The Judgment of the Court was as follows:—
[After dealing with the history of the trial and the main facts of the case, the judgment proceeded as follows:—]
We proceed now to deal with such points of law as were raised and discussed before us. The first of them might conceivably have some weight in it. There were two significant aspects touching the point which was raised, namely, (1) that it was raised chiefly on behalf of certain of the accused persons who escaped from jail or from custody while they were under trial in the substantial conspiracy case which is generally referred to as the Inter-Provincial Conspiracy Case, the judgment in the appeal in which has been printed in the record of the present proceedings, and (ii) that as regards one of the accused persons on whose behalf this particular point of law was taken, it had no substance in it because of the difference in the jurisdiction of the Courts before whom he had appeared.
The point of law to which we are referring is the contention—which was originally set up as regards six of the accused at the trial—that the present charge of conspiracy under s. 121A of the Indian Penal Code was barred by reason of the provisions of s. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure. The accused on whose behalf this point was taken were Purnananda, Niranjan, Sita Nath, Ajit Majumdar, Jiban Dhupi and Dinesh Bhattacharjya.
Purnananda, Niranjan and Sita Nath were not only tried in the Inter-Provincial Conspiracy Case, but they were convicted under s. 121A of the Indian Penala, Code and sentenced. Ajit was tried and convicted by a Special Magistrate under s. 6(1) of the Bengal Criminal Law Amendment Act and was sentenced to undergo five years' rigorous imprisonment. We are no longer concerned with him because in the present proceedings he was acquitted by the learned Commissioners. Jiban Dhupi was tried by a Special Magistrate at Faridpur under s. 36(a) of the Bengal Suppression of Terrorist Outrages Act. He was convicted by a Special Magistrate but on appeal the conviction was set aside and he was acquitted.
Now as regards Purnananda, Niranjan and Sita Nath, the argument put forward was that as they had previously been tried and convicted on a charge of conspiracy to wage we against the King-Emperor, they could not now be tried for the same offence, particularly having regard to the fact that it was the prosecution case (so it was argued in the present instance), that the conspiracy now charged is connected with; the conspiracy for which the accused persons had been convicted in the Inter-Provincial Conspiracy Case. It must have been conceded at the trial that if after the period for which these accused had been convicted in the previous trial, they agreed with a different and distinct set of persons to wage war against the King, that would undoubtedly be a different conspiracy for which they would be liable to be tried again and s. 463, Criminal Procedure Code, could not be prayed in aid as a bar to the second proceeding. But the argument was, put forward in the present appeal that when the accused persons had entered with some other persons into a conspiracy and they had been tried in respect of that conspiracy, they could never be tried again for conspiring with the same persons. It is to be observed in connection with this argument that the prosecution case in the present proceedings was not that the conspiracy by Pumananda, Niranjan and Sita Nath was with exactly the same see of persons with whom they were said to have conspired in the previous case. No doubt many of the persons are the same but there was a considerable addition to the list of the so-called co-conspirators. The learned Commissioners point out in discussing this point that the prosecution here definitely set out to prove that the conspiracy which a man named Prabhat had organised at Barisal amongst other places was continued by the accused Praphulla and other persons and that it was with respect to this conspiracy that Pumananda, Niranjan and Sita Nath again started carrying on operations after they had escaped from custody. The learned Commissioners pointed out that—
That this is the prosecution case appears from the evidence of the approver Santosh, where he speaks of the activities of Prabhat Chakrabarti and Jogesh Majumdar at Barisal and also from the interpretation the prosecution wants to put on the mention of the name of Satya, Biren Basu and Jagadish Chakrabarti on the Cipher lists, Exs. 1175 and, 1176, found in Prabhat's possession. The Inter-Provincial Conspiracy Pase was with regard to this conspiracy formed by Prabhat Chakrabarti with Pumananda Das Gupta, Niranjan Ghoshal and Sita Nath De and others,
and then the learned Commissioners say that it is on these grounds that the defence counsel argues that the earlier trial was for the same conspiracy as the present trial. Now the learned Conanissioners took the view and, in our opinion quite rightly, that—
The whole argument put forward by the defence counsel appears to us to be based on the assumption that if a man has once agreed with another to do an unlawful act, that agreement is for all time to come; and we cannot consider that if, after having agreed for a certain time to do a thing, he is removed from the scene of action, thereafter can agree afresh with the same men or other men to do the same unlawful act. This assumption is in our judgment entirely fallacious.
With that expression of opinion we entirely agree. It was conceded in the present trial quite frankly by Mr. Dinesh Chandra Roy that the gist, of the offence of conspiracy is the agreement or entering into the conspiracy. What s. 403 merely lays down—if it is a conspiracy matter to be considered—is that a man cannot be tried again for that particular entry into the conspiracy for which he has already been tried. Section 403 does not say, and indeed it would he clearly disastrous if it did say, that for any fresh entry into the conspiracy he cannot be tried. As we pointed out in the course of the argument before us that if it were to be held that, because a man has once been tried for participating in a particular conspiracy, he can never be tried again for participating in the same conspiracy, that would quite obviously mean that the effect of the trial and the sentence in such circumstances would be to confer an immunity against any subsequent criminal proceeding, no matter how active and how vigorous the man might revert to be in connection with the same conspiracy after he had undergone his sentence. To put the matter in another way, a conviction on a conspiracy charge would operate as conferring an unqualified license on the person convicted to resume his nefarious activities in connection with the same conspiracy and continue so doing for the rest of his life. The learned Commissioners put the matter thus:—
The learned defence counsel, who argued this point before us at considerable length, has repeatedly told us that agreement is the gist of the offence of conspiracy. We agree that this is so; but what we are unable to accept in his contention that if a man has once agreed to do a thing, in 1900, he cannot be considered to agree again to do the same thing ever afterwards.
Clearly, such fresh agreement, would not be necessary if nothing had occurred to cut him off from the agreement—a journey abroad or incarceration in gaol would, however, equally take him out of the conspiracy, even though the mental state of intention remained all along. After the return from abroad or after release or escape from jail, he may, in our opinion as already indicated above, express a fresh agreement and, if he does so, that well be a fresh participation in the conspiracy.
We think, therefore, that s. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure is of no help to these three accused, with respect to a fresh agreement expressed by them to the objects of the conspiracy. They cannot be tried for their participation in the conspiracy up to December, 1933, as they had already been tried for that. But for the period starting from the date of their escape from jail, July 31, 1934, to October 31, 1935, if they have entered the conspiracy afresh, they are liable to be tried again. The prosecution does in fact allege such fresh agreement; and has sought to prove this, by facts and circumstances. Accordingly, we hold that these accused are liable to trial for their participation in the conspiracy during the period indicated above. If no fresh agreement is proved they will be entitled to an acquittal. But this trial is not barred in itself while nothing done by the prisoners prior to their escape from jail can be used to substantiate the charge.
It seems to us that the learned Commissioners took an entirely sensible and correct view of the situation and, so far as the position of Purnananda, Niranjan, and Sita Nath is concerned vis-á-vis the provisions of s. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure, the point taken on their behalf has no substance in it. Further, one may emphasise this aspect of the matter:—The conspiracy charge in the present case was not wholly with the same persons: it was not said to have been in operation in precisely the same places as the conspiracy charge in the Inter-Provincial Conspiracy Case and moreover—and this is a decisive factor in the matter—although the charge in form covered the period from 1929 to very nearly the end of 1985, what was really charged against them, speaking now of these particular accused, was that they had re-participated in the conspiracy, and taken an active part in it after the date on which they escaped from jail, that is to say, the month of July, 1934, up to the time of their arrest round about the beginning of 1935. We are not now concerned with Sita Nath, because he was one of the persons who was acquitted. We are concerned with Purnananda and Niranjan and we hold that there is nothing in this point of law so far as they are concerned. A similar point was raised at the trial on behalf of three other accused, viz., Ajit Majumdar, Jiban Dhupi and Dhanesh Bhattacharjya. The argument put forward on their behalf was that their position brought them within the ambit of the second part of s. 403, sub-s. (1) of the Code of Criminal Procedure. Agaim, it may be stated that we are not concerned with the case of Ajit or Dhanesh because they were acquitted by the Tribunal. As regards Jiban, as we have already stated he was tried but was ultimately acquitted of an offence under s. 36(a) of the Bengal Suppression of Terrorist Outrages Act. He had been charged with being in possession of certain literature of a revolutionary character. But as the learned Commissioners point out, it is very difficult to see how it could be argued that an acquittal on a charge of that kind involves so to say an ??? acquittal on a charge of conspiracy to wage war against His Majesty. The learned Commissioners point out that the true test of deciding whether a subsequent trial comes under the second part of s. 403, sub-s. (1) has been laid down in several cases decided by this Court and quite recently in the very matter of the Inter-Provincial Conspiracy Case itself, which is to be found reported under the title of Jitendra Nath Gupta v. Emperor where this proposition was approved. Whether the acquittal or conviction from the first charge necessarily involves an acquittal or conviction on the second charge, that is the test to be applied. In the present instance, however, as we have already indicated, there was a further difficulty in the way of a successful plea on behalf of Jiban Dhupi under s. 403. It is to be observed that the section requires that the Court of the first instance should have been competent to try the charge put forward at the second trial. It is quite obvious in the present case that the Court of the Special Magistrate of Faridpur was not competent to try a charge of conspiracy under s. 121A of the Indian Penal Code and so, in consequence, s. 403, would have no application at all. Mr. Roy, when dealing with the particular case of Jiban Dhupi, invited us to hold that in some way or other the principle laid down in s. 403 could be extended and to give to Jiban Dhupi the benefit of the spirit underlying the provisions of that section rather than ter apply the clear and precise words of the section itself. We are unable to take that view of the matter. We think the principles underlying the English common law pleas of autrefois convict and autrefois acquit, have been embodied so far as this country is concerned within the limits, however narrow they may be or have been stated to be, of the language of the statute itself. In our view, it would be bewildering and, indeed, might result in great injustice to the community at large were we to endeavour to stretch the language or extend the principles in the way we have been invited to do by Mr. Dinesh Chandra Roy. The summing up of this matter, therefore, is that we entirely agree with the learned Commissioners that the plea under s. 403 of the Code of Criminal Procedure fails as regards all the three appellants whose case we have now considered, namely, Purnananda Das Gupta, Niranjan Ghoshal and Jiban Dhupi.
The next point of law, if it can be so described, is really more a question of fact. But it was raised by Mr. Roy as being an argument applicable to most of the accused and was to the effect that even if the case for the prosecution is taken to have been established the evidence was still insufficient and indeed the case of the prosecution was insufficient to establish a charge under, s. 121A of the Indian Penal Code. In other words it was strenuously argued by Mr. Roy that, even assuming the truth of the prosecution story, there was still not enough to entitle the Commissioners to come to the conclusion that these accused persons or any of them had been guilty of conspiracy to wage war against His Majesty the King-Emperor; that is to say the facts proved would not warrant a conviction under, the provisions of s. 121A of the Indian Penal Code. Mr. Roy argued that the conviction under s. 121A is bad, because there was no evidence or not, sufficient evidence to indicate that even if there was a conspiracy, the was a conspiracy of the particular kind charged namely, a conspiracy to wage war against the King. Mr. Roy urged that the finding of the explosives, books and the other articles in the house at Titagarh did not necessarily indicate that the persons residing in the house were persons who had taken ??? a conspiracy of the kind alleged against them. This matter is dealt with at some length by the learned Commissioners in what they have described as Chap. XIII of their Judgment and the conclusion at which they arrived is stated in these words:—
We are of opinion that the papers and things found at Titagarh, without any other circumstance, prove beyond reasonable doubt the existence of such a conspiracy to wage war against the King between Pumananda Das Gupta, Praphulla Sen and the persons named as sources, supplying the names of suitable recruits in Exs. 297-301. As further facts illustrating the existence of this conspiracy, we may mention the close connection established by evidence between the Belgharia House where we have found that a number of young men were living in the last part of December, 1934, and the activities at the Titagarh House. First of all, we should mention a letter in the handwriting of Pumananda Das Gupta—instructing one Kanu to engage a house and arrange a meeting at a place, cryptically referred to V3B.
Finally in summing up their conclusions, the learned Commissioners at the end of the Chapter say:
Furthermore, as discussed in Chapter VIII it is clear that the cipher list, Ex. 115, found with Deba Prasad Sen in Belgharia, was similar in nature to Exs. 291-301, found at Titagarh. The same inference as to the conspiracy may be drawn from them, as there could be no doubt about the connections of the Belgharia den and the Sukhchar finds with the Titagarh conspiracy to wage war against the King. The question to be decided is, which of the accused, if any, are proved to have been members of this conspiracy.
Put quite shortly, the position was this—In the Titagarh house were found explosive materials, books on war and on revolution and also the remnants or torn fragments of what seems to have been intended to be a discourse or monograph on the uses of revolution. The Commissioners themselves point out the significance of the existence of such books as “Infantry Training,” “Field Gunnery,” “Machine Gunners' Handbook,” “War Equipment,” “Aeroplane Construction,” and so on as being indicative of the fact that the explosives which were being provided were not; intended to be used for wreaking private vengeance on some enemies, of Purnananda or any of these other people but must have been intended to be used for the purpose of something much more extensive and something much mere of a public character and the very nature of the books found were indicative of what the common object of the conspiracy really was. The learned Commissioners have discussed this matter at very great length and it is not necessary that we should say anything more about it, except that we entirely endorse the conclusions at which the learned Commissioners have arrived and the, reasons, considerations and deductions which induced them to come to those conclusions. As already stated, the question wether the evidence was sufficient, to establish a charge of conspiracy laid under s. 121A of the Indian Penal; Code was argued by Mr. Roy almost as if it were a point of law: whereas when one comes to look at the matter it seems quite manifest that actually it is much more a question of fact, because the solution of the question depends upon the view which the trial Court takes of the evidence adduced before it and of the inferences reasonably to be drawn from that evidence. What would be sufficient to show that there was a conspiracy to the mind of one man may not be sufficient to indicate a conspiracy to the mind of another man and a concatenation or conjunction of circumstances may be sufficient to induce one Tribunal to come to the conclusion that a number of conspirators had as their object the waging of war against His Majesty, I whereas another Tribunal might think that the facts and circumstances did not warrant any such conclusion. In the present case, we can only say that the learned Commissioners have beyond all question devoted an almost excessive care certainly all possible care and attention to the consideration of the facts proved before them and they have arrived at their conclusion. We say without any hesitation that we think not only that the Commissioners were justified in coming to the conclusion they did on this particular point, but, having regard to the evidence they could rightly have come to no other conclusion.
Before saying something about the evidence as it bears on each of the individual accused, we should like to make one or two general observations with regard to the judgment as a whole. The learned Commissioners have produced a judgment which is net only careful and complete but is comprehensive in the highest degree and one which can, not unreasonably, be described, we think, as voluminous. We make this observation for the purpose of enabling ourselves to say that no one who has read this judgment and has heard the arguments put forward on behalf of the appellants in these appeals can, in our opinion, come to any other conclusion than that the Commissioners have, in every respect, discharged their functions in a manner which is wholly satisfactory, and, indeed admirable. If one does permit oneself to make any sort of criticism at all, it can only be to the effect that these Commissioners have been overscrupulous and, we might almost say, unnecessarily careful to ensure that no single one of the twenty-nine accused persons before them should be convicted by them except upon evidence in regard to which there could be no possible doubt whatever.
We have heard in the course of the argument before us the ‘normal’ argument (we use the word ‘normal’ in preference to the word ‘usual’ because it has almost become a rule of law as regards defence? in criminal cases of this character) with regard to the evidence of “approvers” and the necessity for corroboration of their evidence and of the evidence of persons who accurately or inaccurately may, in some way or other, be described as the ‘accomplice witnesses.’ It is a little difficult to understand what precisely, for the purpose of a lengthy argument of this kind, is the difference between the evidence of an approver and the evidence of the witnesses of the kind whom the learned Commissioners have characterised as ‘accomplice witnesses.’ The learned Commissioners have, hewever, made a differentiation in Chap. XIV of their judgment which deals with ‘approvers,’ and Chap. XV, which deals with ‘accomplice witnesses.’ But whether that nicety of distinction is necessary or justifiable, to my mind makes no difference at all for practical purposes, became whether a witness is stigmatized as an approver or as an accomplice, he is as regards the matter of corroboration on one and the same footing.
Mr. Roy, in the usual fashion, gave us the benefit of a lengthy argument upon the law applicable to the evidence of an accomplice and the necessity for corroboration, and we were treated to what may perhaps be described without any want of respect to the learned advocate as a stock and somewhat jejune argument with regard to corroboration. It was once more emphasised before us that the evidence of an accomplice or an approver is tainted evidence and ought not to be accepted unless it is corroborated in some material particulars. We are told that the evidence given by one accomplice witness cannot operate in corroboration of the evidence given by another. An attempt was made to reagitate the whole question of “corroboration.” Mr. Roy once more put before us a number of authorities dealing with this question. We need hardly say no more than that we reiterate the views on this point expressed in the judgment in the Midnapore case—Nirmaljeeban Ghosh v. Emperor. We are of opinion that the propositions of law laid down by Sir Arthur Page in Aung Hla v. King-Emperor are sufficiently wide to cover the whole of the law dealing with the question of corroboration. In the present instance, the Commissioners, in their obvious desire to err if at all on the side of caution, have acted on the assumption not only that the evidence of an approver and the evidence of an accomplice require corroboration as a matter of precaution—to put it no higher—but also that they ought not to accept the evidence of one accomplice witness which is only supported by the evidence of another accomplice and nothing more. The result of that course of action is that the questions far as there is any law about the matter entirely disappears. Taking if to be the law that an accomplice witness including an approver ought to be corroborated and that at any rate it is unsafe in ordinary cases to treat the evidence of one accomplice as corroborating that of another. Assuming all that, it appears that the learned Commissioners acted strictly and scrupulously in conformity with those assumptions. We find accordingly that in no case is any one of the conviction based one tainted evidence with regard to which there was lacking corroboration. In other words, the Commissioners acquitted everyone of the accused persons with regard to whom corroboration of accomplice evidence was not forthcoming. We find at the end of the general observations in the judgment at the end of Chap. XV, p. 363, this statement:—
The evidence of the approver and the accomplice witnesses has been set out at rather great length in this judgment. This is to show how much the prosecution set out to prove by their evidence. It will be seen, however, that in most cases, the corroboration of this evidence is very scanty, and it will also be seen in this and other chapters of the judgment that we have mostly been loath to rely upon this evidence and we have only done so, where there has been strong corroboration (not only corroboration, but strong corroboration).
That was the principle laid down by the learned Commissioners for their own guidance and to it they have strictly adhered. Had it been otherwise it would have been extremely difficult to understand why so many of the twenty-nine accused persons were in fact acquitted. An examination of the record seems to show that quite a number of the acquitted persons were in all probability just as guilty as those of the accused who were, in fact, convicted. The comparatively high percentage of acquittals is plainly and obviously due to the rigid and conscientious manner in which the Commissioners applied the principle of no conviction without corroboration.
We have listened with great care and attention and, we hope, with due patience to the arguments, put forward in this appeal on behalf of the appellants. We have considered them, examined them carefully—almost microscopically—for ourselves and we have considered the manner in which the learned Commissioners have dealt with that evidence as disclosed in their elaborate and comprehensive and altogether satisfactory judgment. The result is that—certainly as regards the majority of the cases with which we are now concerned—the canvassing of the matter by Mr. Roy and the other learned advocates has only served to bring into prominence the points telling against the accused which make it abundantly clear that the Verdicts of the Commissioners were correct.
It is only as regards the case of one of the appellants that there could be any kind of hesitation whatever and that was the case of Jagadish Chandra Ghatak. We will say a word or two with regard to his case before we deal with the rest of the appellants. The learned Commissioners pointed out that the principal evidence against this accused was his own confession, that is to say, the statement which he made before one of the Presidency Magistrates of Calcutta on March 15, 1934 and which is on the record as Ex. 44. This confession was retracted at the outset of the trial. Apparently at the time when the accused were being called upon to make answer to the charges laid against them Jagadish said in answer to a question put to him after the charge was explained:—
I am innocent. The confession that I made before the Magistrate was not of my own accord. I was compelled to say what the police tutored me under their torture. I have told the Magistrate at Bankshall Street Court that I wanted to “retract the confession.” On that he said that nothing could be done there.
Thus the array of common form defences to be found in a case of this kind was complete, because here is one accused who makes a confession and then retracts it on the hackneyed ground that he was tortured by the police. We sky ‘the array of common form defences’—in appeals of this kind having in mind the observations of Sir George Rankin, Chief Justice, that—
No criminal defence in this country is complete without a retracted confession.
It seems tolerably clear that what really happened was that it must have been brought to his notice that he could not very well hope to be acquitted as long as there was a confession on the record. It seems that the confession was sufficiently wide or sufficiently explicit to implicate him in the particular conspiracy to which the charge related. The learned Commissioners obviously did not pay any serious attention to the somewhat threadbare and unconvincing allegations of torture by the police. The very phrase ‘torture by the police’ has been so often used on behalf of the defence in similar circumstances that any sting it might ever have had has long since departed from it and a scepticism is engineered something like that aroused by the frequent and false cry of alarm “wolf, wolf.” This excuse of torture by the police is used so often without any justification, time and again, that it has become very difficult for any Court to pay any serious attention to it, and indeed no Court should pay any attention to it unless it is supported by evidence. In the present case, there is not a scintilla of evidence that Jagadish was improperly treated by the police and consequently the Commissioners said that—
We cannot brush aside the statement, merely because the accused now says that what he stated then, was not true.
Then they proceeded to say very properly:—
Nor can we convict him on the basis of the confession, unless we are satisfied of its truth as regards himself by corroboration from independent evidence in material particulars.
That was, of course, because it was a retracted confession. If a confession is made and is not withdrawn, that may furnish the strongest possible evidence of guilt of an accused, because unless there is something to raise a different inference what a man says about his own actions and his own intentions must be even more potent evidence against him than what others may say as to that man's intentions. Therefore, normally a confession of guilt is the most conclusive evidence which one can have. But if that confession is “retracted,” to use the word which has almost become a word of art, then it is certainly desirable, if not absolutely necessary, that there should be some corroboration of what the accused has said about himself even in respect of his own actions. But as the Commissioners pointed out an accused person cannot get rid of a statement merely by saying that he retracts it. He cannot get rid of it by saying that he withdraws it.
[Their Lordships then dealt with the evidence as to whether there was really a confession and thereafter the evidence as against individual accused persons.]
Mr. Dinesh Chandra Roy and other learned advocates as a last resort in each case invited us to reconsider the question of the sentences which the learned Commissioners thought fit to inflict upon the accused who were convicted. We have considered them and discussed them in detail and we have, on a careful review of the whole case, come to the conclusion that there is no reason why we should interfere with any of the sentences which the learned Commissioners in the exercise of their discretion have passed on each and every one of the accused.
A.C.R.C
Appeals dismissed.