Translate
Text Highlighter

Bookmark

PDF

Share

Report a problem
AMICUS AI
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Are you a practicing lawyer?
Enhance your digital presence and reach by creating a Casemine profile.
Upload pleading to use the new AI search
Cites
Cited by
Citation Codes
Equivalent Citations
citation codes
Case Number
Advocates
Judges
Smart Summary

Concise Analytical Summary of the Opinion

Factual and Procedural Background

Venkatasubbayya became a Sanyasi on 2 February 1904 and died on 6 April 1904. The plaint alleges that he left a will dated 2 February 1904 (referred to as Ex. B) making dispositions of his property. The plaintiff's claim is founded on a mortgage deed dated 14 April 1910 executed by defendants 1 and 2 and by the husband of the 3rd defendant (the 3rd defendant is the appellant in the appeal). The will was registered on 17 March 1904. The plaintiff filed the suit on 4 April 1922, and the central factual dispute is whether Ex. B was actually executed on 2 February 1904 or was executed later (between 9 and 12 March 1904, according to the contesting defendants) and ante-dated to 2 February.

Relevant family relationships appearing in the opinion: the 1st defendant is a sister's son of the testator and is married to the testator's pre-deceased son's daughter; the 2nd defendant married the testator's brother's daughter; the 3rd defendant's husband (one of the executants of the mortgage) is deceased.

At first instance the District Judge addressed whether the will was ante-dated and whether Venkatasubbayya was a Sanyasi in the strict Hindu-law sense. On appeal, the court was asked to decide these issues (and whether the decree should be confined to the mortgagors' interests).

Legal Issues Presented

  1. Whether the will (Ex. B) was executed on 2 February 1904 as it bears, or whether it was executed later (between 9 and 12 March 1904) and ante-dated to 2 February 1904.
  2. Whether Venkatasubbayya became a Sanyasi in the strict Hindu-law sense such that he became civilly dead and incapable of disposing of his property.
  3. Whether the mortgage decree could be framed against the entire property or must be limited to the interests of the mortgagors under the will.

Arguments of the Parties

3rd Defendant / Appellant (contesting defendant)

  • Contended that Venkatasubbayya became a Sanyasi on 2 February 1904 and that the will was executed after he became a Sanyasi — specifically between 9 and 12 March 1904 — and was thereafter ante-dated to 2 February.
  • Asserted that as a Sanyasi the testator would be civilly dead and therefore incapable of making a valid will disposing of property.
  • Relied on documentary material including Exs. I, II (letters dated 9 and 12 March) and Ex. VII (a document dated 6 February 1904) to support the contention that no valid will existed on 2 February or that the will was made later and ante-dated.

Plaintiff / Respondent

  • Bases title on Ex. B (the will dated 2 February 1904) and the mortgage executed in 1910.
  • Relied on the presumption (supported by precedent) that a document bears the true date it purports to bear and on attestation evidence, notably P.W.2 as an attesting witness, to establish the execution of Ex. B on 2 February.
  • Argued that the contesting defendant failed to discharge the onus of proving that the will was ante-dated.

Table of Precedents Cited

Precedent Rule or Principle Cited For Application by the Court
Mina Kumari Bibi v. Bijoy Singh Dudhuria (Privy Council) Presumption that a document was executed on the date it bears; onus lies on the party alleging ante-dating to establish it. The court invoked this authority to affirm that the onus was on the contesting defendant (the appellant) to prove that Ex. B was executed later than the date it bears; this principle shaped the court's assessment of the evidentiary burden and findings on ante-dating.

Court's Reasoning and Analysis

The court's reasoning proceeded along two primary lines: (A) the question whether Ex. B was ante-dated, and (B) the question whether the testator was a Sanyasi in the strict sense. The court found it unnecessary to resolve the Sanyasi question finally because the appeal could be disposed of on the question of ante-dating and on the form of the decree.

Presumption as to date and onus: The court started from the legal presumption (citing Mina Kumari Bibi v. Bijoy Singh Dudhuria) that a document is presumed to have been executed on the date it bears. Consequently, the onus was on the 3rd defendant, as the contesting party, to prove that Ex. B was executed subsequently and ante-dated. The long lapse of time (suit filed in 1922 concerning documents of 1904) reinforced the evidentiary burden on the contestant.

Evaluation of evidence regarding ante-dating:

  • The court examined the testimony of P.W.2, the only attesting witness called to prove attestation; P.W.2 was called by the plaintiff and gave evidence some 19–20 years after the purported execution. He admitted he was not present at the execution of Ex. B but signed it when it was later sent to him with space left for his signature. The court held that P.W.2's evidence therefore did not establish ante-dating of Ex. B.
  • D.W.3 (an agent of the 3rd defendant) was considered unreliable for proving execution because he did not assert personal presence at execution and was acting as agent in the litigation.
  • Ex. VII (dated 6 February 1904) was scrutinised: its recital that the testator was unable to make a will and that his last hours had come was found to be inconsistent with the fact that the testator lived until 6 April 1904 and, on 2 February, underwent a Sanyasam ceremony lasting about six hours and was not described by witnesses as being near death. The court considered the recitals in Ex. VII to be false or suspicious and observed that Ex. VII appears to grant broad powers to the widow in contrast to Ex. B, suggesting Ex. VII might have been produced for an ulterior purpose.
  • Given that the testator executed multiple wills and had a pattern of making and destroying wills, the court exercised caution in accepting inferences from remote documentary references; the existence of other wills and the testamentary propensity required careful assessment rather than automatic acceptance of the defence theory.
  • The letters dated 9 and 12 March (Exs. I and II) were examined: the court found that even if Ex. II referred to a will and showed P.W.2 signing as an attesting witness on or about 12 March, this did not establish that Ex. B was executed between 9 and 12 March. P.W.2 conceded he was not present at execution and only signed later; therefore the letters and P.W.2's inferences did not conclusively prove ante-dating.

Conclusion on ante-dating: On the whole evidentiary picture — the presumption in favour of the date on the will, the limited and circumstantial nature of the defence evidence, the suspicious character of Ex. VII, and the absence of reliable direct testimony that Ex. B was executed in March and ante-dated — the court concluded it could not hold that Ex. B was ante-dated. Both judges agreed that the defence had failed to discharge the onus of proof that the will was executed later and ante-dated.

On the Sanyasi question: The court stated it was unnecessary to decide whether Venkatasubbayya underwent Sanyasam in the strict Hindu-law sense and thereby became civilly dead, because the appeal could be resolved on the antecedent evidentiary issue of ante-dating. The opinion contains observations that (a) strict proof of becoming a Sanyasi is appropriate when consequences are grave and allegations are raised after a long delay, and (b) when a ceremony is admittedly performed, the presumption is that it was performed in accordance with Shastric requirements; repetition of mantras was considered sufficient in modern practice for the court's purposes. However, the ultimate disposal did not rest on resolving the Sanyasi characterization.

Form of the decree and interests affected: The court analysed the decree passed by the District Judge and held that a mortgage decree cannot be framed so as to affect the entire property irrespective of the mortgagors' distinct shares. The mortgage decree must be limited to the interest of the mortgagors in the mortgaged property under the will. The court also explained the procedural position of the 3rd defendant: as the legal representative of a mortgagor (her deceased husband), she could not in that representative capacity set up a title adverse to the title her husband executed; although in her own right as daughter of the testator she might have independent claims, those could not be adjudicated in the mortgage suit in which she stands as the legal representative of a mortgagor. The court referenced (without giving a case name) the principle from the Privy Council that one should not join in a mortgage suit parties claiming a paramount adverse title; accordingly the court refused to go into collateral or paramount-title questions in this mortgage suit.

Holding and Implications

Holding: APPEAL DISMISSED. The court held that Ex. B (the will dated 2 February 1904) could not be shown on the evidence to have been executed subsequently and ante-dated; therefore the principal contention of the appellant failed. The decree below was to be modified so that it would operate only as against the interests of the mortgagors in the property (and would not purport to affect the entire property irrespective of shares).

Direct consequences and orders made:

  • The appeal was dismissed and the decree below was modified: the mortgage decree would be confined to the interests of the mortgagors in the mortgaged property (the court did not attempt to quantify those interests in these proceedings).
  • The appellant (3rd defendant) was ordered to pay the respondents' costs because the main contentions were not substantiated.
  • Time for redemption was fixed at six months from the date of the judgment.

The opinion does not assert the creation of a new general precedent; it applies established principles (including the presumption as to the date of a document) to the evidence in this case and limits the mortgage decree to the mortgagors' interests without finally determining any paramount or collateral titles of other parties.

    Kalakantharam Rukmani Ammal v. Ka Ki, Ankama Naidu

    Sir Kumaraswami Sastri J. — The 3rd defendant is the appellant. One Venkatasubbayya died on 6th April, 1904. He became a Sanyasi on 2nd February, 1904, and it is alleged in the plaint that he left a will, dated 2nd February, 1904, making certain dispositions of his property. The plaintiff claimed under a mortgage deed, dated 14th April, 1910, executed by defendants 1 and 2 and the 3rd defendant's deceased husband. The 1st defendant was the sister's son of the testator and be also married the pre-deceased son's daughter of the testator. The 2nd defendant married the brother's daughter of the testator. The 3rd defendant's husband is dead. The main pleas of the defendants in their written statements to be considered at present are that Venkatasubbayya became a Sanyani on 2nd February, 1904, that the will referred to in the plaint was executed after he became a Sanyasi, the exact date not being known, between the 9th and 12th of March and that it was antedated to 2nd February. Other contentions were raised which it is unnecessary to consider for the purpose of this appeal. The will was registered on 17th March and so far as it appears from the evidence there was no dispute raised as regards this will till we come to the present suit. The plaintiff filed the suit on 4th April, 1922, so that we have to decide the question as to the exact date of Ex. B, the will, twenty years after its execution and registration. The District Judge was of opinion that, although Venkatasubbayya became a Sanyasi, he was not a true Sanyasi under the Hindu Law having renounced the world and gone through the necessary ceremonies and that he did not divest himself of all the properties as required, but continued to deal with them and that his professed Sanyasam would not prevent his willing away the properties, even though the will was executed after he became a Sanyasi. In this view, he is of opinion whether the will was executed on the 2nd February or subsequently it will not make much difference) even though he was inclined to the view that the will was executed subsequent to his becoming a Sanyasi.

    The first question that arises in this case is what was the date of the will) whether it was executed on the 2nd or whether it was executed subsequently a ad ante-dated? In cases where a document has been executed and registered and the question arises as to the date it bears, there can be little doubt that the presumption is that the document was executed on the date it bears. If any authority were needed for this proposition I may refer to the decision of their Lordships of the Privy Council in Mina Kumari Bibi v. Bijoy Singh Dudhuria(1). The onus, therefore, is on the 3rd defendant who is the contesting defendant to show that although the document was executed so long ago as 1904 and bears the date 2nd February, it was executed subsequently. In all such cases lapse of time does strengthen the onus cast. Venkatasubbaya is dead. His widow is dead, and so far as the evidence goes we have to rely mainly on the evidence of P.W 2 who was the only attesting witness to the will who has been examined. D. W. 3 has no doubt been referred to by Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyangar. But he is the agent of the 3rd defendant conducting the litigation on her behalf and it is riot safe to rely upon his evidence especially when he does not say that he was present at the execution. So far as the evidence of P.W, 2 is concerned he was called by the plaintiff for proving attestation to the mortgage sued on. In his cross-examination Exs. I and II (letters) were given to him and from these letters no says he infers that the will was executed subsequent to these letters. Reference is made by Mr. Krisbnaswami Aiyangar to Ex. VII as strongly probabilising the non-existence of any will on the 2nd February. In dealing with this question there is one fact to be borne in mind, namely, that the testator executed more than one will and according to one witness he was a man with a passion for making and destroying wills. He wrote several wills and changed his mind very often. Admittedly in this case three wills were brought into existence and there are two wills which P.W, 2 says be attested. There is another will, Ex. VIII, which nobody attested but which seems to have been signed by the testator. So that in estimating the evidence of P. W, 2 who was examined on 12th February, 1923 about 20 years after the date of the will in question, one has to be careful in saying whether his evidence if accepted, shows beyond doubt that the will was ante-dated. I do not think that I can on his evidence hold that the will was ante-dated. Exs. I and II could not in terms be attributed to this will. He admits that even as regards this will he was not present when it was executed but that it was sent to him later on space being left for his signature, so that it is not possible to say with certainty when the will was executed. As regards Ex. VII the statement in it is that Venkatasubbayya was unable to execute a will. So far as Ex. VII is concerned, it seems to me to be fairly clear that the recital therein that his last hours had come and that he was not able to leave a will because the last hours had arrived is false Ex. VII is dated 6th February, 1904. He died on 6th April, 1904 two months after the date Ex. VII bears. If he was able to have a document like Ex. VII written, there is no reason why he could not have left a will in terms of Ex. B. The clauses in Ex. VII are peculiar. He refers to a contemplated charity and contemplated gifts all of which appear in Ex-B. He gives the property absolutely to his wife subject to the charity. It is doubtful whether even that charity, under the terms of Ex. VII was to continue after her death because he permits his wife to will away the properties as she pleased. As regards the recitals in Ex. VII there is no evidence to show that he was on the point of death at the time of Ex. VII It seems to me that Ex. VII was brought into existence for some ulterior purpose. What that purpose is it is difficult, in the absence of evidence, to determine. But the circumstances which the testator recites do not, in my view, represent the true state of affairs. He was not dying and he was certainly on that date, if the evidence is true, capable of leaving a will because on the 2nd of February he underwent a ceremony, lasting about six hours of Sanyasam. He was living in a hut near the house being fed daily and no witness says that he was on the point of death or was unable to attend to his affairs. I am not, therefore, prepared to hold that Ex. VII evidences the truth of the defendant's case that no will was executed before that date. I have gone through the evidence carefully. I think it is difficult on that evidence to hold that the document, Ex. B, purporting to be executed on the 2nd February, 1904 can be held to be a document which was executed in March and ante-dated for any ulterior purpose. It is not clear to me why there should be such ante-dating. If the evidence that he was performing Yoga and was a religious man is true, the probability is that before he took Sanyasam he would have left a will disposing of his properties rather than that he would not have disposed of his properties while knowing that the obligation of a Sanyasi was to divest himself of his property before he took Sanyasam and that he would have subsequently executed a will and ante-dated it. There is no motive for ante-dating as the deceased thought that on the 6th February and the 17th March he could, though a Sanyasi, execute a document and register another. He could not have known that the law invalidated documents or acts relating to property by a Hindu Sanyasin. There is nothing to show that on the 2nd February he was not in a position to make a will in terms of Ex. B. I am, there fore, of opinion that on the evidence it cannot be held that Ex. B was ante-dated.

    I think it is unnecessary to consider the question whether Venkatasubbayya was a Sanyasi in the strict sense of the term under the Hindu Law having undergone all the ceremonies and consequently civilly dead and unable to dispose of the property. If knowledge of the Mantrams and the understanding of the ceremonies are essential very few ceremonies now performed by Hindus could be upheld. I. do not agree with the District Judge that knowledge of any Mantram is necessary, repetition being sufficient in these days. All you have to see is whether a person performs his ceremony repeating the mantras. “Where a ceremony is admittedly performed, the presumption is that it was performed in accordance with the Shastras.

    Then the next question is whether the decree as passed by the learned judge is correct. The plaintiff admits and bases the title of the mortgagors on the will, Ex. B The mortgagors under Ex. B are three out of the eight persons who are entitled to the properties bequeathed. The decree as it stands is a decree against the entire property irrespective of any shares of the mortgagors. I do not think that such a decree can be passed. The decree ought to be limited to the interest of the mortgagors in the property under the will. What that interest is it is unnecessary to determine in this case. It is clear that in a suit on a mortgage the mortgagors are estopped from disputing that they have not got the interest which they said they had and which the mortgagees bargained for. But it is open to third parties to state and prove what that interest is. It is open to third parties to say that the mortgagors have no interests or lesser interests than those prescribed for in the mortgage. The position of the 3rd defendant in this case is peculiar. She is a daughter of the testator and she is also the widow of one of the executants of the mortgage. She could not as legal representative of the mortgagor set up any title adverse to the title which the husband prescribed for. But in her own right as daughter, it is open to her to set up any title which she may have but that is not possible in a mortgage suit where she is the legal representative of one of the mortgagors. It has been decided by their Lordships of the Privy Council that you ought not in a mortgage suit to join parties claiming a paramount adverse title. Therefore it is unnecessary to determine what her rights are as daughter of the the testator. Though Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyangar invites us to discuss this question in view of the fact that according to him one of the legatees under the will has forfeited his right but in view of the fact that this circumstance is not admitted we cannot go into the question.

    The question as to 3rd defendant's rights as daughter need not be determined in this case as her position is that of the legal representative of a mortgagor and as legal representative she cannot be allowed in this suit to contest the right of her husband who executed the mortgage. The decree will be only as regards the interests of the mortgagors in the property mortgaged without determining what that interest is in these proceedings. The appeal is dismissed.

    As the main contentions have not been substantiated the appellant will pay the respondents' costs. Time for redemption six months from this date.

    Venkatasubba Rao, J.—I entirely agree; and but for the fact that I strongly feel that the defence put forward is unrighteous in the extreme, I should not take the trouble to deliver a separate judgment. The defence is strikingly ingenious and has the merits of being original. The suit is brought to enforce a mortgage executed by certain legatees under the will of Venkatasubbayya who died in April 1904. The mortgage was executed by defendants 1 and 2 and the husband of the 3rd defendant. In 1910, the mortgage was effected and the present suit was brought in 1922.

    The principal contesting defendant is the 3rd and her defence is that at the time of the making of the Will her father was a Sanyasi. The will bears the date 2nd of February, 1904 and was registered on the 17th of March, 1904; the defence suggests that Venkatasubbayya became a Sanyasi on the 2nd of February and that the will was not executed on that day previous to his having become a Sanyasi, but that, as a matter of fact, it was made some time between the 9th and the 12th of March and that it was ante-dated to make it appear that the testator executed it while still a householder. It is then contended that as a Sanyasi Venkatasubbayya would be civilly dead and that his will would be invalid. If this contention succeeds, it would follow that the suit would fail, the mortgagee having acquired no right.

    The District Judge has dealt with two questions:

    1. Was the will ante-dated? and

    2. Did Venkatasubbayya become a Sanyasi in the strict sense of that term?

    He has devoted a large portion of his judgment to a discussion of the second question and has come to the conclusion that the deceased did not become a Sanyasi and that he was not, therefore, incompetent to make a will. In regard to the other question, the learned judge has not dealt with it quite as fully as he might have done, for, in his opinion, on his finding that the testator was not a Sanyasi it was not necessary to consider very fully the plea of the ante-dating of the will. All the same; he has recorded a finding that the will was ante-dated.

    In the view I take of the case, it is unnecessary to decide whether the deceased did or did not become a Sanyasi. But I wish to make one observation. The District Judge is perfectly justified in demanding the strictest proof possible of the fact that the testator did become a Sanyasi. The will is challenged 18 years after its execution, It was duly executed, attested and registered, It was acted on and the mortgagee, a stranger to the family, was led to believe that it was perfectly valid. At this distance of time, the testator's daughter, the 3rd defendant, chooses to deny its validity. This is one aspect of the case. Then again, the suggestion made is that Venkatasubbayya became as “Apath-Sanyasi”. This form of renunciation of the world is clearly not the approved form. Renunciation is considered meritorious, but a man renounces only what he may keep and gives up what he may retain. In the case of an Apath Sanyasi, the man is face to face with death and he makes a virtue of necessity and gives up earthly things when be cannot help doing so. He expects that he is dying and goes through the form of renouncing the world. This is a sort of Sanyasi which Venkatasubbayya is supposed to have become. That he did wear keshaya and change his name, there can be no doubt. But when the consequences of holding that the deceased became a Sanyasi are so grave, the District Judge, in the circumstances, is entitled to demand a most rigorous proof of the fact alleged. Whether the District Judge's conclusion is right or wrong I need not pause to consider, because I am perfectly satisfied that the will was not ante-dated and that his Judgment must be supported on that ground.

    As I have said the District Judge's discussion of the issue, was the will ante-dated, has been somewhat scrappy, but after hearing Mr. Krishnaswami Aiyangar for the appellant, I have come to the conclusion that he his hopelessly failed to make out a case. It is said first that Ex. VII, which is dated 6th February, 1904 signed by the testator contains a statement that he had not till then made a will. This does not prove in the least that the deceased did not in fact make a will. To my mind, this is a most suspicious document. Ex. VII far from showing that no will was made, proves the exact contrary. My view of the situation is that the will had previously been made, that the testator was prevailed upon to make a document on the footing that no will was made and that to carry out the scheme Ex. VII was brought into existence. It will be seen that under this document, almost complete powers are given to the widow and in this respect it is in marked contrast to the will. As my learned brother has shown there are other recitals in Ex. VII. which are clearly untrue, I am not disposed to place any value upon this.

    Then there is a most significant circumstance which is ignored by the defence. As I have said Ex. VII was made on the 6th February, 1904. On that date, Venkatasubbayya was not conscious of his disability: he did not think that as a Sanyasi he was incapable of dealing with his property. Ex. VII was intended according to the defence to be operative. When, then, I ask, did the knowledge dawn upon Venkatasubbayya that a Sanyasi was civilly dead and, therefore could not enter into any secular transaction? It is not suggested that, he had legal advice or received the information from any friend or relation. This circumstance is almost fatal to the defence and shows that the plea put forward is utterly false.

    Next, great reliance is placed by the defendant upon two letters dated the 9th and 12th of March respectively Exs. I. and II, PW. 2 was cross-examined in regard to them and his so-called admissions are relied on. The truth is, he went into the box to prove the mortgage and advantage was taken of that fact and these two letters written 19 years previous to his giving evidence, were put into his hands and he was asked to explain certain statements in them. He said that Ex. 1 refers to a will which was not before the Court and that Ex, II refers to the will in question. Ex. II shows that he signed the Will referred to in it as an attesting witness on or about the date of that letter, namely, 12th of March, 1904; The defence asks, does this not show that the will relied on by the plaintiff was executed between the 9th and the 12th of March? The answer is clearly not. In Ex, I, certain corrections are suggested and it is said that they are embodied in the will before us. But it is forgotten that the witness is himself making inferences after the lapse of several years. The will had been signed and attested by several before it was sent on to P.W.2 Space was left for him to sign his name as a witness. In that space he signed his name. He was not present at the time of the execution of the will, nor was he present at the time of the execution of the other will which is supposed to be referred to in Ex. I. P.W 2 does not speak from direct knowledge. He merely infers that the will before the Court is that referred to in Ex. II. Granting that Ex. II refers to it, there is nothing to show that the testator executed it between the 9th and the 12th of March. Finding that Exs. VII, I and II would give her apparent support, the 3rd defendant has not scrupled to put forward a thoroughly false and unjust plea. It is not pretended that if these three documents go out, there is anything like a case worth mentioning. It is remarkable that the 3rd defendant who is an elderly lady aged about 54 and who must have knowledge of all the facts she alleges has not ventured to go into the witness box to support her case. It is also noticeable that defendants 1 and 2 have kept out of the box although they are the relations of the testator and the 3rd defendant and presumably are aware of the true state of things. The theory of ante dating has been resorted to by the 3rd defendant in her desperate attempt to get rid of a just claim.

    In regard to the form of the decree, 1 agree with what has fallen from my learned brother. I do not think that the plaintiff has asked for more than what we are going to give him by our judgment. The first two defendants have been impleaded because they are mortgagors and the 3rd defendant because she is the widow and heir of the deceased mortgagor Rangiah. The mortgage decree can affect only the interests of the mortgagors, and in so far as the 3rd defendant represents Rangiah, she can have no answer. Any paramount right of the 3rd defendant, granting she has one, is not affected by the mortgage decree. I, therefore, agree that the decree shall be modified in the way suggested by my learned brother.

    The appeal otherwise stands dismissed with costs.

    C.KAppeal dismissed.

    Use AI to get other relevant cases.

    Comments

    Kalakantharam Rukmani Ammal v. Ka Ki, Ankama Naidu
    (Nov 6, 1925)