Ryots Of Peddamamidipalli (S),

1. The Revenue Officer for the settlement of rents in the villages of Kalagampudi and Pedamamidipalli, Narasapur Taluk, Kistna District made a Record of Rights under Oh. XI of the Estates Land Act. The appeal of the proprietor of.... Pedamamidipalli to the Board of Revenue against the Record of Rights made by the Revenue Officer has been dismissed. He now moves the High Court to revise the order of the Board of Revenue.

2. Two points arise for decision in this case (1) Has the High Court revisional jurisdiction over the orders of the Board passed under Sections 171 and 172 of the Estates Land Act? and (2) If the question of jurisdiction is answered in the affirmative, should the High Court exercise its revisional jurisdiction in this case.

3. The first point has been fully argued by Mr. Ramadoss for the petitioner and Mr. Venkatarayaliah for the respondents. We have also heard the Government Pleader to whom we gave notice to appear for the Board of Revenue as it was represented to us that a number of civil revision petitions were pending in the High Court in which the question of jurisdiction was involved. After a careful consideration of the arguments in the case, I see no reason to change my view expressed in Burla Appanna v. Anala Latchayya 79 Ind. Cas. 372 : 47 M. 250 : 45 M.L.T. 735 : 33 M.L.T. 92 : 18 L.W. 849 A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 119. I do not wish to repeat here the reasons which I gave in that case but will deal briefly with the arguments of the learned Government Pleader.

4. His contention is that the Board of Revenue is not a Civil Court and jurisdiction is given to it under the Estates Land Act to hear appeals from and to revise, the orders of the Collector and the Settlement Officer and the High Court cannot revise the orders of the Board of Revenue either under Section 115, C.P.C., or under Section 107 of the Government of India Act, 1915. His argument is based upon the observations made by the learned Chief Justice in Abdul Sattar Sahib v. Special Deputy Collector, Vizagapatam 84 Ind. Cas. 616 : 47 M. 357 : 46 M.L.J. 209 : (1924) M.W.N. 224 : 19 L.W. 445 : A.I.R. 1925 Mad. 442 : 34 M.L.T. 18. In that case it was held that the High Court could not interfere in revision with the order of a Land Acquisition-Officer who refused to refer a case to the District Court under Section 18 of the Land Acquisition Act. As the decision is that of a Full Bench I am bound by it, but I may be permitted to remark, why could not the High Court interfere with the order of a Land Acquisition Officer if he refused to refer a case to the District Court when the High Court has jurisdiction to determine any question that may arise on a reference being made? In other words, if the Land Acquisition Officer makes a reference to the District Court, an appeal lies from the District Court to the High Court; but if he does not refer the case to the District Court, the High Court is said to have no power to direct him to refer the case to the District Court. If a Collector refused to refer a case to the Civil Court, he does something which he ought not to do, and the High Court which has the power to hear and determine matters on a reference being made to the District Court cannot be said to have no power to direct the Collector to do what he is bound to do. However, as that case has no application to the present, I refrain from making any further comment. The decision in Kokku Parthasarathy Naidu v. Chintalachervu Koteswara Rao 78 Ind. Cas. 98 : 47 M. 369 : 46 M.L.J. 201 : 19 L.W. 402 : (1924) M.W.N. 272 : A.I.R. 1921 Mad. 591, has no application to the present case. According to that decision, where the Legislature erects a Tribunal for the purpose of determining any question which arises under a particular enactment, the High Court cannot interfere with the decision of that Tribunal, unless the High Court is empowered under the enactment which erected the Tribunal to hear appeals from such Tribunal or unless the enactment erecting the Tribunal makes it a Civil Court within the meaning of Clause 16 of the Letters Patent of the Madras High Court.

5. When a Settlement Officer makes a Record of Rights under Oh. XI of the Estates Land. Act, he determines the right of the parties; in other words he determines the rights and liabilities of both the landholder and the ryot. His proceedings are governed by the C. P. C:, vide Section 192. Part B of the Schedule of the Estates Land Act, No. 21 provides an appeal to the District Court against an order under Section 137 for the repair of an irrigation work and Nos. 22 and 23 provide for an appeal to the District Court in the case of applications by ryots to execute works in default of the landholder and for the recovery of the costs of the repair of an irrigation work. From a perusal of Parts A and B of the Schedule, it is apparent that wherever civil rights of the parties i.e., landholder and ryot, are determined, an appeal is provided to the District Court. In the case of matters which are entirely within the cognizance of the Revenue Officer, an appeal is provided to the Collector and against his decision a second appeal is provided under Section 190 to the Board of Revenue. A Record of Rights is as important as, if not more important than the terms of a patta, and Section 173 gives liberty to a party to sue to set aside an order of the Settlement Officer in certain cases. Under Section 172 the Board of Revenue may, on an application of its own motion, direct the revision of any Record of Rights or any portion thereof. The mere fact that an appeal lies to the Board of Revenue is no argument for saying that the High Court has no power,, under the Act to revise the orders of a Collector or Settlement Officer acting under Ch. XI. The Calcutta High Court has consistently held that in the case of orders of Collectors or Revenue Officers determining the rights of the landlord and tenant, the High Court has power to interfere in revision with them. In Kartik Chandra Ojha v. Gora Chand Mahto 20 Ind. Cas. 420 : 40 C. 518 : 17 C.L.J. 593 it was held that "Proceedings on applications for enhancement of rent under Section 27 of the Chota Nagpur Tenancy Act are judicial proceedings.... The High Court has jurisdiction to interfere in cases where the Courts of Collectors have either exceeded the jurisdiction or failed or refused to exercise the jurisdiction-vested in them by the Chota nagpur tenancy act." The learned Judges observed at page 522 Page of 40 C.-[Ed.] "From the very nature of the proceedings themselves, and also from the provisions of the Act as contained, for instance, in Ch. XVI it is clear that proceedings on applications for enhancement of rent are judicial proceedings and in view 6f the express provisions of Section 224 (2) which allows in certain cases a second appeal to this Court, it cannot, in our opinion, be contended that Deputy Commissioners in the performance of their judicial duties under the Chota nagpur tenancy act are not Courts subject to the appellate jurisdiction of this Court".

6. The learned Judges held that notwithstanding that the Board of Revenue had revisional jurisdiction over the orders of Collectors, the High Court had revisional jurisdiction over such orders. In Ram Dayal v. Ramadhin 12 A. 198 : A.W.N. (1890) 59 : 6 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) 875 a Bench of the Allahabad High Court held that the High Court has no power under Section 622 to revise an order of a Collector under Section 183 of the North West Provinces Rent Act, XII of 1881 on appeal from an Assistant Collector of the Second Class. The argument of Straight, J., who delivered the judgment of the Court is that if it were held that the High Court had jurisdiction to revise such orders, it might create a dilemma inasmuch as the Board of Revenue also had revisional jurisdiction. The question is whether the High Court could, and not, whether it should, interfere with an order of a Collector after the Board of Revenue had interfered with it. The question does not depend upon any dilemma arising in the exercise of revisional jurisdiction by the High Court as well as by the Board of Revenue. It would be a matter for consideration in each case whether the High Court should exercise its powers or not. If it considers that the case is not a proper case for the exercise of its revisional powers, it would refrain from doing so, but if it is a proper case, the High Court would interfere with such orders.

7. In one portion of the argument the learned Government Pleader almost suggested that if the Board of Revenue declined to interfere with the order of a Collector then the High. Court might interfere but if the Board of Revenue did interfere with such order, the High Court had no power to interfere. Such an argument, though not put forward in so many words by the Government Pleader is on the face of it untenable. It is not seriously contended that Ramamami Goundan v. Kali Goundan 52 Ind. Cas. 634 : 42 M. 310 : 36 M.L.J. 571 was not correctly decided. The same learned Judges who decided Ramaswami Goundan v. Kali Goundan 52 Ind. Cas. 634 : 42 M. 310 : 36 M.L.J. 571 decided Paramaswami Aygangar v. Alamu Nachiar Ammal 49 Ind. Cas. 11 : (1919) M.W.N. 107 : 35 M.L.J. 632 : 9 L.W. 26 : 42 M. 76.

8. In considering this question, the aim and the scope of the Estates Land Act should be considered. Under the old Rent Recovery Act (VIII of 1865) the High Court had no revisional jurisdiction over the orders of Revenue Courts. Under the Estates Land Act, I of 1908, appeals are provided to the District Court against the Orders of Revenue Courts and the C.P.C. is made expressly applicable to the proceedings of the Revenue Officers and Revenue Courts by Section 192. Under Section 202 the High Court is empowered to make rules consistent with the Estates Land Act declaring that any portion of the C.P.C. shall not apply to suits between landholder and ryot as such or to any specified classes of such suits or shall apply to them subject to modifications specified in the rules. These are' innovations which are made in the present enactment and the object of the legislation was to determine the respective rights and liabilities both of the landholder and the ryot. In all cases where the rights of the landholder or the ryot are affected an appeal is given to the District Court. It would be against the scope of the Act and the specific provisions of Section 199 to hold that the High Court has no revisional jurisdiction over the orders of the Board of Revenue. It is unnecessary in this connection to consider whether the Board of Revenue is a Court subordinate to the High Court. All Courts which are governed by the C.P.C. are Civil Courts and, therefore, the High Court as having the right of superintendence over all the Civil Courts in the Presidency has power over such Civil Courts as are erected by any enactment. The Board of Revenue is authorised under Rule 21 framed by the Governor in Council under Section 215 of the Estates Land Act to hear appeals from the decision of the Collector under Ch. XI. The mere fact that appeals lie to the Board of Revenue would not take away the power of the High Court to revise the orders of the Collector or of the Board of Revenue. It is nowhere said and there is no provision in the Act or in the rules framed under the Act, that the orders of the Board of Revenue are final. The argument advanced in Ram Dayal v. Ramadhin 12 A. 198 : A.W.N. (1890) 59 : 6 Ind. Dec. (N.S.) cannot apply to this case, for the Board of Revenue in this case is only an appellate authority and not a revisional authority. For the above reasons given by me in Burla Appanna v. Anala Latchayya 79 Ind. Cas. 372 : 47 M. 250 : 45 M.L.T. 735 : 33 M.L.T. 92 : 18 L.W. 849 A.I.R. 1924 Mad. 119, I answer the question in the affirmative.

9. Second point.--The Revenue Officer had to determine what was a fair and equitable rent. He thought he was bound by the provisions of Section 30 of the Estates Land Act in determining under Ch. XI what was fair and equitable rent. The provisions of Section 30 of the Act apply to enhancement of rent at the instance of the landholder. Under Ch. XI either the landholder or the ryot may apply to the Government for an order directing that a survey be made and a Record of Rights be prepared by the Revenue Officer in respect of an estate or a portion of an estate. In making the Record of Rights, the Revenue Officer has to be guided by considerations which are not necessarily the same as those arising under Section 30. A Revenue Officer acting under Ch. XI should take into consideration the existing rate of rent, the rise in prices, the time when the rate was last settled and the present state of things as regards the facilities of irrigation and other circumstances which would enable him to settle what is a fair and equitable rent. Whatever may be the rate of rent, if he considers that it is not fair and equitable he is entitled to alter it; and in doing so he is not bound by the rule in section 30 that the increase cannot be more than annas 2 in the rupee. Under Ch. XI the Revenue Officer may reduce the rent and may settle different rates of rent for land of different value or different fertility, The Revenue Officer, therefore, has not exercised the jurisdiction which he had in determining what is fair and equitable in the circumstances of the case. The High Court does not interfere as a rule with the orders of Courts subordinate to it, over which it has revisional jurisdiction in cases where there is another remedy open for the party than by revision. Section 173 provides for suit by a party who feels aggrieved by the Record of Rights, but none of the Clauses (a) to (f) of Sub-section (3) applies to the present case. The parties have no right of suit in this case and, therefore, this is a case in which the High Court would be justified in exercising revisional jurisdiction.

10. I, therefore, set aside the order of the Revenue Officer for the settlement of rents and direct him to make a proper record of the rent in the light of the remarks made above. Petitioner will have the costs of this application. The costs of further proceedings will abide the result.

Waller, J.

11. On the first point I think that the matter is concluded by Ramaswami Goundan v. Kali Goundan 52 Ind. Cas. 634 : 42 M. 310 : 36 M.L.J. 571 a decision from which I see no reason to dissent. On the second I agree that the Revenue Officer in settling a fair and equitable rent is not bound by the provisions of Section 30 of the Act. It is obvious that there is no right of suit in regard to the question raised. If there is, we should not be justified in interfering in revision.

12. I concur in the order proposed.

Valluri Narasimha Ra... v. The Ryots Of Peddama...