Adami, J.:— (After stating the facts set out above, proceeded as follows): With regard to the last objection, Mr. Sushil Madhab Mullick, on behalf of the appellant, withdraws the objection admitting that the suit in the High Court had been dismissed previous to the filing of the award.
We have to consider the three other objections.
With regard to the first objection that the question of costs was not decided by the arbitrators, I have cited above both the clause in the reference and the decision of the arbitrators thereon. It appears that the appellant Jnanendra Nath wrote to the arbitrators asking them not to come to a decision upon the costs in his letter dated the 16th July, 1924. Babu Jnanendra Nath Bagchi on the 21st July, 1924, a short time before the award was signed, wrote to the arbitrators complaining that he had not yet been paid his costs in the High Court and demanding that the arbitrators should pay to him the sum of Rs. 1,300 with interest at 12 per cent, per annum from the date of the signing of the deed of reference. He threatened that, if he were not paid this amount within 24 hours, he would move the court for an injunction directing the arbitrators to refrain from giving their award. The arbitrators replied on the 9th August, that the question of costs was to be decided by them and that the costs would be paid out of the estate in the first instance. The arbitrators did consider a certain travelling allowance bill submitted for journeys by Janendra Nath to Calcutta and his claim for travelling allowance was allowed. It is clear that the arbitrators were considering the question of costs and decided that the costs were to be paid out of the estate. If no more definite decision was come to it is clear that it was due to the letter written by the appellant on the 10th July, 1924. Under the circumstances I do not think that Babu Jnanendra Nath had any cause for complaint; the arbitrators decided the question so far as they could.
The next objection is that the arbitrators failed to divide all the properties by metes and bounds, and, therefore, the award was not complete. Mr. Sushil Madhab Mullick points out that in the case of an arbitration without the intervention of a court if the arbitrators leave undetermined any of the maters referred to arbitration or determined any matter not referred to arbitration, the court must refuse to file the award. He refers us to the wording of paragraph 21 of Schedule 2 and points put the difference between an award without the intervention of the court and an award made in a suit. Under clause (a) of paragraph 14 the court may remit the award for reconsideration where a matter has been undetermined or there is the determination of a matter not referred to arbitration. He relies on a decision of this court in Kunjlal v. Banwari Lal and contends that in the present case this Court is bound to find that the award could not be filed since matters had been left undetermined. The matter left undetermined is the partition by metes and bounds of the north Bhagalpur properties and the house in Calcutta. The arbitrators have given their reason for leaving this partition undetermined, the reason being that all the parties' including the appellant, by their letter dated the 19th March, 1924, to which I have referred above, requested the arbitrators to postpone the partition of those properties and to first pass an award as to the partition of the other properties. In Makund Ram Sukal v. Saliq Ram Sukal their Lordships of the Privy Council ruled that the ground for holding an award to be invalid on account of its not disposing of all the matter referred appears to be that there is an implied condition in the submission of the parties to the arbitration that the award shall dispose of all; this condition may be waived by the consent of the parties before the arbitrators. Where the partition of a joint estate consisting of different properties had been submitted to arbitration and the parties agreed to a division being made by steps and that each division should be final without any condition that the award should not be final while a part remained undivided, it was competent to the parties to agree before the arbitrators to the division being made as it had been and the partition as to the property divided was final.
It is quite clear that in the present case the parties did agree to the partition by stages and asked that the properties remaining undivided should be the subject of a further award to be made by the same arbitrators. The arbitrators followed the direction of the parties but were unable themselves to perform the further work of partitioning the remaining properties in a separate award.
In the present case, I do not think that, under the circumstances, the arbitrators failed to carry out the duties imposed as agreed to by the parties in their letter of March, 1924.
The last objection seems to be a more serious one. Though the will is not before us, it appears that the testator directed that Dhirendra Nath should not have possession of his share until he reached 35 and only then if the brothers consented that he was of good behaviour and conduct.
Under the terms of paragraph 8 of the reference, it is quite clear that the parties to the reference, including the appellant, agreed that the wishes of the testator with regard to the postponement of the bequest should not be observed. It is contended by Mr. Sushil Madhab Mullick that the reference was bad by reason of this opposition to the terms of the will and that the award must also be bad. He relies on the case of Soudamani Ghosh v. Gopal Chandra Ghosh. In that case it was found that the executors authorised the arbitrators to substitute for the provisions of the will which might seem to them indefinite or illegal other provisions agreeably to what might have been imagined to have been the intention of the testator: in other words the executors in their submission authorised the arbitrators to make a new will for the testator. It was there laid down—“But it is equally plain that an executor cannot make a reference to arbitration with the avowed purpose that the terms of, the will may be modified and arrangements made for the management and distribution of the estate contrary to the directions of the testator…………………. The arbitrators are no doubt asked to construe the will; and it need not be disputed that pure questions of law may be referred to the decision of an arbitrator [Staff v. Andrews Ching v. Ching Young v. Walter, Mathew v. Davis(4) and Gulam Jilani v. Mohammed Ahmed Husan(5)]. But the arbitrators are here authorised to do something more than a construction of the will which as their Lordships of the Judicial Committee said in Venkata v. Parthasarathi(6) does not mean an addition to the terms of the will; they are not empowered to alter the terms of the will. This plainly was not within the competence of the executors.”
Now, under the reference, the arbitrators had power to construe the terms of the will. Where there is a direction in the will, that a donee is not to enjoy a vested gift in full until he attains a particular age, then unless there is in the will, or some codicil to it a clear indication of intention not only that the donee is not to have the enjoyment of the gift until attaining that age but that some other person is to have that enjoyment, or unless the property is so clearly taken away from the donee up to the time of attaining that age as to induce the court to hold that as to the previous income there is an intestacy, the court on the application of the donee, if he is entitled to give a discharge for the gift, or the person deriving title under him, will strike that direction out of the Will” [Halsbury's Laws of England, Volume 28, paragraph 1161]. The case of Gosling v. Gosling is relied on.
Mr. Sushil Madhab Mullick does not deny that an interest vested in Dhirendra Nath under the will, but he contends that he had not an absolute interest subject as it was to the condition that a certain age was reached and the brothers gave their consent.
Now the executors evidently knew the law and they examined the will to find out whether the interest granted was an absolute one or not. The arbitrators' finding on the matter shows that they held that it could not be conceived that the testator meant that if Dhirendra Nath died before reaching the age of 35 his share was to vest in his brothers. They held that the testator meant that if Dhirendra had a wife or children and died before the age of 35, the share would belong to his wife and children. They found definitely that the interest vested in Dhirendra absolutely. The reference gave them power to find this construction. They found indeed practically that in spite of the terms of the will Dhirendra could have claimed possession of his share at once. That being so, in my opinion, the award cannot be found to be invalid by reason of the arbitrators directing that Dhirendra should get his share at once. It has to be remembered that the appellant himself was a party to the reference and that he consented that Dhirendra's conduct fitted him to get the share. Further Dhirendra is now over 35 years of age and the condition of his reaching that age has been fulfilled and it will be idle now to set aside the award on the ground that the property was given into his possession before he reached the age of 35.
I cannot find in any of the grounds put forward by Mr. Sushil Madhab Mullick any reason why the award should be set aside, and I would therefore dismiss the appeal with costs.
Allanson, J.:— I agree.
Appeal dismissed.