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  • S. 18 of the Limitation Act
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  • S. 18 of the Limitation Act
Smart Summary

Structured Summary of the Opinion (Delivered by The Offg. Chief Justice)

Factual and Procedural Background

This appeal concerns the extent of a Court's inherent powers in relation to a sale in execution of a mortgage decree. The appellant obtained a mortgage decree of 1929 with a final decree passed on 10-2-1942. Part of the hypothecated property was put up for sale on 2-4-1943; that sale was abortive (no bidders) and was adjourned to 19-4-1943.

On 19-4-1943 four items were sold, including items 6 (S. No. 440-B, 103 acres 9 cents of dry land) and 9 (1993 acres). The decree-holder purchased both items at bids slightly above the upset prices (item 6: upset Rs. 400, bid Rs. 405; item 9: upset Rs. 100, bid Rs. 102). The Court then closed and reopened on 7-6-1943; on 10-6-1943 the sale of items 6 and 9 was confirmed and part satisfaction recorded.

On the afternoon of 10-6-1943 the judgment-debtor appeared in Court with the decree amount to seek to set aside the sale but was unable to deposit in time. On 30-6-1943 (more than two months after sale and 20 days after confirmation) the judgment-debtor filed a petition purportedly under Ss. 47 and 151 and O. 7, R. 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, alleging fraud and seeking to set aside the sale. The petition omitted reference to O. 21, R. 90 of the Code.

The trial Court (District Munsif) found the petitioner’s allegation of the Panchayat agreement and clandestine conduct not proved but found that item 6 had been undervalued by failure to disclose a temple on the land (value of temple at least Rs. 700) and, invoking inherent power under S. 151, set aside the whole sale. The District Judge confirmed that order, relying on the view that a Court may cancel confirmation in special circumstances and referring to Raghava Chariar v. Murugesa Mudali. Koman, J. in second appeal confirmed the District Judge's decision. This appeal followed and the present Court heard arguments and delivered the impugned opinion.

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether a Court has inherent power under S. 151 of the Civil Procedure Code to cancel or set aside a sale in execution which has already been held and confirmed on the ground of fraud on the Court (suppression of relevant facts in the sale proclamation).
  2. Whether the existence of a statutory remedy under Order 21 (in particular R. 90) and the time limits prescribed by the Limitation Act preclude the exercise of an overlapping inherent power to set aside a confirmed sale.
  3. Whether lateness by the judgment-debtor in depositing the decree amount (arrival after confirmation) can be excused by the Court's inherent powers so as to permit setting aside of a confirmed sale.
  4. Whether the petition filed on 30-6-1943 could be treated as within time by invoking S. 18 of the Limitation Act when the petition did not plead the facts required to sustain that section.

Arguments of the Parties

Petitioner's (Judgment-Debtor's) Arguments

  • The sale was a nullity effected by fraud on the Court and on the petitioner.
  • There was an earlier Panchayat (around 10-4-1943) in which it was agreed that the decree-holder would obtain correct particulars of the amount due, adjourn the sale past the holidays, and accept the amount in full satisfaction. The decree-holder breached that agreement and clandestinely purchased the properties at low prices.
  • The petitioner only discovered the fraud during the holidays on enquiry from his vakil and thus could not make timely deposit before confirmation.
  • The decree-holder suppressed the existence of a temple on item 6, which (it was asserted) made the land effectively public/in alienable and meant the petitioner had no saleable interest; alternatively the land’s value was far higher (claimed Rs. 6,000) and the bid (Rs. 405) was grossly inadequate, giving the decree-holder an unconscionable advantage.
  • The petitioner attempted to deposit the decree amount on 10-6-1943 but arrived in Court only in the afternoon and was unable to make the deposit before confirmation.

Decree-holder's / Respondent's and Lower Courts' Position

  • The lower courts (District Munsif and District Judge) accepted that there was suppression in valuation regarding the temple and concluded that the District Munsif could exercise inherent powers under S. 151 to set aside the sale to prevent abuse of process and do equity, especially given the late arrival of the judgment-debtor on 10-6-1943 (attributed to a late bus).
  • The District Judge relied on Raghava Chariar v. Murugesa Mudali to support the proposition that the Court may exercise inherent power to refuse confirmation or to cancel a sale where it has been misled by the decree-holder’s non-disclosure or misstatements.
  • On appeal the respondent relied chiefly on Raghava Chariar to argue that the Court has inherent power to cancel an already confirmed sale where there has been fraud on the Court.
  • At the final hearing the respondent also invited the Court to treat the petition as filed within time under S. 18 of the Limitation Act, by reason of the petitioner having been kept from prior knowledge of the sale by fraud.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Raghava Chariar v. Murugesa Mudali Holds that a Court has an inherent power to refuse to confirm a Court auction sale if it is satisfied that it has been misled by the decree-holder by actual misstatements or non-disclosure of relevant facts; Wallace, J. observed O. 21, R. 92 is no bar to interfering in such circumstances. The Court considered this decision but concluded that its observations are not authority for cancelling a sale that has been held and confirmed where no timely application under O. 21, R. 90 (or related Rules) was made. The Court held that Raghava Chariar does not justify exercising inherent power to set aside a confirmed sale in the present circumstances.
Maqbul Ahmad v. Pratap Narain Singh Establishes the general rule that a Court should not presume an inherent power to do what the statute provides and that, outside limited statutory discretions, a Court does not have a general discretion to relieve a suitor from the operation of the Limitation Act. The Court relied on this principle to underscore that where the Code or Limitation Act prescribes a statutory remedy and time limits (e.g., O. 21 R. 90; Limitation provisions), the Court cannot assume an inherent power to provide a parallel remedy or to extend statutory time-limits.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The Court structured its analysis around two central themes: (a) whether fraud on the Court by suppression of relevant facts in the sale proclamation justifies invocation of inherent power to cancel a sale already confirmed; and (b) whether lateness of the judgment-debtor in depositing amounts prior to confirmation could be excused by inherent power.

1. On the nature of the petition and pleaded grounds: The petition was brought under Ss. 47 and 151 and O. 7, R. 1 of the Code, scrupulously avoiding reference to O. 21, R. 90 (the statutory provision governing setting aside sales in execution for fraud). The petitioner alleged a Panchayat agreement and fraud by the decree-holder and asserted undervaluation and suppression of the temple.

2. Proper remedy under the Code: The Court observed that if there was fraud in publishing the sale or in the conduct of the sale (such as suppression in the proclamation), Order 21, Rule 90 of the Civil Procedure Code is the proper statutory remedy to set aside the sale. That rule prescribes a specific procedure and time-limit; the Limitation Act (S. 18) affords relief only where the petitioner sufficiently pleads and proves that he was prevented by fraud from obtaining knowledge of the sale.

3. Limitation and pleading: The Court emphasized that S. 18 of the Limitation Act cannot be invoked defensively unless facts supporting that section are properly pleaded. In this case the petition contained only a bare averment that the petitioner learned of the fraud “during the holidays on enquiry from his vakil,” which the Court found insufficient to sustain an S. 18 plea. The Court refused to treat an apparently time-barred application as within time by invoking S. 18 where the pleading did not demonstrate entitlement to the section and where the plea was raised for the first time only at the appellate stage.

4. On the trial Court's inference of fraud in valuation: The District Munsif inferred suppression by the decree-holder of the existence of a temple and concluded the land had been undervalued. The High Court noted a conceptual difficulty: if the temple were public property dedicated to a deity, it would not be the petitioner’s property and therefore could not pass to the purchaser; yet the Munsif relied on suppressed information about the temple to determine undervaluation. The present Court did not adopt the view that the trial Court’s inference justified invoking inherent power in place of the statutory remedy.

5. On lateness of deposit and inherent power: The Code (in the case of mortgage decrees) allows a sale to be set aside by deposit of all amounts due at any time before confirmation of sale. If a judgment-debtor chooses to defer deposit until the day of confirmation and arrives late (e.g., because of a late bus), the Court found that while regrettable, such lateness does not justify extending the statutory time by invoking inherent power. The Court held it cannot presume an inherent power to extend the period beyond that fixed by the Code.

6. On reliance upon Raghava Chariar: The Court carefully examined Raghava Chariar and acknowledged observations supportive of the respondent’s position, but distinguished the facts — in Raghava an application under O. 21, R. 90 was actually pending and the trial Court invoked inherent powers while that application was before it. The High Court concluded that the case did not stand as authority for cancelling an already confirmed sale where the statutory procedures (Order 21) had not been invoked within time.

7. Overall conclusion of analysis: Given that the statutory remedy under Order 21, Rule 90 exists and that limitation rules apply (and S. 18 was not properly pleaded or proved), the Court determined that the trial Court had no power under S. 151 to cancel the confirmed sale on the grounds advanced and the delay and pleading deficiencies meant the petition could not be treated as within time.

Holding and Implications

Holding: The appeal is allowed with costs throughout, and the order confirming the sale of items 6 and 9 is restored.

Implications and consequences:

  • Direct effect: The setting aside of the sale by the trial Court (and confirmation by the District Judge) was reversed; the sale confirmation for items 6 and 9 stands reinstated.
  • No substitution of statutory remedies: The Court held that where the Code prescribes a specific remedy (Order 21, Rule 90) and where limitation rules apply (and S. 18 of the Limitation Act is not pleaded/proved), inherent powers under S. 151 cannot be invoked to create an alternate remedy that overlaps or extends statutory time-limits.
  • Limitation and pleading requirements emphasized: Parties seeking relief based on fraud preventing knowledge of a sale must plead and prove facts sufficient to invoke S. 18 of the Limitation Act; appellate invocation of S. 18 for the first time is improper where pleadings do not support it.
  • No new broad precedent created: The Court expressly declined to accept that Raghava Chariar authorizes cancelling a sale already held and confirmed where statutory remedies were not invoked in time; the opinion restricts the use of inherent powers where the Code contains specific provisions. The decision restores the statutory framework as governing such disputes rather than a general inherent jurisdiction to override the Code's time-limits.

Disposition: Appeal allowed; sale confirmation restored.

Reference: Opinion delivered by The Offg. Chief Justice; final line: "In the result, therefore, we allow the appeal with costs throughout and restore the order confirming the sale of items 6 and 9."

    Muttalooru Bojjanna. v. Boya Kristappa.

    (Delivered by The Offg. Chief Justice).

    This is an appeal against the decision of Koman, J., and it raises the question of the extent of the inherent powers of the Court in dealing with a sale in execution of a mortgage decree. The appellant obtained a decree on a mortgage of 1929. The final decree was passed on 10-2-42. The part of the hypotheca with which we are now concerned was put up for sale on 2-4-43, but there were no bidders and the sale was adjourned to the 19th April, 1943, when four items were sold, including items 6 and 9 with which we are now concerned. Both of these items were purchased by the decree-holder at a price slightly in excess of the upset price. Item No. 6 which is S. No. 440-B is of an extent of 103 acres 9 cents of dry land which the decree-holder valued at Rs. 200. The upset price fixed by the Court was Rs. 400 and the successful bid was Rs. 405. Item No. 9 is of an extent of 1993 acres which was valued by the decree-holder at Rs. 50, the upset price was Rs. 100 and the successful bid Rs. 102. The Court closed shortly after this sale and reopened on the 7th June. On the 10th June, the sale of these two items 6 and 9 was confirmed and part satisfaction was recorded. On the afternoon of the day on which the sale was confirmed, the judgment debtor appeared in Court with the amount of the decree to get the sale set aside. But it was too late to make the deposit.

    On the 30th June 1943, that is to say more than two months after the sale and 20 days after the confirmation of the sale, the judgment-debtor filed the petition out of which these proceedings arise. The petition purports to be under Ss. 47 and 151 and O. VII, R. 1 of the Civil Procedure Code, It scrupulously avoids any reference to the provisions of O. 21, R. 90 of the Code. It starts by reciting the bare facts, stating that the sale is a nullity having been effected by playing fraud on the Court as well as on the petitioner. Then it proceeds to set forth the particulars of the fraud. Firstly it is alleged that after the first abortive sale, the petitioner tendered to the decree-holder the amount of the decree; there was a Panchayat on or about the 10th April, 1943 in which it was settled that the decree-holder should get correct particulars of the amount due from his vakil, get the sale adjourned to some other date after the holidays and take the amount in full satisfaction of the decree. It is alleged that when the properties came up for sale on 19th April, the decree-holder clandestinely and in defiance of the agreement, got the properties knocked down to himself for absurdly low prices, keeping back the facts from the knowledge of the debtor and his friends. Next it is asserted that the petitioner came to know of the fraud practised by the decree-holder “during the holidays” on enquiry from his vakil who wrote to him that he should come to Court with money on the 10th of June. Then it is alleged that the petitioner charged the decree-holder with fraud and the latter said that he would get matters rectified immediately after the reopening of the Court and that he failed to do so. Then the petitioner came to Court on 10th June to deposit the money by way of abundant caution and to his surprise found that the sale had been already confirmed. On account of the fraud practised by the decree-holder, the petitioner was kept back from coming to the Court and the other bidders in the village also were kept back from attending the Court on the day of sale. It was also contended with reference to item 6 that the petitioner has no saleable interest in the land which contains a temple utilised by the public to whom free access is given. The profits of the land have been endowed for the maintenance and upkeep of the temple. The decree-holder is charged with having suppressed the fact that there is a temple which makes the land public property and as such inalienable. As to item 6 it is also said that it is worth Rs. 6,000 that the bid of Rs. 405 is grossly inadequate, the decree-holder has gained an unconscionable advantage and the sale is therefore a nullity.

    It is to be noticed that the whole application is based on the alleged fraud in the matter of the Panchayat agreement for the liquidation of the decree and the postponement of the sale while inquiry was being made. The trial Court did not believe that story; but the learned District Munsif came to the conclusion that the major item, item 6, had been undervalued by the decree-holder by the omission of all reference to the temple constructed in the land the value of which is admittedly at least Rs. 700. No attention seems to have been given to the fact that if the temple was as alleged public property dedicated to a God it would not be the property of the judgment-debtor, and could not pass to the purchaser at the Court auction. However, the learned District Munsif after pointing out that a petition to set aside the sale having regard to O. 21. R. 90 of the Code would become barbed on 7th June, 1943, that as it was a mortgage decree, the decree amount should have been paid on 10th June, 1943 before the sale was confirmed and that the judgment-debtor Arrived at the Court on the afternoon of the day of the confirmation of the sale apparently owing to the bus arriving late, remarks that it is not unusual in such circumstances that the Court should set right the matters excusing the delay. The learned District Munsif concludes that on account of the unfortunate delay in the arrival of the bus on the 10th June and also on account of the fact that the decree-holder deliberately misled the Court in valuing the property, this is a fit case in which the Court should exercise its inherent power under S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure; and for the ends of justice and to prevent abuse of the process of Court it is essential that the sale should be set aside. The whole sale was therefore set aside.

    This order was confirmed by the learned District Judge who does not go into the question of the truth of the alleged Panchayat, but bases his conclusion solely on the fact that there was a fraud on the Court by the suppression of any reference to the building on item 6. The learned District Judge says:

    “I am definitely of the opinion that even after a Court has confirmed sale order if a judgment-debtor in a mortgage suit appears that same day a little late and offers to deposit the whole amount, it is open to a Court to cancel its order of confirmation and allow this to be one under O. 34, R. 5 of the Civil Procedure Code, in special circumstances such as this,”

    and quoting Raghava Chariar v. Murugesa Mudali (1) the learned Judge comes to the conclusion that the District Munsif had inherent powers to cancel the sale. This decision has been confirmed by Koman, J. in second appeal.

    No case has been quoted before us in which it has been specifically held that after a sale in execution has been confirmed, the Court can, by the exercise of its inherent powers, cancel that sale on the ground that there has been a fraud on the Court by the suppression of relevant matters in the sale proclamation. The general rule undoubtedly is that the Court should not presume the existence of an inherent power to do that for which a statutory provision has been made and it is quite clear that outside the limited discretion conferred by the Limitation Act in certain cases, a Court has no general discretion to relieve a suitor from the operation of the provisions of the Limitation Act, vide Maqbul Ahmad v. Pratap Narain Singh (2). In the present case, the petitioner came to Court alleging that the sale was a nullity because of the fraudulent conduct of the decree-holder in getting the sale knocked down in his favour notwithstanding an agreement that he would get the sale adjourned. That allegation was not proved to the satisfaction of the trial Judge. No doubt the petition does also contain an allegation that the sale has been for much less than the real value of the property and it contains a reference to the existence of the temple on the land. But the temple is referred to only far the purpose of showing that the petitioner has not got a saleable interest therein and that the public have certain rights which prevent the land from being sold. There is no suggestion that the saleable value of the land as the land of the petitioner was enhanced by the existence of this temple.

    If there was a fraud in publishing the sale or in the conduct of the sale, an application under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code is the proper remedy for a person whose interests are affected by the sale. For that remedy a period of limitation has been prescribed and no doubt the person affected could get the benefit of S. 18 of the Limitation Act if he alleged and proved that he was prevented from getting knowledge of the sale by the fraud of the opposite party. The point to note is that if we assume the fraud which the petitioner does not allege in his petition but which the Court has inferred out of the facts appearing in the evidence, it is a fraud in the preparation of the proclamation of sale. The decree-holder is found to have suppressed the fact which has resulted in the settlement of wrong terms for the sale. It is admitted that the judgment-debtor was aware of the original sale. He had notice of the proclamation and did not object to its terms. Assuming that there was a fraud on the Court for which the decree-holder was responsible, that was a matter which would have given the petitioner a ground for an application under O. 21. R. 90 of the Civil Procedure Code to set aside the sale. Prima facie therefore it is not a ground with reference to which the Court should presume the existence of any inherent power to remedy the wrong done. The Code having given a specific remedy, the Court cannot be presumed to have an inherent power overlapping or running parallel to the procedure laid down in the Code.

    Similarly with reference to what seems to be the alternative ground for the exercise of the inherent powers, viz., the hardship resulting from the lateness of the arrival of the judgment-debtor to deposit the sale amount, the Code provides that in the case of a mortgage decree, the sale may be set aside by a deposit of all the amounts due from the judgment-debtor at any time before the confirmation of the sale. If the the judgment-debtor takes the risk of deferring his deposit until the very day of the confirmation of the sale and then arrives too late owing to some accident, it is no doubt unfortunate, but he has only himself to blame for taking the risk of waiting to the last possible day. At any rate the Code clearly provides a definite period of limitation for such payments and it seems to us that there cannot be an inherent power in the Court to extend that period beyond the limits prescribed by the Code.

    The respondent in the argument before us has relied chiefly on the decision in Raghava Chariar v. Murugesa Mudali in which it was held by Schwabe, C.J and Wallace, J. that a Court has an inherent power to refuse to confirm a sale held in Court auction if it is satisfied that it has been misled by the decree-holder either by actual misstatements to the Court or non-disclosure to the Court of relevant facts unknown to the Court and which there was a duty to bring before the Court. In the judgment of Wallace, J. the learned Judge remarks that O. 21, R. 92 of the Civil Procedure Code is no bar to the Court interfering to cancel the sale in such circumstances. It is contended that by inference from this decision if the Court has an inherent power to disobey the mandatory provisions of O. 21, R. 92 and refuse to confirm the sale it must also have the inherent power, on proof of a fraud on the Court, to cancel a sale which has already been held and confirmed. There are no doubt observations in the judgments in this case which would seem to go some way towards supporting the respondent's argument, and it is possible that at some future time the correctness of these observations will have to be considered. We are however concerned now with the actual decision. The observation of Wallace, J. with reference to O. 21, R. 92 may well have been influenced by the fact that in the case before that Bench there was an application under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code which was actually before the learned trial Judge at the time when he purported to invoke his inherent powers to refuse to confirm the sale. What seems to have happened was that the application to set aside the sale was based on untenable grounds and the trial Court called in aid its inherent powers to give effect to a ground for setting aside the sale which might have been but was not taken in the actual application. It was therefore a case to which O. 21, R. 92 did not in terms apply. Moreover although the learned Judges observed that the Courts have inherent powers to refuse to confirm a sale when it is established that there has been a fraud on the Court, they were in fact dealing with a case in which an application under O. 21. R. 90 of the Code was pending and the same result could have been achieved by allowing the applicant to amend his application and allege the fraud which the Court found to have been committed. We do not therefore think that the rather wide observations in this judgment are sufficient authority for holding that the Court has a discretion to disregard the mandatory provisions of O. 21, R. 92 in a case where there has been no application under Rr. 89, 90 or 91 of O. 21, of the Code or where such an application has been made and dismissed. Nor do we think this decision is authority for the further proposition that when a sale has been held and confirmed without objection, the Court can utilise its inherent powers to give effect to any objection based on fraud which should have been put forward by an application under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code, when, no application his been preferred within the time allowed. We are therefore of opinion that the trial Court had not the power under S. 151 of the Code of Civil Procedure to cancel this sale on the ground of fraud in the valuation of the land, which fraud had not been the subject of an application under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code filed within time.

    We are however asked to treat this application as an application which is within time, having been filed within 30 days of the date on which the petitioner had knowledge of the sale, he having been kept from prior knowledge of the sale by the fraud of the decree-holder, and we are asked to hold that the sale is liable to be set aside in such circumstances either because of suppression of facts affecting the value, a matter falling under O. 21, R. 90 of the Code, or because owing to the fraud of the decree-holder in the circumstances of the alleged Panchayat on which the District Judge has given no finding the petitioner was prevented from averting the sale by paying the decree amount. This contention involves the admission of a plea under S. 18 of the Limitation Act which is not put forward in the petition and has not apparently been suggested at any of the three previous hearings of the case. Nor are there the facts pleaded in the petition on which a plea under S. 18 of the Limitation Act could be founded. The only relevant plea is that the petitioner came to know of the fraud practised by the respondent “during the holidays on enquiry from his vakil.” Since the Court reopened on the 7th of June and the petition was actually filed on the 30th of June it is obvious that the averment that the petitioner only came to know the facts during the holidays would not be a sufficient averment if he sought to save limitation for his petition by pleading S. 18 of the Limitation Act. We see no reason why the principle of O. 7, R. 6 of the Code of Civil Procedure should not be applied to an application to set aside a sale in execution and it seems to be improper to treat an apparently time-barred application as being within time by calling in aid S. 18 of the Limitation Act when the pleading does not show how the exemption under the section is available to the petitioner and particularly when the plea is raised for the first time in Letters Patent Appeal. Moreover, the plea rests in substance on allegations of fact which have been discredited by the trial Court though the learned District Judge has not given any finding upon them.

    In the result, therefore, we allow the appeal with costs throughout and restore the order confirming the sale of items 6 and 9.

    N.R.R

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    Muttalooru Bojjanna. v. Boya Kristappa.
    (Nov 1, 1946)