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    Nannapaneni Seshayya, In Re

    Mockett, J.:— The appellant has been convicted by the learned Sessions Judge of Guntur of the murder of a little girl, one Seetharamamma. The trial Court imposed a sentence of transportation for life and the learned Judge who perused the judgment of the trial Court ordered the issue of a notice to the prisoner to show cause why the sentence should not be enhanced to a sentence of death.

    [His Lordship after setting out the evidence in the case proceeded:] The story of the prosecution may be summarized as follows. On some pretext proved to be false the appellant took from her house Seetharamamma on the morning of the 15th September. He returned without her and, according to the evidence, first gave the explanation that she had been killed by a car and later stated that he had killed her himself being under the influence of the evil one. Enquiries showed that in fact the girl had died in the manner in which it is stated. She was in a pond. She had a stone tied round her waist and under those circumstances there is an irresistible inference that she was murdered. If the evidence were only that she was last in the presence of the accused and in his presence under suspicious circumstances and that her body was found with a stone tied to it in the pond, that alone would raise a hostile presumption against the accused which he would necessarily have to explain. But in this case there is in addition evidence of a confession to the relatives which we accept and which is entirely consistent with the rest of the case. It is true that the motive for this crime may be slight. It appears to be a fact that he quarrelled with the girl's mother but equally there are no grounds for supposing not only that anybody else had committed this crime but that this family should desire to fabricate false evidence with the purpose of obtaining a conviction for murder against the accused.

    We have listened to a long and careful argument by Mr. S. Vepa and he invites us to say that the evidence of these witnesses for the prosecution is not satisfactory, that there is a doubt in the case and that the appellant should necessarily receive the benefit of that doubt. We are unable to accept that argument. The evidence is consistent in all material particulars. The most that can be said is that, had these villagers acted in a manner which one would expect of people of a much higher grade of education, a very strong case might have been somewhat stronger. In our view the guilt of the accused has been proved beyond any shadow of doubt and we have no reason to suppose that the evidence for the prosecution is other than true.

    This appeal will therefore be dismissed.

    In considering the question whether the sentence should be enhanced, it is well to remember that the appellant has been convicted of the murder of a little girl whom he was proved to have taken from her house for reasons which have been shown to be false. He was never intending to take her to her grandfather. The moment the girl's mother heard of his supposed intention she was surprised. She states she wondered why, after the quarrel between herself and the wife of the accused, the accused should take her daughter away without her permission because be it remembered that when P.W 1 left the house that day there was no question. The accused never asked her permission to take her daughter so far away as Tekkellapad, nine miles distance. We cannot doubt therefore that this murder was premeditated and deliberate. Why exactly it was perpetrated is known only to the appellant. The learned Judge dealt with the question of sentence as follows:—

    “As to the punishment since the guilt of the accused has been proved by strong circumstantial evidence this is not a case calling for capital punishment. I therefore sentence him to transportation for life.”

    That reason, namely, that the conviction was based on circumstantial evidence, has been in innumerable cases condemned by this High Court. It was condemned in 1914 by Ayling and Kumaraswami Sastri, JJ. in Muniandi v. Emperor; in 1921 by Ayling and Krishnan, JJ. in Public Prosecutor v. Paramandi(2); and again in 1929 by Waller and Krishnan Pandalai, JJ. in In Re Chava Indramma Alias Tata… v. Emperor…Opposite Party.(3). There is thus ample authority for so self-evident a proposition. It must surely be obvious that it matters not how an accused's guilt, is established whether by the testimony of eye-witnesses or by the testimony of combined circumstances provided that it is established beyond all reasonable doubt, and the measure of proof must be the same in either case. Our attention has been drawn to some decisions the effect of which is as stated in the head-note in In re Gunduthalayan:

    “Where on a conviction for murder the Sessions Court awarded a sentence lesser than death, the High Court will not enhance the sentence, unless it is satisfied that on the evidence in the case the sentence of death is the only possible sentence which could have been passed by the Sessions Court.”

    As on a conviction for murder the law provides for an alternative sentence we have no doubt that when using the phrase “the only possible sentence” the Court intended to express the view that it was only in cases in which the lower Court had manifestly failed in its duty that the High Court would impose the sentence of death. As stated by Waller, J. in In Re Chava Indramma Alias Tata… v. Emperor…Opposite Party., because the lower Court had failed in its duty there was no reason why the High Court should do the same. In this case we consider that the trial Court's duty was to impose the sentence of death. There must be cases in which that is manifestly so and perhaps as good an example as can be given is the case of the deliberate murder of a small child for purposes of robbery or any other purpose such as this case. No doubt examples can be multiplied but such an example may be mentioned. For reasons which are wholly unsupportable and which Mr. Vepa did not attempt to support, the learned Judge has passed the lesser sentence. There are no other reasons justifying such a course. It is our duty to pass a sentence of death.

    We therefore enhance the sentence of transportation for life to a sentence of death and direct that the accused be hanged by the neck until he be dead.

    V.V.C

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    Nannapaneni Seshayya, In Re
    (Oct 11, 1940)