Old field, J. — The decree in question in this petition was passed by this Court in Second Appeal and is for deliveiy to plaintiff's of certain property on their paying Rs. 50 within three months from its date. The payment was not made, and plaintiffs were refused an extension of the time for making it when they applied for one to the lower Courts. They appealed to this Court against the refusal in Appeal Against Order No. 56 of 1910 and failed here also, one ground for the decision being that the lower Courts had no power to extend time fixed by the decree of this Court. The judgment concluded with the observation “We do not decide the question whether this Court should extend the time, if and when a proper application is made to it for the purpose.” The present application has therefore been made. It is opposed on the merits and also on the ground that payment within the time fixed being specified in the decree as a condition precedent to plaintiffs' right to delivery under it, the grant of an extension of time would be in effect a modification of the decree, which the Court has no power to make otherwise than on a preper application for review. It is not contended by plaintiffs that their present application is or could be treated as one for review.
We deal with the question without reference to the argument that it is already concluded by the description in the judgment in Appeal Against Order No. 56 of the provision as to payment within a fixed time as a condition precedent, that is, as an essential part of the decree, for it is not clear that the implications of that view were considered by the learned Judges.
We, however, cannot see how the specific direction as to time, given in the decree, is not an essential part of it; and we have not been shown by argument or authority that we have power to modify the decree in respect of it to respondent's prejudice. Section 148, Code of Civil Procedure, is inapplicable, since it applies only to cases in which time has been fixed for the doing of acts prescribed or allowed by the Code. Cases of extension of time for payment under a mortgage decree are covered by Order XXXIV, Rule 8 (Section 87, Transfer of Property Act). Specific provision being absent, petitioners would rely on the inherent powers of the Court. But there is no precedent for their exercise in order to the modification of a decree, not alleged to be erroneous in itself.
Petitioners have also contended that the time fixed in the decree does not run against them, because they are minors, and, that an extension is therefore unnecessary. That is not material in connection with their present application and we express no opinion regarding it. It is sufficient that the grant of the relief now asked for is not within the power of the Court. The Civil Miscellaneous Petition must therefore be dismissed with costs.
Tyabji, J. — On the 20th November 1906, a Division Bench of this Court decreed that the 8th defendant (the respondent to this petition) do deliver over a moiety of the property in suit to the plaintiffs (the present petitioners) on payment of Rs. 50 within three months from the date of the decree.
The present petition prays in form for an extension of the time for the payment. The ground is that the plaintiffs are minors and that their next friend, in collusion with the 8th defendant, misconducted himself wilfully in not making the payment within the time. Section 148 of the Civil Procedure Code, 1908, has no application as the act for doing which time is sought to be enlarged, is not an act “prescribed [See section 2 (16)] or allowed by this Code “. Obviously the petition is by way neither of appeal nor review under Section 114 or 151, and must fail on the authority of Kotaghiri Venkata Subbamma Rao v. Vellanki Venkatarama Rao.
It is argued, however, that the Court has inherent powers under Section 151 to vary the decree as suggested. It is difficult to consider that the addition of Section 151 to the law of Civil Procedure in 1908 can affect the exposition of the law contained in Kotaghiri's case, but I will for the purposes of argument assume that it may be so.
On this assumption and without attempting to define what inherent power means, or to restrict its ambit, I presume it may ordinarily be taken to be something which inheres in a Court by the very fact of its being empowered to express any jurisdiction at all, so that it comes either within the express sense of the law, or within the consequences that may be gathered from it, as Woodroffe, J., said in Hukum Chand Boid v. Kamalanand Singh. If inherent powers are to be invoked for a solution of the question now before us, will they not tell rather in support of the view that the court in 1906 had inherent power to settle finally the disputes between the parties on terms which cannot be disturbed? Preston Banking Co. v. William Allsupp and Sons(3).
But assuming further that we have the fullest powers untrammelled by the Legislature or the decisions, the present case does not seem to me to be one in which it is necessary to grasp at powers not falling within sections 141 and 152 of the Civil Procedure Code. The lure that it is necessary to interfere, for otherwise the Court's efforts to administer justice would be futile, is akin to the invocation of public policy, and that as we all know is an unruly horse. But even that unruly horse is not available to the applicant. I see nothing approaching public policy in favour of adopting the view that the question whether the plaintiffs' next friend colluded with the 8th defendant, and the legal effect of any such collusion on the rights of the parties in the decree of 1906 should be determined in the present application.
I express no opinion on the question whether a review application would be open to the petitioner as that question is not directly before us.
The petition will be dismissed with costs.
Petition dismissed.